Fry v. Napoleon Community Schools

FRY et vir , as next friends of minor E. F. v.

NAPOLEON COMMUNITY SCHOOLS et al.

certiorari to the united states court of appeals for

the sixth circuit No. 15–497. Argued October 31, 2016—Decided February 22, 2017 The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) offers federal funds to States in exchange for a commitment to furnish a “free appropriate public education” (FAPE) to children with certain disabilities, 20 U. S. C. § 1412(a)(1)(A), and establishes formal administrative procedures for resolving disputes between parents and schools concerning the provision of a FAPE. Other federal statutes also protect the interests of children with disabilities, including Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. In Smith v. Robinson, 468 U. S. 992, this Court considered the interaction between those other laws and the IDEA, holding that the IDEA was “the exclusive avenue” through which a child with a disability could challenge the adequacy of his education. Id., at 1009. Congress responded by passing the Handicapped Children's Protection Act of 1986, overturning Smith's preclusion of non-IDEA claims and adding a carefully de-fined exhaustion provision. Under that provision, a plaintiff bringing suit under the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, or similar laws “seeking relief that is also available under [the IDEA]” must first exhaust the IDEA's administrative procedures. § 1415( l). Petitioner E. F. is a child with a severe form of cerebral palsy; a trained service dog named Wonder assists her with various daily life activities. When E. F.'s parents, petitioners Stacy and Brent Fry, sought permission for Wonder to join E. F. in kindergarten, officials at Ezra Eby Elementary School refused. The officials reasoned that the human aide provided as part of E. F.'s individualized education program rendered the dog superfluous. In response, the Frys removed E. F. from Ezra Eby and began homeschooling her. They also filed a complaint with the Department of Education's Office for Civil Rights (OCR), claiming that the exclusion of E. F.'s service animal violated her rights under Title II and § 504. OCR agreed, and school officials invited E. F. to return to Ezra Eby with Wonder. But the Frys, concerned about resentment from school officials, instead enrolled E. F. in a different school that welcomed the service dog. The Frys then filed this suit in federal court against Ezra Eby's local and regional school districts and principal (collectively, the school districts), alleging that they violated

Title II and § 504 and seeking declaratory and monetary relief. The District Court granted the school districts' motion to dismiss the suit, holding that § 1415( l) required the Frys to first exhaust the IDEA's administrative procedures. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, reasoning that § 1415(l) applies whenever a plaintiff's alleged harms are “educational” in nature. Held:

1. Exhaustion of the IDEA's administrative procedures is unnecessary where the gravamen of the plaintiff's suit is something other than the denial of the IDEA's core guarantee of a FAPE. Pp. 165–174.

(a) The language of § 1415( l) compels exhaustion when a plaintiff seeks “relief” that is “available” under the IDEA. Establishing the scope of § 1415(l), then, requires identifying the circumstances in which the IDEA enables a person to obtain redress or access a benefit. That inquiry immediately reveals the primacy of a FAPE in the statutory scheme. The IDEA's stated purpose and specific commands center on ensuring a FAPE for children with disabilities. And the IDEA's administrative procedures test whether a school has met this obligation: Any decision by a hearing officer on a request for substantive relief “shall” be “based on a determination of whether the child received a free appropriate public education.” § 1415(f)(3)(E)(i). Accordingly, § 1415( l)'s exhaustion rule hinges on whether a lawsuit seeks relief for the denial of a FAPE. If a lawsuit charges such a denial, the plaintiff cannot escape § 1415(l) merely by bringing the suit under a statute other than the IDEA. But if the remedy sought in a suit brought under a different statute is not for the denial of a FAPE, then exhaustion of the IDEA's procedures is not required. Pp. 165–169. (b) In determining whether a plaintiff seeks relief for the denial of a FAPE, what matters is the gravamen of the plaintiff's complaint, setting aside any attempts at artful pleading. That inquiry makes central the plaintiff's own claims, as § 1415( l) explicitly requires in asking whether a lawsuit in fact “seeks” relief available under the IDEA. But examination of a plaintiff's complaint should consider substance, not surface: Section 1415( l) requires exhaustion when the gravamen of a complaint seeks redress for a school's failure to provide a FAPE, even if not phrased or framed in precisely that way. In addressing whether a complaint fits that description, a court should attend to the diverse means and ends of the statutes covering persons with disabilities. The IDEA guarantees individually tailored educational services for children with disabilities, while Title II and § 504 promise nondiscriminatory access to public institutions for people with disabilities of all ages. That is not to deny some overlap in coverage: The same conduct might violate

