Majority — SOTOMAYOR J.
I
Congress enacted CAFA in order to "amend the procedures that apply to consideration of interstate class actions." 119 Stat. 4 . In doing so, Congress recognized that "[c]lass action lawsuits are an important and valuable part of the legal system." CAFA § 2. It was concerned, however, that certain requirements of federal diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332 , had functioned to "kee[p] cases of national importance" in state courts rather than federal courts. CAFA § 2.
CAFA accordingly loosened the requirements for diversity jurisdiction for two types of cases-"class actions" and "mass actions." The Act defines "class action" to mean "any civil action filed under
B
Respondents manufacture liquid crystal displays, or LCDs. In March 2011, the State of Mississippi sued them in state court, alleging that they had formed an international cartel to restrict competition and raise prices in the LCD market. The State claimed that these actions violated two Mississippi statutes: the Mississippi Antitrust Act, Miss.Code Ann. § 75-21-1 et seq . (2009), and the Mississippi Consumer Protection Act, § 75-24-1 et seq. (2009 and Cum. Supp. 2013). The State sought injunctive relief and civil penalties under both statutes, along with punitive damages, costs, and attorney's fees. It also sought restitution for its own purchases "of LCD products and the purchases of its citizens." App. to Brief in Opposition 65a; § 75-24-11.
Respondents filed a notice to remove the case from state to federal court, arguing that the case was removable under CAFA as either a "class action" or a "mass action." The District Court ruled that the suit did not qualify as a "class action" because it was "not brought pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 or a 'similar State statute or rule of judicial procedure.' " 876 F.Supp.2d 758 , 769 (S.D.Miss.2012). But it held that the suit did qualify as a "mass action,"
1 CAFA provides certain exceptions for class actions that involve matters of principally local or state concern. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332 (d)(3)-(5). None of them are at issue in this case.
II
A
Our analysis begins with the statutory text. Sebelius v. Cloer, 569 U.S. ----, ----, 133 S.Ct. 1886 , 1892-1893, 185 L.Ed.2d 1003 (2013). The statute provides:
"[T]he term mass action means any civil action (except a [class action] ) in which monetary relief claims of 100 or more persons are proposed to be tried jointly on the ground that the plaintiffs' claims involve common questions of law or fact, except that jurisdiction shall exist only over those plaintiffs whose claims in a mass action satisfy the jurisdictional amount requirements under subsection (a)." § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i).
The parties do not dispute that this provision encompasses suits that are brought jointly by 100 or more named plaintiffs who propose to try their claims together. The question is whether the
3 The Court of Appeals did so on the rationale that because individual Mississippi consumers are real parties in interest to the State's restitution claim, the general public exception's requirement that "all of the claims" must be "asserted on behalf of the general public (and not on behalf of individual claimants)" was not satisfied. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (d)(11)(B)(ii)(III).
4 See AU Optronics Corp. v. South Carolina, 699 F.3d 385 (C.A.4 2012) ; Nevada v. Bank of Am. Corp., 672 F.3d 661 (C.A.9 2012) ; LG Display Co. v. Madigan, 665 F.3d 768 (C.A.7 2011).
To start, the statute says "100 or more persons," not "100 or more named or unnamed real parties in interest." Had Congress intended the latter, it easily could have drafted language to that effect. Indeed, when Congress wanted a numerosity requirement in CAFA to be satisfied by counting unnamed parties in interest in addition to named plaintiffs, it explicitly said so: CAFA provides that in order for a class action to be removable, "the number of members of all proposed plaintiff classes" must be 100 or greater, § 1332(d)(5)(B), and it defines "class members" to mean "the persons (named or unnamed) who fall within the definition of the proposed or certified class," § 1332(d)(1)(D). Congress chose not to use the phrase "named or unnamed" in CAFA's mass action provision, a decision we understand to be intentional. See Dean v. United States, 556 U.S. 568 , 573, 129 S.Ct. 1849 , 173 L.Ed.2d 785 (2009) (" '[W]here Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion' ").
