McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm'n

By contrast, the Court concluded that contribution limits impose a lesser restraint on political speech because they "permit[ ] the symbolic expression of support evidenced by a contribution but do[ ] not in any way infringe the contributor's freedom to discuss candidates and issues." Buckley, 424 U.S., at 21 , 96 S.Ct. 612 . As a result, the Court focused on the effect of the contribution limits on the freedom of political association and applied a lesser but still "rigorous standard of review." Id., at 29, 96 S.Ct. 612 . Under that standard, "[e]ven a ' "significant interference" with protected rights of political association' may be sustained if the State demonstrates a sufficiently important interest and employs means closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgement of associational freedoms." Id., at 25, 96 S.Ct. 612 (quoting Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477 , 488, 95 S.Ct. 541 , 42 L.Ed.2d 595 (1975) ).

The primary purpose of FECA was to limit quid pro quo corruption and its appearance; that purpose satisfied the requirement of a "sufficiently important" governmental interest. 424 U.S., at 26-27 , 96 S.Ct. 612 . As for the "closely drawn"

The Court next separately considered an overbreadth challenge to the base limit. See id., at 29-30, 96 S.Ct. 612 . The challengers argued that the base limit was fatally overbroad because most large donors do not seek improper influence over legislators' actions. Although the Court accepted that premise, it nevertheless rejected the overbreadth challenge for two reasons: First, it was too "difficult to isolate suspect contributions" based on a contributor's subjective intent. Id., at 30, 96 S.Ct. 612 . Second, "Congress was justified in concluding that the interest in safeguarding against the appearance of impropriety requires that the opportunity for abuse inherent in the process of raising large monetary contributions be eliminated." Ibid.

Finally, in one paragraph of its 139-page opinion, the Court turned to the $25,000 aggregate limit under FECA. As a preliminary matter, it noted that the constitutionality of the aggregate limit "ha[d] not been separately addressed at length by the parties." Id., at 38, 96 S.Ct. 612 . Then, in three sentences, the Court disposed of any constitutional objections to the aggregate limit that the challengers might have had:

"The overall $25,000 ceiling does impose an ultimate restriction upon the number of candidates and committees with which an individual may associate himself by means of financial support. But this quite modest restraint upon protected political activity serves to prevent evasion of the $1,000 contribution limitation by a person who might otherwise contribute massive amounts of money to a particular candidate through the use of unearmarked contributions to political committees likely to contribute to that candidate, or huge

contributions to the candidate's political party. The limited, additional restriction on associational freedom imposed by the overall ceiling is thus no more than a corollary of the basic individual contribution limitation that we have found to be constitutionally valid." Ibid.

B

1

The parties and amici curiae spend significant energy debating whether the line that Buckley drew between contributions and expenditures should remain the law. Notwithstanding the robust debate, we see no need in this case to revisit Buckley 's distinction between contributions and expenditures and the corollary distinction in the applicable standards of review. Buckley held that the Government's interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption or its appearance was "sufficiently important," id., at 26-27, 96 S.Ct. 612 ; we have elsewhere stated that the same interest may properly be labeled "compelling," see National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S., at 496-497 , 105 S.Ct. 1459 , so that the interest would satisfy even strict scrutiny. Moreover, regardless whether we apply strict scrutiny or Buckley 's"closely drawn" test, we must assess the fit between the stated governmental objective and the means selected to achieve that objective. See, e.g., National Conservative Political Action

Although Buckley provides some guidance, we think that its ultimate conclusion about the constitutionality of the aggregate limit in place under FECA does not control here. Buckley spent a total of three sentences analyzing that limit; in fact, the opinion pointed out that the constitutionality of the aggregate limit "ha[d] not been separately addressed at length by the parties." Ibid. We are now asked to address appellants' direct challenge to the aggregate limits in place under BCRA. BCRA is a different statutory regime, and the aggregate limits it imposes operate against a distinct legal backdrop.

Most notably, statutory safeguards against circumvention have been considerably strengthened since Buckley was decided, through both statutory additions and the introduction of a comprehensive regulatory scheme. With more targeted anticircumvention measures in place today, the indiscriminate aggregate limits under BCRA appear particularly heavy-handed.

The 1976 FECA Amendments, for example, added another layer of base contribution limits. The 1974 version of FECA had already capped contributions from political committees to candidates, but the 1976 version added limits on contributions to political committees. This change was enacted at least "in part to prevent circumvention of the very limitations on contributions that this Court upheld in

The 1976 Amendments also added an antiproliferation rule prohibiting donors from creating or controlling multiple affiliated political committees. See

In addition to accounting for statutory and regulatory changes in the campaign finance arena, appellants' challenge raises distinct legal arguments that Buckley did not consider. For example, presumably because of its cursory treatment of the $25,000 aggregate limit, Buckley did not separately address an overbreadth challenge with respect to that provision. The Court rejected such a challenge to the base limits because of the difficulty of isolating suspect contributions. The propriety of large contributions to individual candidates turned on the subjective intent of donors, and the Court concluded that there was no way to tell which donors sought improper influence over legislators' actions. See 424 U.S., at 30 , 96 S.Ct. 612 . The aggregate limit, on the other hand, was upheld as an anticircumvention measure, without considering whether it was possible to discern which donations might be used to circumvent the base limits. See id., at 38, 96 S.Ct. 612 . The Court never addressed overbreadth in the specific context of aggregate limits, where such an argument has far more force.

Given the foregoing, this case cannot be resolved merely by pointing to three sentences in Buckley that were written without the benefit of full briefing or argument on the issue. See Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118 , 139-140, 62 S.Ct. 139 , 86 L.Ed. 100 (1941) (departing from "[l]oose language and a sporadic, ill-considered decision" when asked to resolve a question "with our eyes wide open and in the light of full consideration"); Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236 , 251, 118 S.Ct. 1969 , 141 L.Ed.2d 242 (1998) (departing from a prior decision where it "was rendered without full

Buckley acknowledged that aggregate limits at least diminish an individual's right of political association. As the Court explained, the "overall $25,000 ceiling does impose an ultimate restriction upon the number of candidates and committees with which an individual may associate himself by means of financial support." 424 U.S., at 38 , 96 S.Ct. 612 . But the Court characterized that restriction as a "quite modest restraint upon protected political activity." Ibid. We cannot agree with that characterization. An aggregate limit on how many candidates and committees an individual may support through contributions is not a "modest restraint" at all. The Government may no more restrict how many candidates or causes a donor may support than it may tell a newspaper how many candidates it may endorse.

To put it in the simplest terms, the aggregate limits prohibit an individual from fully contributing to the primary and general election campaigns of ten or more candidates, even if all contributions fall within the base limits Congress views as adequate to protect against corruption. The individual may give up to $5,200 each to nine candidates, but the aggregate limits constitute an outright ban on further contributions to any other candidate (beyond the additional $1,800 that may be spent before reaching the $48,600 aggregate limit). At that point, the limits deny the individual all ability to exercise his expressive and associational rights by contributing to someone who will advocate for his policy preferences. A donor must limit the number of candidates he supports, and may have to choose which of several policy concerns he will advance-clear First

Second, the degree to which speech is protected cannot turn on a legislative or judicial determination that particular speech is useful to the democratic process. The First Amendment does not contemplate such "ad hoc balancing of relative social costs and benefits." United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 , 470, 130 S.Ct. 1577 , 176 L.Ed.2d 435 (2010) ; see also United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803 , 818, 120 S.Ct. 1878 , 146 L.Ed.2d 865 (2000) ("What the Constitution says is that" value judgments "are for the individual to make, not for the

As we framed the relevant principle in Buckley, "the concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment." 424 U.S., at 48-49 , 96 S.Ct. 612 . The dissent's suggestion that Buckley supports the opposite proposition, see post, at 1467 - 1468, simply ignores what Buckley actually said on the matter. See also Citizens Against Rent Control/Coalition for Fair Housing v. Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290 , 295, 102 S.Ct. 434 , 70 L.Ed.2d 492 (1981) (" Buckley ... made clear that contributors cannot be protected from the possibility that others will make larger contributions").

Moreover, while preventing corruption or its appearance is a legitimate objective, Congress may target only a specific type of corruption-" quid pro quo " corruption. As Buckley explained, Congress may permissibly seek to rein in "large contributions [that] are given to secure a political quid pro quo from current and potential office holders." 424 U.S., at 26 , 96 S.Ct. 612 . In addition to "actual quid pro quo arrangements," Congress may permissibly limit "the appearance of corruption stemming from public awareness of the opportunities for abuse inherent in a regime of large individual financial contributions" to particular candidates. Id., at 27, 96 S.Ct. 612 ; see also Citizens United, 558 U.S., at 359 , 130 S.Ct. 876 ("When Buckley identified a sufficiently important governmental interest in preventing

Spending large sums of money in connection with elections, but not in connection with an effort to control the exercise of an officeholder's official duties, does not give rise to such quid pro quo corruption.

The difficulty is that once the aggregate limits kick in, they ban all contributions of any amount. But Congress's selection of a $5,200 base limit indicates its belief that contributions of that amount or less do not create a cognizable risk of corruption. If there is no corruption concern in giving nine candidates up to $5,200 each, it is difficult to understand how a tenth candidate can be regarded as corruptible if given $1,801, and all others corruptible if given a dime. And if there is no risk that additional candidates will be corrupted by donations of up to $5,200, then the Government must defend the aggregate limits by demonstrating that they prevent circumvention of the base limits.

