Luna Torres v. Lynch, Attorney General

the second circuit No. 14–1096. Argued November 3, 2015—Decided May 19, 2016 Any alien convicted of an “aggravated felony” after entering the United States is deportable, ineligible for several forms of discretionary relief, and subject to expedited removal. 8 U. S. C. §§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), (3). An “aggravated felony” is defined as any of numerous offenses listed in § 1101(a)(43), each of which is typically identified either as an offense “described in” a specific federal statute or by a generic label (e. g., “murder”). Section 1101(a)(43)'s penultimate sentence states that each enumerated crime is an aggravated felony irrespective of whether it violates federal, state, or foreign law. Petitioner Jorge Luna Torres (Luna), a lawful permanent resident, pleaded guilty in a New York court to attempted third-degree arson. When immigration officials discovered his conviction, they initiated removal proceedings. The Immigration Judge determined that Luna's arson conviction was for an “aggravated felony” and held that Luna was therefore ineligible for discretionary relief. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. It found the federal and New York arson offenses to be identical except for the former's requirement that the crime have a connection to interstate or foreign commerce. Because the federal statute's commerce element serves only a jurisdictional function, the Board held, New York's arson offense is “described in” the federal statute, 18 U. S. C. § 844(i), for purposes of determining whether an alien has been convicted of an aggravated felony. The Second Circuit denied review. Held: A state offense counts as a § 1101(a)(43) “aggravated felony” when it has every element of a listed federal crime except one requiring a connection to interstate or foreign commerce. Because Congress lacks general constitutional authority to punish crimes, most federal offenses include a jurisdictional element to tie the substantive crime to one of Congress's enumerated powers. State legislatures are not similarly constrained, and so state crimes do not need such a jurisdictional hook. That discrepancy creates the issue here— whether a state offense lacking a jurisdictional element but otherwise mirroring a particular federal offense can be said to be “described” by that offense. Dictionary definitions of the word “described” do not clearly resolve this question one way or the other. Rather, two contextual considerations decide this case: § 1101(a)(43)'s penultimate sentence and a

(a) Section 1101(a)(43)'s penultimate sentence shows that Congress

meant the term “aggravated felony” to capture serious crimes regardless of whether they are made illegal by the Federal Government, a State, or a foreign country. But Luna's view would substantially undercut that function by excluding from the Act's coverage all state and foreign versions of any enumerated federal offense containing an interstate commerce element. And it would do so in a particularly perverse fashion—excluding state and foreign convictions for many of § 1101(a)(43)'s gravest crimes (e. g., most child pornography offenses), while reaching convictions for far less harmful offenses (e. g., operating an unlawful gambling business). Luna theorizes that such haphazard coverage might refect Congress's belief that crimes with an interstate connection are generally more serious than those without. But it is implausible that Congress viewed the presence of an interstate commerce element as separating serious from non-serious conduct. Luna's theory misconceives the function of interstate commerce elements and runs counter to the penultimate sentence's central message—that the state, federal, or foreign nature of a crime is irrelevant. And his claim that many serious crimes excluded for want of an interstate commerce element would nonetheless count as § 1101(a)(43)(F) “crime[s] of violence” provides little comfort: That alternative would not include nearly all such offenses, nor even the worst ones. Pp. 460–466.

(b) The settled practice of distinguishing between substantive and

jurisdictional elements in federal criminal statutes also supports reading § 1101(a)(43) to include state analogues that lack only an interstate commerce requirement. Congress uses substantive and jurisdictional elements for different reasons and does not expect them to receive identical treatment. See, e. g., United States v. Yermian, 468 U. S. 63, 68. And that is true where, as here, the judicial task is to compare federal and state offenses. See Lewis v. United States, 523 U. S. 155, 165. Pp. 467–471. 764 F. 3d 152, affirmed. Kagan, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Kennedy, Ginsburg, and Alito, JJ., joined. Sotomayor, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Thomas and Breyer, JJ., joined, post, p. 473.

Matthew L. Guadagno argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Stuart Banner. Elaine J. Goldenberg argued the cause for respondent. On the brief were Solicitor General Verrilli, Principal Dep-

Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court.

