Dan's City Used Cars, Inc. v. Pelkey

"[A] State ... may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision having

Disposal of abandoned vehicles by a "storage company" is regulated by chapter 262 of the New Hampshire Revised Statutes Annotated. See N.H.Rev.Stat. Ann. §§ 262:31 to 262:40-c (West 2004 and 2012 West Cum.Supp.). Dan's City relied on those laws to dispose of Pelkey's vehicle for nonpayment of towing and storage fees. According to Pelkey, however, Dan's City failed to comply with New Hampshire's provisions governing the sale of stored vehicles and the application of sale proceeds. Pelkey charged that Dan's City's disposal of his car without following the requirements contained in chapter 262 violated the New Hampshire Consumer Protection Act, § 358-A:2 (West 2009), as well as Dan's City's statutory and common-law duties as bailee to exercise reasonable care while in possession of a bailor's property.

We hold, in accord with the New Hampshire Supreme Court, that state-law claims stemming from the storage and disposal of a car, once towing has ended, are not sufficiently connected to a motor carrier's service with respect to the transportation of property to warrant preemption under § 14501(c)(1). The New Hampshire law in point regulates no towing services, no carriage of property. Instead, it trains on custodians of stored vehicles seeking to sell them. Congress did not displace the State's regulation of that activity by any federal prescription.

A

The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978(ADA), 92 Stat. 1705 , largely deregulated the domestic airline industry. In keeping with the statute's aim to achieve "maximum reliance on competitive market forces," id., at 1706 , Congress sought to

Two years later, the Motor Carrier Act of 1980, 94 Stat. 793 , extended deregulation to the trucking industry. Congress completed the deregulation 14 years thereafter, in 1994, by expressly preempting state trucking regulation. Congress did so upon finding that state governance of intrastate transportation of property had become "unreasonably burden[some]" to "free trade, interstate commerce, and American consumers." Columbus v. Ours Garage & Wrecker Service, Inc., 536 U.S. 424 , 440, 122 S.Ct. 2226 , 153 L.Ed.2d 430 (2002) (citing FAAAA § 601(a)(1), 108 Stat. 1605 ). Borrowing from the ADA's preemption clause, but adding a new qualification, § 601(c) of the FAAAA supersedes state laws "related to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier ... with respect to the transportation of property ."

B

The landlord of the apartment complex in which Pelkey lived required tenants to remove their cars from the parking lot in the event of a snowstorm, so that the snow could be cleared. Pelkey's 2004 Honda Civic remained in the lot during and after a February 2007 snowstorm. At the landlord's

Dan's City maintains that because § 13102(23)(B)'s definition of "transportation" includes "storage" and "handling," Pelkey's claims, which do concern the storage and handling of his car, fall within § 14501(c)(1)'s preemptive ambit. Dan's City overlooks, however, that under § 13102(23)(B), services such as "storage" and "handling" fit within the definition of "transportation" only when those services "relat[e] to th[e] movement" of property. Temporary storage of an item in transit en route to its final destination relates to the movement of property and therefore fits within § 13102(23)(B)'s definition. But property stored after delivery is no longer in transit. Cf. 49 C.F.R. § 375.609 (2012) (distinguishing between "storage-in-transit" and "permanent storage" (regulation of Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration)). Here, no storage occurred in the course of transporting Pelkey's vehicle. Dan's City's storage of Pelkey's car after the towing job was done, in short, does not involve "transportation" within the meaning of the federal Act.

Pelkey's claims also survive preemption under § 14501(c)(1) because they are unrelated to a "service" a motor carrier renders its customers. The transportation service Dan's City provided was the removal of Pelkey's car from his landlord's parking lot. That service, which did involve the movement of property, ended months before the conduct on

C

Dan's City advances two further arguments in favor of preemption. First, Dan's City contends that Congress' enumeration of exceptions to preemption, detailed in 49 U.S.C. § 14501 (c)(2), (3), and (5), permits state regulation of motor carriers only when the State's law comes within a specified exception. Because Pelkey's claims do not fit within any exception to preemption, Dan's City urges, those claims must be preempted. This argument exceeds sensible bounds. Exceptions to a general rule, while sometimes a helpful interpretive guide, do not in themselves delineate the scope of the rule. The exceptions to § 14501(c)(1)'s general rule of preemption identify matters a State may regulate when it would otherwise be precluded from doing so, but they do not control more than that.

