Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio

CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES,

et al. v. CUELLAR de OSORIO et al.

certiorari to the united states court of appeals for

the ninth circuit No. 12–930. Argued December 10, 2013—Decided June 9, 2014 The Immigration and Nationality Act permits qualifying U. S. citizens and lawful permanent residents (LPRs) to petition for certain family members to obtain immigrant visas. A sponsored individual, known as the principal beneficiary, is placed into a “family preference” category based on his relationship with the petitioner. 8 U. S. C. §§ 1153(a)(1)–(4). The principal beneficiary's spouse and minor children in turn qualify as derivative beneficiaries, “entitled to the same status” and “order of consideration” as the principal. § 1153(d). The beneficiaries then become eligible to apply for visas in order of “priority date”—that is, the date a petition was filed. § 1153(e)(1). Because the immigration process often takes years or decades to complete, a child seeking to immigrate may “age out”—i. e., reach adulthood and lose her immigration status—before she reaches the front of the visa queue. The Child Status Protection Act (CSPA) sets forth a remedy in that circumstance, providing that “[i]f the age of an alien is determined . . . to be 21 years of age or older,” notwithstanding certain allowances for bureaucratic delay, §§ 1153(h)(1)–(2), “the alien's petition shall automatically be converted to the appropriate category and the alien shall retain the original priority date issued upon receipt of the original petition,” § 1153(h)(3). Respondents, principal beneficiaries who became LPRs, filed petitions for their aged-out children, asserting that the newly filed petitions should receive the same priority date as their original petitions. Instead, U. S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) gave the new petitions current priority dates. The District Court granted the Government summary judgment, deferring to the Board of Immigration Appeals' (BIA's) determination that only those petitions that can be seamlessly converted from one family preference category to another without the need for a new sponsor are entitled to conversion under § 1153(h)(3). The en banc Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the provision unambiguously entitled all aged-out derivative beneficiaries to automatic conversion and priority date retention. Held: The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded. 695 F. 3d 1003, reversed and remanded.

Justice Kagan, joined by Justice Kennedy and Justice Gins-burg , concluded that the BIA's textually reasonable construction of § 1153(h)(3)'s ambiguous language was entitled to deference. Pp. 56–75. (a) Because § 1153(h)(3) does not speak unambiguously to the issue here, a court must defer to the BIA's reasonable interpretation. See Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 844. The first clause of § 1153(h)(3) states a condition that encompasses every aged-out beneficiary of a family preference petition. The second clause, however, does not easily cohere with the first. It prescribes a remedy that can apply to only a subset of the beneficiaries described in the first clause. This remedial prescription directs immigration officials to take the alien's petition and convert it from a category benefiting a child to an appropriate category for adults, without any change in the petition, including its sponsor, or any new fling. Moreover, this conversion is to be “automati[c]”—that is, one involving no additional decisions, contingencies, or delays. Thus, the only aliens who may benefit from § 1153(h)(3)'s back half are those for whom automatic conversion is possible. The understanding that “automatic conversion” entails nothing more than picking up the petition from one category and dropping it into another for which the alien now qualifies matches the exclusive way immigration law used the term when § 1153(h)(3) was enacted. See 8 CFR §§ 204.2(i)(1)–(3) (2002). And Congress used the word “conversion” in the identical way elsewhere in the CSPA. See, e. g., §§ 1151(f)(2), (3). If the term meant more than that in § 1153(h)(3), it would undermine the family preference system's core premise: that each immigrant must have a qualified and willing sponsor. See §§ 1154(a), (b). If an original sponsor does not have a legally recognized relationship with the aged-out derivative beneficiary, another sponsor, e. g., the old principal bene-fciary, must be swapped in for the alien to qualify for a new family preference category. But immigration officials cannot assume that a new sponsor is eligible and willing to petition on the alien's behalf, given the numerous requirements the law imposes on family preference petitioners. See, e. g., § 1154(a)(1)(B)(i)(II). Neither can they figure out whether a valid sponsor exists unless he files and USCIS approves a new petition—the very thing § 1153(h)(3) says is not required. In any case, a new qualified sponsor will rarely exist at the requisite time. An alien is deemed to age out on “the date on which an immigrant visa number became available for the alien's parent.” § 1153(h)(1)(A). Since aging out triggers automatic conversion, the date of automatic conversion is best viewed as the same. But at that time, the aged-out beneficiary's parent cannot yet be a citizen or LPR, and so no new, quali-fed sponsor will be ready to step into the old one's shoes.

On the above account, § 1153(h)(3)'s second clause provides a remedy to those principal and derivative beneficiaries who had a qualifying relationship with an LPR both before and after they aged out. In contrast, aliens like respondents' children—the nieces, nephews, and grandchil-dren of the initial sponsors—cannot qualify for “automatic conversion”: They lacked a qualifying preference relationship with the initial petitioner, and so cannot ft into a new preference category without obtaining a new sponsor. The ambiguity created by § 1153(h)(3)'s ill-fitting clauses left the BIA to choose how to reconcile the statute's different commands. It reasonably opted to abide by the inherent limits of § 1153(h)(3)'s remedial clause, rather than go beyond those limits so as to match the sweep of the first clause's condition. When an agency thus resolves statutory tension, ordinary principles of administrative deference require this Court to defer. See National Assn. of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife , 551 U. S. 644, 666. Pp. 56–64. (b) Respondents take issue with the BIA's interpretation, but none of their contentions is persuasive. Pp. 65–75.

(1) Respondents aver that every aged-out beneficiary could be automatically converted if immigration officials substituted new sponsors and managed the timing of conversion so that a new sponsor existed on the relevant date. These administrative maneuvers are not in keeping with the natural and long-established meaning of “automatic conversion,” they require conversion to occur on a date that has no connection to the alien's aging out, and they demand administrative juggling to make automatic conversion work. And that painstakingly managed process still cannot succeed because a derivative's parent may never become able to sponsor a visa—and immigration officials cannot practicably tell whether a given parent has done so. Pp. 65–69. (2) Respondents argue that the word “and” in the second clause of § 1153(h)(3) indicates that priority date retention is a benefit wholly independent of automatic conversion. But “and” does not necessarily disjoin two phrases, and context suggests that the instructions work in tandem. In other statutory and regulatory provisions respecting “conversions,” retention of a priority date is conditional on a conversion occurring. See, e. g., §§ 1154(k)(1)–(3). Respondents' reading would make priority date retention conditional on something the statute nowhere mentions. And it would engender unusual results that, without some clearer statement, the Court cannot conclude that Congress intended. Pp. 69–72. (3) Finally, respondents contend that, assuming § 1153(h)(3) is ambiguous, the BIA acted unreasonably in choosing the more restrictive reading. But the BIA's interpretation benefits from administrative simplicity and fits with immigration law's basic first-come-first-served

rule. By contrast, respondents would scramble the priority order Congress established by allowing aged-out derivative beneficiaries, like respondents' sons and daughters, to enter the visa queue ahead of benef-ciaries who had a qualifying relationship with an LPR for a far longer time. Pp. 73–75.

The Chief Justice , joined by Justice Scalia, agreed that the BIA's interpretation was reasonable, but not because an agency has authority to resolve direct conflicts within a statute. There is no conflict or internal tension in § 1153(h)(3). The first clause of the provision defines the persons potentially affected, but does not grant anything to anyone. The particular benefit provided by the statute—automatic conversion and retention of priority date—is found exclusively in the second clause, and that relief requires, at minimum, that an aged-out beneficiary have his own eligible sponsor who is committed to providing financial support for the beneficiary. Beyond that, Congress did not speak clearly to which petitions can be automatically converted. The BIA's reasonable interpretation of § 1153(h)(3) is consistent with the ordinary meaning of the statutory terms, with the established meaning of automatic conversion in immigration law, and with the structure of the family-based immigration system. Pp. 76–79. Kagan, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which Kennedy and Ginsburg, JJ., joined. Roberts, C. J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Scalia, J., joined, post, p. 76. Alito, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 79. Sotomayor, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Breyer, J., joined, and in which Thomas, J., joined except as to footnote 3, post, p. 81.

Elaine J. Goldenberg argued the cause for petitioners. With her on the briefs were Solicitor General Verrilli, Assistant Attorney General Delery, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, and Gisela A. Westwater.