The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA or Act) imposes certain adverse immigration consequences on an alien convicted of an “aggravated felony.” The INA defines that term by listing various crimes, most of which are identified as offenses “described in” specified provisions of the federal criminal code. Immediately following that list, the Act provides that the referenced offenses are aggravated felonies irrespective of whether they are “in violation of Federal[,] State[,]” or foreign law. 108 Stat. 4322, 8 U. S. C. § 1101(a)(43). In this case, we must decide if a state crime counts as an aggravated felony when it corresponds to a specified federal offense in all ways but one—namely, the state crime lacks the interstate commerce element used in the federal statute to establish legislative jurisdiction (i. e., Congress's power to enact the law). We hold that the absence of such a jurisdictional element is immaterial: A state crime of that kind is an aggravated felony.

The INA makes any alien convicted of an “aggravated felony” after entering the United States deportable. See § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). Such an alien is also ineligible for several forms of discretionary relief, including cancellation of removal—an order allowing a deportable alien to remain in the country. See § 1229b(a)(3). And because of his felony, the alien faces expedited removal proceedings. See § 1228(a)(3)(A).

Petitioner Jorge Luna Torres, who goes by the name George Luna, immigrated to the United States as a child and has lived here ever since as a lawful permanent resident. In 1999, he pleaded guilty to attempted arson in the third degree, in violation of New York law; he was sentenced to one day in prison and five years of probation. Seven years later, immigration officials discovered his conviction and initiated proceedings to remove him from the country. During those proceedings, Luna applied for cancellation of removal. But the Immigration Judge found him ineligible for that discretionary relief because his arson conviction qualified as an aggravated felony. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 21a–22a.

The Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) affirmed, based on a comparison of the federal and New York arson

The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied Luna's petition for review of the Board's ruling. See 764 F. 3d 152 (2014). The court's decision added to a Circuit split over whether a state offense is an aggravated felony when it has all the elements of a listed federal crime except one requir-ing a connection to interstate commerce. 1 We granted certiorari. 576 U. S. 1053 (2015).

For obvious reasons, state criminal laws do not include the jurisdictional elements common in federal statutes. 2 State

Both parties begin with the statutory text most directly at issue, disputing when a state offense (here, arson) is “described in” an enumerated federal statute (here, 18 U. S. C. § 844(i)). Luna, armed principally with Black's Law Dictionary, argues that “described in” means “expressed” or “set forth” in—which, he says, requires the state offense to include each one of the federal law's elements. Brief for Petitioner 15–16. 3 The Government, brandishing dictionaries of its own, contends that the statutory phrase has a looser meaning—that “describing entails . . . not precise replication,” but “convey[ance of] an idea or impression” or of a thing's “central features.” Brief for Respondent 17. 4 On

But neither of those claims about the bare term “described in” can resolve this case. Like many words, “describe” takes on different meanings in different contexts. Consider two ways in which this Court has used the word. In one case, “describe” conveyed exactness: A contractual provision, we wrote, “describes the subject [matter] with great particularity[,] . . . giv[ing] the precise number of pounds [of tobacco], the tax for which each pound was liable, and the aggregate of the tax.” Ryan v. United States, 19 Wall. 514, 517 (1874). In another case, not: “The disclosure provision is meant,” we stated, “to describe the law to consumers in a manner that is concise and comprehensible to the layman— which necessarily means that it will be imprecise.” Compu- Credit Corp. v. Greenwood, 565 U. S. 95, 102 (2012). So staring at, or even looking up, the words “described in” cannot answer whether a state offense must replicate every last element of a listed federal statute, including its jurisdictional one, to qualify as an aggravated felony. In considering that issue, we must, as usual, “interpret the relevant words not in a vacuum, but with reference to the statutory context.” Abramski v. United States, 573 U. S. 169, 179 (2014). 5

A

Section 1101(a)(43)'s penultimate sentence, as noted above, provides: “The term [aggravated felony] applies to an offense described in this paragraph whether in violation of Federal or State law and applies to such an offense in violation of the law of a foreign country for which the term of imprisonment was completed within the previous 15 years.” See supra, at 455. That sentence (except for the time limit on foreign convictions) declares the source of criminal law irrelevant: The listed offenses count as aggravated felonies regardless of whether they are made illegal by the Federal Government, a State, or a foreign country. That is true of the crimes identified by reference to federal statutes (as here, an offense described in 18 U. S. C. § 844(i)), as well as those employing generic labels (for example, murder). As even Luna recognizes, state and foreign analogues of the enumerated federal crimes qualify as aggravated felonies. See Brief for Peti-

§ 1101(a)(43)) that a person followed the itinerary for a journey through Brazil that is “described in” a Lonely Planet guide if he traveled every leg of the tour other than a brief “detour north to Petrópolis.” The Lonely Planet, On the Road: Destination Brazil, p. 30, http://media.lonelyplanet .com/shop/pdfs/ brazil-8-getting-started.pdf (all Internet materials as last visited May 16, 2016). And similarly, a person would say that she had followed the instructions for setting up an iPhone that are “described in” the user's manual even if she in fact ignored the one (specifically highlighted there) telling her to begin by “read[ing] important safety information” to “avoid injury.” Apple, Set Up iPhone, http://help.apple.com/ iphone/9/#iph3bf43d79.