More fundamentally, respondents' interpretation cannot be reconciled with the fact that the "100 or more persons" referred to in the statute are not unspecified individuals who have no actual participation in the suit, but instead the very "plaintiffs" referred to later in the sentence-the parties who are proposing to join their claims in a single trial. Congress made this understanding evident in two key ways.
First, we presume that " 'Congress is aware of existing law when it passes legislation.' " Hall v. United States, 566 U.S. ----, ----, 132 S.Ct. 1882 , 1889, 182 L.Ed.2d 840 (2012). Here, Congress used the terms "persons"
Second, respondents' interpretation of "persons" cannot square with the statute's requirement that the claims of the "100 or more persons" must be proposed for joint trial "on the ground that the plaintiffs' claims involve common questions of law or fact." § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i). It is difficult to imagine how the claims of one set of unnamed individuals could be proposed for joint trial on the ground that the claims of some completely different group of named plaintiffs share common questions. The better understanding is that Congress meant for the "100 or more persons" and the proposed "plaintiffs" to be one and the same.
Moreover, Congress used the term "plaintiffs" twice in the mass action provision. The provision encompasses actions in which monetary "claims of 100 or more persons are proposed to be tried jointly on the ground that the plaintiffs' claims involve common questions," and it then provides that "jurisdiction shall exist only over those plaintiffs whose claims in a mass action satisfy the jurisdictional amount requiremen[t]" of $75,000. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i). If respondents are correct that "plaintiffs" means unnamed parties in interest where it is used the first time, then so too the second. After all, the "presumption that a given term is used to mean the same thing throughout a statute" is "at its most vigorous when a term is repeated within a given sentence." Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115 , 118, 115 S.Ct. 552 , 130 L.Ed.2d 462 (1994).
Yet if the term "plaintiffs" is stretched to include all unnamed individuals with an interest in the suit, then § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i)'s requirement that "jurisdiction shall exist only over those plaintiffs whose claims [exceed $75,000]" becomes an administrative nightmare that Congress could not possibly have intended, see Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564 , 575, 102 S.Ct. 3245 , 73 L.Ed.2d 973 (1982). How is a district court to identify the unnamed parties whose claims in a given case are for less than $75,000? Would the court in this case, for instance, have to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine the identity of each of the hundreds of thousands of unnamed Mississippi citizens who purchased one of respondents' LCD products between 1996 and 2006 (the period alleged in the complaint)? Even if it could identify every such person, how would it ascertain the amount in controversy for each individual claim? Respondents suggest that "[i]n some circumstances,
5 Congress could of course require a real party in interest inquiry in a statute that uses the term "plaintiff" simply by saying so. But it has not done that here.
Furthermore, what would happen with individuals whose claims were valued at less than $75,000? The District Court in this case suggested that if the suit were deemed a mass action, it would sever the claim for "restitution for losses incurred by individuals claiming less than or equal to $75,000 each" and remand that claim to state court, while allowing the other claims (including the restitution claims exceeding $75,000) to proceed in federal court. 876 F.Supp.2d, at 775 . Even respondents do not defend that outcome, presumably because it would mean that
B
Our reading of the mass action provision's text is reinforced by the statutory context. See Mohamad v. Palestinian Authority, 566 U.S. ----, ----, 132 S.Ct. 1702 , 1707-1708, 182 L.Ed.2d 720 (2012).
First, the provision of CAFA governing transfer motions confirms our view that the term "plaintiffs" refers to actual named parties as opposed to unnamed real parties in interest. That provision, § 1332(d)(11)(C)(i), provides that once a mass action has been removed to federal court, it "shall not thereafter be transferred to any other court ... unless a majority of the plaintiffs in the action request transfer." If respondents are correct that "plaintiffs" means "unnamed parties in interest," it will be surpassingly difficult for a court to decide in a case like this one whether an action may be transferred. The District Court itself acknowledged this problem, noting that it would have to identify and communicate with "hundreds of thousands if not millions of real parties in interest" to "pol[l] [them] about their preferred forum" if respondents' interpretation were correct. 876 F.Supp.2d, at 777 .