Mark C. Fleming argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Harriet A. Hoder , Paul R. Q. Wolfson, Megan Barbero, Christina Manfredi McKinley, Jason D. Hirsch, Carl Shusterman, Amy Prokop, Nancy E. Miller, and Robert L. Reeves.*

Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U. S. C. § 1101 et seq., citizens and lawful permanent residents (LPRs) of the United States may petition for certain family members—spouses, siblings, and children of various ages— to obtain immigrant visas. Such a sponsored individual is known as the petition's principal beneficiary. In turn, any principal beneficiary's minor child—meaning an unmarried child under the age of 21—qualifies as a derivative beneficiary, “entitled to the same [immigration] status” and “order of consideration” as his parent. § 1153(d). Accordingly, when a visa becomes available to the petition's principal beneficiary, one also becomes available to her minor child.

But what happens if, sometime after the relevant petition was filed, a minor child (whether a principal or a derivative beneficiary) has turned 21—or, in immigration lingo, has “aged out”? The immigration process may take years or even decades to complete, due in part to bureaucratic delays associated with reviewing immigration documents and in (still greater) part to long queues for the limited number of visas available each year. So someone who was a youngster at the start of the process may be an adult at the end, and no longer qualify for an immigration status given to minors. The Child Status Protection Act (CSPA), 116 Stat. 927, ensures that the time Government officials have spent processing immigration papers will not count against the beneficiary in assessing his status. See 8 U. S. C. § 1153(h)(1). But even with that provision, the beneficiary may age out solely because of the time he spent waiting in line for a visa to become available.

The question presented in this case is whether the CSPA grants a remedy to all aliens who have thus outpaced the immigration process—that is, all aliens who counted as child beneficiaries when a sponsoring petition was filed, but no

A

An alien needs an immigrant visa to enter and permanently reside in the United States. See § 1181(a). 1 To obtain that highly sought-after document, the alien must fall within one of a limited number of immigration categories. See §§ 1151(a)–(b). The most favored is for the “immediate relatives” of U. S. citizens—their parents, spouses, and unmarried children under the age of 21. See §§ 1151(b)(2) (A)(i), 1101(b)(1). Five other categories—crucial to this case, and often denominated “preference” categories—are for “family-sponsored immigrants,” who include more distant or independent relatives of U. S. citizens, and certain close relatives of LPRs. 2 Specifically, those family preference categories are:

F1: the unmarried, adult (21 or over) sons and daughters of U. S. citizens;

F2A: the spouses and unmarried, minor (under 21) children of LPRs; F2B: the unmarried, adult (21 or over) sons and daughters of LPRs; F3: the married sons and daughters of U. S. citizens; F4: the brothers and sisters of U. S. citi zens. §§ 1151(a)(1), 1153(a)(1)–(4).3

(A word to the wise: Dog-ear this page for easy reference,

because these categories crop up regularly throughout this opinion.)

The road to obtaining any family-based immigrant visa begins when a sponsoring U. S. citizen or LPR files a petition on behalf of a foreign relative, termed the principal ben-efciary. See §§ 1154(a)(1)(A)(i), (a)(1)(B)(i)(I), (b); 8 CFR § 204.1(a)(1) (2014). The sponsor (otherwise known as the petitioner—we use the words interchangeably) must provide U. S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) with evidence showing, among other things, that she has the necessary familial relationship with the beneficiary, see §§ 204.2(a)(2), (d)(2), (g)(2), and that she has not committed any conduct disqualifying her from sponsoring an alien for a visa, see, e. g., 8 U. S. C. § 1154(a)(1)(B)(i)(II) (barring an LPR from submitting a petition if she has committed certain offenses against minors). USCIS thereafter reviews the petition, and approves it if found to meet all requirements. See § 1154(b).

For a family preference beneficiary, that approval results not in getting a visa then and there, but only in getting a place in line. (The case is different for “immediate relatives” of U. S. citizens, who can apply for and receive a visa

Such a date may benefit not only the principal beneficiary of a family preference petition, but also her spouse and minor children. Those persons, labeled the petition's “derivative benefciar[ies],” are “entitled to the same status, and the same order of consideration,” as the principal. 8 U. S. C. §§ 1153(d), (h). Accordingly, when a visa becomes available for the principal, one becomes available for her spouse and minor children too. And that is so even when (as is usually but not always the case) the spouse and children would not qualify for any family preference category on their own. For example, the child of an F4 petition's principal bene-fciary is the niece or nephew of a U. S. citizen, and federal immigration law does not recognize that relationship. Nonetheless, the child can piggy-back on his qualifying parent in seeking an immigrant visa—although, as will be further discussed, he may not immigrate without her. See 22 CFR § 40.1(a)(2); infra, at 49, 63–64, 74.

Once visas become available, the principal and any derivative beneficiaries must separately file visa applications. See 8 U. S. C. § 1202(a). Such an application requires an alien to

After the beneficiaries have filed their applications, a consular official reviews the documents and, if everything is in order, schedules in-person interviews. See § 1202(h). The interviews for a principal and her children (or spouse) usually occur back-to-back, although those for the children may also come later. 4 The consular official will determine first whether the principal should receive a visa; if (but only if) the answer is yes, the official will then consider the derivatives' applications. See 22 CFR §§ 40.1(a)(2), 42.62, 42.81(a). Provided all goes well, everyone exits the consulate with visas in hand—but that still does not make them LPRs. See 8 U. S. C. § 1154(e). Each approved alien must then travel to the United States within a set time, undergo inspection, and confirm her admissibility. See §§ 1201(c), 1222, 1225(a)–(b). Once again, a derivative's fate is tied to the principal's: If the principal cannot enter the country, neither can her children (or spouse). See § 1153(d); 22 CFR § 40.1(a)(2). When, but

B

All of this takes time—and often a lot of it. At the front end, many months may go by before USCIS approves the initial sponsoring petition. 6 On the back end, several additional months may elapse while a consular official considers the alien's visa application and schedules an interview. 7 And the middle is the worst. After a sponsoring petition is approved but before a visa application can be filed, a family-sponsored immigrant may stand in line for years—or even decades—just waiting for an immigrant visa to become available. See, e. g., Dept. of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs, 9 Visa Bulletin, Immigrant Numbers for December 2013 (Nov. 8, 2013).

And as the years tick by, young people grow up, and thereby endanger their immigration status. Remember that not all offspring, but only those under the age of 21 can qualify as an “immediate relative” of a U. S. citizen, or as the principal beneficiary of an LPR's F2A petition, or (most crucially here) as the derivative beneficiary of any family preference petition. See supra, at 47, 48. So an alien eligible to immigrate at the start of the process (when a sponsor files a petition) might not be so at the end (when an immigra-

In 2002, Congress enacted the Child Status Protection Act (CSPA), 116 Stat. 927, to address the treatment of those once-but-no-longer-minor aliens. One section of the Act neatly eliminates the “aging out” problem for the offspring of U. S. citizens seeking to immigrate as “immediate relatives.” Under that provision, the “determination of whether [such] an alien satisfies the [immigration law's] age requirement . . . shall be made using [his] age” on the date the initial petition was filed. 8 U. S. C. § 1151(f)(1). The section thus halts the fow of time for that group of would-be immigrants: If an alien was young when a U. S. citizen sponsored his entry, then Peter Pan-like, he remains young throughout the immigration process.

A different scheme—and one not nearly so limpid—applies to the offspring of LPRs and aliens who initially qualified as either principal beneficiaries of F2A petitions or derivative beneficiaries of any kind of family preference petition. Section 3 of the CSPA, now codified at 8 U. S. C. § 1153(h), contains three interlinked paragraphs that mitigate the “aging out” problem for those prospective immigrants. The first two are complex but, with some perseverance, comprehensible. The third—the key provision here—is through and through perplexing.8

“(A) the age of the alien on the date on which an immigrant visa number becomes available for such alien (or, in the case of [derivative beneficiaries], the date on which an immigrant visa number became available for the alien's parent) . . . ; reduced by “(B) the number of days in the period during which the applicable petition described in paragraph (2) was pending.” § 1153(h)(1).