Luna's jot-for-jot view of “described in” would substantially undercut that function by excluding from the Act's coverage all state and foreign versions of any enumerated federal offense that (like § 844(i)) contains an interstate commerce element. Such an element appears in about half of § 1101(a)(43)'s listed statutes—defining, altogether, 27 serious crimes. 6 Yet under Luna's reading, only those federal

Indeed, Luna's view would limit the penultimate sentence's effect in a peculiarly perverse fashion—excluding state and foreign convictions for many of the gravest crimes listed in § 1101(a)(43), while reaching those convictions for less harmful offenses. Consider some of the state and foreign crimes that would not count as aggravated felonies on Luna's reading because the corresponding federal law has a commerce element: most child pornography offenses, includ-ing selling a child for the purpose of manufacturing such material, see § 1101(a)(43)(I); demanding or receiving a ran-

inalizes transporting a person for purposes of prostitution); ibid. (“an offense described in” 18 U. S. C. § 2422, which criminalizes coercing or enticing a person to travel for purposes of prostitution); ibid. (“an offense described in” 18 U. S. C. § 2423, which criminalizes transporting a child for purposes of prostitution); § 1101(a)(43)(K)(iii) (“an offense described in” 18 U. S. C. § 1591(a)(1), which criminalizes sex trafficking of children, or of adults by force, fraud, or coercion).

imprisonment, see 18 U. S. C. § 1963(a). That language's presence shows that Congress thought § 1101(a)(43)(J) would sweep in some state and foreign laws: The final clause served to filter out such statutes when—but only when—they applied to less serious conduct than the federal racketeering offense. 9 The dissent attempts a variant of Luna's “not so serious” argument, but to no better effect. Claims the dissent: Even if Congress could not have viewed “interstate crimes [as] worse than wholly intrastate crimes,” it might have thought that, say, “arsons prosecuted as federal crimes are more uniformly serious than arsons prosecuted as state crimes.” Post,

Luna's argument does not reassure us. We agree that state counterparts of some enumerated federal offenses would qualify as aggravated felonies through the “crime of violence” provision. But not nearly all such offenses, and not even the worst ones. Consider again some of the listed offenses described earlier. See supra, at 462–463. The “crime of violence” provision would not pick up demanding a

at 486 (emphasis added). But we see no call to suppose that Congress regarded state prosecutions as Grapefruit League versions of the Big Show. Cf. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U. S. 361, 427 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting). In our federal system, “States possess primary authority for defining and enforcing” criminal laws, including those prohibiting the gravest crimes. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U. S. 619, 635 (1993) (quoting Engle v. Isaac, 456 U. S. 107, 128 (1982)). For that reason, even when U. S. Attorneys have jurisdiction, they are generally to defer to, rather than supplant, state prosecutions of serious offenses. See U. S. Attorneys' Manual: Principles of Federal Prosecution § 9–27.240 (1997). And still more obviously, the dissent's theory flails with respect to foreign convictions. That a foreign sovereign prosecutes a given crime reflects nothing about its gravity, but only about its location.

B

Just as important, a settled practice of distinguishing between substantive and jurisdictional elements of federal criminal laws supports reading § 1101(a)(43) to include state analogues lacking an interstate commerce requirement. As already explained, the substantive elements of a federal statute describe the evil Congress seeks to prevent; the jurisdictional element connects the law to one of Congress's enumerated powers, thus establishing legislative authority. See supra, at 457; ALI, Model Penal Code § 1.13(10) (1962). Both kinds of elements must be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt; and because that is so, both may play a real role in a criminal case. But still, they are not created equal for every purpose. To the contrary, courts have often recognized—including when comparing federal and state offenses—that Congress uses substantive and jurisdictional elements for different reasons and does not expect them to receive identical treatment.

