Florida v. Thomas

Although the parties did not raise the issue in their briefs on the merits, we must first consider whether we have jurisdiction to decide this ease. See Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U. S. 299 , 306 (1989). Title 28 U. S. C. § 1257 (a) authorizes this Court to review “[f]inal judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision could be had ... where any title, right, privilege, or immunity is specially set up or claimed under the Constitution.” In a criminal prosecution, finality generally “is defined by a judgment of conviction and the imposition of a sentence.” Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 489 U. S. 46 , 54 (1989). But we have not, in practice, interpreted the finality rule so strictly. In certain circumstances, we have “treated state-court judgments as final for jurisdictional purposes although there were further proceedings to take place in the state court.” Flynt v. Ohio, 451 U.S. 619 , 620-621 (1981) (per curiam). In Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975), we divided eases of this kind into four categories. None fits the judgment of the Florida Supreme Court, however, and we therefore conclude that its judgment is not final.

The first Cose category includes those cases in which “there are further proceedings — even entire trials — yet to occur in the state courts but where for one reason or another the federal issue is conclusive or the outcome of further proceedings preordained.” Id., at 479 . The prototypical example of this category is Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1966). There the Supreme Court of Alabama held that a statute

The decision of the Supreme Court of Florida here differs considerably from that of the state court in Mills. The Florida Supreme Court remanded the case not only for application of Chimel, but for further factfinding, and the State has not conceded that the search is invalid under Chimel.

In Goafs second category are those cases in whieh “the federal issue, finally decided by the highest court in the State, will survive and require decision regardless of the outcome of future state-court proceedings.” 420 U. S., at 480 . In Cox we used our decision in Radio Station WOW, Inc. v. Johnson, 326 U.S. 120 (1946), to illustrate the second category. We said:

“In Radio Station WOW, the Nebraska Supreme Court directed the transfer of the properties of a federally licensed radio station and ordered an accounting, rejecting the claim that the transfer order would interfere with the federal license.... Nothing that could happen

in the course of the accounting, short of settlement of the ease, would foreclose or make unnecessary decision on the federal question.” Cox, supra, at 480.

In this case, howeyer, were the Florida courts to find that Chimel allows the search, a decision on the Belton issue would no longer be necessary. We have also noted that we treat state-court judgments in this category as final on the assumption that “ ‘the federal questions that could come here have been adjudicated by the State court,’” and the state proceedings to take place on remand “‘could not remotely give rise to a federal question... that may later come here.’ ” Cox, 420 U.S., at 480 . We cannot make that assumption in this ease.

Cases where “the federal claim has been finally decided, with farther proceedings on the merits in the state courts to come, but in which later review of the federal issue cannot be had, whatever the ultimate outcome of the case,” fall into Cox’s third category. Id., at 481 . New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984), is such a ease. Respondent was charged in state court with criminal possession of a weapon, and certain evidence was suppressed on federal constitutional grounds. We granted the petition for certiorari and reversed, explaining that the suppression ruling was a “final judgment” although respondent had yet to be tried. * Id., at 651 . We said that this case fell within Cox’s third category because “should the State convict respondent at trial, its claim that certain evidence was wrongfully suppressed will be moot. Should respondent be acquitted at trial, the State will be precluded from pressing its federal claim again on appeal.” 467 U.S., at 651 , and n. 1.

To deny review here would not necessarily cause Florida to go to trial without the suppressed evidence, with further appeal barred in the event of an acquittal or the federal claim mooted in the event of a conviction. The state court has

The fourth Cox category includes those cases where “the federal issue has been finally decided in the state courts with further proceedings pending in which the party seeking review here might prevail on the merits on nonfederal grounds, thus rendering unnecessary review of the federal issue by this Court, and where reversal of the state court on the federal issue would be preclusive of any further litigation on the relevant cause of action rather than merely controlling the nature and character of, or determining the admissibility of evidence in, the state proceedings still to come. In these circumstances, if a refusal immediately to review the state-court decision might seriously erode federal policy, the Court has entertained and decided the federal issue, which itself has been finally determined by the state courts for purposes of the state litigation.” 420 U. S., at 482-483 .

Here the State can make no claim of serious erosion of federal policy that is not common to all run-of-the-mine decisions suppressing evidence in criminal trials. The fourth Cox exception does not apply here.

It is so ordered.