p. 518and elevation, for the use of the respective parties, and that the complainants did proceed to lay through the premises of the grantors a pipe for the conveyance of the water from one of the said "holes or orifices.
It denies, however, that the said cistern was pierced at any time with any tubes whatever, or that complainants laid down, through the premises of the grantors, any pipes or tubes of a dimensión-corresponding with either of the said holes or orifices, or of equal diameter with the tubes or pipes which were used for supplying -the works or factory of the grantors;. but avers to the contrary, that although the pipe or tube which was then used and continued to be used, for the purpose of supplying the factory of the grantors, has at no time exceeded the diameter of one inch, and has conformed precisely to the position and level of one of the said holes or orifices, the said complainants have -laid down and are now using, through the premises of the defendant, a tube of the diameter of two and a half inches, with a capacity more than six times that of the tube used by the defendant, and not conforming in its level or elevation with either of the orifices aforesaid, but affixed to the exterior circumference or rim of the said cistern in such manner as to extend below the said orifice, and to increase the weight or head of water about seven eighths of an inch over and above that of the defendant.
The above are the material facts of the answer.
To this answer a general replication was filed, and the cause sent to an examiner; and on the' 19th of November, 1852, the cause came on to be heard on bill, answer, exhibits, replication, and testimony, and was argued by counsel,, and upon consideration thereof, the court awarded a perpetual injunction against the defendant, as prayed, with costs.
Whereupon- the defendant entered this appeal from the said decree.
It was argued by Mr, Wylie and Mr. Ritchie, upon a brief . prepared by Mr. Irwin, for the appellant, and by Mr. Gashing, (Attorney-General,) for th? United States.
The following extracts from the brief filed by the counsel for the appellant, will show their views;
The learned judge who decided the case below was of opinion that the words of the deed imported a conveyance of one half of the water.It is most certain, however — and so much is admitted by the learned judge himself — that there is nothing in the terms of the deed, or, to use his own language, “ in so many words,” to convey such an interest.
p. 519It is not less certain that if such was the intent of the parties, it might have been precisely indicated by the obvious, easy, and familiar form of expression which the occasion would naturally and almost necessarily have suggested.. And the presumption is, that it would have been so indicated, instead of either resorting to a standard which was erroneous, or clouding the meaning with a periphrasis.It is a part of the case, however, that a tube or pipe leading to the arsenal of the complainants, of equal diameter with that used to convey the water to the factory of the grantors, will not deliver more than a fractional part of the water conveyed by the latter; and that this is the result of a law of hydraulics which every man, and certainly every agent of the government, is bound to know.It is also to be takén as a part of the case that the localities of the several properties, and the distance to which the water was to be conveyed or at all events to the premises, of the grantee, were well understood by the parties, and of course a plea' of ignorance of the facts would be as unavailable to the complainants, as the more discreditable plea of ignorance of a natural law.It is incontrovertible, therefore, that if only a fractional part of the water delivered to the grantors could be conveyed by the means agreed on, to the premises of the grantees, then it was just that portion, and no more, that was intended to be conveyed to the complainants.Nor is it any answer to say that the grant would be rendered illusory, and the object of the grantee defeated thereby. There is nothing in the deed to indicate either the quantity of water required, or the purpose for which it was destined, and although it might be convenient or even necessary for the government to enlarge the supply, this court can make no new contract for the parties by the substitution of terms which they have not thought proper to use. There is no ambiguity in the language, and in such case it is a maxim of the law, that no construction can be made against the words. And yet it is by such a process of change and substitution that it is now sought to escape from the consequences of what is considered a hard bargain for the government.The effect moreover of the departure on the part' of the complainants, from the terms' of the contract, and the simple and easy rule which it prescribes, is to. produce irregularity in the flow, and to render every thing uncertain. No witness, examined by the government, has undertaken to speak with any degree of precision in regard to the comparative quantities of water drawn through the two pipes. They suppose them to be