Consider the law respecting mens rea. In general, courts interpret criminal statutes to require that a defendant possess a mens rea, or guilty mind, as to every element of an offense. See Elonis v. United States, 575 U. S. 723, 734–735 (2015). That is so even when the “statute by its terms does not contain” any demand of that kind. United States v. X- Citement Video, Inc., 513 U. S. 64, 70 (1994). In such cases, courts read the statute against a “background rule” that the defendant must know each fact making his conduct illegal. Staples v. United States, 511 U. S. 600, 619 (1994). Or otherwise said, they infer, absent an express indication to the contrary, that Congress intended such a mental-state requirement.

mercy of the Attorney General”). But Congress made a judgment that aliens convicted of certain serious offenses (irrespective of whether those convictions were based on federal, state, or foreign law) should be not only removable but also ineligible for discretionary relief. It is not our place to second-guess that decision.

Still more strikingly, courts have distinguished between the two kinds of elements in contexts, similar to this one, in which the judicial task is to compare federal and state offenses. The Assimilative Crimes Act (ACA), 18 U. S. C. § 13(a), subjects federal enclaves, like military bases, to state criminal laws except when they punish the same conduct as a federal statute. The ACA thus requires courts to decide when a federal and a state law are sufficiently alike that only the federal one will apply. And we have held that, in making that assessment, courts should ignore jurisdictional elements: When the “differences among elements” of the state and federal crimes “refect jurisdictional, or other technical, considerations” alone, then the state law will have no effect in the area. Lewis v. United States, 523 U. S. 155, 165

And lower courts have uniformly adopted the same approach when comparing federal and state crimes in order to apply the federal three-strikes statute. That law imposes mandatory life imprisonment on a person convicted on three separate occasions of a “serious violent felony.” 18 U. S. C. § 3559(c)(1). Sounding very much like the INA, the three-strikes statute defines such a felony to include “a Federal or State offense, by whatever designation and wherever committed, consisting of” specified crimes (e. g., murder, manslaughter, robbery) “as described in” listed federal criminal statutes. § 3559(c)(2)(F). In deciding whether a state crime of conviction thus corresponds to an enumerated federal statute, every court to have faced the issue has ignored the statute's jurisdictional element. See, e. g., United States v. Rosario-Delgado, 198 F. 3d 1354, 1357 (CA11 1999) (per curiam ); United States v. Wicks, 132 F. 3d 383, 386–387 (CA7 1997). Judge Wood, writing for the Seventh Circuit, highlighted the phrase “a Federal or State offense, by whatever designation and wherever committed”—the three-strikes law's version of § 1101(a)(43)'s penultimate sentence. “It is hard to see why Congress would have used this language,” she reasoned, “if it had meant that every detail of the federal offense, including its jurisdictional element[ ], had to be replicated in the state offense.” Id., at 386–387. Just so, too, in the INA—whose “aggravated felony” provisions operate against, and rely on, an established legal backdrop distinguishing between jurisdictional and substantive elements.12

the dissent flails to explain. First, the dissent errs in suggesting that the uniform judicial interpretation of the three-strikes law ignores only “place-based jurisdiction elements” (because, so says the dissent, of the phrase “wherever committed”). Post, at 484–485. As Judge Wood's analysis indicates, that is a theory of the dissent's own creation; the actual appellate decisions apply to all jurisdictional elements, not just territorial ones. Next, the dissent goes wrong in claiming that the ACA is not pertinent because this Court adopted a different method for matching substantive elements under that law than under the INA. See post, at 482–483. For even as the Court made that choice, it unanimously agreed that, however substantive elements should be compared, jurisdictional elements should be disregarded. See Lewis v. United States, 523 U. S. 155, 165 (1998); id., at 182 (Kennedy , J., dissenting). And finally, the dissent does nothing to undermine our point on mens rea by noting that Congress very occasionally dispenses with that requirement for substantive elements. See post, at 483–484. As just shown, the default rule respecting mental states flips as between jurisdictional and substantive elements, see supra, at 468—reflecting the view (also at play in the three-strikes and ACA contexts) that Congress generally means to treat the two differently. That leaves the dissent with nothing except its observation that when applying the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt and jury-trial requirements, the Court does not distinguish between jurisdictional and substantive elements. See post, at 482–483. But the dissent forgets that those commands are constitutional in nature; a principle of statutory interpretation distinguishing between the two kinds of elements, as best reflecting Congress's intent, could not bear on those mandates.