The problem is that they do not serve that function in any meaningful way. In light of the various statutes and regulations currently in effect, Buckley 's fear that an individual might "contribute massive amounts of money to a particular candidate through the use of unearmarked contributions" to entities likely to support the candidate, 424 U.S., at 38 , 96 S.Ct. 612 , is far too speculative. And-importantly-we "have never accepted mere conjecture as adequate to carry a First Amendment burden." Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S. 377 , 392, 120 S.Ct. 897 , 145 L.Ed.2d 886 (2000).

As an initial matter, there is not the same risk of quid pro quo corruption or its appearance when money flows through independent actors to a candidate, as when a donor contributes to a candidate directly. When an individual contributes

Buckley nonetheless focused on the possibility that "unearmarked contributions" could eventually find their way to a candidate's coffers. 424 U.S., at 38 , 96 S.Ct. 612 . Even accepting the validity of Buckley 's circumvention theory, it is hard to see how a candidate today could receive a "massive amount[ ] of money" that could be traced back to a particular contributor

Further, to the extent that the law does not foreclose the scenario described by the District Court, experience and common sense do. The Government provides no reason to believe that many state parties would willingly participate in a scheme to funnel money to another State's candidates. A review of FEC data of Republican and Democratic state party committees for the 2012 election cycle reveals just 12 total instances in which a state party committee contributed to a House or Senate candidate in another State. No surprise there. The Iowa Democratic Party, for example, has little reason to transfer money to the California Democratic Party, especially when the Iowa Democratic Party would be barred for the remainder of the election cycle from receiving another contribution for its own activities from the particular donor.

The dissent argues that such knowledge may be difficult to prove, pointing to eight FEC cases that did not proceed because of insufficient evidence of a donor's incriminating knowledge. See post, at 1477 - 1478. It might be that such guilty knowledge could not be shown because the donors were not guilty-a possibility that the dissent does not entertain. In any event, the donors described in those eight cases were typically alleged to have exceeded the base limits by $5,000 or less. The FEC's failure to find the requisite knowledge in those cases hardly means that the agency will be equally powerless to prevent a scheme in which a donor routes millions of dollars in excess of the base limits to a particular candidate, as in the dissent's "Example Two." And if an FEC official cannot establish knowledge of circumvention (or establish affiliation) when the same ten donors contribute $10,000 each to 200 newly created PACs, and each PAC writes a $10,000 check to the same ten candidates-the dissent's "Example Three"-then that official has not a heart but a head of stone. See post, at 1474 - 1475, 1477 - 1478.

The dissent concludes by citing three briefs for the proposition that, even with the aggregate limits in place, individuals "have transferred large sums of money to specific candidates" in excess of the base limits. Post, at 1478. But the cited sources do not provide any real-world examples of circumvention of the base limits along the lines of the various hypotheticals. The dearth of FEC prosecutions, according to the dissent, proves only that people are getting away with it. And the violations that surely must be out there elude detection "because in the real world, the methods of achieving circumvention are more subtle and more complex"

Buckley upheld aggregate limits only on the ground that they prevented channeling money to candidates beyond the base limits. The absence of such a prospect today belies the Government's asserted objective of preventing corruption or its appearance. The improbability of circumvention indicates that the aggregate limits instead further the impermissible objective of simply limiting the amount of money in political campaigns.

C

Quite apart from the foregoing, the aggregate limits violate the First Amendment because they are not "closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment of associational freedoms." Buckley, 424 U.S., at 25 , 96 S.Ct. 612 . In the First Amendment context, fit matters. Even when the Court is not applying strict scrutiny, we still require "a fit that is not necessarily perfect, but reasonable; that represents not necessarily the single best disposition but one whose scope is 'in proportion to the interest served,' ... that employs not necessarily

Some figures might be useful to put the risk of circumvention in perspective. We recognize that no data can be marshaled to capture perfectly the counterfactual world in which aggregate limits do not exist. But, as we have noted elsewhere, we can nonetheless ask "whether experience under the present law confirms a serious threat of abuse." Federal Election Comm'n v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431 , 457, 121 S.Ct. 2351 , 150 L.Ed.2d 461 (2001). It does not. Experience suggests that the vast majority of contributions made in excess of the aggregate limits are likely to be retained and spent by their recipients rather than rerouted to candidates.

In the 2012 election cycle, federal candidates, political parties, and PACs spent a total of $7 billion, according to the FEC. In particular, each national political party's spending ran in the hundreds of millions of dollars. The National Republican Senatorial Committee (NRSC), National Republican Congressional Committee (NRCC), Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee (DSCC), and Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC), however, spent less than $1 million each on direct candidate contributions and less than $10 million each on coordinated expenditures. Brief for NRSC et al. as Amici Curiae 23, 25 (NRSC Brief). Including both coordinated expenditures and direct candidate contributions, the NRSC and DSCC spent just 7% of their total funds on contributions to candidates and the NRCC and DCCC spent just 3%.

Likewise, as explained previously, state parties rarely contribute to candidates in other States. In the 2012 election cycle, the Republican and Democratic state party committees in all 50 States (and the District of Columbia) contributed a paltry $17,750 to House and Senate candidates in other States. The state party committees spent over half a billion dollars over the same time period, of which the $17,750

As with national and state party committees, candidates contribute only a small fraction of their campaign funds to other candidates. Authorized candidate committees may support other candidates up to a $2,000 base limit. 2 U.S.C. § 432 (e)(3)(B). In the 2012 election, House candidates spent a total of $1.1 billion. Candidate-to-candidate contributions among House candidates totaled $3.65 million, making up just 0.3% of candidates' overall spending. NRSC Brief 29. The most that any one individual candidate received from all other candidates was around $100,000. Brief for Appellee 39. The fact is that candidates who receive campaign contributions spend most of the money on themselves, rather than passing along donations to other

2

Importantly, there are multiple alternatives available to Congress that would serve the Government's anticircumvention interest, while avoiding "unnecessary abridgment" of First Amendment rights. Buckley, 424 U.S., at 25 , 96 S.Ct. 612 .

The most obvious might involve targeted restrictions on transfers among candidates and political committees. There are currently no such limits on transfers among party committees and from candidates to party committees. See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(4) ; 11 CFR § 113.2 (c). Perhaps for that reason, a central concern of the District Court, the Government, multiple amici curiae, and the dissent has been the ability of party committees to transfer money freely. If Congress agrees that this is problematic, it might tighten its permissive transfer rules. Doing so would impose a lesser burden on First Amendment rights, as compared to aggregate limits that flatly ban contributions beyond certain levels. And while the Government has not conceded that transfer restrictions would be a perfect substitute for the aggregate limits, it has recognized that they would mitigate the risk of circumvention. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 29.

One possible option for restricting transfers would be to require contributions above the current aggregate limits to be deposited into segregated, nontransferable accounts and

We do not mean to opine on the validity of any particular proposal. The point is that there are numerous alternative approaches available to Congress to prevent circumvention of the base limits.

D

Finally, disclosure of contributions minimizes the potential for abuse of the campaign finance system. Disclosure requirements are in part "justified based on a governmental interest in 'provid[ing] the electorate with information' about the sources of election-related spending." Citizens United, 558 U.S., at 367 , 130 S.Ct. 876 (quoting Buckley, supra, at 66, 96 S.Ct. 612 ). They may also "deter actual corruption and avoid the appearance of corruption by exposing large contributions and expenditures to the light of publicity." Id., at 67, 96 S.Ct. 612 . Disclosure requirements burden speech, but-unlike the aggregate limits-they do not impose a ceiling on speech.

With modern technology, disclosure now offers a particularly effective means of arming the voting public with information. In 1976, the Court observed that Congress could regard disclosure as "only a partial measure." Buckley, 424 U.S., at 28 , 96 S.Ct. 612 . That perception was understandable in a world in which information about campaign contributions was filed at FEC offices and was therefore virtually inaccessible to the average member of the public. See Brief for Cause of Action Institute as Amicus Curiae 15-16. Today, given the Internet, disclosure offers much more robust protections against corruption. See Citizens United, supra, at 370-371, 130 S.Ct. 876 . Reports and databases are available on the FEC's Web site almost immediately after they are filed, supplemented by private entities such as OpenSecrets.org and FollowTheMoney.org. Because massive quantities of information can be accessed at the click of a mouse, disclosure is effective to a degree not possible at the time Buckley, or even McConnell, was decided.

The existing aggregate limits may in fact encourage the movement of money away from entities subject to disclosure. Because individuals' direct contributions are limited, would-be donors may turn to other avenues for political speech. See Citizens United, supra, at 364, 130 S.Ct. 876 . Individuals can, for example, contribute unlimited amounts to 501(c) organizations, which are not required to publicly disclose their donors. See 26 U.S.C. § 6104 (d)(3). Such organizations spent some $300 million on independent expenditures in the 2012 election cycle.

