Virginia et al. v. Leblanc

VIRGINIA et al. v. LEBLANC

on petition for writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the fourth circuit

No. 16–1177. Decided June 12, 2017

Respondent was sentenced to life in prison in 2003 for crimes that he committed when he was 16. The Court later decided in Graham v. Florida, 560 U. S. 48, that the Eighth Amendment prohibits juvenile offenders convicted of nonhomicide offenses from being sentenced to life without parole. Respondent sought resentencing in light of Graham, but the Virginia courts denied relief based on a Supreme Court of Virginia decision holding that the Commonwealth's framework for granting release to inmates 60 years and older under certain conditions satisfies Graham's requirement of a meaningful opportunity for parole. Respondent next sought federal habeas relief. The District Court granted relief, finding no possibility that fairminded jurists could disagree that the state court's decision conflicts with Graham. A divided panel of the Fourth Circuit affirmed. Held: The Fourth Circuit flailed to accord the state court's decision the deference owed under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. For a state court's decision to be an unreasonable application of the Court's case law, the ruling must be not just wrong but “objectively unreasonable.” Woods v. Donald , 575 U. S. 312, 316. This is “meant to be” a difficult standard to meet. Harring-ton v. Richter, 562 U. S. 86, 102. It was not objectively unreasonable based on current case law for the state court to conclude that Virginia's release program satisfied Graham's requirement that juveniles convicted of a nonhomicide crime have a meaningful opportunity to receive parole. Graham did not consider whether a release program like Virginia's flails to satisfy the Eighth Amendment. That question cannot be resolved in the narrow context of federal habeas review, and the Court expresses no view on the merits of the underlying Eighth Amendment claim. Certiorari granted; 841 F. 3d 256, reversed.

Per Curiam. Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), a state prisoner is eligible for federal habeas relief if the underlying state-court merits ruling

On July 6, 1999, respondent Dennis LeBlanc raped a 62-year-old woman. He was 16 at the time. In 2003, a state trial court sentenced him to life in prison for his crimes. In the 1990's, Virginia had, for felony offenders, abolished parole that followed a traditional framework. See Va. Code Ann. § 53.1–165.1 (2013). As a form of replacement, Virginia enacted its so-called geriatric release program, which allows older inmates to receive conditional release under some circumstances. LeBlanc v. Mathena, 841 F. 3d 256, 261 (CA4 2016) (citing Va. Code Ann. § 53.1–40.01).

Seven years after respondent was sentenced, this Court decided Graham v. Florida. Graham established that the Eighth Amendment prohibits juvenile offenders convicted of nonhomicide offenses from being sentenced to life without parole. While a “State is not required to guarantee eventual freedom to a juvenile offender convicted of a nonhomi-cide crime,” the Court held, it must “give defendants like Graham some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.” 560 U. S., at 75. The Court in Graham left it to the States, “in the first instance, to explore the means and mechanisms for compliance” with the Graham rule. Ibid.

Respondent later filed a motion in state trial court—the Virginia Beach Circuit Court—seeking to vacate his sentence in light of Graham. The trial court denied the motion. In so doing, it relied on the Supreme Court of Virginia's deci-

“Any person serving a sentence imposed upon a conviction for a felony offense . . . (i) who has reached the age of sixty-five or older and who has served at least five years of the sentence imposed or (ii) who has reached the age of sixty or older and who has served at least ten years of the sentence imposed may petition the Parole Board for conditional release.” § 53.1–40.01.

The Angel court explained that “[t]he regulations for conditional release under this statute provide that if the prisoner meets the qualifications for consideration contained in the statute, the factors used in the normal parole consideration process apply to conditional release decisions under this statute.” 281 Va., at 275, 704 S. E. 2d, at 402. The geriatric release program thus complied with Graham, the Angel court held, because it provided “the meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation required by the Eighth Amendment.” 281 Va., at 275, 704 S. E. 2d, at 402 (internal quotation marks omitted).

The Virginia Supreme Court, in reviewing the trial court's ruling in the instant case, summarily denied respondent's requests for appeal and for rehearing.

In 2012, respondent filed a federal habeas petition in the Eastern District of Virginia pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 2254. A Magistrate Judge recommended dismissing the petition, but the District Court disagreed and granted the writ. The District Court explained that “there is no possibility that fairminded jurists could disagree that the state court's decision conflicts wit[h] the dictates of Graham.” LeBlanc v. Mathena, 2015 WL 4042175, *18 (July 1, 2015).

Judge Niemeyer dissented. He criticized the majority for “fail[ing] to respect, in any meaningful way, the deference Congress requires federal courts to give state court decisions on postconviction review.” Id., at 275.

The Commonwealth of Virginia petitioned for certiorari. The petition is now granted, and the judgment is reversed: The Virginia trial court did not unreasonably apply the Graham rule.

I

n order for a state court's decision to be an unreasonable application of this Court's case law, the ruling must be “objectively unreasonable, not merely wrong; even clear error will not suffice.” Woods v. Donald, 575 U. S. 312, 316 (2015) (per curiam ) (internal quotation marks omitted). In other words, a litigant must “show that the state court's ruling . . . was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). This is “meant to be” a diff-cult standard to meet. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U. S. 86, 102 (2011).

The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit erred by failing to accord the state court's decision the deference owed under AEDPA. Graham did not decide that a geriatric release program like Virginia's flailed to satisfy the Eighth Amendment because that question was not presented. And it was not objectively unreasonable for the state court to conclude that, because the geriatric release program employed normal parole factors, it satisfied Graham's require-

“Perhaps the logical next step from” Graham would be to hold that a geriatric release program does not satisfy the Eighth Amendment, but “perhaps not.” 572 U. S., at 427. “[T]here are reasonable arguments on both sides.” Ibid. With respect to petitioners, these include the arguments discussed above. With regards to respondent, these include the contentions that the parole board's substantial discretion to deny geriatric release deprives juvenile nonhomicide offenders a meaningful opportunity to seek parole and that juveniles cannot seek geriatric release until they have spent at least four decades in prison.

These arguments cannot be resolved on federal habeas review. Because this case arises “only in th[at] narrow context,” the Court “express[es] no view on the merits of the underlying” Eighth Amendment claim. Woods, supra, at 319 (internal quotation marks omitted). Nor does the Court “suggest or imply that the underlying issue, if presented on direct review, would be insubstantial.” Marshall v. Rodgers, 569 U. S. 58, 64 (2013) (per curiam ); accord, Woodall,

A proper respect for AEDPA's high bar for habeas relief avoids unnecessarily “disturb[ing] the State's significant interest in repose for concluded litigation, den[ying] society the right to punish some admitted offenders, and intrud[ing] on state sovereignty to a degree matched by few exercises of federal judicial authority.” Harrington, supra, at 103 (internal quotation marks omitted). The federalism interest implicated in AEDPA cases is of central relevance in this case, for the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit's holding created the potential for significant discord in the Virginia sentencing process. Before today, Virginia courts were permitted to impose—and required to affirm—a sentence like respondent's, while federal courts presented with the same fact pattern were required to grant habeas relief. Reversing the Court of Appeals' decision in this case— rather than waiting until a more substantial split of authority develops—spares Virginia courts from having to confront this legal quagmire.

For these reasons, the petition for certiorari and the motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis are granted, and the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.

It is so ordered.

Justice Ginsburg , concurring in the judgment.

Graham v. Florida, 560 U. S. 48 (2010), as today's per cu-riam recognizes, established that a juvenile offender convicted of a nonhomicide offense must have “some meaningful opportunity to obtain release [from prison] based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.” Id., at 75. See ante,