all three statutes. But still, these statutory differences mean that a complaint brought under Title II and § 504 might instead seek relief for simple discrimination, irrespective of the IDEA's FAPE obligation. One clue to the gravamen of a complaint can come from asking a pair of hypothetical questions. First, could the plaintiff have brought essentially the same claim if the alleged conduct had occurred at a public facility that was not a school? Second, could an adult at the school have pressed essentially the same grievance? When the answer to those questions is yes, a complaint that does not expressly allege the denial of a FAPE is also unlikely to be truly about that subject. But when the answer is no, then the complaint probably does concern a FAPE. A further sign of the gravamen of a suit can emerge from the history of the proceedings. Prior pursuit of the IDEA's administrative remedies may provide strong evidence that the substance of a plaintiff's claim concerns the denial of a FAPE, even if the complaint never explicitly uses that term. Pp. 169–174.

2. This case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for a proper analysis of whether the gravamen of E. F.'s complaint charges, and seeks relief for, the denial of a FAPE. The Frys' complaint alleges only disability-based discrimination, without making any reference to the adequacy of the special education services E. F.'s school provided. Instead, the Frys have maintained that the school districts infringed E. F.'s right to equal access—even if their actions complied in full with the IDEA's requirements. But the possibility remains that the history of these proceedings might suggest something different. The parties have not addressed whether the Frys initially pursued the IDEA's administrative remedies, and the record is cloudy as to the relevant facts. On remand, the court below should establish whether (or to what extent) the Frys invoked the IDEA's dispute resolution process before filing suit. And if the Frys started down that road, the court should decide whether their actions reveal that the gravamen of their complaint is indeed the denial of a FAPE, thus necessitating further exhaustion. Pp. 174–176. 788 F. 3d 622, vacated and remanded. Kagan, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Kennedy , Ginsburg , Breyer , and Sotomayor , JJ., joined. Alito , J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which Thomas, J., joined, post, p. 176.

Samuel R. Bagenstos argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Steven R. Shapiro , Jill M.

Roman Martinez argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Gershengorn, Principal Deputy Assistant General Gupta, Irving Gornstein, Sharon M. McGowan, Jennifer Levin Eichhorn, James Cole, Jr., Francisco Lopez, and Rhonda Weiss.

Neal Kumar Katyal argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Eugene A. Sokoloff, Thomas P . Schmidt, Timothy J. Mullins, and Kenneth B. Chapie .*

Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court.

The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA or Act), 84 Stat. 175, as amended, 20 U. S. C. § 1400 et seq., ensures that children with disabilities receive needed special education services. One of its provisions, § 1415( l), addresses the Act's relationship with other laws protecting those children. Section 1415( l) makes clear that nothing in the IDEA “restrict[s] or limit[s] the rights [or] remedies” that other federal laws, including antidiscrimination statutes, confer on children with disabilities. At the same time, the

A

The IDEA offers federal funds to States in exchange for a commitment: to furnish a “free appropriate public education”—more concisely known as a FAPE—to all children with certain physical or intellectual disabilities. Ibid.; see § 1401(3)(A)(i) (listing covered disabilities). As defined in the Act, a FAPE comprises “special education and related services”—both “instruction” tailored to meet a child's “unique needs” and sufficient “supportive services” to permit the child to benefit from that instruction. §§ 1401(9), (26), (29); see Board of Ed. of Hendrick Hudson Central School Dist., Westchester Cty. v. Rowley , 458 U. S. 176, 203 (1982). An eligible child, as this Court has explained, acquires a “substantive right” to such an education once a State accepts the IDEA's financial assistance. Smith v. Robinson, 468 U. S. 992, 1010 (1984).