An example may clarify the point. Section 14501(c) does not exempt zoning regulations. Such laws, however, "are peculiarly within the province of state and local legislative authorities." Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 , 508, n. 18, 95 S.Ct. 2197 , 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975). It is hardly doubtful that state or local regulation of the physical location of motor-carrier operations falls outside the preemptive sweep of § 14501(c)(1). That is so because zoning ordinances ordinarily are not "related to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier ... with respect to the transportation of property." § 14501(c)(1). The same is true of New Hampshire's regulation of the disposal of stored vehicles.

It is so ordered.

the force and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier ... with respect to the transportation of property."

Plaintiff-respondent Robert Pelkey brought suit under New Hampshire law against defendant-petitioner Dan's City Used Cars (Dan's City), a towing company. Pelkey alleged that Dan's City took custody of his car after towing it without

Unaware of Pelkey's identity or illness, Dan's City sought permission from New Hampshire's Department of Public Safety to sell the Honda at auction without notice. In response, the department identified Pelkey as the last known owner of the vehicle. Dan's City wrote to Pelkey, notifying him that it had towed and was storing his car. When the post office returned the letter, checking the box "moved, left no address," Dan's City scheduled an auction for April 19. Meanwhile, in the days following Pelkey's discharge from the hospital, his attorney learned from counsel for the apartment complex that the car had been towed by Dan's City and was scheduled to be sold at public auction. On April 17, Pelkey's attorney informed Dan's City that Pelkey wanted to pay any charges owed and reclaim his vehicle. Dan's City nevertheless proceeded with the auction. Attracting no bidders, Dan's City later disposed of the car by trading it to a third party. Pelkey was not notified in advance of the trade, and has received no proceeds from the sale.

A

Where, as in this case, Congress has superseded state legislation by statute, our task is to "identify the domain expressly pre-empted." Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 , 541, 121 S.Ct. 2404 , 150 L.Ed.2d 532 (2001). To do so, we focus first on the statutory language, "which necessarily contains the best evidence of Congress' pre-emptive intent." CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658 , 664, 113 S.Ct. 1732 , 123 L.Ed.2d 387 (1993).

The FAAAA's preemption clause prohibits enforcement of state laws "related to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier ... with respect to the transportation of property." 49 U.S.C. § 14501 (c)(1). In Rowe v. New Hampshire Motor Transp. Assn., 552 U.S. 364 , 370, 128 S.Ct. 989 , 169 L.Ed.2d 933 (2008), our reading of this language was informed by decisions interpreting the parallel language in the ADA's preemption clause. The phrase "related to," we said, embraces state laws "having a connection with or reference to" carrier " 'rates, routes, or services,' " whether directly or indirectly. Ibid. (quoting Morales, 504 U.S., at 384 , 112 S.Ct. 2031 ; emphasis deleted). See also id. , at 383, 128 S.Ct. 989 ("ordinary meaning of ... words ['related to'] is a broad one," thus ADA's use of those words "expresses a broad pre-emptive purpose").

At the same time, the breadth of the words "related to" does not mean the sky is the limit. We have refused to read the preemption clause of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (a), which supersedes state laws "relate[d] to any employee benefit plan," with an "uncritical literalism," else "for all practical purposes pre-emption would never run its course." New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645 , 655-656, 115 S.Ct. 1671 , 131 L.Ed.2d 695 (1995) (internal quotation marks

Title 49 defines "transportation," in relevant part, as "services related to th[e] movement" of property, "including arranging for, receipt, delivery, elevation, transfer in transit, refrigeration, icing, ventilation, storage, handling, packing, unpacking, and interchange of passengers and property." § 13102(23)(B). Pelkey's Consumer Protection Act and negligence

Pelkey's claims are far removed from Congress' driving concern. He sued under state consumer protection and tort laws to gain compensation for the alleged unlawful disposal of his vehicle. The state laws in question hardly constrain participation in interstate commerce by requiring a motor carrier to offer services not available in the market. Nor do