p. 415A demand for the bonds and coupons, was made by the plaintiff of the defendants before the suit was brought.
The court declared that, on this evidence the plaintiff could not recover, and the plaintiff having excepted, now brought the case here accordingly
Messrs. Carlisle and McPherson, for the plaintiff in error:
The bonds were those of the Cairo and Fulton Railroad Company, and were “ put in the hands ” of Rayburn “ to expend in the purchase of lands from the trustees of the company;” a most natural use of them; since in so using them, they could be used as money, and their full or best value got; the only way it is obvious in which they could be so used, or such value could be got. The ease, then, is that of a delivery of a thing in trust upon an agreement to conform to the purpose of the trust. But this is the definition of a bailment, not of a sale. The transaction indeed has no aspect of a sale.
These bonds having been disposed of in a way different from the specific one for which they were given to Rayburn, there has been a conversion, and trover lies.
Mr. T. T. Gantt, contra:
1. A fair construction of the paper is, that the bonds and coupons were absolutely sold to Rayburn at par, and that he stipulated to invest this par value in lands, as prescribed in the bond. It is declared expressly that he has received two sums of money amounting to $169,405, “ which said sum ” he promises to expend in the purchase of lands, &c.; that is to say, he takes the bonds, charges himself with their par value, and agrees to invest that amount or “ sum ” in the purchase of lands.
The case shows nothing of the value of the bonds in December, 1866; nor anything to show that the price at which —as we suppose—Rayburn took them, was not their then true market price. It is obvious from the difference between the price at which Bedford bought them and that at which he sold them, that the bonds were bonds having what is
p. 416known as “ a speculative value;” an immense class of bonds in this country. If $169,405 was a fair market value, every presumption is in favor of a sale, rather than of a bailment. If this view is right, and Rayburn has not invested—a matter not shown on the other side, nor by us admitted—then a suit for breach of covenant lies against him ; but not trover against his vendees.
But certainly if there was a trust, it was a trust with a power to sell, and invest proceeds. The sale has been made, and non constat but that the proceeds have been invested. Embezzlement is not to be presumed; and it is not proved. Whether invested or not invested—no charge of fraud at all being made as respects them—suit cannot be maintained against the vendees for making a purchase under a sale authorized and obligatory. As matter of fact, there is no proof that the prices paid by both Bedford and Webber— great as the difference between them was—were not both true market prices at this time. In “ fancy stocks” fluctuations are violent.
2. But Kitchen had given the bonds to his wife, and Rayburn receives them from her. The husband does not once appear in the history, after his gift. The wife should have been joined with the husband as plaintiff’.
Meply:
The husband had owned the bonds, and he it was wnió “ put them in the hands of Rayburn.” As between husband and wife, no valid gift could be made to her; and if the bonds had been delivered to her when the husband resumed possession they would become his own. The receipt is to be construed in connection with the rest of the evidence, which shows that the bonds were received from the plaintiff’, and were his property, and were intended to be dedicated to his wife’s use in the manner provided in the receipt. But all this is unimportant. The husband alone can bring trover for conversion of the wife’s chattels.
delivered the opinion of the court.
Supposing the facts upon the evidence of which the court
p. 417below declared that the plaintiff could not recover, to have been sufficiently proven, it seems to us that the court erred in taking the view of the case which it did. Rayburn had possession of the bonds for the purpose of purchasing therewith, for the benefit of Mrs. Kitchen, lands of the railroad company which had issued them, “ at or near the average price of five dollars per acre.” Instead of doing this, as he was bound, he sold them to Bedford for six cents on the dollar; and Bedford sold them to Webber at a hundred and fifty per cent, advance, both knowing the object for which Rayburn held the bonds. A clearer ease of fraudulent breach of trust, it is difficult to conceive, and the defendants being
participes criminis, were bound to deliver the bonds and coupons to the plaintiff when he demanded them.
It is contended that by the fair construction of the paper, Rayburn was to sell the bonds for what he could get, and invest the proceeds in lands, and non constat that he has not done so; or at all events, the defendants, as purchasers from Rayburn, have good title to the bonds, because he was invested with a trust to sell them. But the paper does not so read. It declares that Rayburn had received “ the sum of one hundred and nineteen thousand dollars in bonds of the Cairo and Fulton Railroad Company, and fifty thousand four hundred and five dollars of coupons, &c., amounting in the aggregate to the sum of one hundred and sixty-nine thousand four hundred and five dollars, which said sum, I promise to expend in the purchase of lands, &e., at or near the average price of five dollars per acre.” In other words, he was to purchase lauds with the bonds and coupons at five dollars per acre, not with the proceeds of them, after being sold at a nominal price. He was to procure an acre for every five dollars of the bonds and coupons. That was the trust which he assumed. If he was unable to perform it, he should have returned the bonds, and n.ot have sold them at six cents on the dollar. The defendants, when they bought them under these circumstances, did so at their peril, and were bound to restore the bonds to the plaintiff.