Under the IDEA, an “individualized education program,” called an IEP for short, serves as the “primary vehicle” for providing each child with the promised FAPE. Honig v. Doe , 484 U. S. 305, 311 (1988); see § 1414(d). (Welcome to— and apologies for—the acronymic world of federal legislation.) Crafted by a child's “IEP Team”—a group of school officials, teachers, and parents—the IEP spells out a personalized plan to meet all of the child's “educational needs.” §§ 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(II)(bb), (d)(1)(B). Most notably, the IEP documents the child's current “levels of academic achieve-

Because parents and school representatives sometimes cannot agree on such issues, the IDEA establishes formal procedures for resolving disputes. To begin, a dissatisfied parent may file a complaint as to any matter concerning the provision of a FAPE with the local or state educational agency (as state law provides). See § 1415(b)(6). That pleading generally triggers a “[p]reliminary meeting” involv-ing the contending parties, § 1415(f)(1)(B)(i); at their option, the parties may instead (or also) pursue a full-fledged mediation process, see § 1415(e). Assuming their impasse continues, the matter proceeds to a “due process hearing” before an impartial hearing officer. § 1415(f )(1)(A); see § 1415(f)(3)(A)(i). Any decision of the officer granting substantive relief must be “based on a determination of whether the child received a [FAPE].” § 1415(f)(3)(E)(i). If the hearing is initially conducted at the local level, the ruling is appealable to the state agency. See § 1415(g). Finally, a parent unhappy with the outcome of the administrative process may seek judicial review by filing a civil action in state or federal court. See § 1415(i)(2)(A).

Important as the IDEA is for children with disabilities, it is not the only federal statute protecting their interests. Of particular relevance to this case are two antidiscrimination laws—Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U. S. C. § 12131 et seq., and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U. S. C. § 794—which cover both adults and children with disabilities, in both public schools and other settings. Title II forbids any “public entity” from discriminating based on disability; § 504 applies the same prohibition to any federally funded “program or activity.” 42 U. S. C. §§ 12131–12132; 29 U. S. C. § 794(a). A regulation implementing Title II re-

This Court first considered the interaction between such laws and the IDEA in Smith v. Robinson, 468 U. S. 992. 1 The plaintiffs there sought “to secure a `free appropriate public education' for [their] handicapped child.” Id., at 994. But instead of bringing suit under the IDEA alone, they appended “virtually identical” claims (again alleging the denial of a “free appropriate public education”) under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. Id., at 1009; see id., at 1016. The Court held that the IDEA altogether foreclosed those additional claims: With its “comprehensive” and “carefully tailored” provisions, the Act was “the exclusive avenue” through which a child with a disability (or his parents) could challenge the adequacy of his education. Id., at 1009; see id., at 1013, 1016, 1021.

“Nothing in [the IDEA] shall be construed to restrict or limit the rights, procedures, and remedies available under the Constitution, the [ADA], title V of the Rehabilitation Act [including § 504], or other Federal laws protecting the rights of children with disabilities, except that before the filing of a civil action under such laws seeking relief that is also available under [the IDEA], the [IDEA's administrative procedures] shall be exhausted to the same extent as would be required had the action been brought under [the IDEA].”

