Hamer v. Neighborhood Housing Services of Chicago

CHICAGO et al.

certiorari to the united states court of appeals for

the seventh circuit No. 16–658. Argued October 10, 2017—Decided November 8, 2017 An appeal fling deadline prescribed by statute is considered “jurisdictional,” meaning that late fling of the appeal notice necessitates dismissal of the appeal. See Bowles v. Russell, 551 U. S. 205, 210–213. In contrast, a time limit prescribed only in a court-made rule is not jurisdictional. It is a mandatory claim-processing rule that may be waived or forfeited. Ibid. This Court and other forums have sometimes overlooked this critical distinction. See Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U. S. 154, 161. Petitioner Charmaine Hamer filed an employment discrimination suit against respondents. The District Court granted respondents' motion for summary judgment, entering final judgment on September 14, 2015. Before October 14, the date Hamer's notice of appeal was due, her attorneys filed a motion to withdraw as counsel and a motion for an extension of the appeal fling deadline to give Hamer time to secure new counsel. The District Court granted both motions, extending the deadline to December 14, a two-month extension, even though the governing Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure, Rule 4(a)(5)(C), confines such extensions to 30 days. Concluding that Rule 4(a)(5)(C)'s time prescription is jurisdictional, the Court of Appeals dismissed Hamer's appeal. Held: The Court of Appeals erred in treating as jurisdictional Rule 4(a)(5)(C)'s limitation on extensions of time to file a notice of appeal. Pp. 22–28. (a) The 1948 version of 28 U. S. C. § 2107 allowed extensions of time to file a notice of appeal, not exceeding 30 days, “upon a showing of excusable neglect based on failure of a party to learn of the entry of the judgment,” but the statute said nothing about extensions when the judgment loser did receive notice of the entry of judgment. In 1991, the statute was amended, broadening the class of prospective appellants who could gain extensions to include all who showed “excusable neglect or good cause” and reducing the time prescription for appellants who lacked notice of the entry of judgment from 30 to 14 days. § 2107(c). For other cases, the statute does not say how long an extension may run. Rule 4(a)(5)(C), however, does prescribe a limit: “No extension [of time for filing a notice of appeal] may exceed 30 days after the pre-

scribed time [for filing a notice of appeal] or 14 days after the date [of] the order granting the [extension] motion . . . , whichever is later.” Pp. 22–24.

(b) This Court's precedent shapes a rule of decision that is both clear and easy to apply: If a time prescription governing the transfer of adju-dicatory authority from one Article III court to another appears in a statute, the limitation is jurisdictional; otherwise, the time specification fits within the claim-processing category. In concluding otherwise, the Court of Appeals relied on Bowles. There, Bowles filed a notice of appeal outside a limitation set by Congress in § 2107(c). This Court held that, as a result, the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction over his tardy appeal. 551 U. S., at 213. In confating Rule 4(a)(5)(C) with § 2107(c) here, the Seventh Circuit flailed to grasp the distinction between jurisdictional appeal fling deadlines and deadlines stated only in mandatory claim-processing rules. It therefore misapplied Bowles. Bowles's statement that “the taking of an appeal within the prescribed time is `mandatory and jurisdictional,' ” id., at 209, is a characterization left over from days when the Court was “less than meticulous” in using the term “jurisdictional,” Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U. S. 443, 454. The statement was correct in Bowles, where the time prescription was imposed by Congress, but it would be incorrect here, where only Rule 4(a)(5)(C) limits the length of the extension. Pp. 24–27. 835 F. 3d 761, vacated and remanded. Ginsburg, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

Jonathan A. Herstoff argued the cause and filed the briefs for petitioner.

Damien G . Stewart argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Linda T . Coberly, Daniel J. Fazio , Benjamin M . Ostrander , Brian P . Brooks , Jeff Nowak, and Gwendolyn B . Morales.*

Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case presents a question of time, specifically, time to file a notice of appeal from a district court's judgment. In

A

“Only Congress may determine a lower federal court's subject-matter jurisdiction.” Kontrick, 540 U. S., at 452 (citing U. S. Const., Art. III, § 1); Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U. S. 365, 370 (1978) (“[I]t is axiomatic that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not create or withdraw federal jurisdiction.”). Accordingly, a provision governing the time to appeal in a civil action qualifies as jurisdictional only if Congress sets the time. See Bowles, 551 U. S., at 211–212 (noting “the jurisdictional distinction between court-promulgated rules and limits enacted by Congress”); Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U. S. 1, 10 (1941) (noting “the inability of a court, by rule, to extend or restrict the jurisdiction conferred by a statute”). A time limit not prescribed by Congress ranks as a mandatory claim-processing rule, serving “to promote the orderly progress of litigation by requiring that the parties take certain procedural steps at certain specified times.” Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U. S. 428, 435 (2011).

This Court and other forums have sometimes overlooked this distinction, “mischaracteriz[ing] claim-processing rules or elements of a cause of action as jurisdictional limitations,

Mandatory claim-processing rules are less stern. If properly invoked, mandatory claim-processing rules must be enforced, but they may be waived or forfeited. Manrique v. United States, 581 U. S. 116, 121 (2017). “[C]laim-processing rules [ensure] relief to a party properly raising them, but do not compel the same result if the party forfeits them.” Eberhart v. United States, 546 U. S. 12, 19 (2005) (per curiam ).3

B

Petitioner Charmaine Hamer filed a complaint against respondents Neighborhood Housing Services of Chicago and Fannie Mae alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq., and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U. S. C. § 621 et seq. The District Court granted respondents' motion for summary judgment on September 10, 2015, and entered final judgment on September 14, 2015. In the absence of a time extension, Hamer's notice of appeal would have been due by October 14, 2015. Fed. Rule App. Proc. 4(a)(1)(A).

