Majority — STRONG J.
Syllabus
1. The contract between a ship and the shipper is that which is contained in the bills of lading delivered to the shipper. The bill retained by the ship or ship’s bill,” as it is sometimes called, is designed only for it's own information and convenience; not for evidence, as between the parties, of what their agreement was. If it differs from the others, they must be considered as the true and only evidence of the contract.delivered the opinion of the court.
The engagement of the ship with the shipper was to deliver the cotton in New York to order. In regard to this there is no doubt. Such was the express stipulation of the bills of lading, which were given on the 28th of January, 3868, when the cotton was received on shipboard. On that day Gilbert Van Pelt purchased the cotton in Savannah from Brady & Moses, and settled for it by giving in payment his draft upon the firm of Bennett, Van Pelt & Co., in New York, of which firm he was a member. The draft was drawn at fifteen days’ sight in favor of the libellant, Billopp Seaman, cashier, or order, and it was discounted by Brady & Moses with money of the Atlanta National Bank, which they had in hand for the purpose of purchasing bills on New York on the bank’s account. The price of the cotton was
The proofs in the ease leave no reasonable doubt that the bills of lading were indorsed to the libellant in order to transfer to him the cotton as a security for the payment of the draft at its maturity. Gilbert Van Pelt alone asserts the contrary. His testimony, it must be admitted, tends to show that they were indorsed and received as security for the acceptance only of the draft. But he is directly contradicted by Moses, by Brady, and by Bruen, neither of whom has any interest in this controversy, and all of whom state that the bills of lading were indorsed to secure to Seaman the payment of the draft and not merely its acceptance. Besides, their testimony is in harmony with all the probabilities of the case. It is absurd to talk of security for the acceptance
It must be considered, then, that by the indorsement of the bills of lading the libellant became the owner of the cottou, and that by force of the contract with the ship it was deliverable at New York only to him, or to his order. Reference to authorities to show that the effect of the indorsement was to vest such ownership in Seaman is quite unnecessary. We may, however, refer to a few.[5]
No argument is needed to show, what is most manifest, that the delivery which was thus made was a breach of the ship’s contract. By issuing bills of lading for the cotton, stipulating for a delivery to order, the ship became bound to deliver it to no one who had not the order of the shipper, and this obligation was disregarded instantly on the arrival of the ship. And it is no excuse for a delivery to the wrong persons that the indorsee of the bills of lading was unknown, if indeed he was, and that notice of the arrival of the cotton could not be given. Diligent inquiry for the consignee, at least, was a duty, and no inquiry was made. Want of notice is excused when a consignee is unknown, or is absent, or cannot be found after diligent search.[5] And if, after inquiry, the consignee or the indorsees of a bill of lading for delivery to order cannot be found, the duty of the carrier is to retain the goods until they are claimed, or to store them prudently for and on account of their owner. He may thus
It is said, however, that the libellant delayed presenting the bills of lading which had been indorsed to him, and delayed making any demand for-the cotton until after the 19th of February, when, the draft had fallen due, and when it had been dishonored. But that delay cannot justify the ship’s delivery of the cotton, on the day after its arrival, to persons who had no biR of lading and no authority whatever to receive it. Had the delay been instrumental in causing such a wrongful delivery, had it been active interposition to mislead the ship, a different case might possibly have been presented. But at most the laches of the libellant was mere inaction, and the wrong delivery-was in no degree due to it. The delivery -was, as we have stated, made on the morning after the ship’s arrival in port, and the - ship’s order for delivery to Bennett, Van Pelt & Co. was issued before the libellant could have known of its arrival; We. say this, notwithstanding the testimony of James Van Pelt, which is plainly in conflict with the proved and conceded facts-of the case. And- as the cotton was sold for cash on the 3d of February, the very day of its delivery, the failure of the libellant to claim it until some weeks 'afterwards, wrought no injury or loss to. the.carrier, so far as it appears: We are, therefore, of opinion that the. ship is clearly liable for the cotton to the libellant. .
And we think that the libel was rightly filed in the name of Billopp Seaman. By the indorsement of the bills of lading the legal ownership of the cotton passed to him, as well as the right to control its delivery. It is a matter of no importance that the beneficial interest may have been in the bank of which he was cashier.[4] The holder of a legal.right may always assert it by suit, though he may be accountable to another for what he may recover. A judgment in his favor may always be pleaded in bar against a suit by thfe
† † Fairfield v. Adams, 16 Pickering, 381.
Decree affirmed.
* Houseman v. The Schooner North Carolina, 15 Peters, 49; McKinlay v. Morrish, 21 Howard, 355 ; Lawrence v. Minturn, 17 Id. 100.
Footnotes
- * Conrad v. The Atlantic Insurance Company, 1 Peters, 445; Gibson v. Stevens, 8 Howard, 384 ; Thompson v. Dominy, 14 Meeson & Welsby, 403; Caldwell v. Ball, 1 Term, 205; Wright v. Campbell, 4 Burrow, 2051; 1 Lord Raymond, 271; Walter v. Ross, 2 Washington’s Circuit Court, 283.
- * Fisk v. Newton, 1 Denio, 45 ; Peytona, 2 Curtis, 21.
- * Galloway v. Hughes, 1 Bailey, 553; 1 Conklin's Admiralty, 396; Fisk v. Newton, supra.