The cross-referenced second paragraph, § 1153(h)(2), then explains that the “applicable petition” mentioned is the petition

the alien's parent), but only if the alien has sought to acquire the status of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence within one year of such availability; reduced by

“(B) the number of days in the period during which the applicable petition described in paragraph (2) was pending. “(2) Petitions described “The petition described in this paragraph is— “(A) with respect to a relationship described in subsection (a)(2)(A) of this section, a petition filed under section 1154 of this title for classification of an alien child under subsection (a)(2)(A) of this section; or “(B) with respect to an alien child who is a derivative beneficiary under subsection (d) of this section, a petition filed under section 1154 of this title for classification of the alien's parent under subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section. “(3) Retention of priority date “If the age of an alien is determined under paragraph (1) to be 21 years of age or older for the purposes of subsections (a)(2)(A) and (d) of this section, the alien's petition shall automatically be converted to the appropriate category and the alien shall retain the original priority date issued upon receipt of the original petition.” 8 U. S. C. § 1153(h).

Taken together, those two paragraphs prevent an alien from “aging out” because of—but only because of—bureaucratic delays: the time Government officials spend reviewing (or getting around to reviewing) paperwork at what we have called the front and back ends of the immigration process. See supra, at 49–51. The months that elapse before USCIS personnel approve a family preference petition (“the period during which the applicable petition described in paragraph (2) was pending”) do not count against an alien in determin-ing his statutory “age.” Neither do the months a consular officer lets pass before adjudicating the alien's own visa application (the period after “an immigrant visa number becomes available for such alien (or . . . [his] parent)”). But the time in between—the months or, more likely, years the alien spends simply waiting for a visa to become available— is not similarly excluded in calculating his age: Every day the alien stands in that line is a day he grows older, under the immigration laws no less than in life. And so derivative beneficiaries, as well as principal beneficiaries of F2A petitions, can still “age out”—in other words , turn 21, notwithstanding § 1153(h)(1)'s dual age adjustments—prior to receiv-ing an opportunity to immigrate.

What happens then (if anything) is the subject of § 1153(h)'s third paragraph—the provision at issue in this case. That paragraph states:

“If the age of an alien is determined under paragraph (1) to be 21 years of age or older for the purposes of subsections (a)(2)(A) and (d) of this section, the alien's petition shall automatically be converted to the appropriate category and the alien shall retain the original priority date issued upon receipt of the original petition.”

The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) addressed the meaning of § 1153(h)(3) in Matter of Wang , 25 I. & N. Dec. 28 (2009); its interpretation there is what we review in this case. Wang was the principal beneficiary of an F4 petition that his sister, a U. S. citizen, filed in 1992. At that time, Wang's daughter was 10 years old, and thus qualified as a derivative beneficiary. But Wang waited in line for a visa for more than a decade, and by the time his priority date finally came up, his daughter had turned 22 (even after applying § 1153(h)(1)'s age-reduction formula). Wang thus obtained a visa for himself, boarded a plane alone, and entered the United States as an LPR. He then filed a new preference petition on his daughter's behalf—this one under F2B, the category for LPRs' adult sons and daughters. USCIS approved that petition, with a priority date corresponding to the date of Wang's fling. Wang contended that under § 1153(h)(3), his daughter was instead entitled to “retain the original priority date” given to his sister's old F4 petition, because that petition could “automatically be converted” to the F2B category.

The Board rejected that argument. It explained that “the language of [§ 1153(h)(3)] does not expressly state which petitions qualify for automatic conversion and retention of priority dates.” Id., at 33. Given that “ambiguity,” the BIA looked to the “recognized meaning” of “the phrase `automatic conversion' ” in immigration statutes and regulations—which it “presume[d]” Congress understood when enacting the CSPA. Id., at 33–35. “Historically,” the BIA showed, that language applied only when a petition could move seamlessly from one family preference category to another—not when a new sponsor was needed to ft a benef-

C

The respondents in this case are similarly situated to Wang, and they seek the same relief. Each was once the principal beneficiary of either an F3 petition filed by a U. S. citizen parent or an F4 petition filed by a U. S. citizen sibling. Each also has a son or daughter who, on the date of filing, was under 21 and thus qualified as a derivative beneficiary of the petition. But as was true of Wang's daughter, the respondents' offspring had all turned 21 (even accounting for § 1153(h)(1)'s age adjustments) by the time visas became available. Accordingly, the respondents immigrated to the United States alone and, as new LPRs, filed F2B petitions for their sons and daughters. Each argued that under § 1153(h)(3), those petitions should get the same priority date as the original F3 and F4 petitions once had. USCIS in-

This case began as two separate suits, one joining many individual plaintiffs and the other certified as a class action. In each suit, the District Court deferred to the BIA's interpretation of § 1153(h)(3) in Wang , and accordingly granted summary judgment to the Government. See Zhang v. Na-politano, 663 F. Supp. 2d 913, 919 (CD Cal. 2009); Costelo v. Chertoff, No. SA08–00688, 2009 WL 4030516 (CD Cal., Nov. 10, 2009). After consolidating the two cases on appeal, a panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed: Like the lower courts, it found § 1153(h)(3) ambiguous and acceded to the BIA's construction. 656 F. 3d 954, 965–966 (2011). The Ninth Circuit then granted rehearing en banc and reversed in a 6-to-5 decision. 695 F. 3d 1003 (2012). The majority concluded that “the plain language of the CSPA unambiguously grants automatic conversion and priority date retention to [all] aged-out derivative beneficiaries,” and that the Board's contrary conclusion “is not entitled to deference.” Id., at 1006.

We granted certiorari, 570 U. S. 916 (2013), to resolve a Circuit split on the meaning of § 1153(h)(3), 9 and we now reverse the Ninth Circuit's decision.

Principles of Chevron deference apply when the BIA interprets the immigration laws. See Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 842– 844 (1984); INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre , 526 U. S. 415, 424–425 (1999). Indeed, “judicial deference to the Executive Branch is especially appropriate in the immigration context,” where

And § 1153(h)(3) does not speak unambiguously to the issue here—or more precisely put, it addresses that issue in divergent ways. We might call the provision Janus-faced. Its first half looks in one direction, toward the sweeping relief the respondents propose, which would reach every aged-out beneficiary of a family preference petition. But as the BIA recognized, and we will further explain, the section's second half looks another way, toward a remedy that can apply to only a subset of those beneficiaries—and one not including the respondents' offspring. The two faces of the statute do not easily cohere with each other: Read either most naturally, and the other appears to mean not what it says. That internal tension makes possible alternative reasonable constructions, bringing into correspondence in one way or another the section's different parts. And when that is so, Chevron dictates that a court defer to the agency's choice—here, to the Board's expert judgment about which interpretation fits best with, and makes most sense of, the statutory scheme.

Begin by reading the statute from the top—the part favoring the respondents. Section 1153(h)(3)'s first clause—“If the age of an alien is determined under paragraph (1) to be 21 years of age or older for the purposes of subsections (a)(2)(A) and (d)”—states a condition that every aged-out beneficiary of a preference petition satisfies. That is because all those beneficiaries have had their ages “determined under paragraph (1)” (and have come up wanting): Recall

But read on, because § 1153(h)(3)'s second clause instead prescribes a remedy containing its own limitation on the eligible class of recipients. “[T]he alien's petition,” that part provides, “shall automatically be converted to the appropriate category and the alien shall retain the original priority date.” That statement directs immigration officials to take the initial petition benefiting an alien child, and now that he has turned 21, “convert[ ]” that same petition from a category for children to an “appropriate category” for adults (while letting him keep the old priority date). The “conversion,” in other words, is merely from one category to another; it does not entail any change in the petition, including its sponsor, let alone any new fling. And more, that category shift is to be “automatic”—that is, one involving no additional decisions, contingencies, or delays. See, e. g., Random House Webster's Unabridged Dictionary 140 (2d ed. 2001) (defining “automatic” as “having the capability of starting, operating, moving, etc., independently”); American Heritage Dictionary 122 (4th ed. 2000) (“[a]cting or operating in a manner essentially independent of external influence”). The operation described is, then, a mechanical cut-and-paste job—moving a petition, without any substantive alteration, from one (no-longer-appropriate, child-based) category to an-