V

At oral argument, the Government shifted its focus from Buckley 's anticircumvention rationale to an argument that the aggregate limits deter corruption regardless of their ability to prevent circumvention of the base limits. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 29-30, 50-52. The Government argued that there is an opportunity for corruption whenever a large check is

In analyzing the base limits, Buckley made clear that the risk of corruption arises when an individual makes large contributions to the candidate or officeholder himself. See 424 U.S., at 26-27 , 96 S.Ct. 612 . Buckley ' s analysis of the aggregate limit under FECA was similarly confined. The Court noted that the aggregate limit guarded against an individual's funneling-through circumvention-"massive amounts of money to a particular candidate ." Id., at 38, 96 S.Ct. 612 (emphasis added). We have reiterated that understanding several times. See, e.g., National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S., at 497 , 105 S.Ct. 1459 ( quid pro quo corruption occurs when "[e]lected officials are influenced to act contrary to their

When donors furnish widely distributed support within all applicable base limits, all members of the party or supporters of the cause may benefit, and the leaders of the party or cause may feel particular gratitude. That gratitude stems from the basic nature of the party system, in which party members join together to further common political beliefs, and citizens can choose to support a party because they share some, most, or all of those beliefs. See Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208 , 214-216, 107 S.Ct. 544 , 93 L.Ed.2d 514 (1986). To recast such shared interest, standing alone, as an opportunity for quid pro quo corruption would dramatically expand government regulation of the political process. Cf. California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 , 572-573, 120 S.Ct. 2402 , 147 L.Ed.2d 502 (2000) (recognizing the Government's "role to play in structuring and monitoring the election process," but rejecting "the proposition that party affairs are public affairs, free of First Amendment protections").

The Government suggests that it is the solicitation of large contributions that poses the danger of corruption, see Tr. of Oral Arg. 29-30, 38-39, 50-51; see also post, at 1472 - 1473, 1475, but the aggregate limits are not limited to any direct solicitation by an officeholder or candidate. Cf. McConnell, supra, at 298-299, 308 , 124 S.Ct. 619 (opinion of KENNEDY, J.) (rejecting a ban on "soft money" contributions to national parties, but approving a ban on the solicitation of such contributions as "a direct and necessary regulation of federal candidates' and officeholders' receipt of quids "). We have no occasion to consider a law that would specifically ban candidates from soliciting donations-within the base limits-that would go to many other candidates, and would add up to a large sum. For our purposes here, it is enough that the aggregate limits at issue are not directed specifically to candidate behavior.

* * *

Political speech is " 'the primary object of First Amendment protection' " and "the lifeblood of a self-governing people." Colorado II, supra, at 465-466, 121 S.Ct. 2351 (THOMAS, J., dissenting). Contributions to political campaigns, no less than direct expenditures, "generate essential political speech" by fostering discussion of public issues and candidate qualifications. Shrink Missouri, supra, at 412 , 120 S.Ct. 897 (THOMAS, J., dissenting); see also id., at 410-411 , 120 S.Ct. 897 . Buckley itself recognized that both contribution and expenditure limits "operate in an area of the most fundamental First Amendment activities" and "implicate fundamental First Amendment interests." 424 U.S., at 14, 23 , 96 S.Ct. 612 . But instead of treating political giving and political spending alike, Buckley distinguished the two, embracing a bifurcated standard of review under which contribution limits receive less rigorous scrutiny. Id., at 25, 96 S.Ct. 612 .

As I have explained before, "[t]he analytic foundation of Buckley ... was tenuous from the very beginning and has only continued to erode in the intervening years." Shrink Missouri, supra, at 412 , 120 S.Ct. 897 (THOMAS, J., dissenting). To justify a lesser standard of review for contribution limits, Buckley relied on the premise that contributions are different in

The remaining justifications Buckley provided are also flawed. For example, Buckley claimed that contribution limits entail only a "marginal" speech restriction because "[a] contribution serves as a general expression of support for the candidate and his views, but does not communicate the underlying basis for the support." 424 U.S., at 20, 21 , 96 S.Ct. 612 . But this Court has never required a speaker to explain the reasons for his position in order to obtain full First Amendment protection. Instead, we have consistently held that speech is protected even "when the underlying basis for a position is not given." Shrink Missouri, supra, at 415, n. 3 , 120 S.Ct. 897 (THOMAS, J., dissenting); see, e.g., City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43 , 46, 114 S.Ct. 2038 , 129 L.Ed.2d 36 (1994) (sign reading "For Peace in the Gulf"); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 , 415-416, 109 S.Ct. 2533 , 105 L.Ed.2d 342 (1989) (flag burning); Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 , 510-511, 89 S.Ct. 733 , 21 L.Ed.2d 731 (1969) (black armband

Equally unpersuasive is Buckley 's suggestion that contribution limits warrant less stringent review because "[t]he quantity of communication by the contributor does not increase perceptibly with the size of his contribution," and "[a]t most, the size of the contribution provides a very rough index of the intensity of the contributor's support for the candidate." 424 U.S., at 21 , 96 S.Ct. 612 . Contributions do increase the quantity of communication by "amplifying the voice of the candidate" and "help[ing] to ensure the dissemination of the messages that the contributor wishes to convey." Shrink Missouri, supra, at 415 , 120 S.Ct. 897 (THOMAS, J., dissenting). They also serve as a quantifiable metric of the intensity of a particular contributor's support, as demonstrated by the frequent practice of giving different amounts to different candidates. Buckley simply failed to recognize that "we have accorded full First Amendment protection to expressions of intensity." Id., at 415, n. 3 , 120 S.Ct. 897 ; see also Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 , 25-26, 91 S.Ct. 1780 , 29 L.Ed.2d 284 (1971) (protecting the use of an obscenity for emphasis).

Although today's decision represents a faithful application of our precedents, the

contributor's freedom to discuss candidates and issues." Ibid.

That proposition, read in full, cannot be squared with a key premise of today's decision.

Among the Government's justifications for the aggregate limits set forth in the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA) is that "an individual can engage in the 'symbolic act of contributing' to as many entities as he wishes." Brief for Appellee 20. That is, the Government contends that aggregate limits are constitutional as long as an individual can still contribute some token amount (a dime, for example) to each of his preferred candidates. The plurality, quite correctly, rejects that argument, noting that "[i]t is no answer to say that the individual can simply contribute less money to more people." Ante, at 1449. That is so because "[t]o require one person to contribute at lower levels than others because he wants to support more candidates or causes is to impose a special burden on broader participation in the democratic process." Ibid.

What the plurality does not recognize is that the same logic also defeats the reasoning from Buckley on which the plurality purports to rely. Under the plurality's analysis, limiting the amount of money a person may give to a candidate does impose a direct restraint on his political communication; if it did not, the aggregate limits at issue here would not create "a special burden on broader participation in the democratic process." Ibid. I am wholly in agreement with the plurality's conclusion on this point: "[T]he Government may not penalize an individual for 'robustly exercis[ing]' his First Amendment rights." Ibid. (quoting Davis v. Federal Election Comm'n, 554 U.S. 724 , 739, 128 S.Ct. 2759 , 171 L.Ed.2d 737 (2008) ). I regret only that the plurality does not acknowledge that today's decision, although purporting not to overrule Buckley, continues to chip away at its footings.

In sum, what remains of Buckley is a rule without a rationale. Contributions and expenditures are simply "two

This case represents yet another missed opportunity to right the course of our campaign finance jurisprudence by restoring a standard that is faithful to the First Amendment. Until we undertake that reexamination, we remain in a "halfway house" of our own design. Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S., at 410 , 120 S.Ct. 897

upon protected political activity serves to prevent evasion of the $1,000 contribution limitation by a person who might otherwise contribute massive amounts of money to a particular candidate through the use of unearmarked contributions to political committees likely to contribute to that candidate, or huge contributions to the candidate's political party. The limited, additional restriction on associational freedom imposed by the overall ceiling is thus no more than a corollary of the basic individual contribution limitation that we have found to be constitutionally valid." 424 U.S., at 38 , 96 S.Ct. 612 .

Today a majority of the Court overrules this holding. It is wrong to do so. Its conclusion rests upon its own, not a record-based, view of the facts. Its legal analysis is faulty: It misconstrues the nature of the competing constitutional interests at stake. It understates the importance of protecting the political integrity of our governmental institutions. It creates a loophole that will allow a single individual to contribute millions of dollars to a political party or to a candidate's campaign. Taken together with Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310 , 130 S.Ct. 876 , 175 L.Ed.2d 753 (2010), today's decision eviscerates our Nation's campaign finance laws, leaving a remnant incapable of dealing with the grave problems of democratic legitimacy that those laws were intended to resolve.

The plurality concludes that the aggregate contribution limits " 'unnecessar [ily] abridg[e]' " First Amendment rights. Ante, at 1444 - 1445, 1456 - 1457 (quoting Buckley, supra, at 25, 96 S.Ct. 612 ). It notes that some individuals will wish to "spen[d] 'substantial amounts of money in order to communicate [their] political ideas through sophisticated' means." Ante, at 1447 - 1448 (quoting Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480 , 493, 105 S.Ct. 1459 , 84 L.Ed.2d 455 (1985) ( NCPAC ) ). Aggregate

The plurality's conclusion rests upon three separate but related claims. Each is fatally flawed. First, the plurality says that given the base limits on contributions to candidates and political committees, aggregate limits do not further any independent

This critically important definition of "corruption" is inconsistent with the Court's prior case law (with the possible exception of Citizens United, as I will explain below). It is virtually impossible to reconcile with this Court's decision in McConnell, upholding the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA). And it misunderstands the constitutional importance of the interests at stake. In fact, constitutional interests-indeed, First Amendment interests-lie on both sides of the legal equation.