C

Luna makes a final argument opposing our reading of § 1101(a)(43): If Congress had meant for “ordinary state-law” crimes like arson to count as aggravated felonies, it would have drafted the provision to make that self-evident. Id., at 20. Congress, Luna submits, would have used the generic term for those crimes—e. g., “arson”—rather than demanding that the state law of conviction correspond to a listed federal statute. See id., at 20–23. Or else, Luna (and the dissent) suggests, see id., at 24; post, at 485, Congress would have expressly distinguished between substantive and jurisdictional elements, as it did in an unrelated law mandat-ing the pretrial detention of any person convicted of a federal offense “described in [a certain federal statute], or of a State or local offense that would have been an offense described in [that statute] if a circumstance giving rise to Federal jurisdiction had existed,” 18 U. S. C. § 3142(e)(2)(A).

But as an initial matter, Congress may have had good reason to think that a statutory reference would capture more accurately than a generic label the range of state convictions warranting automatic deportation. The clause of § 1101(a)(43) applying to Luna's case well illustrates the point. By referring to 18 U. S. C. § 844(i), that provision incorporates not only the garden-variety arson offenses that a generic “arson” label would cover, but various explosives offenses too. See Brief for Petitioner 23, n. 7 (conceding that had Congress used the term “arson,” it would have had to separately identify the explosives crimes encompassed in

Still more, Congress's omission of statutory language spe-cifcally directing courts to ignore those elements cannot tip the scales in Luna's favor. We have little doubt that “Congress could have drafted [§ 1101(a)(43)] with more precision than it did.” Graham County Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. United States ex rel. Wilson, 545 U. S. 409, 422 (2005). But the same could be said of many (even most) statutes; as to that feature, § 1101(a)(43) can join a well-populated club. And we have long been mindful of that fact when interpreting laws. Rather than expecting (let alone demanding) perfection in drafting, we have routinely construed statutes to have a particular meaning even as we acknowledged that Congress could have expressed itself more clearly. See, e. g., ibid.; Florida Dept. of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc., 554 U. S. 33, 41 (2008); Scarborough v. United States, 431 U. S. 563, 570–571, 575 (1977). The question, then, is not: Could Congress have indicated (or even did

That reading of § 1101(a)(43) resolves this case. Luna has acknowledged that the New York arson law differs from the listed federal statute, 18 U. S. C. § 844(i), in only one respect: It lacks an interstate commerce element. See Pet. for Cert. 3. And Luna nowhere contests that § 844(i)'s commerce element—featuring the terms “in interstate or foreign commerce” and “affecting interstate or foreign commerce”— is of the standard, jurisdictional kind. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 12, 19; Scheidler , 547 U. S., at 17–18 (referring to the phrases “affect commerce” and “in commerce” as conventional “jurisdictional language”). For all the reasons we have given, such an element is properly ignored when determining if a state offense counts as an aggravated felony under § 1101(a)(43). We accordingly affirm the judgment of the Second Circuit.

It is so ordered.

Justice Sotomayor , with whom Justice Thomas and Justice Breyer join, dissenting.

The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) metes out severe immigration consequences to a noncitizen convicted of any of a number of “aggravated felon[ies].” 8 U. S. C. § 1101(a)(43). An offense “described in” 18 U. S. C. § 844(i)— a federal arson statute—qualifies as such a crime.

In this case, petitioner, who goes by George Luna, was convicted of third-degree arson under N. Y . Penal Law Ann.

Not for the majority. It dubs the fifth element “jurisdictional,” then relies on contextual clues to read it out of the statute altogether. As a result of the majority's sleuthing, Luna—a long-time legal permanent resident—is foreclosed from even appealing to the sound discretion of the Attorney General to obtain relief from removal. Because precedent and the text and structure of the INA require the opposite result, I respectfully dissent.

Noncitizens convicted of crimes face various consequences under the INA. Among the harshest of those consequences fall on noncitizens convicted of 1 of the approximately 80 “aggravated felonies.” A crime that falls into one of the listed provisions can be an aggravated felony “whether in violation of Federal or State law” or “in violation of the law of a foreign country.” See 8 U. S. C. § 1101(a)(43).

An aggravated felony conviction has two primary repercussions for noncitizens: It renders them deportable, § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), and it makes them categorically ineligible for several forms of immigration relief ordinarily left to the discretion of the Attorney General, see, e. g., §§ 1229b(a)–(b) (cancellation of removal).

Second, it lists crimes that are wholly “described in” the Federal Criminal Code. See, e. g., § 1101(a)(43)(H) (“an offense described in section 875, 876, 877, or 1202 of title 18 (relating to the demand for or receipt of ransom)”); § 1101(a)(43)(I) (“an offense described in section 2251, 2251A, or 2252 of title 18 (relating to child pornography)”). The Government contends that Luna committed a crime in this second category: an “offense described in” 18 U. S. C. § 844(i), which criminalizes arson. 8 U. S. C. § 1101(a)(43)(E)(i).