That understanding of § 1153(h)(3)'s “automatic conversion” language matches the exclusive way immigration law used the term when Congress enacted the CSPA. For many years before then (as today), a regulation entitled “Automatic conversion of preference classification” instructed immigration officials to change the preference category of a petition's principal beneficiary when either his or his sponsor's status changed in specified ways. See 8 CFR §§ 204.2(i)(1)–(3) (2002). For example, the regulation provided that when a U. S. citizen's child aged out, his “immediate relative” petition converted to an F1 petition, with his original priority date left intact. See § 204.2(i)(2). Similarly, when a U. S. citizen's adult son married, his original petition migrated from F1 to F3, see § 204.2(i)(1)(i); when, conversely, such a person divorced, his petition converted from F3 to F1, see § 204.2(i)(1)(iii); and when a minor child's LPR parent became a citizen, his F2A petition became an “immediate relative” petition, see § 204.2(i)(3)—all again with their original priority dates. Most notable here, what all of those authorized changes had in common was that they could occur without any change in the petitioner's identity, or otherwise in the petition's content. In each circumstance, the “automatic conversion” entailed nothing more than picking up the petition from one category and dropping it into another for which the alien now qualified.10

And if the term meant more than that in § 1153(h)(3), it would undermine the family preference system's core premise: that each immigrant must have a qualified sponsor. Consider the alternative addressed in Wang—if “automatic conversion” were also to encompass the substitution of a new

by years, and thus is equally irrelevant to what Congress intended. See

Indeed, in cases like Wang , the problem is broader: Under the statute's most natural reading, a new qualified sponsor will hardly ever exist at the moment the petition is to be “converted.” Section 1153(h)(3), to be sure, does not explicitly identify that point in time. But § 1153(h)(1) specifies the date on which a derivative beneficiary is deemed to have either aged out or not: It is “the date on which an immigrant visa number became available for the alien's parent.” See §§ 1153(h)(1)(A)–(B). Because that statutory aging out is the one and only thing that triggers automatic conversion for eligible aliens, the date of conversion is best viewed as the

On the above account—in which conversion entails a simple reslotting of an original petition into a now-appropriate category—§ 1153(h)(3)'s back half provides a remedy to two groups of aged-out beneficiaries. First, any child who was the principal beneficiary of an F2A petition (filed by an LPR parent on his behalf) can take advantage of that clause after turning 21. He is, upon aging out, the adult son of the same LPR who sponsored him as a child; his petition can therefore be moved seamlessly—without the slightest alteration or delay—into the F2B category. Second, any child who was the derivative beneficiary of an F2A petition (filed by an LPR on his spouse's behalf) can similarly claim relief, pro-

In contrast, as the Board held in Wang , the aged-out derivative beneficiaries of the other family preference categories—like the sons and daughters of the respondents here— cannot qualify for “automatic conversion.” Recall that the respondents themselves were principal beneficiaries of F3 and F4 petitions; their children, when under 21, counted as derivatives, but lacked any qualifying preference relationship of their own. The F3 derivatives were the petitioners' grandsons and granddaughters; the F4 derivatives their nephews and nieces; and none of those are relationships Congress has recognized as warranting a family preference. See 8 U. S. C. §§ 1153(a)(3)–(4). Now that the respondents' children have turned 21, and they can no longer ride on their parents' coattails, that lack of independent eligibility makes a difference. For them, unlike for the F2A beneficiaries, it is impossible simply to slide the original petitions from a

All that said, we hold only that § 1153(h)(3) permits—not that it requires—the Board's decision to so distinguish among aged-out beneficiaries. That is because, as we explained earlier, the two halves of § 1153(h)(3) face in different directions. See supra , at 57. Section 1153(h)(3)'s first part—its conditional phrase—encompasses every aged-out beneficiary of a family preference petition, and thus points toward broad-based relief. But as just shown, § 1153(h)(3)'s second part—its remedial prescription—applies only to a narrower class of beneficiaries: those aliens who naturally qualify for (and so can be “automatically converted” to) a new preference classification when they age out. Were there an interpretation that gave each clause full effect, the Board would have been required to adopt it. But the ambiguity those ill-fitting clauses create instead left the Board with a choice—essentially of how to reconcile the statute's different commands. The Board, recognizing the need to make that call, opted to abide by the inherent limits of § 1153(h)(3)'s remedial clause, rather than go beyond those limits so as to match the sweep of the section's initial condition. On the Board's reasoned view, the only beneficiaries entitled to statutory relief are those capable of obtaining the remedy designated. When an agency thus resolves statutory tension, ordinary principles of administrative deference require us to defer. See National Assn. of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife , 551 U. S. 644, 666 (2007) (When a statutory scheme contains “a fundamental ambiguity” aris-ing from “the differing mandates” of two provisions, “it is appropriate to look to the implementing agency's expert interpretation” to determine which “must give way”).

The respondents (and the dissent) initially aver that every aged-out beneficiary (including their own sons and daughters) can “automatically be converted” to an “appropriate” immigration category, if only immigration officials try hard enough. The Government, in the respondents' view, can accomplish that feat by substituting new sponsors for old ones, and by “managing the timing” of every conversion to ensure such a new petitioner exists on the relevant date. Brief for Respondents 33. And because, the respondents say, it is thus possible to align the two halves of § 1153(h)(3)—even if through multiple administrative maneuvers—immigration officials are under an obligation to do so. We disagree, for reasons that should sound familiar: Several are the same as those we have just given for upholding the Board's interpretation. But still, we walk through the respondents' ar-

The first (and necessary) premise of that argument does not augur well for the remainder: It is the view that the “automatic conversion” procedure permits a change in the petitioner's identity. According to the respondents, the aged-out beneficiaries' parents, upon becoming LPRs, can be subbed in for the original sponsors (i. e., the beneficiaries' grandparents, aunts, and uncles), and the petitions then converted to the F2B category. But as we have shown, the “automatic conversion” language—as most naturally read and as long used throughout immigration law—contemplates merely moving a petition into a new and valid category, not changing its most essential feature. See supra, at 58–60. That alone defeats the respondents' position.

And a further problem follows—this one concerning the date of automatic conversion. The respondents need that date to come at a time when the derivative beneficiaries' parents (the substitute petitioners) are already living in the United States as LPRs; otherwise, the petitions could not qualify for the F2B box. In an attempt to make that possible, the respondents propose that conversion be viewed as taking place when “the derivative beneficiary's visa . . . application is adjudicated.” Brief for Respondents 29. But as we have (again) demonstrated, the statute is best read as establishing a different date: that “on which an immigrant visa number became available for the alien's parent”—when, by definition, the parent is not yet an LPR. § 1153(h)(1); see supra, at 61–62. That is the moment when a derivative ages out, which is the single change conversion reflects. By contrast, the respondents' suggested date has no connection to that metamorphosis; the date of adjudication is merely when an immigration official later discovers that a child has turned 21. And that date is itself fortuitous, reflecting no more than when an immigration officer got around to reviewing a visa application: The possibility of conversion would thus de-

Yet there is more—because even after substituting a new petitioner and delaying the conversion date in a way the statute does not contemplate, the respondents must propose yet further fixes to make “automatic” conversion work for

And after all this fancy footwork, the respondents' scheme still cannot succeed, because however long a visa adjudication is postponed, a derivative's parent may never become able to sponsor a relative's visa—and immigration officials cannot practicably tell whether a given parent has done so. We have noted before the potential impediments to serving as a petitioner—including that a parent may not immigrate, may not qualify as a sponsor, or may not be able to provide the requisite financial support. See supra, at 60–61. The respondents offer no way to deal with those many contingencies. Require the parent to submit a new petition? But the entire point of automatic conversion (as the respondents

That leaves us with the same statutory inconsistency with which we began. Having followed each step of the respondents' resourceful (if Rube Goldbergish) argument, we still see no way to apply the concept of automatic conversion to the respondents' children and others like them. And that means we continue to face a statute whose halves do not correspond to each other—giving rise to an ambiguity that calls for Chevron deference.