p. 520“near about equal,” but they admit that “the flow of water through the complainants’ pipe is much greater at some times than at others, and. that this does occur frequently; ” and that “ at times the complainants’ pipe draws more water than that of the defendant, and at times-it loses, so that the quantity drawn by both pipes is near about equál.”The facts of irregularity and occasional advantage are thus admitted, in connection with the liability to abuse, and the impossibility of precise measurement, and of course of detection or correction — an objection which led the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania to hold, in the case cited from Wharton, that a circular aperture could not be substituted for a square.It-is sufficient, however, for our case — even though the court were right in their_construction of the deed — that the arrangement was such as to deprive us- of our share of the water at ány time. We are entitled to it at all times. We are not to be put off with a mere average — it principle which would authorize the government to take the whole of the water for one half the year, provided it allowed us the whole for the other.But there is another violation of the contract — supposing even the -construction of the court to be the correct one — in the position of the copper adjutage, as well as in the level and inclination of the distributing pipes. The deed provides that the complainants’ pipe shall be upon the same level with that which shall convey the water to the factory of the grantors. The copper adjutage is howeverjseven eighths of an inch below, while the point of discharge is lower by at least sixty — perh'aps one hundred feet — thus conferring the twofold advantage of a greater head and a more rapid chute.'Supposing however that the water was, by the terms of. the contract, to be gauged by equal orifices, it has been settled, as already shown, by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in the case of the Schuylkill Navigation Company v. Moore, that no artificial contrivance can be resorted to, for the purpose of increasing the volume of discharge at the point of delivery.It remains, then, only to consider the supplementary reasons by which it is sought to supply any possible insufficiency in the terms of the contract. They are1st. The construction supposed to have been given to it .by the parties themselves, as shown by the assertion of a larger right in the laying of the present pipes with the knowledge and without any objection on the part of one of the grantors; and2d. The recital in the deed of William Black to the de-> fendant.I pass over the suggestion in regard to the rule that the “ words are to be taken most strongly against the grantor,” which is
p. 521hinted at as a possible though unnecessary resort in the present case. That rule, which is one of great rigor, applies only to cases of ambiguity in the words, or where the exposition is necessary to give them effect, and is only to be resorted to when all other rules of exposition fail. 2 Kent’s Com. 556. And it is now superseded by the more reasonable practice of giving to the language its just sense, 'and searching for its precise meaning. Ibid.To the argument, however, drawn from the fact that the present pipes were laid without objection, I reply1st. That there is no ambiguity which would authorize an appeal to the acts of the parties themselves for the purpose of giving a construction to their contract. In the case even of a patent ambiguity the deed must speak for itself. It is not pretended that there is any which is latent, and which parol evidence might therefore raise and remove.2d. That the evidence shows that the factory never went into operation after the purchase by the United States, and no inference is therefore to be drawn to the prejudice of the defendant from the acquiescence of the grantors. If such inference might thus be drawn, then by the same process the rights of the grantors might be taken as altogether abdicated by mere nonuser, and a mere temporary parol license without consideration, be regarded as an absolute conveyance of the entire fee.3d. That the right, being an incorporeal one, could only pass by grant or prescription, which presupposes it. Callen v. Hocker. 1 Rawle, 108 .4th. That the evidence shows further that the copper pipe was a one-inch bore originally; while, on the other hand, there is no evidence that either the grantors or their assigns were ever advised of the change.Then as to the recital in the deed, the answer is,1st. That the conveyance is of the whole interest held by Black, which was the entire estate of the original grantors; and the. recital is -not even a description of the property intended to be conveyed, but a mere enumeration of sundry deeds with a reference, for their contents, to the records themselves, which exhibit a clear case of mistake.2d. That if the said Black was even mistaken as to the extent of his right, it was entirely “ res inter alias acta,” and cannot either compromise that right or enlarge the terms of a grant made to a third person, between whom and the immediate grantor of the defendant there was no priority whatever. And3d. That the inference that the defendant. knew that he was buying only one half of the water right, is entirely gratuitous, neither warranted by any evidence in the cause nor by any just
p. 522view of the law. The conveyance was of the whole estate of the grantors, &c., and there is no lawyer who would not have advised him that it would pass, notwithstanding a mistake in his references or a misdescription of any of his deeds.Mr. Cushing, (Attorney-General,) contended that, the title deed to the United States shows they are entitled to the use of one half of the water \ the title paper of the appellant, Irwin, shows the same; the proof shows that the pipes of the United States and of the ¡appellant convey an equal quantity of water, and that the threat of the appellant to cut away the pipe was without any just cause, designed, as the bill charges, to compel the United States to purchase of the said Irwin the residue of the water at an exorbitant price.delivered the opinion of the, court.