On October 8, 2015, before the October 14 deadline for filing Hamer's notice of appeal, her attorneys made two motions.4 First, they sought to withdraw as counsel because of their disagreement with Hamer on pursuit of an appeal. Second, they sought a two-month extension of the notice of appeal fling date, so that Hamer would have adequate time to engage new counsel for her appeal. App. to Pet. for Cert. A–57–A–59. The District Court granted both motions on the same day and ordered extension of the deadline for Ham-er's notice of appeal from October 14 to December 14, 2015. Id., at A–60. Respondents did not move for reconsideration or otherwise raise any objection to the length of the extension.

In the docketing statement respondents filed in the Court of Appeals, they stated: “The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has jurisdiction over this appeal under 28 U. S. C. § 1291, in that on December 11, 2015, [Hamer] filed a timely Notice of Appeal from a final judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois that disposed of all of [Hamer's] claims against

Section 2107 of Title 28 of the U. S. Code, as enacted in 1948, allowed extensions of the time to file a notice of appeal, not exceeding 30 days, “upon a showing of excusable neglect based on failure of a party to learn of the entry of the judgment.” Act of June 25, 1948, § 2107, 62 Stat. 963. 6 Nothing in the statute provided for extension of the time to file a

“(c) The district court may, upon motion filed not later than 30 days after the expiration of the time otherwise set for bringing appeal, extend the time for appeal upon a showing of excusable neglect or good cause. In addition, if the district court finds— “(1) that a party entitled to notice of the entry of a judgment or order did not receive such notice from the clerk or any party within 21 days of its entry, and “(2) that no party would be prejudiced, “the district court may, upon motion filed within 180 days after entry of the judgment or order or within 14 days after receipt of such notice, whichever is earlier, reopen the time for appeal for a period of 14 days from the date of entry of the order reopening the time for appeal.”

In short, current § 2107(c), like the provision as initially enacted, specifies the length of an extension for cases in which the appellant lacked notice of the entry of judgment. 8

But Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(5)(C) does prescribe a limit: “No extension [of time for filing a notice of appeal] may exceed 30 days after the prescribed time [for filing a notice of appeal] or 14 days after the date [of] the order granting the [extension] motion . . . , whichever is later.” Unlike § 2107(c), we note, Rule 4(a)(5)(C) limits extensions of time to file a notice of appeal in all circumstances, not just in cases in which the prospective appellant lacked notice of the entry of judgment.

Although Rule 4(a)(5)(C)'s limit on extensions of time appears nowhere in the text of § 2107(c), respondents now con-tend that Rule 4(a)(5)(C) has a “statutory basis” because § 2107(c) once limited extensions (to the extent it did authorize them) to 30 days. Brief for Respondents 17. No matter, respondents submit, that Congress struck the 30-day limit in 1991 and replaced it with a 14-day limit governing, as the 30-day limit did, only lack-of-notice cases; deleting the 30-day prescription, respondents conjecture, was “probably inadver-ten[t].” Id., at 1. In support of their argument that Congress accidentally flailed to impose an all-purpose limit on extensions, respondents observe that the 1991 statute identi-fies Congress' aim as the enactment of “certain technical corrections in . . . provisions of law relating to the courts.” 105 Stat. 1623. They also note the caption of the relevant section of the amending statute: “Conformity with Rules of Appellate Procedure.” See id., at 1627. Because striking the 30-day limit from § 2107 made the statute less like Rule 4(a)(5)(C), respondents reason, Congress likely erased the relevant paragraph absentmindedly. Hence, respondents conclude, “there is no reason to interpret the 1991 amendment as stripping Rule 4(a)(5)(C) of its jurisdictional signif-cance.” Brief for Respondents 2.

9

category, ibid.

In dismissing Hamer's appeal for want of jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals relied heavily on our decision in Bowles. We therefore reiterate what that precedent conveys. There,

Quoting Bowles at length, the Court of Appeals in this case reasoned that “[l]ike Rule 4(a)(6), Rule 4(a)(5)(C) is the vehicle by which § 2107(c) is employed and it limits a district court's authority to extend the notice of appeal fling deadline to no more than an additional 30 days.” 835 F. 3d, at 763. In confating Rule 4(a)(5)(C) with § 2107(c), the Court of Appeals flailed to grasp the distinction our decisions delineate between jurisdictional appeal fling deadlines and mandatory claim-processing rules, and therefore misapplied Bowles.

Several Courts of Appeals, 10 including the Court of Appeals in Hamer's case, have tripped over our statement in Bowles that “the taking of an appeal within the prescribed time is `mandatory and jurisdictional.' ” 551 U. S., at 209 (quoting Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 U. S. 56, 61 (1982) (per curiam )). The “mandatory and juris-

* * *

For the reasons stated, the Court of Appeals erroneously treated as jurisdictional Rule 4(a)(5)(C)'s 30-day limitation on extensions of time to file a notice of appeal. We therefore vacate that court's judgment and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We note, in this regard, that our decision does not reach issues raised by Hamer, but left unaddressed by the Court of Appeals, includ-ing: (1) whether respondents' failure to raise any objection in the District Court to the overlong time extension, by itself, effected a forfeiture, see Brief for Petitioner 21–22; (2) whether respondents could gain review of the District Court's time extension only by filing their own appeal notice,

It is so ordered.