In 2006, Luna was found removable from the United States. He attempted to apply for cancellation of removal, a form of relief available to long-time legal permanent residents at the discretion of the Attorney General. § 1229b(a). Nothing in Luna's history would otherwise preclude cancellation. He was the sole source of financial support for his U. S. citizen fiance, enrolled in college and studying engineering, a homeowner, and a law-abiding legal permanent resident since he was brought to the United States as a child over 30 years ago, aside from the one third-degree arson conviction at issue in this case, for which he served a day in jail.

But the Immigration Judge found—and the Board of Immigration Appeals and the Second Circuit confirmed— that Luna was ineligible for cancellation of removal. Luna's

But the offense of which Luna was convicted is not “described in” § 844(i). This Court's ordinary method of interpreting the aggravated felony statute, the plain text of that provision, and the structure of the INA all confirm as much.

This is not the first time the Court has been tasked with determining whether a state offense constitutes an “aggravated felony” under the INA. Until today, the Court has always required the state offense to match every element of the listed “aggravated felony.” Kawashima v. Holder, 565 U. S. 478, 482 (2012); see also Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U. S. 184, 190 (2013); Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 560 U. S. 563, 580 (2010); Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U. S. 29, 33 (2009); Gon-zales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U. S. 183, 185 (2007); Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U. S. 47, 52–53 (2006); Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U. S. 1, 8 (2004).

Our ordinary methodology thus confirms that the federal arson statute does not describe the New York arson statute under which Luna was convicted. As I have outlined above, see supra, at 474, the federal statute is more limited: It applies only to fires that involve “interstate or foreign commerce.” The state statute contains no such limitation. Thus, under the approach we have used in every case to date, the omission of the interstate commerce element means that Luna's state arson conviction was not an aggravated felony under the INA.

The plain language of the statute supports this straightforward approach. The word “describe” means to “express,” “portray,” or “represent.” See Black's Law Dictionary 445 (6th ed. 1990); Webster's Third New International Dictionary 610 (1986). A description may be “detailed” or it may be general, setting forth only the “recognizable features, or characteristic marks,” of the thing described while leaving the rest to the imagination. 4 Oxford English Dictionary 512 (2d ed. 1989). For example, a Craigslist ad describing an apartment with “in-unit laundry, a dishwasher, rooftop access, central A/C, and a walk-in closet” may leave much to the imagination. After all, the description does not mention the apartment's square footage, windows, or floor number. But though the ad omits features, we would still call it a “description” because it accurately conveys the “recognizable features” of the apartment.

However, even the most general description cannot refer to features that the thing being described does not have. The ad is only an accurate description if the apartment “described in” it has at least the five features listed. If the apartment only has four of the five listed features— there is no rooftop access, say, or the walk-in closet is not so much walk-in as shimmy-in—then the Craigslist ad no longer “describes” the apartment. Rather, it misdescribes it.

So, too, with the statutes in this case. The federal description can be general as long as it is still accurate—that is, as long as the state law has at least all of the elements in the federal law. But there is no meaning of “describe” that allows the Court to say § 844(i) “describes” the New York offense when the New York offense only has four of the five elements listed in § 844(i). Section 844(i) misdescribes the New York offense just as surely as the too-good-to-be-true Craigslist ad misdescribes the real-life apartment.

The structure of the INA confirms that conclusion and makes clear that we need not contort the ordinary, accepted meaning of the phrase “described in.” The INA has many overlapping provisions that assign carefully calibrated consequences to various types of criminal convictions. The Court thus need not interpret any provision—and certainly none of the aggravated felony provisions, among the harshest in the INA—as broadly as possible because the INA as a whole ensures that serious criminal conduct is adequately captured.

That overlapping structure is apparent throughout the INA. First, the aggravated felony list itself has multiple fail-safe provisions. Most serious offenses, for instance, will qualify as “crime[s] of violence . . . for which the term of imprisonment [is] at least one year,” 8 U. S. C. § 1101(a) (43)(F), even if they are not covered by a more specific provision in the aggravated felony list. Had his crime been charged as a more serious arson and had he been punished by one year of imprisonment instead of one day, Luna might have qualified as an aggravated felon under that provision. See Santana v. Holder, 714 F. 3d 140, 145 (CA2 2013) (second-degree arson in New York is a “crime of violence”). 1

And finally, in Luna's case or anyone else's, the Attorney General can exercise her discretion to deny relief to a serious criminal whether or not that criminal has been convicted of an aggravated felony. See Carachuri-Rosendo, 560 U. S., at 581 (doubting that a narrow reading of § 1101(a)(43) will have “any practical effect on policing our Nation's borders”).