The first half of § 1415( l) (up until “except that”) “reaffirm[s] the viability” of federal statutes like the ADA or Rehabilitation Act “as separate vehicles,” no less integral than the IDEA, “for ensuring the rights of handicapped children.” H. R. Rep. No. 99–296, p. 4 (1985); see id., at 6. According to that opening phrase, the IDEA does not prevent a plaintiff from asserting claims under such laws even if, as in Smith itself, those claims allege the denial of an appropriate public education (much as an IDEA claim would). But the second half of § 1415( l) (from “except that” onward) imposes a limit on that “anything goes” regime, in the form of an exhaustion provision. According to that closing phrase, a plaintiff bringing suit under the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, or similar laws must in certain circumstances—that is, when “seeking relief that is also available under” the IDEA—first exhaust the IDEA's administrative procedures. The reach of that requirement is the issue in this case.

B

Petitioner E. F. is a child with a severe form of cerebral palsy, which “significantly limits her motor skills and mobil-

But when the Frys sought permission for Wonder to join E. F. in kindergarten, officials at Ezra Eby Elementary School refused the request. Under E. F.'s existing IEP, a human aide provided E. F. with one-on-one support throughout the day; that two-legged assistance, the school officials thought, rendered Wonder superfluous. In the words of one administrator, Wonder should be barred from Ezra Eby because all of E. F.'s “physical and academic needs [were] being met through the services/programs/accommodations” that the school had already agreed to. Id., at 8, ¶33. Later that year, the school officials briefly allowed Wonder to accompany E. F. to school on a trial basis; but even then, “the dog was required to remain in the back of the room during classes, and was forbidden from assisting [E. F.] with many tasks he had been specifically trained to do.” Ibid., ¶35. And when the trial period concluded, the administrators again informed the Frys that Wonder was not welcome. As a result, the Frys removed E. F. from Ezra Eby and began homeschooling her.

In response to OCR's decision, school officials at last agreed that E. F. could come to school with Wonder. But after meeting with Ezra Eby's principal, the Frys became concerned that the school administration “would resent [E. F.] and make her return to school difficult.” App. to Brief in Opposition 10, ¶48. Accordingly, the Frys found a different public school, in a different district, where administrators and teachers enthusiastically received both E. F. and Wonder.

C

The Frys then filed this suit in federal court against the local and regional school districts in which Ezra Eby is located, along with the school's principal (collectively, the school districts). The complaint alleged that the school dis-

The District Court granted the school districts' motion to dismiss the suit, holding that § 1415( l) required the Frys to first exhaust the IDEA's administrative procedures. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 50. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed on the same ground. In that court's view, § 1415(l) applies if “the injuries [alleged in a suit] relate to the specific substantive protections of the IDEA.” 788 F. 3d 622, 625 (2015). And that means, the court continued, that exhaustion is necessary whenever “the genesis and the manifestations” of the complained-of harms were “educational” in nature. Id., at 627 (quoting Charlie F. v. Board of Ed. of Skokie School Dist. 68, 98 F. 3d 989, 993 (CA7 1996)). On that understanding of § 1415( l), the Sixth Circuit held, the Frys' suit could not proceed: Because the harms to E. F. were generally “educational”—most notably, the court reasoned, because “Wonder's absence hurt her sense of independence and social confidence at school”—the Frys had to exhaust the IDEA's procedures. 788 F. 3d, at 627. Judge Daughtrey dissented, emphasizing that in bringing their Title II and § 504 claims, the Frys “did not allege the denial of a FAPE” or “seek to modify [E. F.'s] IEP in any way.” Id., at 634.

We granted certiorari to address confusion in the Courts of Appeals as to the scope of § 1415(l)'s exhaustion requirement.

