anded the flour of the defendants, on the 14thof October 1803. No final answer was made by the defendants to the demand, until the 19th of November ; but the intermediate time was given to them to consider of the demand and make propositions of compromise. No compromise being made, and the flour not being delivered, this action was commenced, on the 21st of the same month. It did not appear, that any answer was given to the plaintiff’s demand.
At the trial, the plaintiff offered evidence to the jury of the price of flour on the 19th and 21st days of November, the price being the same on both days, and contended to the jury only for that price. Whereupon, the counsel for the defendants prayed the court to instruct the jury, that in estimating the compensation for the non-delivery of the said flour, they should be governed by the price of that article on the day the plaintiff signified his option, and made his demand under the contract, to have the flour specifically delivered to him; and further prayed the court, in case the aforesaid instruction was not given, to direct the jury by what rule, in point of time, they are to take the price of flour in the estimation of the damages, sustained by the plaintiff, by reason of the breach of the contract. But the court being divided in opinion upon those points (two judges only being present), did not give the instructions as prayed, wherefore, the defendants excepted, &c.
The jury found a verdict for the plaintiff, for $2159.48, upon which judgment was rendered accordingly, and the defendants brought their writ of error. The question before this court was, whether the court below ought to have given the instructions prayed for by the plaintiffs in error.
This question was submitted, without argument, by Swann, for the plaintiffs in error, and E. J. Lee, for the defendant.
The error complained of is, that the circuit court did not give an opinion on a point proposed. The court was certainly bound to give an opinion, if z-equired, upon any point relevant to the issue.
It appears, from the facts stated, that the cause of action did not accrue until the 19th of November, when the negotiation for a compromise was broken off. A tender of the flour at any time after the 14th, and before the 19th, would have been a compliance with the contract. As the plaintiff claimed no more than the pzice of the flour on the 19th, and as the z-efusal of the court to instruct the jury did not alter the verdict, which was for the price on that day, and was for the same amount as if the opinion had been given, there is no error of which the defendants could complain.
Judgment affirmed, with costs.