The respondents, however, have another idea for reconciling § 1153(h)(3)'s front and back parts (and this back-up claim

But the conjunction “and” does not necessarily disjoin two phrases in the way the respondents say. In some sentences, no doubt, the respondents have a point. They use as their primary example: “[I]f the boat takes on water, then you shall operate the bilge pump and you shall distribute life jackets.” Brief for Respondents 39; see also post, at 89 (offering further examples). We agree that “you shall distribute life jackets” functions in that sentence as an independent command. But we can come up with many paired dictates in which the second is conditional on the first. “If the price is reasonable, buy two tickets and save a receipt.” “If you have time this summer, read this book and give me a report.” Or, shades of this case: “If your cell-phone contract expires, buy a new phone and keep the old number.” 15 In each case,

Here, we think, context compels the Board's view that the instructions work in tandem. The first phrase instructs immigration officials to convert a petition (when an “appropriate category” exists); the next clarifies that such a converted petition will retain the original priority date, rather than receive a new one corresponding to the date of conversion. That reading comports with the way retention figures in other statutory and regulatory provisions respecting “conversions”; there too, retention of a priority date is conditional on a conversion occurring. See 8 U. S. C. §§ 1154(k)(1)–(3); 8 CFR § 204.2(i); supra, at 59. The respondents wish to unhook the “retention” phrase from that mooring, and use it to explain what will attend a different event—that is, the filing of a new petition. But that is to make “retention” conditional on something the statute nowhere mentions—a highly improbable thing for Congress to have done. (If, once again, a teacher says to “read this book and give me a report,” no one would think he wants a report

interview and you shall come in to answer questions.” “If the plane is low on fuel, the tanks shall be refilled and the pilot shall fy the route as scheduled.” In these sentences, as in our prior ones, the second command is conditional on the first; all that differs is that these sentences are (much like statutes) more formal and stilted. And the dissent's citation of United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U. S. 235 (1989), adds nothing to its argument. There, we construed the following provision: “[T]here shall be allowed to the holder of [a secured] claim, interest on such claim, and any reasonable fees, costs, or charges provided for under the agreement under which such claim arose.” Id., at 241. We held that the phrase “provided for under the agreement” qualifies the words “any reasonable fees, costs, or charges,” but not the words “interest on such claim.” Id., at 241–242. What relevance that interpretation bears to this case eludes us.

The respondents' contrary view would also engender unusual results, introducing uncertainty into the immigration system's operation and thus interfering with statutory goals. Were their theory correct, an aged-out alien could hold on to a priority date for years or even decades while waiting for a relative to file a new petition. Even if that fling happened, say, 20 years after the alien aged out, the alien could take out his priority-date token, and assert a right to spring to the front of any visa line. At that point, USCIS could well have a hard time confirming the old priority date, in part because the names of derivative beneficiaries need not be listed on a visa petition. And the possibility of such leapfrogging from many years past would impede USCIS's publication of accurate waiting times. As far as we know, immigration law nowhere else allows an alien to keep in his pocket a priority date untethered to any existing valid petition. Without some clearer statement, we cannot conclude Congress intended here to create such a free-floating, open-ended entitlement to a defunct petition's priority date. See Wang , 25 I. & N. Dec., at 36. 16

Finally, the respondents contend that even if § 1153(h)(3) points at once in two directions—toward a broader scope in its first half and a narrower one in its second—the BIA acted unreasonably in choosing the more restrictive reading. In their view, the Board has offered no valid reason, consistent with “the purposes and concerns of the immigration laws,” to treat their own sons and daughters less favorably than aliens who were principal and derivative beneficiaries of F2A petitions. Brief for Respondents 47. Indeed, the respondents suggest that the BIA, “for its own unfathomable reasons, disapproves of Congress's decision to allow any aged-out” aliens to get relief, and has thus “limited [§ 1153(h)(3)] to as few derivative beneficiaries as possible.” Id., at 55.

We cannot agree. At the least, the Board's interpretation has administrative simplicity to recommend it. Under that view, immigration authorities need only perform the kind of straightforward (i. e., “automatic”) conversion they have done for decades—moving a petition from one box to another to refect a given status change like aging out. See Wang , 25 I. & N. Dec., at 36. The respondents, as we have shown, would transform conversion into a managed, multi-stage process, requiring immigration and consular officials around

is filed by the same petitioner ” as filed the original. Far from authorizing an open-ended, free-floating entitlement, that now-superseded regulation allowed an alien to keep his priority date only if he (unlike the respondents' offspring) had a qualifying relationship with the initial petitioner— that is, only if he fell within the group that the BIA in Wang thought entitled to relief. See 25 I. & N. Dec., at 34–35. And the other provisions the dissent cites (which, unlike § 204.2(a)(4), continue to operate) similarly fail to support the dissent's position, because they enable an alien to retain a priority date only if attached to an existing valid petition. See 8 U. S. C. § 1154(k)(3) (permitting an alien to retain a priority date associated with an existing F2B petition); 8 CFR § 204.5(e) (permitting an alien to retain a priority date associated with an existing employment-based petition); § 204.12(f)(1) (permitting an alien to retain a priority date associated with an existing employment-based petition for immigrating physicians).

Still more important, the Board offered a cogent argument, reflecting statutory purposes, for distinguishing between aged-out beneficiaries of F2A petitions and the respondents' sons and daughters. See Wang, 35 I. & N. Dec., at 38. As earlier explained, the F2A beneficiaries have all had a qualifying relationship with an LPR for the entire period they have waited in line—i. e., since their original priority dates. See supra, at 62–63. That means that when immigration authorities convert their petitions, they will enter the F2B line at the same place as others who have had a comparable relationship for an equal time. The conversion thus fits with the immigration law's basic first-come-first-served rule. See 8 U. S. C. § 1153(e); supra, at 48. By contrast, the derivative beneficiaries of F3 and F4 petitions, like the respondents' sons and daughters, lacked any qualifying relationship with a citizen or LPR during the period they waited in line. See supra, at 63–64. They were, instead, the grandchildren, nieces, or nephews of citizens, and those relationships did not independently entitle them to visas. If such aliens received relief under § 1153(h)(3), they would jump over thousands of others in the F2B line who had a qualifying relationship with an LPR for a far longer time. That displacement would, the Board reasonably found, scramble the priority order Congress prescribed.

The argument to the contrary assumes that the respondents' sons and daughters should “receive credit” for all the time the respondents themselves stood in line. Brief for Respondents 50. But first, the time the respondents spent waiting for a visa may diverge substantially from the time their children did. Suppose, for example, that one of the

This is the kind of case Chevron was built for. Whatever Congress might have meant in enacting § 1153(h)(3), it flailed to speak clearly. Confronted with a self-contradictory, ambiguous provision in a complex statutory scheme, the Board chose a textually reasonable construction consonant with its view of the purposes and policies underlying immigration law. Were we to overturn the Board in that circumstance, we would assume as our own the responsible and expert agency's role. We decline that path, and defer to the Board.

We therefore reverse the judgment of the Ninth Circuit and remand the case for further proceedings.

It is so ordered.

I agree with much of the plurality's opinion and with its conclusion that the Board of Immigration Appeals reasonably interpreted 8 U. S. C. § 1153(h)(3). I write separately because I take a different view of what makes this provision “ambiguous” under Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 843 (1984).

As the plurality reads section 1153(h)(3), the statute's two clauses address the issue before the Court “in divergent ways” and “do not easily cohere with each other.” Ante, at 57. For the plurality, the first clause looks “toward the sweeping relief the respondents propose, which would reach every aged-out beneficiary of a family preference petition,” while the second clause offers narrower relief that can help “only a subset of those beneficiaries.” Ibid. Such “ill-fitting clauses,” the plurality says, “left the Board with a choice—essentially of how to reconcile the statute's different commands.” Ante, at 64.

To the extent the plurality's opinion could be read to suggest that deference is warranted because of a direct conflict between these clauses, that is wrong. Courts defer to an agency's reasonable construction of an ambiguous statute because we presume that Congress intended to assign responsibility to resolve the ambiguity to the agency. Chevron, supra, at 843–844. But when Congress assigns to an agency the responsibility for deciding whether a particular group should get relief, it does not do so by simultaneously saying that the group should and that it should not. Direct conflict is not ambiguity, and the resolution of such a conflict is not statutory construction but legislative choice. Chevron is not a license for an agency to repair a statute that does not make sense.1

The statute reads:

“If the age of an alien is determined under [section 1153(h)(1)] to be 21 years of age or older for the purposes of subsections (a)(2)(A) and (d) of this section, the alien's petition shall automatically be converted to the appropriate category and the alien shall retain the original priority date issued upon receipt of the original petition.” § 1153(h)(3).