Section 1415(l) requires that a plaintiff exhaust the IDEA's procedures before filing an action under the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, or similar laws when (but only when) her suit “seek[s] relief that is also available” under the IDEA. We first hold that to meet that statutory standard, a suit must seek relief for the denial of a FAPE, because that is the only “relief” the IDEA makes “available.” We next conclude that in determining whether a suit indeed “seeks” relief for such a denial, a court should look to the substance, or gravamen, of the plaintiff's complaint. 4

In this Court, the parties have reached substantial agreement about what “relief” the IDEA makes “available” for children with disabilities—and about how the Sixth Circuit went wrong in addressing that question. The Frys maintain

We begin, as always, with the statutory language at issue, which (at risk of repetition) compels exhaustion when a plaintiff seeks “relief” that is “available” under the IDEA. The ordinary meaning of “relief” in the context of a lawsuit is the “redress[ ] or benefit” that attends a favorable judgment. Black's Law Dictionary 1161 (5th ed. 1979). And such relief is “available,” as we recently explained, when it is “accessible or may be obtained.” Ross v. Blake, 578 U. S. 632, 642 (2016) (quoting Webster's Third New International Dictionary 150 (1993)). So to establish the scope of § 1415( l), we must identify the circumstances in which the IDEA enables a person to obtain redress (or, similarly, to access a benefit).

That inquiry immediately reveals the primacy of a FAPE in the statutory scheme. In its first section, the IDEA declares as its first purpose “to ensure that all children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education.” § 1400(d)(1)(A). That principal purpose then

The IDEA's administrative procedures test whether a school has met that obligation—and so center on the Act's FAPE requirement. As noted earlier, any decision by a hearing officer on a request for substantive relief “shall” be “based on a determination of whether the child received a free appropriate public education.” § 1415(f)(3)(E)(i); see supra, at 159.6 Or said in Latin: In the IDEA's administrative process, a FAPE denial is the sine qua non. Suppose that a parent's complaint protests a school's failure to provide some accommodation for a child with a disability. If that accommodation is needed to fulfill the IDEA's FAPE requirement, the hearing officer must order relief. But if it is not, he cannot—even though the dispute is between a child with a disability and the school she attends. There might be good reasons, unrelated to a FAPE, for the school to make the

For that reason, § 1415( l)'s exhaustion rule hinges on whether a lawsuit seeks relief for the denial of a FAPE. If a lawsuit charges such a denial, the plaintiff cannot escape § 1415(l) merely by bringing her suit under a statute other than the IDEA—as when, for example, the plaintiffs in Smith claimed that a school's failure to provide a FAPE also violated the Rehabilitation Act. 8 Rather, that plaintiff must first submit her case to an IDEA hearing officer, experienced in addressing exactly the issues she raises. But if, in a suit brought under a different statute, the remedy sought is not for the denial of a FAPE, then exhaustion of the IDEA's procedures is not required. After all, the plaintiff could not get any relief from those procedures: A hearing officer, as just explained, would have to send her away empty-handed. And that is true even when the suit arises directly from a school's treatment of a child with a disability—and so could be said to relate in some way to her education. A school's conduct toward such a child—say, some refusal to make an accommodation—might injure her in ways unrelated to a FAPE, which are addressed in statutes other than the

Still, an important question remains: How is a court to tell when a plaintiff “seeks” relief for the denial of a FAPE and when she does not? Here, too, the parties have found some common ground: By looking, they both say, to the “substance” of, rather than the labels used in, the plaintiff's complaint. Brief for Respondents 20; Reply Brief 7–8. And here, too, we agree with that view: What matters is the crux—or, in legal-speak, the gravamen—of the plaintiff's complaint, setting aside any attempts at artful pleading.

That inquiry makes central the plaintiff's own claims, as § 1415(l) explicitly requires. The statutory language asks whether a lawsuit in fact “seeks” relief available under the IDEA—not, as a stricter exhaustion statute might, whether the suit “could have sought” relief available under the IDEA (or, what is much the same, whether any remedies “are” available under that law). See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 20 (contrasting § 1415(l) with the exhaustion provision in the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U. S. C. § 1997e(a)). In effect, § 1415( l) treats the plaintiff as “the master of the claim”: She identifies its remedial basis—and is subject to exhaustion or not based on that choice. Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U. S. 386, 392, and n. 7 (1987). A court deciding whether § 1415( l) applies must therefore examine whether a plaintiff's complaint—the principal instrument by which she describes her case—seeks relief for the denial of an appropriate education.