The context in which the mass action provision was enacted lends further support to our conclusion. Congress' overriding concern in enacting CAFA was with class actions. See Preamble, 119 Stat. 4 (describing CAFA as an "An Act To amend the procedures that apply to consideration of interstate class actions"); CAFA § 2 (Congress' findings with respect to class actions). The mass action provision thus functions largely as a backstop to ensure that CAFA's relaxed jurisdictional rules for class actions cannot be evaded by a suit that names a host of plaintiffs rather than using the class device. Respondents' argument fails to recognize this key distinction. Their position is ultimately that "[t]his action is similar to a class action," such that it should be removed. Brief for Respondents 27. But if Congress had wanted representative
First, it makes sense to infer Congress' intent to incorporate a background principle into a new statute where the principle has previously been applied in a similar manner. But that is not the case here. The background real party in interest inquiry identifies what party's (or parties') citizenship should be considered in determining diversity. The inquiry that respondents urge is quite different: It is an attempt to count up additional unnamed parties in order to satisfy the mass action provision's numerosity requirement. Respondents offer no reason to believe that Congress intended to extend the real party inquiry to this new circumstance, and so any presumption that Congress wanted to incorporate the inquiry, if it exists in this case at all, would be comparatively weak. Cf. Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S. 280 , 286, 123 S.Ct. 824 , 154 L.Ed.2d 753 (2003) ("Congress' silence, while permitting an inference that Congress intended to apply ordinary background tort principles, cannot show that it intended to apply an unusual modification of those rules").[8]
8 We have also applied a real party in interest inquiry in contexts other than that of determining citizenship for purposes of diversity jurisdiction. See North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365 , 374-376, 44 S.Ct. 138 , 68 L.Ed. 342 (1923) (state sovereign immunity); Oklahoma ex rel. Johnson v. Cook, 304 U.S. 387 , 392-393, 58 S.Ct. 954 , 82 L.Ed. 1416 (1938) (original jurisdiction). But even if we were to indulge in a presumption that Congress somehow intended to import the inquiry applied in those particular contexts into the mass action provision's distinct numerosity requirement, we would find any such presumption overridden by CAFA's text.
* * *
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
For class and mass actions, CAFA expanded diversity jurisdiction in two key ways. First, it replaced the ordinary requirement of complete diversity of citizenship among all plaintiffs and defendants, see State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523 , 530-531, 87 S.Ct. 1199 , 18 L.Ed.2d 270 (1967), with a requirement of minimal diversity. Under that requirement, a federal court may exercise jurisdiction over a class action if "any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State different from any defendant." § 1332(d)(2)(A). The same rule applies to mass actions. See § 1332(d)(11)(A) ("[A] mass action shall be deemed ... removable under [ §§ 1332(d)(2) through (d)(10) ]"). Second, whereas § 1332(a) ordinarily requires each plaintiff's claim to exceed the sum or value of $75,000, see
The District Court nonetheless remanded the case to state court on the basis of CAFA's "general public exception," which excludes from the "mass action" definition "any civil action in which ... all of the claims in the action are asserted on behalf of the general public (and not on behalf of individual claimants or members of a purported class) pursuant to a State statute specifically authorizing such action." 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (d)(11)(B)(ii)(III).
The Court of Appeals reversed. 701 F.3d 796 (C.A.5 2012). It agreed with the District Court's determination that Mississippi's suit is not a "class action" under CAFA.[2] Id. , at 799. It also agreed that, under Caldwell, the suit qualifies as a "mass action" because "[t]he real parties in interest in Mississippi's suit are those more than 100 ... individual citizens who purchased the [LCD] products within Mississippi." 701 F.3d, at 800 . It disagreed, however, with the District
