Majority — Souter J.
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The challenge here is to the use of the All Writs Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1651 (a), by the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, to enjoin the President and various military officials from dropping respondent from the rolls of the Air Force. Because that court’s process was neither “in aid of” its strictly circumscribed jurisdiction to review court-martial findings and sentences under 10 U. S. C. §867 nor “necessary or appropriate” in light of a servieemember’s alternative opportunities to seek relief, we hold that the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces lacked jurisdiction to issue the injunction.
I
Respondent James Goldsmith, a major in the United States Air Force, was ordered by a superior officer to inform his sex partners that he was HIV-positive and to take measures to block any transfer of bodily fluids during sexual relations. Contrary to this order, on two occasions Goldsmith had unprotected intercourse, once with a fellow officer and once with a civilian, without informing either that he was carrying HIV.
As a consequence of his defiance, Goldsmith was convicted by general court-martial of willful disobedience of an order from a superior commissioned officer, aggravated assault with means likely to produce death or grievous bodily harm, and assault consummated by battery, in violation of Articles 90 and 128 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U. S. C. §§890 , 928(b)(1), (a). In 1994, he was sentenced to six years’ confinement and forfeiture of $2,500 of his pay
In 1996, Congress empowering him to drop from the rolls of the Armed Forces any officer who had both beerLsentenced by a court-martial to more than six months’ confinement and served at least six months.[1] See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, 110 Stat. 325 , 10 U. S. C. §§ 1161 (b)(2), 1167 (1994 ed., Supp. III).[2] In reliance on this statutory authorization, the Air Force notified Goldsmith in 1996 that it was taking action to drop him from the rolls.
Goldsmith did not immediately drop him, but rather petitioned the Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals for extraordinary relief under the All Writs Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1651 (a), to redress the unrelated alleged inter
1 When a servicemember is dropped horn the rolls, he forfeits his military pay. See 37 U. S. C. §803 . The drop-from-the-rolls remedy targets a narrow category of servicemembers who are absent without leave (AWOL) or else have been convicted of serious crimes. Since 1870, the President has had authority to drop from the rolls of the Army any officer who has been AWOL for at least three months. See Act of July 15,1870, § 17, 16 Stat. 319 . The power was subsequently extended to officers confined in prison after final conviction by a civil court, see Act of Jan. 19, 1911, ch. 22, 36 Stat. 894 , and then to “any armed force” officer AWOL for at least three months or else finally sentenced to confinement in a federal or state penitentiary or correctional institution, see Act of May 5, 1950, §10, 64 Stat. 146 .
2 Section 1161(b)(2) authorizes the any armed force any commissioned officer... who may be separated under Section 1167 of this title by reason of a sentence to confinement adjudged by a court-martial.” Section 1167 provides that “a member sentenced by a court-martial to a period of confinement for more than six months may be separated from the member’s armed force at any time after the sentence to confinement has become final... and the member has served in confinement for a period of six months.”
II
When Congress exercised its power to govern and regulate the Armed Forces by establishing the CAAF, see U. S. Const., Art. I, §8, cl. 14; 10 U. S. C. § 941 ; see generally Weiss
3 Because respondent had been released from confinement, the CAAF denied respondent’s writ-appeal petition concerning his medical treatment claim as moot. See 48 M. J. 84 , 87-88 (1998). As a result of the CAAF’s order, respondent has not been dropped from the rolls, and has returned to active duty status. The Air Force initiated an administrative separation proceeding against respondent, see 10 U. S. C. § 1181 , which has been deferred pending resolution of this case. See Brief for Petitioners 8, n. 2.
4 In light of our holding that the CAAF lacked jurisdiction in this case, we do not reach the merits of respondent’s double jeopardy and ex post facto claims.
While the All Writs Act authorizes employment extraordinary writs, it confines the authority to the issuance of process “in aid of” the issuing court’s jurisdiction. 28 U. S. C. § 1651 (a) (“[A]ll courts established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law”). Thus, although military appellate courts are among those empowered to issue extraordinary writs under the Act, see Noyd v. Bond, 395 U. S. 683 , 695, n. 7 (1969), the express terms of the Act confine the power of the CAAF to issuing process “in aid of” its existing statu
5 When Congress established the Court of Military Appeals (the CAAF's predecessor), it similarly confined its jurisdiction to the review of specified sentences imposed by courts-martial. See Act of May 5, 1950, ch. 169, Art. 67(d), 64 Stat. 130 . See also H. R. Rep. No. 491, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 32 (1949); S. Rep. No. 486, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 3, 28-29 (1949).