But that examination should consider substance, not surface. The use (or non-use) of particular labels and terms is not what matters. The inquiry, for example, does not ride on whether a complaint includes (or, alternatively, omits) the

In addressing whether a complaint fits that description, a court should attend to the diverse means and ends of the statutes covering persons with disabilities—the IDEA on the one hand, the ADA and Rehabilitation Act (most notably) on the other. The IDEA, of course, protects only “children” (well, really, adolescents too) and concerns only their schooling. § 1412(a)(1)(A). And as earlier noted, the statute's goal is to provide each child with meaningful access to education by offering individualized instruction and related services appropriate to her “unique needs.” § 1401(29); see Rowley, 458 U. S., at 192, 198; supra, at 167. By contrast, Title II of the ADA and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act cover people with disabilities of all ages, and do so both inside and outside schools. And those statutes aim to root out disability-based discrimination, enabling each covered person (sometimes by means of reasonable accommodations) to participate equally to all others in public facilities and federally funded programs. See supra, at 159–160. In short, the IDEA guarantees

One clue to whether the gravamen of a complaint against a school concerns the denial of a FAPE, or instead addresses disability-based discrimination, can come from asking a pair of hypothetical questions. First, could the plaintiff have brought essentially the same claim if the alleged conduct had occurred at a public facility that was not a school—say, a public theater or library? And second, could an adult at the school—say, an employee or visitor—have pressed essentially the same grievance? When the answer to those questions is yes, a complaint that does not expressly allege the denial of a FAPE is also unlikely to be truly about that subject; after all, in those other situations there is no FAPE obligation and yet the same basic suit could go forward. But when the answer is no, then the complaint probably does concern a FAPE, even if it does not explicitly say so; for the FAPE requirement is all that explains why only a child in the school setting (not an adult in that setting or a child in some other) has a viable claim.

Take two contrasting examples. Suppose first that a wheelchair-bound child sues his school for discrimination under Title II (again, without mentioning the denial of a FAPE) because the building lacks access ramps. In some sense, that architectural feature has educational consequences, and a different lawsuit might have alleged that it violates the IDEA: After all, if the child cannot get inside the school, he cannot receive instruction there; and if he must

But suppose next that a student with a learning disability sues his school under Title II for failing to provide remedial tutoring in mathematics. That suit, too, might be cast as one for disability-based discrimination, grounded on the school's refusal to make a reasonable accommodation; the complaint might make no reference at all to a FAPE or an IEP. But can anyone imagine the student making the same claim against a public theater or library? Or, similarly, imagine an adult visitor or employee suing the school to ob-

A further sign that the gravamen of a suit is the denial of a FAPE can emerge from the history of the proceedings. In particular, a court may consider that a plaintiff has previously invoked the IDEA's formal procedures to handle the dispute—thus starting to exhaust the Act's remedies before switching midstream. Recall that a parent dissatisfied with her child's education initiates those administrative procedures by filing a complaint, which triggers a preliminary meeting (or possibly mediation) and then a due process hearing. See supra, at 159. A plaintiff's initial choice to pursue that process may suggest that she is indeed seeking relief for the denial of a FAPE—with the shift to judicial proceedings prior to full exhaustion reflecting only strategic calculations about how to maximize the prospects of such a remedy. Whether that is so depends on the facts; a court may conclude, for example, that the move to a courtroom came from a late-acquired awareness that the school had fulfilled its FAPE obligation and that the grievance involves something else entirely. But prior pursuit of the IDEA's administrative remedies will often provide strong evidence that the substance of a plaintiff's claim concerns the denial of a

The Court of Appeals did not undertake the analysis we have just set forward. As noted above, it asked whether E. F.'s injuries were, broadly speaking, “educational” in nature. See supra, at 164; 788 F. 3d, at 627 (reasoning that the “value of allowing Wonder to attend [school] with E. F. was educational” because it would foster “her sense of independence and social confidence,” which is “the sort of interest the IDEA protects”). That is not the same as asking whether the gravamen of E. F.'s complaint charges, and seeks relief for, the denial of a FAPE. And that difference in standard may have led to a difference in result in this case. Understood correctly, § 1415( l) might not require exhaustion of the Frys' claim. We lack some important information on that score, however, and so we remand the issue to the court below.