A

In reality, as the history of campaign finance reform shows and as our earlier cases on the subject have recognized, the

What has this to do with corruption? It has everything to do with corruption. Corruption breaks the constitutionally necessary "chain of communication" between the people and their representatives. It derails the essential speech-to-government-action tie. Where enough money calls the tune, the general public will not be heard. Insofar as corruption cuts the link between political thought and political action, a free marketplace of political ideas loses its point. That is one reason why the Court has stressed the constitutional importance of Congress' concern that a few large donations not drown out the voices of

The "appearance of corruption" can make matters worse. It can lead the public to believe that its efforts to communicate with its representatives or to help sway public opinion have little purpose. And a cynical public can lose interest in political participation altogether. See Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S. 377 , 390, 120 S.Ct. 897 , 145 L.Ed.2d 886 (2000) ("[T]he cynical assumption that large donors call the tune could jeopardize the willingness of voters to take part in democratic governance"). Democracy, the Court has often said, cannot work unless "the people have faith in those who govern." United States v. Mississippi Valley Generating Co., 364 U.S. 520 , 562, 81 S.Ct. 294 , 5 L.Ed.2d 268 (1961).

The upshot is that the interests the Court has long described as preventing "corruption" or the "appearance of corruption" are more than ordinary factors to be weighed against the constitutional right to political speech. Rather, they are interests rooted in the First Amendment itself. They are rooted in the constitutional effort to create a democracy responsive to the people-a government where laws reflect the very thoughts, views, ideas, and sentiments, the expression of which the First Amendment protects. Given that end, we can and should understand campaign finance laws as resting upon a broader and more significant constitutional rationale than the plurality's limited definition of "corruption" suggests. We should see these laws as seeking in significant part to strengthen, rather than weaken, the First Amendment. To say this is not to deny the potential for

B

Since the kinds of corruption that can destroy the link between public opinion and governmental action extend well beyond those the plurality describes, the plurality's notion of corruption is flatly inconsistent with the basic constitutional rationale I have just described. Thus, it should surprise no one that this Court's case law ( Citizens United excepted) insists upon a considerably broader definition.

In Buckley, for instance, the Court said explicitly that aggregate limits were constitutional because they helped "prevent evasion ... [through] huge contributions to the candidate's political party," 424 U.S., at 26 , 96 S.Ct. 612 (the contrary to what the plurality today seems to believe, see ante, at 1460 - 1462). Moreover, Buckley upheld the base limits in significant part because they helped thwart "the

C

Most important, in McConnell, this Court considered the constitutionality of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, an Act that set new limits on "soft money" contributions to political parties. "Soft money" referred to funds that, prior to BCRA, were freely donated to parties for activities other than directly helping elect a federal candidate-activities such as voter registration, "get out the vote" drives, and advertising that did not expressly advocate a federal candidate's election or defeat. 540 U.S., at 122-124 , 124 S.Ct. 619 . BCRA imposed a new ban on soft money contributions to national party committees, and greatly curtailed them in respect to state and local parties. Id., at 133-134, 161-164 , 124 S.Ct. 619 .

The Court in McConnell upheld these new contribution restrictions under the First Amendment for the very reason the plurality today discounts or ignores. Namely, the Court found they thwarted a significant risk of corruption-understood not as quid pro quo bribery, but as privileged access to and pernicious influence upon elected representatives.

In reaching its conclusion in McConnell, the Court relied upon a vast record compiled in the District Court. That record

This Court upheld BCRA's limitations on soft money contributions by relying on just the kind of evidence I have described. We wrote:

"The evidence in the record shows that candidates and donors alike have in fact exploited the soft-money loophole, the former to increase their prospects of election and the latter to create debt on the part of officeholders.... Plaintiffs argue that without concrete evidence of an instance in which a federal officeholder has actually switched a vote [in exchange for soft money] ..., Congress has not shown that there exists real or apparent corruption.... [P]laintiffs conceive of corruption too narrowly. Our cases have firmly established that Congress' legitimate interest extends beyond preventing simple cash-for-votes corruption to curbing 'undue influence on an officeholder's judgment, and the appearance of such influence.' " 540 U.S., at 146, 149-150 , 124 S.Ct. 619 (quoting Colorado II, 533 U.S., at 441 , 121 S.Ct. 2351 ; emphasis added; paragraphs and paragraph breaks omitted).

We specifically rejected efforts to define "corruption" in ways similar to those the plurality today accepts. We added:

"Just as troubling to a functioning democracy as classic quid pro quo corruption is the danger that officeholders will decide issues not on the merits or the desires of their constituencies, but according to the wishes of those who have made large financial contributions valued by the officeholder." 540 U.S., at 153 , 124 S.Ct. 619 .

Insofar as today's decision sets forth a significantly narrower definition of "corruption," and hence of the public's interest in political integrity, it is flatly inconsistent with McConnell.

D

The plurality's use of Citizens United 's narrow definition of corruption here, however, is a different matter. That use does not come accompanied with a limiting context (independent expenditures by corporations and unions) or limiting language. It applies to the whole of campaign finance regulation. And, as I have pointed out, it is flatly inconsistent with the broader definition of corruption upon which McConnell 's holding depends.

So: Does the Court intend today to overrule McConnell ? Or does it intend to leave McConnell and BCRA in place? The plurality says the latter. Ante, at 1451, n. 6 ("Our holding about the constitutionality of the aggregate limits clearly does not overrule McConnell 's holding about 'soft money' "). But how does the plurality explain its rejection of the broader definition of corruption, upon which McConnell 's holding depends? Compare ante, at 1450 - 1452, with McConnell, 540 U.S., at 146, 149-153 , 124 S.Ct. 619 .

The plurality invalidates the aggregate contribution limits for a second reason. It believes they are no longer needed to prevent contributors from circumventing federal limits on direct contributions to individuals, political parties, and political action committees. Ante, at 1452 - 1456. Cf. Buckley, 424 U.S., at 38 , 96 S.Ct. 612 (aggregate limits "prevent evasion" of

The plurality is wrong. Here, as in Buckley , in the absence of limits on aggregate political contributions, donors can and likely will find ways to channel millions of dollars to parties and to individual candidates, producing precisely the kind of "corruption" or "appearance of corruption" that previously led the Court to hold aggregate limits constitutional. Those opportunities for circumvention will also produce the type of corruption that concerns the plurality today. The methods for using today's opinion to evade the law's individual contribution limits are complex, but they are well known, or will become well known, to party fundraisers. I shall describe three.

A

Example One: Gifts for the Benefit of the Party . Campaign finance law permits each individual to give $64,800 over two years to a national party committee. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(B) ; 78 Fed.Reg. 8532 (2013). The two major political parties each have three national committees. Ante, at 1442, n. 1. Federal law also entitles an individual to give $20,000 to a state party committee over two years. § 441a(a)(1)(D). Each major political party has 50 such committees. Those individual limits mean that, in the absence of any aggregate limit, an individual could legally give to the Republican Party or to the Democratic Party about $1.2 million over two years. See Appendix B, Table 1, infra, at 1485. To make it easier for contributors to give gifts of this size, each party could create a "Joint Party Committee," comprising all of its national and state party committees. The titular heads could be the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Minority Leader of the House. A contributor could then write a single check to the Joint Party Committee-and its staff would divide the funds so that each

Will political parties seek these large checks? Why not? The recipient national and state committees can spend the money to buy generic party advertisements, say television commercials or bumper stickers saying "Support Republicans," "Support Democrats," or the like. They also can transfer the money to party committees in battleground States to increase the chances of winning hotly contested seats. See § 441a(a)(4) (permitting national or state political committees to make unlimited "transfers" to other committees "of the same political party").

Will party officials and candidates solicit these large contributions from wealthy donors? Absolutely. Such contributions will help increase the party's power, as well as the candidate's standing among his colleagues.

Will elected officials be particularly grateful to the large donor, feeling obliged to provide him special access and influence, and perhaps even a quid pro quo legislative favor? That is what we have

Example Two: Donations to Individual Candidates (The $3.6 Million Check) . The first example significantly understates the problem. That is because federal election law also allows a single contributor to give $5,200 to each party candidate over a 2-year election cycle (assuming the candidate is running in both a primary and a general election). § 441a(a)(1)(A) ; 78 Fed.Reg. 8532. There are 435 party candidates for House seats and 33 party candidates for Senate seats in any given election year. That makes an additional $2.4 million in allowable contributions. Thus, without an aggregate limit, the law will permit a wealthy individual to write a check, over a 2-year election cycle, for $3.6 million-all to benefit his political party and its candidates. See Appendix B, Table 2(a), infra, at 1485.

To make it easier for a wealthy donor to make a contribution of this size, the parties can simply enlarge the composition of the Joint Party Committee described in Example One, so that it now includes party candidates. And a party can proliferate such joint entities, perhaps calling the first the "Smith Victory Committee," the second the "Jones Victory Committee," and the like. See 11 CFR § 102.17 (c)(5) (2012). (I say "perhaps" because too transparent a name might call into play certain earmarking rules. But the Federal Election Commission's (FEC) database of joint fundraising committees in 2012 shows similarly named entities, e.g., "Landrieu Wyden Victory Fund," etc.).

As I have just said, without any aggregate limit, the law will allow Rich Donor to write a single check to, say, the Smith Victory Committee, for up to $3.6 million. This check represents "the total amount that the contributor could contribute to all of the participants" in the Committee over a

So what is wrong with that? The check is considerably larger than Example One 's check. But is there anything else wrong? The answer is yes, absolutely. The law will also permit a party and its candidates to shift most of Rich Donor's contributions to a single candidate, say Smith. Here is how:

The law permits each candidate and each party committee in the Smith Victory Committee to write Candidate Smith a check directly. For his primary and general elections combined, they can write checks of up to $4,000 (from each candidate's authorized campaign committee) and $10,000 (from each state and national committee). 2 U.S.C. §§ 432 (e)(3)(B),

The parties can apply the same procedure to other large donations, channeling money from Rich Donor Two to Candidate Jones. If 10 or 20 candidates face particularly tight races, party committees and party candidates may work together to channel Rich Donor One's multimillion dollar contribution to the Most Embattled Candidate ( e.g., Candidate Smith), Rich Donor Two's multimillion dollar contribution to the Second Most Embattled Candidate ( e.g., Candidate Jones), and so on down the line. If this does not count as evasion of the base limits, what does? Present aggregate limits confine the size of any individual gift to $123,200. Today's opinion creates a loophole measured in the millions.