The first clause states a condition—one that beneficiaries from any preference category can meet—and thereby defines the persons potentially affected by this provision. But the clause does not grant anything to anyone. I disagree with the plurality that the first clause “points toward broad-based relief,” ante, at 64, because I do not think the first clause points toward any relief at all. 2

Imagine a provision of the Tax Code that read: “If a student is determined to be enrolled at an accredited university, the student's cost of off-campus housing shall be deductible on her tax return.” It would be immediately apparent from that provision that an enrolled student who lives on campus

“seemingly categorical—and, at first glance, irreconcilable—legislative commands.” Id., at 661. We deferred to an agency's reasonable interpretation, which “harmonize[d] the statutes,” in large part because of our strong presumption that one statute does not impliedly repeal another. Id., at 662–669. Home Builders did not address the consequences of a single statutory provision that appears to give divergent commands.

The particular benefit provided by section 1153(h)(3) is found exclusively in the second clause—the only operative provision. There we are told what an aged-out beneficiary (from whatever preference category) is entitled to: His petition “shall automatically be converted to the appropriate category and the alien shall retain the original priority date.” § 1153(h)(3). But automatic conversion is not possible for every beneficiary in every preference category, as the plurality convincingly demonstrates. Ante, at 58–62. Automatic conversion requires, at minimum, that the beneficiary have his own sponsor, who demonstrates that he is eligible to act as a sponsor, and who commits to providing financial support for the beneficiary. Ante, at 61. Some aged-out children will not meet those prerequisites, and they cannot benefit

Beyond those requirements, however, Congress did not speak clearly to which petitions can “automatically be converted.” § 1153(h)(3). Whatever other interpretations of that provision might be possible, it was reasonable, for the reasons explained by the plurality, for the Board to interpret section 1153(h)(3) to provide relief only to a child who was a principal or derivative beneficiary of an F2A petition. That interpretation is consistent with the ordinary meaning of the statutory terms, with the established meaning of automatic conversion in immigration law, and with the structure of the family-based immigration system. Ante, at 58–63. It also avoids the problems that would fow from respondents' proposed alternative interpretations, including the suggestion that retention of the original priority date provides a benefit wholly separate from automatic conversion. Ante, at 60–62, 65–75.

I concur in the judgment.

Justice Alito , dissenting.

I agree with many of Justice Sotomayor’ s criticisms of the plurality opinion. I also agree with The Chief Justice's critique of the plurality's suggestion that, when two halves of a statute “do not easily cohere with each other,” an agency administering the statute is free to decide which half it will obey. Ante, at 57. After all, “[d]irect conflict is not ambiguity, and the resolution of such a conflict is not statutory construction but legislative choice.” Ante , at 76 (Roberts, C. J., concurring in judgment). While I, like Justice

As I see it, the question before us is whether there is or is not an “appropriate category” to which the petitions for respondents' children may be converted. If there is, the agency was obligated by the clear text of 8 U. S. C. § 1153(h)(3) to convert the petitions and leave the children with their original priority dates. Any such conversion would be “automatic,” because the agency's obligation to convert the petitions follows inexorably, and without need for any additional action on the part of either respondents or their children, from the fact that the children's ages have been calculated to be 21 or older. 1 If there is not an appropriate category, then the agency was not required to convert the petitions.

By the time respondents became legal permanent residents and filed new petitions for their children (if not sooner), there existed an appropriate category to which the original petitions could be converted. That is because at that point the children all qualified for F2B preference status, as unmarried, adult children of legal permanent residents. Accordingly, the agency should have converted respondents' children's petitions and allowed them to retain their original priority dates. 2

Section 1153(h)(3) is brief and cryptic. It may well contain a great deal of ambiguity, which the Board of Immigration Appeals in its expertise is free to resolve, so long as its resolution is a “permissible construction of the statute.” Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,

Justice Sotomayor , with whom Justice Breyer joins, and with whom Justice Thomas joins except as to footnote 3, dissenting.

Although the workings of our Nation's immigration system are often complex, the narrow question of statutory interpretation at the heart of this case is straightforward. Which aged-out children are entitled to retain their priority dates: derivative beneficiaries of visa petitions in all five family-preference categories, or derivative beneficiaries of peti -tions in only one category? The initial clause of 8 U. S. C. § 1153(h)(3) provides a clear answer: Aged-out children may retain their priority dates so long as they meet a single condition—they must be “determined . . . to be 21 years of age or older for purposes of” derivative beneficiary status. Because all five categories of aged-out children satisfy this condition, all are entitled to relief.

Notwithstanding this textual command, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) ruled that four of the five categories of aged-out children to whom § 1153(h)(3) unambiguously promises priority date retention, are, in fact, entitled to no relief at all. See Matter of Wang , 25 I. & N. Dec. 28, 38–39 (2009). The plurality defers to that interpretation today. In doing so, the plurality does not identify any ambiguity in the dispositive initial clause of § 1153(h)(3). Indeed, it candidly admits that the clause mandates relief for “every aged-out beneficiary of a family preference petition” in any of the five categories. Ante , at 64. The plurality nevertheless

In reaching this conclusion, the plurality flails to follow a cardinal rule of statutory interpretation: When deciding whether Congress has “specifically addressed the question at issue,” thereby leaving no room for an agency to fill a statutory gap, courts must “interpret the statute `as a . . . coherent regulatory scheme' and `ft, if possible, all parts into [a] harmonious whole.' ” FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U. S. 120, 132–133 (2000) (citation omitted). Because the plurality and the BIA ignore obvious ways in which § 1153(h)(3) can operate as a coherent whole and instead construe the statute as a self-contradiction that was broken from the moment Congress wrote it, I respectfully dissent.

Under Chevron, the first question we ask when reviewing an agency's construction of a statute is whether “Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.” Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 842 (1984). If it has, then “the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to th[at] unambiguously expressed intent.” Id., at 842–843. Congress has spoken directly to the question in this case.

United States citizens and lawful permanent residents (LPRs) may petition for certain relatives who reside abroad (known as the “principal beneficiaries” of such petitions) to receive immigrant visas. Congress has defined five categories of eligible relatives—referred to as family-preference categories—with annual limits on the number of visas that

This case arises from a common problem: Given the lengthy period prospective immigrants must wait for a visa, a principal beneficiary's child—although younger than 21 when her parent's petition was initially filed—often will have turned 21 by the time the parent's priority date comes up in line. Such a child is said to have “aged out” of derivative beneficiary treatment under § 1153(d). By way of example, respondent Norma Uy was the principal beneficiary of an F4 family-preference petition filed by her U. S. citizen sister in February 1981. That petition listed Norma's daughter, Ruth, who was then two years old, as a derivative benef-ciary. If Norma had reached the front of the visa line at any time before Ruth's 21st birthday, § 1153(d) would have enabled Ruth to accompany Norma to the United States. Unfortunately, it took more than two decades for Norma's priority date to become current, by which point Ruth was 23 and thus too old for derivative beneficiary status under § 1153(d). Norma therefore immigrated alone to the United States, where she filed a new F2B petition (for unmarried

Congress responded to this problem by enacting § 1153(h)(3), a provision entitled “[r]etention of priority date.” It states:

“If the age of an alien is determined under [the formula specified in] paragraph (1) [2] to be 21 years of age or older for the purpos[e] of [§ 1153(d)] of this section, the alien's petition shall automatically be converted to the appropriate category and the alien shall retain the original priority date issued upon receipt of the original petition.”

The provision's structure is crucial to its meaning. The initial clause (call it the “eligibility clause”) specifies who is eligible for relief. The concluding clause (call it the “relief clause”) describes the two forms of relief to which eligible persons are entitled. As the title of the provision suggests, the main form of relief is the right of an aged-out derivative beneficiary to retain the priority date of her original petition. In Ruth Uy's case, such relief would mean the difference between resuming her wait near the front of the F2B line (which would allow her to receive a visa in short order) and being sent to the back of the line (where she would potentially have to wait an additional 27 years). Brief for Respondents 52.