The Frys' complaint alleges only disability-based discrimination, without making any reference to the adequacy of the special education services E. F.'s school provided. The school districts' “refusal to allow Wonder to act as a service dog,” the complaint states, “discriminated against [E. F.] as a person with disabilities . . . by denying her equal access” to public facilities. App. to Brief in Opposition 15, Complaint ¶68. The complaint contains no allegation about the denial of a FAPE or about any deficiency in E. F.'s IEP. More, it does not accuse the school even in general terms of refusing to provide the educational instruction and services that E. F. needs. See 788 F. 3d, at 631 (acknowledging that

And nothing in the nature of the Frys' suit suggests any implicit focus on the adequacy of E. F.'s education. Consider, as suggested above, that the Frys could have filed essentially the same complaint if a public library or theater had refused admittance to Wonder. See supra, at 172. Or similarly, consider that an adult visitor to the school could have leveled much the same charges if prevented from entering with his service dog. See ibid. In each case, the plaintiff would challenge a public facility's policy of precluding service dogs (just as a blind person might challenge a policy of barring guide dogs, see supra, at 163) as violating Title II's and § 504's equal access requirements. The suit would have nothing to do with the provision of educational services. From all that we know now, that is exactly the kind of action the Frys have brought.

But we do not foreclose the possibility that the history of these proceedings might suggest something different. As earlier discussed, a plaintiff's initial pursuit of the IDEA's administrative remedies can serve as evidence that the gravamen of her later suit is the denial of a FAPE, even though that does not appear on the face of her complaint. See supra, at 173–174. The Frys may or may not have sought those remedies before filing this case: None of the parties here have addressed that issue, and the record is cloudy as to

With these instructions and for the reasons stated, we vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Justice Alito , with whom Justice Thomas joins, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.

I join all of the opinion of the Court with the exception of its discussion (in the text from the beginning of the first new paragraph on page 171 to the end of the opinion) in which the Court provides several misleading “clue[s],” ante, at 171, for the lower courts.

The Court first instructs the lower courts to inquire whether the plaintiff could have brought “essentially the same claim if the alleged conduct had occurred at a public facility that was not a school—say, a public theater or library.” Ibid. Next, the Court says, a court should ask whether “an adult at the school—say, an employee or visitor—[could] have pressed essentially the same grievance.” Ibid. These clues make sense only if there is no overlap between the relief available under the following two sets of claims: (1) the relief provided by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), and (2) the relief provided by other federal laws (including the Constitution, the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973). The Court does not show or even claim that there is no such overlap—to the contrary, it observes that “[t]he same conduct might violate” the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act and the IDEA. Ibid. And since these clues

The Court provides another false clue by suggesting that lower courts take into account whether parents, before filing suit under the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act, began to pursue but then abandoned the IDEA's formal procedures. Ante , at 173. This clue also seems to me to be ill advised. It is easy to imagine circumstances under which parents might start down the IDEA road and then change course and file an action under the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act that seeks relief that the IDEA cannot provide. The parents might be advised by their attorney that the relief they were seeking under the IDEA is not available under that law but is available under another. Or the parents might change their minds about the relief that they want, give up on the relief that the IDEA can provide, and turn to another statute.

Although the Court provides these clues for the purpose of assisting the lower courts, I am afraid that they may have the opposite effect. They are likely to confuse and lead courts astray.