Example Three: Proliferating Political Action Committees (PACs) . Campaign finance law prohibits an individual from contributing (1) more than $5,200 to any candidate in a federal election cycle, and (2) more than $5,000 to a PAC in a calendar year. 2 U.S.C. §§ 441a(a)(1)(A), (C) ; 78 Fed.Reg. 8532. It also prohibits (3) any PAC from contributing more than $10,000 to any candidate in an election cycle. § 441(a)(2)(A). But the law does not prohibit an individual from contributing (within the current $123,200 biannual aggregate limit) $5,000 to each of an unlimited total number of PACs. And there, so to speak, lies the rub.

Here is how, without any aggregate limits, a party will be able to channel $2 million from each of ten Rich Donors to each

The plurality's view depends in large part upon its claim that since this Court decided Buckley in 1976, changes in either statutory law or in applicable regulations have come to make it difficult, if not impossible, for these circumvention scenarios to arise. Hence, it concludes, there is no longer a need for aggregate contribution limits. See ante, at 1446 - 1447, 1452 - 1456. But a closer examination of the five legal changes to which the plurality points makes clear that those changes cannot effectively stop the abuses that I have depicted.

First, the plurality points out that in 1976 (a few months after this Court decided Buckley ) Congress "added limits on contributions to political committees," i.e., to PACs. Ante, at 1446; accord, 90 Stat. 487 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(C) ). But Example Three, the here-relevant example, takes account of those limits, namely, $5,000 to a PAC in any given year. And it shows that the per-PAC limit does not matter much when it comes to the potential for circumvention, as long as party supporters can create dozens or hundreds of PACs. Federal law places no upper limit on the number of PACs supporting a party or a group of party candidates that can be established. And creating a PAC is primarily

Second, the plurality points out that in 1976, Congress "also added an antiproliferation

Fourth, the plurality points out that the FEC's regulations "specify that an individual who has contributed to a particular candidate committee may not also contribute to a single- candidate committee for that candidate." Ante, at 1447 (citing 11 CFR § 110.1 (h)(1) ; emphasis added). The regulations, however, do not prevent a person who has contributed to a candidate from also contributing to multi candidate committees that support the candidate. Indeed, the rules specifically authorize such contributions. See § 110.1(h) ("A person may contribute to a candidate ... and also contribute to a political committee which has supported, or anticipates supporting, the same candidate in the same election," as long as the political committee is "not the candidate's principal campaign committee" or a "single candidate committee" (emphasis added)). Example Three illustrates the latter kind of contribution. And briefs before us make clear that the possibility for circumventing the base limits through making such contributions is a realistic, not an illusory, one. See Brief

In fact, however, this regulation is not the strong anti-circumvention weapon that the plurality imagines. Despite the plurality's assurances, it does not "disarm" the possibilities for circumvention. Ante, at 1452 - 1453. That is because the regulation requires a showing that donors have " knowledge that a substantial portion " of their contributions will be used by a PAC to support a candidate to whom they have already contributed. § 110.1(h)(2) (emphasis added). And "knowledge" is hard to prove.

I have found nine FEC cases decided since the year 2000 that refer to this regulation. In all but one, the FEC failed to find the requisite "knowledge"-despite the presence of Example Two or Example Three circumstances. See Factual and Legal Analysis, In re: Transfund PAC, Matter Under Review (MUR) 6221, p. 11 (FEC, June 7, 2010) (although the donor "might reasonably infer that some portion of his contribution" to a candidate's Leadership PAC would be used to support the candidate, "such an inference alone does not suggest that [he] had 'actual knowledge' " of such); Factual and Legal Analysis, In re: John Shadegg's Friends, MUR 5968, pp. 3, 6-7 (FEC, Nov. 10, 2008) ("[T]here is no basis on which to conclude that [the donors] knew that the

Thus, it is not surprising that throughout the many years this FEC regulation has been in effect, political parties and candidates have established ever more joint fundraising committees (numbering over 500 in the last federal elections); candidates have established ever more "Leadership PACs" (numbering over 450 in the last elections); and party supporters have established ever more multicandidate PACs (numbering over 3,000 in the last elections). See Appendix C, Tables 2-3, infra, at 1488 - 1489; FEC, 2014 Committee Summary (reporting the number of "qualified" (or multicandidate) PACs in 2012), online at http://www.fec.gov/data/CommitteeSummary.do (all Internet materials as visited Mar. 28, 2014, and available in Clerk of Court's case file).

Using these entities, candidates, parties, and party supporters can transfer and, we are told, have transferred large sums of money to specific candidates, thereby avoiding the base contribution limits in ways that Examples Two and Three help demonstrate. See Brief for Appellee 38-39, 53-54; Brief for Campaign Legal Center, et al. as Amici Curiae 12-15;

In sum, the explanation of why aggregate limits are needed is complicated, as is the explanation of why other methods will not work. But the conclusion is simple: There is no "substantial mismatch" between Congress' legitimate objective and the "means selected to achieve it." Ante, at 1445 - 1446. The Court, as in Buckley , should hold that aggregate contribution limits are constitutional.

V

The District Court in this case, holding that Buckley foreclosed McCutcheon's constitutional challenge to the aggregate limits, granted the Government's motion to dismiss the complaint prior to a full evidentiary hearing. See 893 F.Supp.2d 133 , 140-141 (D.C.2012). If the plurality now believes the District Court was wrong, then why does it not return the case for the further evidentiary development which has not yet taken place?

In the past, when evaluating the constitutionality of campaign finance restrictions, we have typically relied upon an evidentiary record amassed below to determine whether the law served a compelling governmental objective. And, typically, that record contained testimony from Members of Congress (or state legislators) explaining why Congress (or the legislature) acted as it did. See, e.g., McConnell, 540 U.S., at 147-154 , 124 S.Ct. 619 (upholding federal restrictions on soft money by

Without further development of the record, however, I fail to see how the plurality can now find grounds for overturning Buckley. The justification for aggregate contribution restrictions is strongly rooted in the need to assure political integrity and ultimately in the First Amendment itself. Part II, supra. The threat to that integrity posed by the risk of special access and influence remains real. Part III, supra. Even taking the plurality on its own terms and considering solely the threat of quid pro quo corruption ( i.e., money-for-votes exchanges), the aggregate limits are a necessary tool to stop circumvention. Ibid. And there is no basis for finding a lack of "fit" between the threat and the means used to combat it, namely the aggregate limits. Part IV, supra .

With respect, I dissent.

APPENDIXES

A

Existence of Large Donations

Expert Report: "During the 1996 election cycle, the top 50 nonfederal money donors made contributions ranging from $530,000 to $3,287,175.... Soft money financing of party campaigning exploded in the 2000 election cycle. Soft money spending by the national parties reached $498 million, now 42% of their total spending. Raising a half billion dollars in soft money [in 2000] took a major effort by the national parties and elected officials, but they had the advantage of focusing their efforts on large donors.... The top 50 soft money donors ... each contributed between $955,695 and $5,949,000." 251 F.Supp.2d, at 440 (opinion of Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (citing T. Mann Expert Report, pp. 22, 24-25)

Candidate Solicitation of Large Donations

Judicial Finding of Fact: "It is a common practice for Members of Congress to be involved in raising both federal and non-federal dollars for the national party committees, sometimes at the parties' request. The personal involvement of high-ranking Members of Congress is a major component of raising federal and nonfederal funds." 251 F.Supp.2d, at 471 .

Senator Paul Simon: " 'While I was in Congress, the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC) and the Democratic

Senator John McCain: " '[T]he parties encourage Members of Congress to raise large amounts of soft money to benefit their own and others' re-election. At one recent caucus meeting, a Member of Congress was praised for raising $1.3 million dollars for the party. James Greenwood, a Republican Congressman from Pennsylvania, recently told the New York Times that House leaders consider soft money fundraising prowess in assigning chairmanships and other sought-after jobs.... I share Mr. Greenwood's concerns.' " Id., at 476 (quoting McCain Decl. ¶ 7).

Representative Christopher Shays: " 'Soft money is raised directly by federal candidates, officeholders, and national political party leaders. National party officials often raise these funds by promising donors access to elected officials. The national parties and national congressional campaign committees also request that Members of Congress make the calls to soft money donors to solicit more funds.' " Id., at 471 (quoting Shays Decl. ¶ 18).

Representative Marty Meehan: " 'Members of Congress raise money for the national party committees, and I have been involved in such fund-raising for the Democratic Party. At the request of the Party Members of Congress go to the [DCCC] and call prospective donors from lists provided by the Party to ask them to participate

Senator Fred Thompson: " 'We have gone from basically a small donor system ... where the average person believed they had a stake, believed they had a voice, to one of extremely large amounts of money, where you are not a player unless you are in the $100,000 or $200,000 range [or more]....' " Id., at 433 (quoting 147 Cong. Rec. 4622 (2001)).

