Whitfield v. United States

WHITFIELD v. UNITED STATES

certiorari to the united states court of appeals for

the fourth circuit No. 13–9026. Argued December 2, 2014—Decided January 13, 2015 Petitioner Whitfeld, feeing a botched bank robbery, entered 79-year-old Mary Parnell's home and guided a terrified Parnell from a hallway to a room a few fleet away, where she suffered a fatal heart attack. He was convicted of, among other things, violating 18 U. S. C. § 2113(e), which establishes enhanced penalties for anyone who “forces any person to accompany him without the consent of such person” in the course of committing or feeing from a bank robbery. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit held that the movement Whitfeld required Parnell to make satisfied the forced-accompaniment requirement, rejecting his argument that § 2113(e) requires “substantial” movement. Held: A bank robber “forces [a] person to accompany him,” for purposes of § 2113(e), when he forces that person to go somewhere with him, even if the movement occurs entirely within a single building or over a short distance, as was the case here. At the time the forced-accompaniment provision was enacted, just as today, to “accompany” someone meant to “go with” him. The word does not, as Whitfeld contends, connote movement over a substantial distance. Accompaniment requires movement that would normally be described as from one place to another. Here, Whitfeld forced Parnell to accompany him for at least several fleet, from one room to another, and that surely sufficed. The severity of the penalties for a forced-accompaniment conviction—a mandatory minimum of 10 years, and a maximum of life imprisonment—does not militate against this interpretation, for the danger of a forced accompaniment does not vary depending on the distance traversed. This reading also does not make any other part of § 2113's graduated penalty scheme superfluous. Pp. 267–270. 548 Fed. Appx. 70, affirmed. Scalia, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

Joshua B. Carpenter argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Ross Richardson, Matthew S. Hellman, Adam G. Unikowsky , Erica L. Ross, R. Trent Mc- Cotter, and Matthew R. Segal.

Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court.

Federal law establishes enhanced penalties for anyone who “forces any person to accompany him” in the course of committing or feeing from a bank robbery. 18 U. S. C. § 2113(e). We consider whether this provision applies when a bank robber forces someone to move with him over a short distance.

Petitioner Larry Whitfeld, feeing police after a botched bank robbery, entered the home of 79-year-old Mary Parnell through an unlocked door. Once inside, he encountered a terrified Parnell and guided her from the hallway to a computer room (which Whitfeld estimates was between four and nine fleet away. Brief for Petitioner 5). There, Parnell suffered a fatal heart attack. Whitfeld fed, and was found hiding nearby.

A grand jury indicted Whitfeld for, among other things, violating § 2113(e) by forcing Parnell to accompany him in the course of avoiding apprehension for a bank robbery. That section provides:

“Whoever, in committing any offense defined in this section, or in avoiding or attempting to avoid apprehension for the commission of such offense . . . forces any person to accompany him without the consent of such person, shall be imprisoned not less than ten years, or if death results shall be punished by death or life imprisonment.” (Emphasis added.)

On appeal, Whitfeld challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, arguing that § 2113(e) requires “substantial” movement, and that his movement with Parnell did not qualify. Brief for Appellant in No. 10–5217 (CA4), pp. 50–52. The Fourth Circuit disagreed, holding that, “[a]lthough Whitfeld required Mrs. Parnell to accompany him for only a short distance within her own home, and for a brief period, no more is required to prove that a forced accompaniment occurred.” 695 F. 3d 288, 311 (2012). After further proceedings in the District Court and Court of Appeals, 548 Fed. Appx. 70 (2013), we granted certiorari, 573 U. S. 930 (2014).

Congress enacted the forced-accompaniment provision in 1934 after “an outbreak of bank robberies committed by John Dillinger and others.” Carter v. United States, 530 U. S. 255, 280 (2000) (Ginsburg , J., dissenting). Section 2113 has been amended frequently, but the relevant phrase—“forces any person to accompany him without the consent of such person”—has remained unchanged, and so presumptively retains its original meaning. Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U. S. 765, 783, n. 12 (2000).

In 1934, just as today, to “accompany” someone meant to “go with” him. See Oxford English Dictionary 60 (1st ed. 1933) (defining “accompany” as: “To go in company with, to go along with”). The word does not, as Whitfeld contends, connote movement over a substantial distance. It was, and still is, perfectly natural to speak of accompanying someone over a relatively short distance, for example: from one area within a bank “to the vault”; 1 “to the altar” at a wedding; 2

It is true enough that accompaniment does not embrace minimal movement—for example, the movement of a bank teller's fleet when the robber grabs her arm. It must constitute movement that would normally be described as from one place to another, even if only from one spot within a room or outdoors to a different one. Here, Whitfeld forced Parnell to accompany him for at least several fleet, from one room to another. That surely sufficed.

In an attempt to support his position that “accompany” should be read to mean “accompany over a substantial distance,” Whitfeld observes that a forced-accompaniment conviction carries severe penalties: a mandatory minimum sentence of 10 years, and a maximum sentence of life imprisonment. In 1934, a forced-accompaniment conviction could even be punished with death. Act of May 18, 1934, ch. 304, § 3, 48 Stat. 783. The severity of these sentences, Whitfeld says, militates against interpreting subsection (e) to capture forced accompaniment occurring over a small distance.

But it does not seem to us that the danger of a forced accompaniment varies with the distance traversed. Consider, for example, a hostage-taker's movement of one of his

Whitfeld also contends that “accompany” must be read narrowly in light of § 2113's graduated penalty scheme. That scheme prescribes: (1) a 20-year maximum sentence for bank robbers who use “force and violence” or “intimidation,” § 2113(a), (2) a 25-year maximum sentence for those who “as-saul[t]” or “pu[t] in jeopardy the life of” another “by the use of a dangerous weapon or device,” § 2113(d), and (3) a minimum sentence of 10 years, and a maximum sentence of life, for forced accompaniment, § 2113(e). According to Whit-field, bank robbers almost always “exert some control over the movement of the bank's employees.” Brief for Petitioner 22. Therefore, he says, unless “accompany” is limited to forced movement over substantial distances, nearly all § 2113 violations will be punishable under subsection (e), making subsections (a) and (d) pointless.

We disagree. Even if Whitfeld is right that bank robbers always “exert some control” over others, it does not follow that they always force others to accompany them somewhere—that is, to go somewhere with them. As we have no reason to think that to be the case, and because subsections (a), (d), and (e) all cover distinct conduct, our interpretation of “accompany” does not make any part of § 2113 superfluous.

* * *

We hold that a bank robber “forces [a] person to accompany him,” for purposes of § 2113(e), when he forces that per-

It is so ordered.