6 One judge was even more emphatic: <cWe should use our diction under the [UCMJ] to correct injustices like this and we need not wait for another court to perhaps act.... Our Court has the responsibility of protecting the rights of all servicemembers in court-martial matters.” 48 M. J., at 91 (Sullivan, J., concurring).
We have already seen that the CAAF’s independent statutory jurisdiction is narrowly circumscribed. To be more specific, the CAAF is accorded jurisdiction by statute (so far as it concerns us here) to “review the record in [specified] cases reviewed by” the service courts of criminal appeals, 10 U. S. C. §§ 867 (a)(2), (3), which in turn have jurisdiction to “revie[w] court-martial eases,” § 866(a). Since the Air Force’s action to drop respondent from the rolls was an executive action, not a “findin[g]” or “sentence,” § 867(c), that was (or could have been) imposed in a court-martial proceeding,[7] the elimination of Goldsmith from the rolls appears straightforwardly to have been beyond the CAAF’s jurisdiction to review and hence beyond the “aid” of the All Writs Act in reviewing it.
Goldsmith nonetheless claims that the CAAF has satisfied the “aid” requirement of the Act because it protected and effectuated the sentence meted out by the court-martial. Goldsmith emphasizes that the court-martial could have dis
7 A court-martial is specifically barred from dismissing or discharging an officer except as in accordance with the UCMJ, which gives it no authority to drop a servicemember from the rolls. See Rules for Courts-Martial 1003(b)(9)(A) — (C); Rule 1003(b)(9) (“A court-martial may not adjudge an administrative separation from the service”). Moreover, respondent brought the petition against the President, the Secretary of Defense, and military officials who were not even parties to the court-martial.
8 At the court-martial, respondent faced a maximum punishment of dismissal, confinement for 10 years, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and afine.
9 Indeed, the approved findings and sentence in Goldsmith’s case had become final over one year before the Air Force initiated its action to drop him from the rolls.
Ill
Even if the CAAF had some seriously arguable basis for jurisdiction in these circumstances, resort to the All Writs Act would still be out of bounds, being unjustifiable either as “necessary” or as “appropriate” in light of alternative remedies available to a servicemember demanding to be kept on the rolls.[11] The All Writs Act invests a court with a power essentially equitable and, as such, not generally available to provide alternatives to other, adequate remedies at law. See, e. g., Carlisle v. United States, 517 U. S. 416 , 429 (1996) (“ ‘The All Writs Act is a residual source of authority to issue writs that are not otherwise covered by statute’ ” (quoting Pennsylvania Bureau of Correction, 474 U. S., at 43 )). See also 19 Moore’s Federal Practice §201.40 (“[A] writ may not be used . . . when another method of review will suffice”). This limitation operates here, since other ad
10 The court, moreover, was simply wrong when it treated itself as a court of original jurisdiction, see supra, at 535.
11 These remedies are in addition to the review as of right by the military department’s Court of Criminal Appeals of any court-martial sentence that includes punitive dismissal or discharge. See 10 U.S. C. § 866(b)(1); § 867(a) (decisions of the Court of Criminal Appeals subject to discretionary review by the CAAF). And of course, once a criminal conviction has been finally reviewed within the military system, and a servicemember in custody has exhausted other avenues provided under the UCMJ to seek relief from his conviction, see Noyd v. Bond, 395 U. S. 683 , 693-699 (1969), he is entitled to bring a habeas corpus petition, see 28 U. S. C. §2241 (e), claiming that his conviction is affected by a fundamental defect that requires that it be set aside. See, e. g., Burns v. Wilson, 346 U. S. 137 , 142 (1953) (opinion of Vinson, C. J.). See also Calley v. Callaway, 519 F. 2d 184 ,199 (CA5 1975); Gorko v. Commanding Officer, Second Air Force, 314 F. 2d 858 , 859 (CA10 1963). In this case, however, respondent chose not to challenge his underlying conviction. See supra, at 533.