The question in this case is which aged-out beneficiaries of family-preference petitions are eligible for priority date

Congress answered that question in § 1153(h)(3)'s eligibility clause, which specifies that relief is to be conferred on any immigrant who has been “determined under [the formula specified in] paragraph (1) to be 21 years of age or older” for the purpose of § 1153(d). As the plurality concedes, this clause “states a condition that every aged-out beneficiary of a preference petition satisfies”—that is, it makes eligible for relief aged-out children within each of the F1, F2A, F2B, F3, and F4 categories. Ante, at 57.

Congress made this clear in two mutually reinforcing ways. First, by referring to the formula set forth in “paragraph (1),” the statute incorporates that paragraph's cross-reference to § 1153(h)(2). Section 1153(h)(2) in turn de-fines the set of covered petitions to include, “with respect to an alien child who is a derivative beneficiary under [§ 1153(d)], a petition fled . . . for classification of the alien's parent under [§ 1153(a)].” And § 1153(a) encompasses all five family-preference categories. See §§ 1153(a)(1)–(4). Second, § 1153(h)(3) promises relief to those who are found to be 21 “for the purpos[e] of . . . [§ 1153](d),” the provision governing derivative beneficiaries. And that provision also unambiguously covers all five family-preference categories. See § 1153(d) (a minor child is “entitled to the same status” as a parent who is the principal beneficiary of a petition filed under § 1153(a)); § 1153(a) (setting forth the five family-preference categories).

In short, § 1153(h)(3)'s eligibility clause answers the precise question in this case: Aged-out beneficiaries within all five categories are entitled to relief. “[T]he intent of Con-

Because it concedes that § 1153(h)(3)'s eligibility clause unambiguously “encompasses every aged-out beneficiary of a family preference petition,” ante, at 64, the plurality tries to ft this case into a special pocket of Chevron jurisprudence in which it says we must defer to an agency's decision to ignore a clear statutory command due to a conflict between that command and another statutory provision. See ante, at 57, 64. Thus, unlike in the usual Chevron case, where ambiguity derives from the fact that the text does not speak with sufficient specificity to the question at issue, the plurality argues that this is a case in which ambiguity can only arise—if it is to arise at all—if Congress has spoken clearly on the issue in diametrically opposing ways. 3 As the plurality frames it, § 1153(h)(3)'s eligibility and relief clauses are “Janus-faced,” and that conflict “makes possible alternative reasonable constructions.” Ante , at 57.

The plurality contends that deference is appropriate here because, in its view, 8 U. S. C. § 1153(h)(3)'s two clauses are “self-contradictory.” Ante, at 75. But far from it being unworkable (or even difficult) for the agency to obey both

The plurality argues that although § 1153(h)(3)'s eligibility clause clearly encompasses aged-out beneficiaries within all five preference categories, the relief clause implies a con-ficting “limitation on the eligible class of recipients.” Ante, at 58. The plurality infers that limitation from two premises. First, it contends that no aged-out child may retain her priority date unless her petition is also eligible for automatic conversion. And second, it asserts that only aged-out F2A beneficiaries may receive automatic conversion. As a result, the plurality concludes, it was reasonable for the BIA to exclude aged-out children in the four other categories from receiving both automatic conversion and priority date retention, thereby rendering § 1153(h)(3)'s eligibility clause defunct.

The plurality's conclusion is wrong because its premises are wrong. For one, § 1153(h)(3) is naturally read to confer priority date retention as an independent form of relief to all aged-out children, regardless of whether automatic conversion is separately available. And even if that were wrong, the plurality's supposition that only F2A beneficiaries can receive automatic conversion is incorrect on its own terms. Because either of these interpretations would treat § 1153(h)(3) as a coherent whole, the BIA's construction was impermissible.

1

The most obvious flaw in the plurality's analysis is its presumption that § 1153(h)(3) permits an aged-out child to retain her original priority date only if her petition can be automatically converted. That is incorrect for many reasons.

When an immigrant is determined to have aged out of derivative beneficiary status, § 1153(h)(3) prescribes two forms of relief: “[T]he alien's petition shall automatically be con-

The plurality responds with a series of examples in which the word “and” is used to join two commands, one of which is—as the plurality asserts here—dependent on another. Ante, at 70–71, and n. 15. But as the plurality recognizes, ante, at 70–71, that is hardly the only way the word can be used. For example: “If today's baseball game is rained out, your ticket shall automatically be converted to a ticket for next Saturday's game, and you shall retain your free souvenir from today's game.” Or: “If you provide the DMV with proof of your new address, your voter registration shall automatically be converted to the correct polling location, and you shall receive in the mail an updated driver's license.” It is plain in both of these examples that the two commands are distinct—the fan in the first example can keep her free souvenir even if she cannot attend next Saturday's game; the new resident will receive an updated driver's license even if she is ineligible to vote. What the plurality does not explain is why we should forgo the same understanding of § 1153(h)(3)'s relief clause when that would treat the statute

With the text unavailing, the plurality turns to a policy argument. The plurality worries that if automatic conversion and priority date retention are independent benefits, aged-out beneficiaries will be able to “hold on to a priority date for years . . . while waiting for a relative to file a new petition,” which might hamper U. S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) operations. Ante, at 72. But the plurality's fears of administrative inconvenience are belied by the fact that USCIS has administered priority date retention in exactly this manner for years, with no apparent problems. Well before § 1153(h)(3) was enacted, a regulation provided aged-out F2A derivative beneficiaries the ability to retain their priority dates without also providing automatic conversion. See 8 CFR § 204.2(a)(4) (permitting priority date retention after a “separate petition” is filed); 57 Fed. Reg. 41053, 41059 (1992) (adopting this provision). Indeed, USCIS continues to instruct field officers that a “separate petition” must be filed in order for such beneficiaries to “retain” their “original priority date[s].” Adjudicator's Field Manual, ch. 21.2(c)(5), online at http://www.uscis.gov/iframe/ ilink/docView/AFM/HTML/AFM/0-0-0-1.html (all Internet materials as visited June 5, 2014, and available in Clerk of Court's case file). The notion that it is somehow impossible for an immigrant to retain her priority date contingent upon the filing of a separate petition is therefore contradicted by years of agency experience. 4

petitioner' ”). Congress included no such language to limit the scope of priority date retention in 8 U. S. C. § 1153(h)(3), however, which just reinforces what the eligibility clause already makes clear: Priority date retention is independently available for aged-out derivative beneficiaries of all family-preference petitions, not just F2A petitions.

The plurality also flails to account for the numerous other contexts in which USCIS has administered priority date retention as a benefit distinct from automatic conversion. See, e. g., § 1154(k)(3) (providing priority date retention to unmarried adult children of LPRs whose parents become naturalized citizens “[r]egardless of whether a petition is converted”);

Even if it were somehow impossible for an aged-out child to retain her priority date independently of automatic conversion, the plurality is wrong to view automatic conversion as a benefit that F2A beneficiaries alone may enjoy.

Section 1153(h)(3) provides that if an aged-out child quali-fies for relief under the statute's eligibility clause, “the alien's petition shall automatically be converted to the appropriate category.” Whether an aged-out beneficiary in a given preference category may enjoy this relief turns on how one understands the words “automatically” and “converted.” Because the statute does not define the terms, we apply their ordinary meaning. See Burrage v. United States, 571 U. S. 204, 210 (2014).

The ordinary meaning of “automatic” is “ `having the capability of starting, operating, moving, etc., independently' ” based upon some predetermined predicate event, with no “additional decisions, contingencies, or delays.” Ante, at 58 (quoting Random House Webster's Unabridged Dictionary 140 (2d ed. 2001)). The ordinary meaning of “convert” is “to change (something) into a different form.” Id., at 444. Here, the statute specifies the form into which an aged-out child's petition shall be changed: another petition in the “appropriate category.” § 1153(h)(3). Tying the terms together, then, “automatic conversion” means changing an old petition into a new petition in an appropriate category upon the occurrence of some predicate event, without a further decision or contingency.