2 Respondents do not challenge this ruling before this Court.
We think it unlikely that Congress intended that federal district courts engage in these unwieldy inquiries. By contrast, interpreting "plaintiffs" in accordance with its usual meaning-to refer to the actual named parties who bring an action-leads to a straightforward, easy to administer rule under which a court would examine whether the plaintiffs have pleaded in good faith the requisite amount. See Horton v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 367 U.S. 348 , 353, 81 S.Ct. 1570 , 6 L.Ed.2d 890 (1961). Our decision thus comports with the commonsense observation that "when judges must decide jurisdictional matters, simplicity
6 Respondents suggest that a district court might be able to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the claims that fall beneath $75,000, thereby avoiding the problem of identifying and remanding such claims to the state court. We need not decide the issue here, but we note that at least one Court of Appeals has rejected that view. See Lowery v. Alabama Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184 , 1206, n. 51 (C.A.11 2007) (holding that because supplemental jurisdiction does not apply where a federal statute " 'expressly provide[s] otherwise,' " 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (a), the mass action provision's explicit exclusion of jurisdiction over claims beneath $75,000 negates supplemental jurisdiction over such claims).
III
Rather than relying on the text of CAFA as the source of its real party in interest inquiry, the Court of Appeals appeared to find such an inquiry necessary on the basis of what it understood to be a background principle: that "federal courts look to the substance of the action and not only at the labels that the parties may attach." Caldwell, 536 F.3d, at 424 . This was error.
We have interpreted the diversity jurisdiction statute to require courts in certain contexts to look behind the pleadings to ensure that parties are not improperly creating or destroying diversity jurisdiction. We have held, for example, that a plaintiff may not keep a case out of federal court by fraudulently naming a nondiverse defendant. Wecker v. National Enameling & Stamping Co., 204 U.S. 176 , 185-186, 27 S.Ct. 184 , 51 L.Ed. 430 (1907). Nor may a plaintiff create diversity by collusively assigning his interest in an action. Kramer v. Caribbean Mills, Inc., 394 U.S. 823 , 825-830, 89 S.Ct. 1487 , 23 L.Ed.2d 9 (1969) ; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1359 . And in cases involving a State or state official, we have inquired into the real party in interest because a State's presence as a party will destroy complete diversity. Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Missouri Railroad and Warehouse Comm'rs, 183 U.S. 53 , 58-59, 22 S.Ct. 18 , 46 L.Ed. 78 (1901).
But the question in this case is not simply whether there exists some background principle of analyzing the real parties in interest to a suit; the question is whether Congress intended that courts engage in that analysis when deciding
7 The parties both point to the "general public exception," § 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii)(III), in support of their respective positions. But because the foregoing arguments resolve this case, we need not construe that provision here.
Cases cited
- Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc. 545 U.S. 546 p. 166
- 876 F.Supp.2d 758 876 F.Supp.2d 758 at 771, at 802-803 p. 166, p. 167, p. 168
- 133 S.Ct. 2736 133 S.Ct. 2736 p. 168
- Sebelius v. Cloer 133 S.Ct. 1886 p. 168
- Dean v. United States 556 U.S. 568 p. 169
- Hall v. United States 132 S.Ct. 1882 p. 169
- Brown v. Gardner 513 U.S. 115 p. 171
- Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc. 458 U.S. 564 p. 171
- Standard Fire Insurance Co. v. Knowles 133 S.Ct. 1345 p. 173
- Mohamad v. Palestinian Authority 132 S.Ct. 1702 p. 173
- United States v. Wells 519 U.S. 482 p. 175
- Meyer v. Holley 537 U.S. 280 p. 175
- Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co. 534 U.S. 438 p. 176
- State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Tashire 386 U.S. 523 p. 740
- 536 F.3d 418 536 F.3d 418 p. 741
- 701 F.3d 796 701 F.3d 796 at 799 p. 741
- Horton v. Liberty Mutual Insurance 367 U.S. 348 p. 744
- Wecker v. National Enameling & Stamping Co. 204 U.S. 176 p. 745
- Kramer v. Caribbean Mills, Inc. 394 U.S. 823 p. 745
- Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway Co. v. Missouri Railroad & Warehouse Commissioners 183 U.S. 53 p. 745