Former DNC official: "Former DNC and DSCC official and current lobbyist Robert Hickmott testifies that even incumbents with safe seats have incentives to raise money for the parties. He explains: 'Incumbents who were not raising money for themselves because they were not up for reelection would sometimes raise money for other Senators, or for challengers. They would send $20,000 to the DSCC and ask that it be entered on another candidate's tally. They might do this, for example, if they were planning to run for a leadership position and wanted to obtain support from the Senators they assisted. This would personally benefit them, in addition to doing their part to help retain Democratic control of the Senate, which would preserve the legislative power of all Democratic senators.' " 251 F.Supp.2d, at 475-476 (quoting Hickmott Decl., Exh. A ¶ 18).

Judicial Finding of Fact: "The DSCC maintains a 'credit' program that credits nonfederal money raised by a Senator or candidate to that Senator or candidate's state party. Amounts credited to a state party can reflect that the Senator or candidate solicited the donation, or can serve as a donor's

Judicial Finding of Fact: "Federal candidates also raise nonfederal money through joint fundraising committees formed with national committees. One common method of joint fundraising is for a national congressional committee to form a separate joint fundraising committee with a federal candidate committee.... Two experts characterize the joint fundraising system as one 'in which Senate candidates in effect raise[ ] soft money for use in their own races.' " Id., at 478 (quoting J. Krasno and F. Sorauf Expert Report, p. 13; citation omitted).

Donor Access and Influence

Judicial Finding of Fact: "The fact that Members of Congress are intimately involved in the raising of money for the political parties, particularly unlimited nonfederal money donations, creates opportunities for corruption. The record does not contain any evidence of bribery or vote buying in exchange for donations of nonfederal money; however, the evidence presented in this case convincingly demonstrates that large contributions, particularly those nonfederal contributions surpassing the federal limits, provide donors access to federal lawmakers which is a critical ingredient for influencing legislation, and which the Supreme Court has determined

Political donor: " 'As a result of my $500,000 soft money donation to the DNC, I was offered the chance to attend events with the President, including events at the White House, a number of times. I was offered special access....' " 251 F.Supp.2d, at 499 (quoting Arnold Hiatt Decl. ¶ 9).

Senator Alan Simpson: " 'Too often, Members' first thought is not what is right or wrong or what they believe, but how will it affect fundraising. Who, after all, can seriously contend that a $100,000 donation does not alter the way one thinks about-and quite possibly votes on-an issue? ... When you don't pay the piper that finances your campaigns, you will never get any more money from that piper. Since money is the mother's milk of politics, you never want to be in that situation.' " 251 F.Supp.2d, at 481 (quoting Simpson Decl. ¶ 10).

Senator Alan Simpson: " 'Large donors of both hard and soft money receive special treatment. No matter how busy a politician may be during the day, he or she will always make time to see donors who gave large amounts of money. Staffers who work for Members know who the big donors are, and those people always get their phone calls returned first and are allowed to see the Member when others are not.' " 251 F.Supp.2d, at 481-482 (quoting Simpson Decl. ¶ 9).

Senator David Boren: " 'Donations, including soft money donations to political parties, do affect how Congress operates. It's only natural, and happens all too often, that a busy Senator with 10 minutes to spare will spend those minutes returning the call of a large soft money donor rather than the

Senator Dale Bumpers: "[Senator Bumpers] had 'heard that some Members even keep lists of big donors in their offices,' and [stated] that 'you cannot be a good Democratic or good Republican Member and not be aware of who gave money to the party.' " 251 F.Supp.2d, at 487 (quoting Bumpers Decl. ¶¶ 18, 20).

Representative Christopher Shays: " 'The candidates know who makes these huge contributions and what these donors expect. Candidates not only solicit these funds themselves, they meet with big donors who have important issues pending before the government; and sometimes, the candidates' or the party's position appear to change after such meetings.' " 251 F.Supp.2d, at 487 (quoting 148 Cong Rec. 1305 (2002)).

Senator John McCain: " 'At a minimum, large soft money donations purchase an opportunity for the donors to make their case to elected officials ... in a way average citizens cannot.' " 251 F.Supp.2d, at 496 (quoting McCain Decl. ¶ 6).

Senator Warren Rudman: " 'I understand that those who opposed passage of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, and those who now challenge its constitutionality in Court, dare elected officials to point to specific [instances of vote buying]. I think this misses the point altogether. [The access and influence accorded large donors] is inherently, endemically, and hopelessly corrupting. You can't swim in the ocean without getting wet; you can't be part of this system without getting dirty.' " 251 F.Supp.2d, at 481 (quoting Rudman Decl. ¶ 10).

Judicial Finding of Fact: "Lobbyists state that their clients make donations to political parties to achieve access." 251 F.Supp.2d, at 489 .

Letter from Republican National Committee (RNC) staffer: " 'As you know, [this executive] has been very generous to the RNC. If there is any way you can assist [in obtaining an appointment with an important Senator], it would be greatly appreciated.' " Id., at 501 (quoting Memorandum from Tim Barnes, RNC, to Royal Roth).

Letter from RNC: "[The] letter from RNC to Senator Hagel staffer [asks] Senator Hagel to meet with a donor for four 'key' reasons including: ... '[h]e just contributed $100,000 to the RNC.' " Ibid. (quoting a letter in the judicial record).

Judicial Finding of Fact: "The political parties have structured their donation programs so that donors are encouraged to contribute larger amounts in order to get access to more exclusive and intimate events at which Members or Congress are present. The evidence also shows that the parties use

B

McCutcheon and the RNC appealed directly to this Court, as authorized by law. 28 U.S.C. § 1253 . In such a case, "we ha[ve] no discretion to refuse adjudication of the case on its merits," Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 , 344, 95 S.Ct. 2281 , 45 L.Ed.2d 223 (1975), and accordingly we noted probable jurisdiction. 568 U.S. ----, 133 S.Ct. 1242 , 185 L.Ed.2d 177 (2013).

II

A

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 , 96 S.Ct. 612 , 46 L.Ed.2d 659 , presented this Court with its first opportunity to evaluate the constitutionality of the original contribution and expenditure limits set forth in FECA. FECA imposed a $1,000 per election base limit on contributions from an individual to a federal candidate. It also imposed a $25,000 per year aggregate limit on all contributions from an individual to candidates or political committees. 18 U.S.C. §§ 608 (b)(1), 608(b)(3) (1970 ed., Supp. IV). On the expenditures side, FECA imposed limits on both independent expenditures and candidates' overall campaign expenditures. §§ 608(e)(1), 608(c).

Buckley recognized that "contribution and expenditure limitations operate in an area of the most fundamental First Amendment activities." 424 U.S., at 14 , 96 S.Ct. 612 . But it distinguished expenditure limits from contribution limits based on

Because we find a substantial mismatch between the Government's stated objective and the means selected to achieve it, the aggregate limits fail even under the "closely drawn" test. We therefore need not parse the differences between the two standards in this case.

2

The intricate regulatory scheme that the Federal Election Commission has enacted since Buckley further limits the opportunities for circumvention of the base limits via "unearmarked contributions to political committees likely to contribute" to a particular candidate. 424 U.S., at 38 , 96 S.Ct. 612 . Although the earmarking provision, 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(8), was in place when Buckley was decided, the FEC has since added regulations that define earmarking broadly. For example, the regulations construe earmarking to include any designation, "whether direct or indirect, express or implied, oral or

Those First Amendment rights are important regardless whether the individual is, on the one hand, a "lone pamphleteer[ ] or street corner orator[ ] in the Tom Paine mold," or is, on the other, someone who spends "substantial amounts of money in order to communicate [his] political ideas through sophisticated" means. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S., at 493 , 105 S.Ct. 1459 . Either way, he is participating in an electoral debate that we have recognized

It is no answer to say that the individual can simply contribute less money to more people. To require one person to contribute at lower levels than others because he wants to support more candidates or causes is to impose a special

Third, our established First Amendment analysis already takes account of any "collective" interest that may justify restrictions on individual speech. Under that accepted analysis, such restrictions are measured against the asserted public interest (usually framed as an important or compelling governmental interest). As explained below, we do not doubt the compelling nature of the "collective" interest in preventing corruption in the electoral process. But we permit Congress to pursue that interest only so long as it does not unnecessarily infringe an individual's right to freedom of speech; we do not truncate this tailoring test at the outset.

A

With the significant First Amendment costs for individual citizens in mind, we turn to the governmental interests asserted in this case. This Court has identified only one legitimate governmental interest for restricting campaign finances: preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption.

The dissent advocates a broader conception of corruption, and would apply the label to any individual contributions above limits deemed necessary to protect "collective speech." Thus, under the dissent's view, it is perfectly fine to contribute $5,200 to nine candidates but somehow corrupt to give the same amount to a tenth.

It is fair to say, as Justice Stevens has, "that we have not always spoken about corruption in a clear or consistent voice." Id., at 447 , 130 S.Ct. 876 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part). The definition of corruption that we apply today, however, has firm roots in Buckley itself. The Court in that case upheld base contribution limits because they targeted "the danger of actual quid pro quo arrangements" and "the impact of the appearance of corruption stemming from public awareness" of such a system of unchecked direct contributions. 424 U.S., at 27 , 96 S.Ct. 612 . Buckley simultaneously rejected limits on spending that was less likely to "be given as a quid pro quo for improper commitments from the candidate." Id., at 47, 96 S.Ct. 612 . In any event, this case is not the first in which the debate over the proper breadth of the Government's anticorruption interest has been engaged. Compare Citizens

The primary example of circumvention, in one form or another, envisions an individual donor who contributes the maximum amount under the base limits to a particular candidate, say, Representative Smith. Then the donor also channels "massive amounts of money" to Smith through a series of contributions to PACs that have stated their intention to support Smith. See, e.g., Brief for Appellee 35-37; Tr. of Oral Arg. 4, 6.