was being considered to drop him from the rolls, he presented his claim to the Secretary of the Air Force. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 4-5. If the Secretary takes final action to drop him from the rolls (as he has not yet done), Goldsmith will (as the Government concedes) be entitled to present his claim to the Air Force Board for Correction of Military Records (BCMR). This is a civilian body within the military service, with broad-ranging authority to review a service-member’s “discharge or dismissal (other than a discharge or dismissal by sentence of a general court-martial),” 10 U. S. C. § 1553 (a), or “to correct an error or remove an injustice” in a military record, § 1552(a)(1).[12]
12 Respondent argues nonetheless that seeking BCMR review in his case would have been futile (especially in light of his life-threatening illness) since BCMR’s lack authority to declare statutes unconstitutional, cannot consider records of courts-martial and related administrative records (with two inapplicable exceptions), and are generally ‘“unresponsive, bureaucratic extensions of the uniformed services,”’ Brief for Respondent 16 (quoting H. R. Coni Rep. No. 104-450, p. 798 (1996)). In light of the fact that respondent chose to circumvent we need not address whether the Air Force BCMR has the power to correct a record that is erroneous as a result of a constitutional violation. Cf. Guerra v. Scruggs, 942 F. 2d 270 , 273 (CA4 1991) (“The [Army BCMR] has authority to consider claims of constitutional, statutory, and regulatory violations”); Bois v. Marsh, 801 F. 2d 462 , 467 (CADC1986) (“[Appellant’s] claims based on [the] Constitution, executive orders and Army regulations ‘could readily have been made within the framework of this intramili-tary procedure’” (quoting Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U. S. 296 , 303 (1983))). And while it is true that unless specifically authorized a BCMR may not correct a court-martial record, see 10 U. S. C. § 1552 (f), it may still consider the record, especially where, as here, the court-martial record is relevant in determining the validity of the subsequent dropping from the rolls. Finally, the alleged unresponsive nature of the BCMR’s, if true, would in *539 no way alter the fact that BCMR’s are legislatively authorized to provide the relief sought by respondent. In any event, it is dear as noted in the text that follows that respondent’s constitutional objections could have been addressed (by the federal courts.
13 Under the Tucker Act, the Court of Federal Claims has exclusive jurisdiction over nontort daims against the Government for greater than $10,000. See 28 U. S. G. § 1491. Determinations of the Court of Federal Claims may be appealed to the Federal Circuit.
In sum, executive action to drop respondent falls outside of the CAAF’s express statutory jurisdiction, and alternative statutory avenues of relief are available. The CAAF’s injunction against dropping respondent from the rolls of the Air Force was neither “in aid of [its] juris-dictio[n]” nor “necessary or appropriate.” Accordingly, we reverse the court’s judgment.
It is so ordered.
14 The “Little Tucker Act,” 28 U. S. C. § 1346 (a)(2), confers jurisdiction on district courts for claims of $10,000 or less. Appeals are taken to the Federal Circuit.
Cases cited
- United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of California 525 U. S. 961 p. 533
- Weiss v. United States 510 U. S. 163 p. 534
- 405 U. S. 84 405 U. S. 84 p. 534
- Noyd v. Bond 395 U. S. 683 p. 534
- Pennsylvania Bureau of Correction v. United States Marshals Service 474 U. S. 34 at 43 p. 535, p. 537
- United States v. United States District Court for the Southern District of New York 334 U. S. 258 p. 536
- Carlisle v. United States 517 U. S. 416 p. 537
- Chappell v. Wallace 462 U. S. 296 p. 539
- 628 F. 2d 594 628 F. 2d 594 p. 539
- 848 F. Supp. 250 848 F. Supp. 250 at 254-255 p. 539
- 132 F. 3d 1430 132 F. 3d 1430 p. 539
- 930 F. 2d 893 930 F. 2d 893 p. 539
- 925 F. 2d 1407 925 F. 2d 1407 at 1416 p. 540
- 924 F. 2d 25 924 F. 2d 25 p. 540