p. 674that there was a grant to Ortega, and made at the time stated, which he then had in his possession, because we have proved it, and that proof has not been overcome by conflicting proof. This fact is fixed. It follows that Ortega had a right to possession, conferred by proper authority. It has been suggested that Ortega’s map was not made in 1840, when it purported to be, and was copied from Miranda’s made in 1844. But why may not Miranda have got his as well from Ortega’s ?6. Then, it is proved that Ortega went into possession in 1889 or 1840 by Vallejo, who let him have stock to put upon the land; proved by Rosa, by Richardson, and by Ortega himself. That he claimed to be in possession, by his father-in-law, is also proved by the same, and others. It is proved by Walker that he took stock from there to drive to Oregon. It is proved by Father Brouillet, Miller herein confirming him, that when he sold to and put the former in possession, Theodore Miranda, the only one on the land, raised no objection, thereby admitting Ortega’s right to the land and possession. Under these circumstances the possession was, m fact, by Ortega personally, and by Miranda, as his tenant, at first, and by his son afterwards, for him. None of the government witnesses know or swear, as a matter of fact, that Miranda did not occupy for Ortega. They infer otherwise, from what they saw, which is not inconsistent with the supposition that he held under and represented his son-in-law, as sworn to by him and several others. That the possession in law was that of Ortega, and followed the permission given to occupy and the title, cannot be reasonably questioned.7. It is a presumption of law, when Miranda entered un der Ortega, who had a claim of title, that the possession continued under Ortega until the contrary is fully proved. Miranda could not throw off his allegiance as a tenant, and assume control on his own account. This, however, is what he sought to do when he sought to obtain title in the absence of Ortega. The law will not let him do this. He entered as a tenant, and continued as a tenant. Those who
p. 675set up the change in the character of the possession must prove it, which in this case has not been done. Having entered under Ortega, the presumption of law, in the absence of clear proof, is that while he continued there, he was a tenant under the owner by whose permission he entered. Hence, the concession or grant and continued occupation are established, and a confirmation must follow.8. Abandonment of claim to land can only take place where the party in fact intends to and does abandon, which must be manifested by acts of a decided and unequivocal character showing such intention, and which can be in no other manner accounted for. Abandonment is a matter of intention, demonstrated by significant and pertinent acts. There are none such on the part of Ortega in this case. He has not in fact abandoned, nor has he said one word looking to abandonment. Leaving a wife, who was an adulteress, is wholly different from abandoning his lands. The case is that of a man who having put a tenant into possession, and leaving that tenant in occupancy, took a portion of his stock, and went away, but who, while away, was continually talking of his land and stock, and of his intention to return, and wrho proposed to transfer a portion of both to the clergy, if they would go home with him, and educate his children. He started to return, and was shipwrecked, and as soon as he could procure means, started again, and entered upon his land, and, in presence of his tenant still holding under him,' conveyed and delivered possession of all his grant but a league, since conveyed. All this, instead of showing abandonment, disproves it, and establishes the fact that there was none actual or intended, but that he clung to his rights from first to last.Messrs. Black, Reverdy Johnson, and Wills, contra:
1. The facts show a secret grant of the land in controversy; a grant retained in the private custody of the Governor of California until after the cession of that country to the United States; one of which no public record in the archives of that country was made at the time at which the grant
p. 677principle applicable to all California land cases. “ In con elusion,” says Mr. Justice Grier, “ we must say, that, aftei a careful examination of the testimony, we entertain no doubt that the title produced by the claimants is false and forged, and that, as an inference or corollary from the facts now brought to our notice, it may be received as a general rule of decision, that no grant of land purporting to have issued from the late government of California should be received as genuine by the courts of the United States, unless it be found noted in the registers, or the expediente, or some part of it be found on file among the archives where other and genuine grants of the same year are found; and that owing to the weakness of memory with regard to the dates of grants signed by them, the testimony of the late ofiicers of that government cannot be received to supply or contradict the public record, title of which there is no trace to be found in the public archives.” How wise are the rules here laid down, the case before us proves. The claim is supported, as we see, by the testimony of General M. G. Vallejo and De la Rosa, whose bad character and bribeworthy avocations are graphically drawn by this court in the case just named. De la Rosa is the same gentleman who declared in that case, “ that the only right way of swearing ivas by the priest on the Catholic cross.” The claim is also supported by the testimony of Ortega, the pretended grantee, another of Vallejo’s dependents, who, according to the evidence, exercised at various times the functions of priest and 'soldier; was keeper of a little liquor store at Sonoma; hanger-on at Vallejo’s; at one time mayordomo of the mission of.Sonoma; at another, keeper of the keys at the same mission; sometimes a bell-ringer at a church, and sometimes a waiter, a carrier of wood and water in a private house, and a lumberman at a saw-mill in. Oregon; during the latter and the greater part of which time, according to the theory of the claimant, he was the owner of four leagues of land in California !2. While the Ortega title has no record evidence in its favor, it has a mass of such evidence against it.
