Majority — DAVIS J.
Syllabus
1. A condition in a policy of assurance, by which the policy was made void in case the assured kept gunpowder, phosphorus, saltpetre, and benzine on the premises, held, under the punctuation of the policy, to mean “in quantities exceeding a barrel;” this being a more reasonable construction than one which made the policy void if there was any quantity, however small, of these articles, on the premises. ,delivered the 'opinion of the court.
If the clause of the policy out of which the difference of opinion between the parties to this suit arises, were detached from other parts of the instrument, there might be some question as to its proper grammatical construction. But such is not the ease. It is the last clause in, the fourth subdivision of the conditions embraced in the body of the policy, and in this subdivision a number of causes are set forth which shall operate to avoid the policy. These causes are all embraced-in separate clauses, each class being separated from the others by a semicolon. If there were in the clause in dispute a semicolon where the word premises is first used, it may- be, in view of the punctuation adopted in reference to the other clauses, that this clause would be complete in itself, and exclude wholly from the premises gunpowder, saltpetre, and the other articles in the same class. But in the absence of the semicolon, it is manifest that no greater restriction can be applied to gunpowder and saltpetre than to camphene and burning fluid, and that, therefore, the words “ in quantities exceeding one barrel at any one time,’’¿are applicable alike to all the materials which are specified in the clause in controversy. This construction is fortified by the-nature of the forbidden articles. Saltpetre is not a dangerous substance; and yet, according to the view of the counsel for the plaintiff' in error, it is prohibited altogether,' while a barrel of camphene and burning fluid, which'are inflammable, can be stored with impunity; A construction.that would lead to such a result canuot be adopted, unless the_Jangüá'ge employed leaves no other alternative. ' .
Besides, if the contract is as contended íór, it.'would'impeach the good faith' and fair dealing-.of the insurance company, for it would be deceptive, and calculated to mislead those who are not well informed on matters of this kind.
This, too, is the i'ational construction of the clause in-question, and we cannot suppose the company which framed this policy intended it to be interpreted differently.
If insurance companies do not mean to take risks .on property where gunpowder, Saltpetre, and tbe like substances are kqpt, even for ordinary use, then good faith totheassured requires that they should declare their intention in terms which -cannot admit of controversy; and, in order to avoid just cause of complaint, it would be better for them to employ type, in relation to this important subject, large enough to-arrest the attention of an interested party.
In our opinion the Circuit Court did not err in sustaining the demurrer to the third' plea, and the judgment of that court is, accordingly, affirmed.
The motion for damages is disallowed.