Various earmarking and antiproliferation rules disarm this example. Importantly, the donor may not contribute to the most obvious PACs: those that support only Smith. See 11 CFR § 110.1 (h)(1) ; see also § 102.14(a). Nor may the donor

Moreover, if 100 PACs were to contribute to Smith and few other candidates, and if specific individuals like our ardent Smith supporter were to contribute to each, the FEC could weigh those "circumstantial factors" to determine whether to deem the PACs affiliated. 11 CFR § 100.5 (g)(4)(ii). The FEC's analysis could take account of a "common or overlapping membership" and "similar patterns of contributions or contributors," among other considerations. §§ 100.5(g)(4)(ii)(D), (J). The FEC has in the past initiated enforcement proceedings against contributors with such suspicious patterns of PAC donations. See, e.g., Conciliation Agreement, In re Riley, Matters Under Review 4568, 4633, 4634, 4736 (FEC, Dec. 19, 2001).

On a more basic level, it is hard to believe that a rational actor would engage in such machinations. In the example described, a dedicated donor spent $500,000-donating the full $5,000 to 100 different PACs-to add just $26,000 to

One problem, however, is that the District Court's speculation relies on illegal earmarking. Lest there be any confusion, a joint fundraising committee is simply a mechanism for individual committees to raise funds collectively, not to circumvent base limits or earmarking rules. See 11 CFR § 102.17 (c)(5). Under no circumstances may a contribution to a joint fundraising committee result in an allocation that exceeds the contribution limits applicable to its constituent parts; the committee is in fact required to return any excess funds to the contributor. See § 102.17(c)(6)(i).

The District Court assumed compliance with the specific allocation rules governing joint fundraising committees, but it expressly based its example on the premise that the donor would telegraph his desire to support one candidate and that "many separate entities would willingly serve as conduits for a single contributor's interests." 893 F.Supp.2d, at 140 . Regardless whether so many distinct entities would cooperate as a practical matter, the earmarking provision prohibits an individual from directing funds "through an intermediary or conduit" to a particular candidate. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(8). Even the "implicit[ ]" agreement imagined by the District Court, 893 F.Supp.2d, at 140 , would trigger the earmarking provision. See 11 CFR § 110.6 (b)(1). So this circumvention scenario could not succeed without assuming that nearly 50 separate party committees would engage in a transparent violation of the earmarking rules (and that they would not be caught if they did).

Moreover, the District Court failed to acknowledge that its $500,000 example cannot apply to most candidates. It crafted the example around a presidential candidate, for

1

The Government argues that the aggregate limits are justified because they prevent an individual from giving to too many initial recipients who might subsequently recontribute a donation. After all, only recontributed funds can conceivably give rise to circumvention of the base limits. Yet all

Indeed, Congress has adopted transfer restrictions, and the Court has upheld them, in the context of state party spending. See 2 U.S.C. § 441i(b). So-called "Levin funds" are donations permissible under state law that may be spent on certain federal election activity-namely, voter registration and identification, get-out-the-vote efforts, or generic campaign activities. Levin funds are raised directly by the state or local party committee that ultimately spends them. § 441i(b)(2)(B)(iv). That means that other party committees may not transfer Levin funds, solicit Levin funds on behalf of the particular state or local committee, or engage in joint fundraising of Levin funds. See McConnell, 540 U.S., at 171-173 , 124 S.Ct. 619 . McConnell upheld those transfer restrictions as "justifiable anticircumvention measures," though it acknowledged that they posed some associational burdens. Id., at 171 , 124 S.Ct. 619 . Here, a narrow transfer restriction on contributions that could otherwise be recontributed in excess of the base limits could rely on a similar justification.

Other alternatives might focus on earmarking. Many of the scenarios that the Government and the dissent hypothesize involve at least implicit agreements to circumvent the

Of course a candidate would be pleased with a donor who contributed not only to the candidate himself, but also to other candidates from the same party, to party committees, and to PACs supporting the party. But there is a clear, administrable line between money beyond the base limits funneled in an identifiable way to a candidate-for which the candidate feels obligated-and money within the base limits given widely to a candidate's party-for which the

The Government has a strong interest, no less critical to our democratic system, in combatting corruption and its appearance. We have, however, held that this interest must be limited to a specific kind of corruption- quid pro quo corruption-in order to ensure that the Government's efforts do not have the effect of restricting the First Amendment right of citizens to choose who shall govern them. For the reasons set forth, we conclude that the aggregate limits on contributions do not further the only governmental interest this Court accepted as legitimate in Buckley . They instead intrude without justification on a citizen's ability to exercise "the most fundamental First Amendment activities." Buckley, 424 U.S., at 14 , 96 S.Ct. 612 .

The judgment of the District Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings.

It is so ordered.

Justice THOMAS, concurring in the judgment.

"A limitation on the amount of money a person may give to a candidate or campaign organization thus involves little direct restraint on his political communication, for it permits the symbolic expression of support evidenced by a contribution but does not in any way infringe the

Justice BREYER, with whom Justice GINSBURG, Justice SOTOMAYOR, and Justice KAGAN join, dissenting.

Nearly 40 years ago in Buckley v . Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 , 96 S.Ct. 612 , 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976) ( per curiam ), this Court considered the constitutionality of laws that imposed limits upon the overall amount a single person can contribute to all federal candidates, political parties, and committees taken together. The Court held that those limits did not violate the Constitution. Id., at 38, 96 S.Ct. 612 ; accord, McConnell v. Federal Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93 , 138, n. 40, 152-153, n. 48, 124 S.Ct. 619 , 157 L.Ed.2d 491 (2003) (citing with approval Buckley 's aggregate limits holding).

The Buckley Court focused upon the same problem that concerns the Court today, and it wrote:

"The overall $25,000 ceiling does impose an ultimate restriction upon the number of candidates and committees with which an individual may associate himself by means of financial support. But this quite modest restraint

Second, the plurality assesses the instrumental objective of the aggregate limits, namely, safeguarding the base limits. It finds that they "do not serve that function in any meaningful way." Ante, at 1452. That is because, even without the aggregate limits, the possibilities for circumventing the base limits are "implausible" and "divorced from reality." Ante, at 1452 - 1453, 1453 - 1454, 1455 - 1456.

Third, the plurality says the aggregate limits are not a " 'reasonable' " policy tool. Rather, they are "poorly tailored to the Government's interest in preventing circumvention of the base limits." Ante, at 1456 - 1457 (quoting Board of Trustees of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469 , 480, 109 S.Ct. 3028 , 106 L.Ed.2d 388 (1989) ). The plurality imagines several alternative regulations that it says might just as effectively thwart circumvention. Accordingly, it finds, the aggregate caps are out of " 'proportion to the [anticorruption] interest served.' " Ante, at 1456 - 1457 (quoting Fox, supra, at 480 , 109 S.Ct. 3028 ).

Consider at least one reason why the First Amendment protects political speech. Speech does not exist in a vacuum. Rather, political communication seeks to secure government action. A politically oriented "marketplace of ideas" seeks to form a public opinion that can and will influence elected representatives.

This is not a new idea. Eighty-seven years ago, Justice Brandeis wrote that the First Amendment's protection of speech was "essential to effective democracy." Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 , 377, 47 S.Ct. 641 , 71 L.Ed. 1095 (1927) (concurring opinion). Chief Justice Hughes reiterated the same idea shortly thereafter: "A fundamental principle of our constitutional system" is the "maintenance of the opportunity for free political discussion to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the people." Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 , 369, 51 S.Ct. 532 , 75 L.Ed. 1117 (1931) (emphasis added). In Citizens United, the Court stated that "[s]peech is an essential mechanism of democracy, for it is the means to hold officials accountable to the people." 558 U.S., at 339 , 130 S.Ct. 876 (emphasis added).

The Framers had good reason to emphasize this same connection between political speech and governmental action. An influential 18th-century continental philosopher had argued that in a representative democracy, the people lose control of their representatives between elections, during which interim periods they were "in chains." J. Rousseau, An Inquiry Into the Nature of the Social Contract 265-266 (transl. 1791).

The Framers responded to this criticism both by requiring frequent elections to federal office, and by enacting a First Amendment that would facilitate a "chain of communication

That is also why the Court has used the phrase "subversion of the political process" to describe circumstances in which "[e]lected officials are influenced to act contrary to their obligations of office by the prospect of financial gain to themselves or infusions of money into their campaigns."

Other cases put the matter yet more strongly. In Beaumont, for example, the Court found constitutional a ban on direct contributions by corporations because of the need to prevent corruption, properly "understood not only as quid pro quo

Testimony by elected officials supported this conclusion. See, e.g., ibid. (" 'Large donors of both hard and soft money receive special treatment' " (Sen. Simpson)); id., at 482 (" 'Donations, including soft money donations to political parties, do affect how Congress operates. It's only natural, and happens all too often, that a busy Senator with 10 minutes to spare will spend those minutes returning the call of a large soft money donor' " (Sen. Boren)); id., at 496 (" 'At a minimum, large soft money donations purchase an opportunity for the donors to make their case to elected officials ...' " (Sen. McCain)). Furthermore, testimony from party operatives showed that national political parties had created "major donor programs," through which they openly "offer[ed]

How should we treat these statements from Citizens United now? They are not essential to the Court's holding in the case-at least insofar as it can be read to require federal law to treat corporations and trade unions like individuals when they independently pay for, e.g., television advertising during the last 60 days of a federal election. Citizens United, supra, at 365, 130 S.Ct. 876 . Taken literally, the statements cited simply refer to and characterize still-earlier Court cases. They do not require the more absolute reading that the plurality here gives them.