The appellant, James' Irwin, was respondent below to a bill filed by the United States, in the nature of a till “ quia timet” in which Irwin was charged with threatening tr* cut off certain pipes conveying water to the United States Arsenal, near Pitts-burg. ' The whole merits of the 'ease are involved in the construction to be put on a certain deed under which the United States claimed to have a right to, “ one half of the water ” delivered from a certain spring or reservoir. The parties both claim under William F. Hamilton and W. V. Robinson, who conveyed to the United States “ the right and privil%e~tq use, divert, and carry away from the fountain spring, &c., by which the woollen factory of grantors is now supplied, so much water as will pass through a pipe or tube of equal diameter, with one that shall convey the water from the said spring, upon the same level therewith to the factory of said grantors, and to proceed from a common cistern or head to be erected by the said United States, and to convey and conduct the same through the premises of the said grantors, &c.”
This grant to the United States was made in November, 1836, for the consideration of $>2,500. Without stating, in so many words, that the water from the common cistern is to be divided equally, or each to have one half, this deed points out a mode of equal distribution .at the cistern. The water is to be delivered to each by a pipe or tube of equal diameter at the same level. The mode of conducting it by either party to the place of its use is not prescribed. Each might have had his share delivered into a tank or cistern of his own' placed along side of the common cistern, which would have been probably the best- plan. The United States were permitted to conduct their share of the water through the lands of .the grantors “ by
p. 523tubes or pipes ” without any restriction as to the size of them. The distance from the common cistern to the arsenal of the United States, where their share of the water was to be conducted, is four times as great as that to the grantors’ premises. Owing to friction, and other causes, explained by the witnesses, it was proved that the flow of water in equal tubes is in the inverse ratio of the squares of the distances. Hence an orifice or tube capable of receiving and passing equal quantities at the fountainhead, if continued of the same size to the place of delivery, would have distributed to the United States about one sixteenth and to the vendors fifteen sixteenths. In fact, from the unevenness of- the ground over which the water must necessarily flow to the arsenal, and the quantity of deposit made in its course, such a construction of the contract would leave the United States very frequently, if not always, without any wafer at all.
The grantors in the deed had no intention of overreaching the grantees, by taking advantage of their want of knowledge of the science of hydraulics, or claiming a construction of their deed which would give their grantees nothing, and thus allow the grantors to again extort from the necessities of the government a double price.
Robinson, one of the grantors, was examined by the appellant as a witness, and swore that one half the water was sold, and one half reserved, “ that such was the agreement.” This was the practical (and only reasonable) construction put on the grant by both parties at the time it was made; and, accordingly the officers of the United States proceeded to make a common cistern, and to ascertain the size of two tubes sufficient to convey the whole water held in common, and distribute it equally — leaving the vendors to .convey their share in pipes of any size they saw fit, they used pipes to convey the water to the arsenal of such size as was deemed necessary from the distance and nature of the ground. The vendors looked on, assisted and acquiesced in all that was done. If the deed were ambiguous, and capable of. a construction, which would permit one party to overreach and defraud the other; if there were no such rule of law as that which gives a construction to a deed most favorable to the grantee; yet we have here a practical construction by the vendor and vendee made on the ground, and acquiesced in for sixteen years. The appellant’s deed from an assignee of the original vendors, carefully refers to this sale to the United States, as a sale “ of one half of the water.” We are of opinion, therefore, that a reasonable construction of the deed to the United States, having reference to the principles of hydraulics, necessarily requires that each party should have half the water, and conduct it in such pipes as they see fit and proper: and
p. 524also, that assuming the deed to be capable of the construction contended for, the parties to it have construed it honestly and correctly; and that this practical construction having been acquiesced in by all parties interested for sixteen years, is conclusive. The appellant, whose deed purports to convey to him but one half the water, cannot now claim to put a new construction on the grant to the appellees which would give them nothing for the large- consideration paid, and the appellant all for nothing. However plausible and astute the reasoning may be, on which such a claim is founded, it does not recommend itself on the ground of justice or equity.
The judgment of the Circuit Court is therefore affirmed, with costs.'
Order.
This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of Pennsylvania, and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof, it is now here ordered, adjudged, and decreed by this court, that the decree of the said-Circuit Court, in this cause, be, and the same is hereby affirmed.