p. 679undisputed that Ortega left California in 1843, and resided in Oregon until 1848.It is not necessary to put this point on the ground of intentional abandonment. But the fact no doubt was, that when Ortega left California, he went abandoning everything he left behind, and intending never to return. The cause of his leaving -was a quarrel with his wife, whom he suspected of conjugal infidelity. He separated from her, took all his goods with him — one cow and a couple of horses— and went. He said he was going to Oregon to remain; he said he had reasons for leaving the country, family reasons; he accused his wife of inconstancy to her marriage vows, and said he was never coming back. The facts that he was •jealous of his wife, and that he left the country for that reason, are not denied. The facts that, years afterwards, he endeavored to return to California, but was prevented for a time by shipwreck, and afterwards did actually return, show only the states of his mind at those times. That, however, is unimportant. The true inquiry is: What was his intention when he first went away ? If he went away with the intention of residing permanently abroad, and had any title to the rancho San Antonio previously, he lost it hy the express law of Mexico. It is also to be observed in this connection, that it was not until after the removal of Ortega to Oregon that Miranda applied for his grant, even admitting, for the sake of argument, that he had not been occupying the land previously on his own account. Under the law of Mexico, therefore, after that event he had a clear right to ask for a grant of the land to himself.4. In point of fact, the documentary and other evidence on which this claim is founded is false and fraudulent. The discussion of tins question of fact involves a consideration of the oral evidence, .in connection with the archive evidence already considered. The alteration of dates is a bad circumstance. The identity in appearance of the two maps, another. Miranda’s map cannot have been copied from Ortega’s; for the latter, if it had existed, was, according to the ease set up, in Alvarado’s private custody, and not
p. 680accessible to Miranda. The oral evidence, considered separately, presents a distressing conflict of testimony. The possession of the archive evidence must control.delivered the opinion of the court.
It would be a waste of time to analyze the conflicting testimony, to weigh against each other the parts which are in conflict, or to attempt to explain or reconcile their antagonisms. It will be sufficient to indicate the conclusions at which we have arrived.
The expediente of Miranda was found among the proper archives. It is referred to in Jimeno’s Index. The title never passed into a formal grant by the governor, but it is shown that this arose from the illness of Miranda and the disturbed condition of the country. The record is wholly silent as to any objection by the governor or from any other quarter. Ortega testified that he was never personally in possession. It is clearly proved that the possession of Miranda commenced as early as 1838, and continued from that time. The petition of Bojorques in 1844, and the grant to him in 1845; the petition of Padilla in 1844, and the accompanying map, and the diseño of the rancho Olimpale, all refer to the rancho in controversy as “the land of Juan Miranda.” These documents show that Miranda was regarded in the neighborhood as the owner, and not as a tenant. We are entirely satisfied, from the evidence found in the record, that he held in his own right and not vicarious"^ for Ortega. The petition of those claiming the title of Miranda was withdrawn from before the Board of Land Commissioners. Why, does not appear. Whatever the cause, its withdrawal cannot lessen the light which the facts relating to it throw upon the merits of the claim of Ortega.
The expediente of Ortega is confronted by strong suspicions of its bona -files. There is no trace of it among the proper archives. It does not appear that any paper belonging to it was ever in any public office before the petition in tnis case was filed by the appellant’s intestate. The Mexicans of the Spanish race, like their progenitors, were a formal
p. 681people, and their officials were usually formal and careful in the administration of their public affairs. Dull archive evidence exists in the case of Miranda. Its absence in this case is not satisfactorily accounted for.
Ortega abandoned his wife in 1843, and went to Oregon. He was poor and had been so for years. It does not appear that, from the time of the concession to the period of his departure, he made the slightest effort to consummate his title. He returned in 1847. There is reason to believe that when he left the country he intended finally to abandon his claim, if he had not done so before, and that such was the understanding of the Mexican authorities.
It appears that the order of reference made by the governor, which is found in the margin of the petition, was originally dated in 1841, and that this date was subsequently changed to 1840 with ink of a different color. A clerical mistake in writing the date originally, by antedating it a year, is unnatural and improbable. As it then stood it was subsequent in date to the report for which it called. It has been suggested that 1841 was the true and proper date, and that the concession was made after the return of Ortega from Oregon, and that it was antedated in 1840, — the writer not observing that the order of reference was dated in 1841,— and that, upon this fact being discovered, the date of the reference was changed to cure the discrepancy. The alteration is unexplained and unaccounted for. The evidence leaves us in the dark as to the time, the motive, and the circumstances.
It seems to be admitted that the diseño of Ortega and that of Miranda were prepared by the same hand and at the same time. Alvarado made the order of reference at Monterey on the 20th of June, 1840, and the order of concession at the same place on the 10th of August, 1840, or 1841. In his last deposition this passage occurs:
“Question. You have said that Ortega twice presented himself to you in Monterey, in 1840, in relation to this grant; state what papers, if any, he presented to you on the occasion of his first visit, and what papers on the occasion of his second visit ?
p. 682“Answer. My recollection is that he brought with him each time the same papers — that is, the petition; but the first time without any map; the second time the petition and diseño together. He might have come other times, but I only recollect those two times.”
Ortega testified to the same effect as to the diseño.
That both are mistaken upon the subject is shown by the concession. In that instrument, which was given at the second interview between them, Alvarado says: “ He” (Ortega) “ shall make a map as required by law, which he will present opportunely.” There was, then, no map present at that time. When was it prepared and added to the other papers ? It is claimed, on behalf of the United States, that it was made when the diseño of Miranda was prepared in 1844, and came into the hands of Ortega by some means unexplained after his return from Oregon. Upon this subject, as in regard to the altered date of the concession, the evidence is inconclusive and unsatisfactory. The obscurity is increased by the character of some of the leading witnesses who have testified in support of the claim. But the solution of these difiicultiés is not necessary to the determination of the case. It has been held by this court, in a long and unbroken line of adjudications, that where there is no archive evidence, and its absence is unaccounted for, and there has been no such possession as raises an equity in behalf of the party, and especially where, in addition, the expediente produced is tainted with suspicions of fraud, the claim must be rejected. We feel no disposition to relax the rule, and it is fatal to the case of the appellant.
Decree affirmed.