All aged-out beneficiaries can have their petitions automatically converted under this definition. Perhaps most sensibly, all five categories of petitions may be converted to an appropriate category, without any further decision or contingency, upon a logical predicate event: when USCIS receives confirmation that an appropriate category exists. To see how this would work, recall the case of Norma Uy and

Indeed, this is how USCIS already applies automatic conversion in other contexts. For example, when an LPR has filed an F2A petition on behalf of a spouse or child, and the LPR subsequently becomes a U. S. citizen, a provision entitled “[a]utomatic conversion of preference classification,” 8 CFR § 204.2(i), permits the F2A petition to be automatically converted to an “immediate relative” petition, § 204.2(i)(3). See ante, at 60. Significantly, the predicate event that triggers this conversion is the agency's receipt of proof that the petition's sponsor has become a U. S. citizen—proof, in other words, that there is an appropriate category into which

The plurality's contrary conclusion that automatic conversion is impossible for all but one category of family-preference petitions hinges on three basic misunderstandings. First, the plurality contends that automatic conversion is triggered not by confirmation of the existence of an appropriate category, but rather by a different predicate event: the moment when “ `an immigrant visa number bec[omes] available for the alien's parent.' ” Ante, at 61. This is a curious argument, not least because nothing in § 1153(h)(3) suggests it. That provision simply makes automatic conversion available “[i]f the age of an alien is determined . . . to be 21 years of age or older” for purposes of § 1153(d). Section 1153(h)(3) thus states the condition that an immigrant must satisfy to be eligible for automatic conversion, but it nowhere commands when the conversion should occur. There is no reason why conversion cannot occur at the logical point just described: the moment when USCIS receives proof that an appropriate category exists.

The plurality acknowledges that § 1153(h)(3) “does not explicitly identify th[e] point in time” at which a “petition is to be `converted.' ” Ante, at 61. It nevertheless suggests that the date when a conversion occurs “is best viewed” as the date when a visa became available for the aged-out child's parent. Ibid. But Congress could not have intended con-

Faced with this fact, the plurality falls back to the position that automatic conversion must merely be viewed as having occurred “as of th[e] . . . date” when a parent's visa becomes available, although the actual “assess[ment]” of the conversion will necessarily occur at some future point in time. Ante , at 67, n. 13. That approach, however, introduces precisely the kind of “additional decisions, contingencies, and delays” that the plurality regards as inconsistent with the ordinary meaning of “automatic,” ante, at 58. For even under the plurality's view, automatic conversion cannot actually be “assesse[d]” until and unless the aged-out child decides to apply for a visa and officials assessing the child's application deem her to have aged out (events which may themselves be contingent on the child's parent first fling her own successful visa application, see ante, at 49). The far simpler approach is for conversion to occur automatically upon the most logical moment suggested by the statute: the moment when USCIS confirms that an “appropriate category”

The plurality's second argument is a corollary of its first. If automatic conversion must occur when a visa first becomes available for a parent, the plurality frets, that will mean an aged-out child will have her petition automatically converted before immigration officials can ascertain whether her parent is even qualified to sponsor her. See ante, at 60–61. True enough, but that only confirms that it makes no sense to force USCIS to convert petitions so prematurely. The plurality's fears can all be averted by having automatic conversion occur, as with petitions sponsored by LPRs who later become U. S. citizens, supra, at 92–95, when USCIS receives confirmation that conversion is appropriate. 7

The plurality points to nothing in the plain meaning of “conversion” that supports this distinction. It instead argues that a “conversion” cannot entail a change to the identity of a petition's sponsor because that is “the exclusive way immigration law used the term when Congress enacted the CSPA.” Ante, at 59. But immigration law has long allowed petitions to be converted from one category to another in contexts where doing so requires changing the sponsor's identity. In 2006, for example, the Secretary of Homeland Security promulgated a regulatory provision entitled “automatic conversion of preference classification,” 8 CFR § 204.2(i)(1)(iv), which allows the automatic conversion of a petition filed by a U. S. citizen on behalf of her spouse to a widower petition if the citizen dies before the petition is approved. That conversion requires changing the sponsor from the citizen to the widower himself. The fact that the agency used the word “conversion” to refer to a process in which the petition's sponsor was changed, just a few years after 8 U. S. C. § 1153(h)(3) was enacted, strongly suggests that the term did not have the exclusive meaning that the plurality suggests. Similarly, § 1154(a)(1)(D)(i)(III), a provision enacted two years before § 1153(h)(3), see Victims of

[child].” Ante , at 69, n. 14. The fact that a statute may require an agency to process a form is not a reason to disregard a coherent reading of a statute in favor of a self-contradictory one.

The concurrence reaches the same result as the plurality does, but for a different reason. It begins by recognizing

The concurrence nonetheless concludes that the BIA was free to exclude F1, F2B, F3, and F4 beneficiaries from the clear scope of the eligibility clause because of a perceived ambiguity as to which beneficiaries can receive “automatic conversion.” See ante, at 79 (“Congress did not speak clearly to which petitions can `automatically be converted' ”). In other words, the concurrence concludes that it was reasonable for the agency to ignore the clear text of the eligibility clause because the phrase “automatic conversion” might be read in a manner that would benefit F2A beneficiaries alone.

This is an unusual way to interpret a statute. The concurrence identifies no case in which we have deferred to an agency's decision to use ambiguity in one portion of a statute as a license to ignore another statutory provision that is perfectly clear. To the contrary, “[a] provision that may seem ambiguous in isolation is often clarified by the remainder of the statutory scheme . . . because only one of the permissible meanings produces a substantive effect that is compatible with the rest of the law.” United Sav. Assn. of Tex., 484 U. S., at 371.

The concurrence justifies its conclusion only by treating the eligibility clause as a nullity. The concurrence is quite candid about its approach, arguing that § 1153(h)(3)'s relief clause is its “only operative provision” and that the eligibility clause does not “grant anything to anyone.” Ante , at 77. Yet “[i]t is our duty `to give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute.' ” United States v. Menasche , 348 U. S. 528, 538–539 (1955). And there is an easy way to give

The concurrence relies ultimately on an irrelevant hypothetical: “If a student is determined to be enrolled at an accredited university, the student's cost of off-campus housing shall be deductible on her tax return.” Ante, at 77. In this example, the concurrence points out, it is “apparent . . . that an enrolled student who lives on campus is not entitled to the deduction, even though the student falls within the conditional first clause.” Ante, at 77–78. That is correct, but it says nothing about this case. For in the hypothetical, it is plain that the promised relief (a tax deduction for off-campus housing) cannot apply to the persons at issue (students who live on campus). Here, however, the relief promised in § 1153(h)(3) (priority date retention and automatic conversion) can be given to persons specified in the initial eligibility clause (aged-out children in all five family-preference categories). See supra, at 88–99. And once one recognizes that aged-out children in each category unambiguously covered by the eligibility clause can receive relief, the BIA's view that no children in four of those categories can ever receive any relief cannot be reasonable. 9

* * *

Congress faced a difficult choice when it enacted § 1153(h)(3). Given the “zero-sum world of allocating a limited number of visas,” ante, at 75, Congress could have required aged-out children like Ruth Uy to lose their place in line and wait many additional years (or even decades) before being reunited with their parents, or it could have enabled such immigrants to retain their place in line—albeit at the cost of extending the wait for other immigrants by some shorter amount. Whatever one might think of the policy arguments on each side, however, this much is clear: Congress made a choice. The plurality's contrary view—that Congress actually delegated the choice to the BIA in a statute that unambiguously encompasses aged-out children in all five preference categories and commands that they “shall retain the[ir] original priority date[s],” § 1153(h)(3)— is untenable.

In the end, then, this case should have been resolved under a commonsense approach to statutory interpretation: Using traditional tools of statutory construction, agencies and courts should try to give effect to a statute's clear text before concluding that Congress has legislated in conflicting and unintelligible terms. Here, there are straightforward interpretations of § 1153(h)(3) that allow it to function as a coherent whole. Because the BIA and the Court ignore these interpretations and advance a construction that contravenes the language Congress wrote, I respectfully dissent.

aries may not be categorically excluded from relief because they are indisputably covered by § 1153(h)(3)'s eligibility clause and able to receive the relief described in the relief clause.