To be sure, on Luna's reading, some serious conduct may not be captured by the INA. But not nearly so much as the majority suggests. By contrast, once the aggravated felony statute applies to a noncitizen, no provision in the INA—and

at 466, n. 10. For example, even on the majority's reading, a state-court defendant who sells a child for purposes of child pornography is unlikely to be convicted of “an offense described in [18 U. S. C.] § 2251A,” see § 1101(a)(43)(I). That is because virtually no States have a statute corresponding to 18 U. S. C. § 2251A, with or without the interstate commerce element. (But see Fla. Stat. § 847.0145 (2015).) Such a defendant may, however, be convicted of a state offense that qualifies as an aggravated felony for conspiring to commit sexual abuse of a minor under 8 U. S. C. §§ 1101(a)(43)(U) and 1101(a)(43)(A).

Looking for consistency in the aggravated felony provisions of the INA is often a fool's errand. See Kawashima, 565 U. S., at 497, n. 2 (Ginsburg , J., dissenting) (noting the absurdity of making a tax misdemeanor, but not driving while drunk and causing serious bodily injury, an aggravated felony). But the structure of the INA gives the Court no reason to read the aggravated felony provisions as broadly as possible.3 That is why this Court has repeatedly cautioned against interpreting the aggravated felony section to sweep in offenses that—like many state arson convictions—may be neither aggravated nor felonies. See Carachuri-Rosendo , 560 U. S., at 574; Brief for National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. as Amici Curiae 28–29 (collecting state misdemeanor arson statutes).

The majority first perceives a conflict between Luna's reading of the INA and what it calls the “penultimate sentence” of the aggravated felony statute. The “penultimate sentence” provides that an offense can be an aggravated felony “whether in violation of Federal or State law” or “in violation of the law of a foreign country.” 8 U. S. C. § 1101(a)(43). The majority claims that Luna's reading of the INA would vitiate the quoted proviso. Ante, at 461–462.

It is true that, on Luna's reading, some of the aggravated felonies listed in the INA (including “an offense described in” § 844(i)) will have no state or foreign analog. But the proviso still applies to generic offenses, which constitute nearly half of the entries in the aggravated felony list. See, e. g., §§ 1101(a)(43)(A), (G), (M)(i). And that already-large portion jumps to close to three-quarters of the offenses after counting those many listed federal statutes with no jurisdictional element. See, e. g., §§ 1101(a)(43)(C), (E)(ii), (J). In fact, it applies to the vast majority of offenses adjudicated under the INA given that most serious crimes are also “crimes of violence.” See § 1101(a)(43)(F). 4

And the majority must admit that its interpretation will also leave entries in the aggravated felony section with no state or foreign analogs. For instance, it seems unlikely

In other words, under Luna's reading, the “penultimate sentence” applies to most, but not all, of the entries of the aggravated felony statute; under the majority's reading, the “penultimate sentence” also applies to most, but not all, of the entries of the aggravated felony statute. The majority's first “contextual consideration” thus supplies no reason to prefer one reading over the other.

Just as important, the majority suggests, is a “settled practice of distinguishing between substantive . . . elements”—those that define “the evil Congress seeks to prevent”—and “jurisdictional element[s],” which merely “estab-lis[h] legislative authority.” Ante, at 467. The majority admits that the Court does not distinguish between substantive and jurisdictional elements for many purposes, such as proof beyond a reasonable doubt and the right to a jury trial. Ante , at 468; see Ring v. Arizona, 536 U. S. 584, 606 (2002). But it nonetheless insists on a standard distinction so entrenched that Congress must have intended it to apply even absent any particular indication in the INA.

None of the three examples that the majority proffers is evidence of such a strong norm. First, the majority invokes our rules for interpreting criminal statutes. Ante, at 468. Whereas our general assumption is that a defendant must know each fact making his conduct illegal, courts generally hold that a criminal defendant need not know the facts that satisfy the jurisdictional element of a statute.

But jurisdictional elements are not the only elements a defendant need not know. Under the “default rule,” ante, at 470, n. 12 (emphasis deleted), for interpreting so-called “public

The majority next points to two of the many statutes that, like the INA, require comparing the elements of federal and state offenses. But in each case, it is the statute's language and context, not some “settled practice,” ante, at 467, that command the omission of the jurisdictional element.

