Bosse v. Oklahoma

Per Curiam.

In Booth v. Maryland, 482 U. S. 496 (1987), this Court held that “the Eighth Amendment prohibits a capital sentencing jury from considering victim impact evidence” that does not “relate directly to the circumstances of the crime.” Id., at 501–502, 507, n. 10. Four years later, in Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U. S. 808 (1991), the Court granted certiorari to reconsider that ban on “ `victim impact' evidence relating to the personal characteristics of the victim and the emotional impact of the crimes on the victim's family.” Id., at 817. The Court held that Booth was wrong to conclude that the Eighth Amendment required such a ban. Payne , 501 U. S., at 827. That holding was expressly “limited to” this particular type of victim impact testimony. Id., at 830, n. 2. “Booth also held that the admission of a victim's family members' characterizations and opinions about the crime, the defendant, and the appropriate sentence violates the Eighth Amendment,” but no such evidence was presented in Payne , so the Court had no occasion to reconsider that aspect of the decision. Ibid.

The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals has held that Payne “implicitly overruled that portion of Booth regarding characterizations of the defendant and opinions of the sentence.” Conover v. State, 933 P. 2d 904, 920 (1997) (emphasis added); see also Ledbetter v. State, 933 P. 2d 880, 890–891 (Okla. Crim. App. 1997). The decision below presents a straightforward application of that interpretation of Payne .

“[I]t is this Court's prerogative alone to overrule one of its precedents.” United States v. Hatter, 532 U. S. 557, 567 (2001) (quoting State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U. S. 3, 20 (1997); internal quotation marks omitted); see Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U. S. 477, 484 (1989). The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals has recognized that Payne “specifically acknowledged its holding did not affect” Booth's prohibition on opinions about the crime, the defendant, and the appropriate punishment. Ledbetter, 933 P. 2d, at 890–891. That should have ended its inquiry into whether the Eighth Amendment bars such testimony; the court was wrong to go further and conclude that Payne implicitly overruled Booth in its entirety. “Our decisions remain binding precedent until we see ft to reconsider them, regardless of whether subsequent cases have raised doubts about their continuing vitality.” Hohn v. United States, 524 U. S. 236, 252–253 (1998).

The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals remains bound by Booth's prohibition on characterizations and opinions from a victim's family members about the crime, the defendant, and the appropriate sentence unless this Court reconsiders that ban. The state court erred in concluding otherwise.

The judgment of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Justice Thomas , with whom Justice Alito joins, concurring.

We held in Booth v. Maryland, 482 U. S. 496 (1987), that the Eighth Amendment prohibits a court from admitting the opinions of the victim's family members about the appropriate sentence in a capital case. The Court today correctly observes that our decision in Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U. S. 808 (1991), did not expressly overrule this aspect of Booth. Because “it is this Court's prerogative alone to overrule one of its precedents,” State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U. S. 3, 20 (1997), the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals erred in holding that Payne invalidated Booth in its entirety. In va-cating the decision below, this Court says nothing about whether Booth was correctly decided or whether Payne swept away its analytical foundations. I join the Court's opinion with this understanding.