More than that. Read as the plurality reads them today, the statements from Citizens United about the proper contours of the corruption rationale conflict not just with language in the McConnell opinion, but with McConnell 's very holding. See supra, at 1469 - 1470. Did the Court in Citizens United intend to overrule McConnell ? I doubt it, for if it did, the Court or certainly the dissent would have said something about it. The total silence of all opinions in Citizens United with respect to this matter argues strongly in favor of treating the language quoted above as dictum, as an overstatement, or as limited to the context in which it appears. Citizens United itself contains language that supports the last mentioned reading, for it says that "[ Buckley ] did not

The upshot is that Candidate Smith can receive at least $2.37 million and possibly the full $3.6 million contributed by Rich Donor to the Smith Victory Committee, even though the funds must first be divided up among the constituent units before they can be rerouted to Smith. Nothing requires

The upshot is that ten Rich Donors will have contributed $2 million each, and ten Embattled Candidates will have collected $2 million each. In this example, unlike Example Two, the recipient candidates may not know which of the ten Rich Donors is personally responsible for the $2 million he or she receives. But the recipient candidate is highly likely to know who the ten Rich Donors are, and to feel appropriately grateful. Moreover, the ability of a small group of donors to contribute this kind of money to threatened candidates is not insignificant. In the example above-with ten Rich Donors giving $2 million each, and ten Embattled Candidates receiving $2 million each-the contributions would have been enough to finance a considerable portion of, and perhaps all of, the candidates' races in the 2012 elections. See Appendix C, Table 1, infra, at 1488 (showing that in 2012, the average winning House candidate spent $1.6 million and the average winning Senate candidate spent $11.5 million).

B

Third, the plurality says that a post- Buckley regulation has strengthened the statute's earmarking provision. Ante, at 1446 - 1447. Namely, the plurality points to a rule promulgated by the FEC in 1976, specifying that earmarking includes any "designation 'whether direct or indirect, express or implied, oral or written.' " Ibid. (quoting 11 CFR § 110.6 (b) );

I have found one contrary example-the single example to which the plurality refers. Ante, at 1454 (citing Conciliation Agreement, In reRiley, MURs 4568, 4633, 4634, 4736 (FEC, Dec. 19, 2001)). In that case, the FEC found probable cause to believe that three individual contributors to several PACs

The plurality, however, does not show, or try to show, that these hypothetical alternatives could effectively replace aggregate

For one thing, an evidentiary record can help us determine whether or the extent to which we should defer to Congress' own judgments, particularly those reflecting a balance of the countervailing First Amendment interests I have described. Determining whether anticorruption objectives justify a particular set of contribution limits requires answering empirically based questions, and applying significant discretion and judgment. To what extent will unrestricted giving lead to corruption or its appearance? What forms will any such corruption take? To what extent will a lack of regulation undermine public confidence in the democratic system? To what extent can regulation restore it?

These kinds of questions, while not easily answered, are questions that Congress is far better suited to resolve than are judges. Thus, while court review of contribution limits has been and should be "rigorous," Buckley, 424 U.S., at 29 , 96 S.Ct. 612 , we have also recognized that "deference to legislative choice is warranted." Beaumont, 539 U.S., at 155 , 123 S.Ct. 2200 . And that deference has taken account of facts and circumstances set forth in an evidentiary record.

For another thing, a comparison of the plurality's opinion with this dissent reveals important differences of opinion on fact-related matters. We disagree, for example, on the possibilities for circumvention of the base limits in the absence of aggregate limits. We disagree about how effectively the

Judicial Finding of Fact: "Individual donors testify that contributions provide access to influence federal officeholders on issue of concern to them." Id., at 498.

Political donor: " 'I've been involved in political fundraising long enough to remember when soft money had little value to federal candidates.... [I]n recent election cycles, Members and national committees have asked soft money donors to write soft money checks to state and national parties solely in order to assist federal campaigns. Most soft money

Senator Paul Simon: " 'While I realize some argue donors don't buy favors, they buy access. That access is the abuse and it affects all of us.... You feel a sense of gratitude for their support.... Because few people can afford to give over $20,000 or $25,000 to a party committee, those people who can will receive substantially better access to elected federal leaders than people who can only afford smaller contributions or can not afford to make any contributions. When you increase the amount that people are allowed to give, or let people give without limit to the parties, you increase

Base Limit Number Total Contributions (per (committees) Years (per 2-year year) cycle) National Party Committees $32,400 3 2 $194,400 State Party Committees $10,000 50 2 $1,000,000 Total $1,194,400

Source: See 2 U. S. C. §§441a(a)(1)(B), (D); 78 Fed. Reg. 8532 .

Table 2(a): The $3.6 Million Check

Base Total Limit Number Years Contributions (per year/election) (committees/candidates) or Elections (per 2-year cycle) National Party Committees $32,400 3 2 $194,400 State Party Committees $10,000 50 2 $1,000,000 Candidates (Senate) $2,600 33 2 $171,600 Candidates (House) $2,600 435 2 $2,262,000 Total $3,628,000

Source: See 2 U. S. C. §§441a(a)(1)(A), (B), (D); 78 Fed. Reg. 8532 .

Direct Total Contributions Direct to Number Contributions Candidate (committees/candidates) Elections (per (per 2-year election) cycle) National Party Committees $5,000 3 2 $30,000 1 State Party Committees $5,000 50 2 $500,000 Candidates (Senate) $2,000 33 2 $132,000 Candidates (House) $2,000 435 2 $1,740,000 Total Direct Contributions $2,372,000 Total IEs Independent Expenditures (per (IEs) Elections general (per general election) election) House Senate Candidate Candidate $46,600-$93,100 National Party $46,600 $94,100 Committees (min) 2 (min) 3 1 (min) $46,600-$93,100 State Party $46,600 $94,100 Committees (min) 2 (min) 3 1 (min) $46,600-$93,100 $46,600 $94,100 Total IEs (min) 2 (min) 3 (min) 1 $45,400 for a Senate candidate. §441a(h); 78 Fed. Reg. 8532. 2 If the State has more than one House seat, this figure is $46,600. If it has one House seat, this figure is $93,100. Id., at 8531. 3 This figure ranges from $93,100 (Del.) to $2,68 million (Cal.), depending on the State's population. Ibid.

Source: See 2 U.S.C. §§432 (e)(3)(B), 441a(a)(2)(A); 11 CFR § 110.3 (b); 78 Fed. Reg. 8530 -8532.

Table 3: Proliferating PACs

Total Contributions (per year) (PACs) Years (per 2-year cycle) Rich Donor One $5,000 200 2 $2,000,000 Rich Donor Two $5,000 200 2 $2,000,000 Rich Donor Three $5,000 200 2 $2,000,000 Rich Donor Four $5,000 200 2 $2,000,000 Rich Donor Five $5,000 200 2 $2,000,000 Rich Donor Six $5,000 200 2 $2,000,000 Rich Donor Seven $5,000 200 2 $2,000,000 Rich Donor Eight $5,000 200 2 $2,000,000 Rich Donor Nine $5,000 200 2 $2,000,000 Rich Donor Ten $5,000 200 2 $2,000,000 Total Contributions to PACs (by 10 Donors) $20,000,000 Total Contributions by Each Donor $2,000,000 Base Limit Number Elections (per (candidates) election) PAC One $5,000 10 2 $100,000 PAC Two $5,000 10 2 $100,000 PAC Three $5,000 10 2 $100,000 ... etc. etc. etc. etc. PAC 200 $5,000 10 2 $100,000 Total Contributions by PACs (to 10 Candidates) $20,000,000 Total Contributions to Each Candidate $2,000,000

Source: 2 U. S. C. §§441a(a)(1)(C), 441a(a)(2)(A).

Table 1: Costs of a Federal Seat

2012 Elections House Average House Winner Spent $1,567,293 Average House Loser Spent $496,637 Average Winner's Receipts from PACs $665,728 Senate Average Senate Winner Spent $11,474,077 Average Senate Loser Spent $7,435,446 Average Winner's Receipts from PACs $2,185,650

Source: Center for Responsive Politics, Election Stats, online at http://www.opensecrets.org/bigpicture/elec_stats.php.

Table 2: Leadership PACs

Number of Leadership PACs Total Contributed (contributing to federal (to federal candidates) candidates) 2000 Elections 175 $17,000,000 2002 Elections 228 $25,000,000 2004 Elections 274 $30,700,000 2006 Elections 336 $44,700,000 2008 Elections 378 $40,600,000 2010 Elections 396 $44,000,000 2012 Elections 456 $46,400,000

Source: Center for Responsive Politics, Leadership PACs, online at http://www.opensecrets.org/pacs.

Number of Joint Fundraising "Senate" "House" Committees Related Related 2008 Elections 269 31 34 2010 Elections 367 37 60 2012 Elections 508 67 89

Source: Federal Election Commission, online at http://www.fec.gov/data/CommitteeSummary.do.