The majority's first example, ante, at 468–469, is the Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 U. S. C. § 13(a), a gap-filling statute that incorporates state criminal law into federal enclaves if the “act or omission” is not “made punishable by any enactment of Congress” but “would be punishable if committed or omitted within the jurisdiction of the State.” The Court held that, in identifying such a gap, courts should ignore “jurisdictional, or other technical,” differences between a state and federal statute. Lewis v. United States, 523 U. S. 155, 165 (1998). But the way courts match the elements of a state

The majority's analogy to the federal three strikes statute, 18 U. S. C. § 3559(c)(2)(F), ante, at 469, is similarly unhelpful. That provision counts as a predicate “ `serious violent felony' ” any “ `Federal or State offense . . . wherever committed, consisting of' ” various crimes, including several “ `as described in' ” federal statutes. Ante, at 469 (emphasis added). Though this Court has not construed the statute, the majority notes that courts of appeals disregard the jurisdictional element of federal statutes in assessing whether a state conviction is for a “serious violent felony.” Ibid. But nearly all of the statutes listed in § 3559(c)(2)(F) contain place-based jurisdiction elements—the crime must take place “within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States,” e. g., § 1111(b), or within “the special aircraft jurisdiction of the United States,” 49 U. S. C. § 46502, and so on. In the two cases cited by the majority, for instance, ante, at 469, Courts of Appeals concluded that a state robbery offense qualified as an offense “described in” the federal bank robbery statute even though the robbery did not

Moreover, in other statutes where Congress wants to exclude jurisdictional elements when comparing state and federal offenses, it ordinarily just says so. See, e. g., 18 U. S. C. § 3142(e)(2)(A) (requiring detention of defendant pending trial if “the person has been convicted . . . of a State or local offense that would have been an offense described in subsection (f)(1) of this section if a circumstance giving rise to Federal jurisdiction had existed”); § 2265A(b)(1)(B); § 2426(b)(1)(B); § 3142(f)(1)(D); § 5032; 42 U. S. C. §§ 671(a) (15)(D)(ii)(I)–(II); §§ 5106a(b)(2)(B)(xvi)(I)–(II). Absent comparably clear language, the Court should not presume that the INA intended deportability to depend on a not-so- “settled practice,” ante, at 467, of occasionally distinguishing between substantive and jurisdictional elements.

Finally, the majority suggests that it would be “peculiarly perverse,” ante, at 462, to adopt Luna's plain-text reading of the statute because it would draw a distinction among crimes based on a jurisdictional element that the majority assumes is wholly divorced from “the evil Congress seeks to prevent,” ante, at 467. The jurisdictional element of a federal statute, the majority asserts, is as trivial as the perfunctory warning on a new electronic device: “[A] person would say that she had followed the instructions for setting up an iPhone that are `described in' the user's manual even if she in fact ignored the one” instructing that she “begin by `read[ing] important safety information.' ” Ante, at 460, n. 5; see also ibid. (comparing jurisdictional element to a “ `detour' ” in a 3-week itinerary).

That is because, far from being token, “conventional jurisdictional elements” serve to narrow the kinds of crimes that can be prosecuted, not just to specify the sovereign that can do the prosecuting. Take the federal statute at issue in this case. Section 844(i) requires that the property destroyed be “used in interstate . . . commerce.” The Court has held that “standard, jurisdictional” element, ante, at 473, demands the property's “active employment for commercial purposes, and not merely a passive, passing, or past connection to commerce,” Jones v. United States, 529 U. S. 848, 855 (2000). As a result, the Court held that a defendant who threw a Molo-tov cocktail through the window of an owner-occupied residential house could not be guilty under § 844(i) because the house was not actively “ `used in' ” interstate commerce. Id., at 850–851. Surely, however, a New York prosecutor could have secured a conviction under N. Y . Penal Law Ann. § 150.10 had the same crime been prosecuted in state, rather than federal, court.

The difference between an offense under N. Y . Penal Law Ann. § 150.10 and an offense under 18 U. S. C. § 844(i) is thus more than a technical consideration about which authority

* * *

On the majority's reading, long-time legal permanent residents with convictions for minor state offenses are foreclosed from even appealing to the mercy of the Attorney General. Against our standard method for comparing statutes and the text and structure of the INA, the majority stacks a supposed superfluity, a not-so-well-settled practice, and its conviction that jurisdictional elements are mere technicalities. But an element is an element, and I would not so lightly strip a federal statute of one. I respectfully dissent.