Majority — DAYIS J.
Syllabus
1. A sale by a person in fact insolvent and made within six months of a bankruptcy subsequently decreed, is not necessarily and without regard to its character, void under the 35th section of the Bankrupt Act.delivered the opinion of the court.
There would seem to be no difficulty in ascertaining the meaning of Congress on the subject embraced in the 35th section of the Bankrupt Act (in contravention of which this sale is alleged to have been made), in its application to this case. Clearly all sales are not forbidden. It would be absurd to suppose that Congress intended to set the seal of condemnation on every transaction of the bankrupt which occurred within six months of bankruptcy, without regard to its character. A policy leading to such a result would be an excellent contrivance for paralyzing business, and cannot be imputed to Congress without an express declaration to that effect. The interdiction, applies to sales for a fraudulent object, not to those with an honest purpose. The law does not recognize that every sale of property by an embarrassed person is necessarily in fraud of the Bankrupt Act. If it were so, no one would know with whom he could safely deal, and besides, a person in this condition would have no encouragement to make proper efforts to extricate himself from difficulty.
It is for the interest of the community that every one should continue his business, and avoid, if possible, going into bankruptcy, and yet how could this result be obtained if the privilege were denied a person who was unable to command ready money to meet his debts as they fell due, of making a fair disposition of his property in order to accomplish this object.
It is true he may fail, notwithstanding all his efforts, in keeping out of bankruptcy, and in that case any sale he has
The evidence in this case, fairly weighed, negative's both these conditions. If Darby’s conduct was unwise, it was prompted by correct motives. There could have been no intention, on his part, of violating any of the provisions of the bankrupt law, for he did not contemplate the necessity of going into bankruptcy. His action was not based on the idea, even, that he was in a bankrupt condition. On the contrary he believed his property, if converted into money, would pay his debts,.^nd this belief induced him to set to work to accomplish that object. There was no thought of preferring one creditor over another, because he was convinced of his ability to pay all. In the execution of his purpose to sell his property and pay his debts, the sale was made to Lucas, and it cannot be impeached because it turns out that Darby was mistaken" in his calculations. There is no arbitrary rule by which the good faith of a transaction can be tested.. It may be that ordinary men in similar circumstances would have acted differently, but this is no reason to condemu the conduct of men like Darby. Possessed of uncommon energy and great business capacity; having in previous crises of his fortune surmounted difficulties of equal, if not greater, magnitude, he was not appalled by a state of aflairs which, to a man not above the common level would have been a hopeless undertaking. That he failed proves nothing, for other men, whose integrity was
If Darby did not intend to defraud his creditors by withdrawing his property from the operation of the Bankrupt Act, it is not easy to see how Lucas can be charged with aiding him to do it, even if at the time he suspected his insolvency. But it is unnecessary to eousider this point, for, in our opinion, the evidence fails to establish that, at the time Lucas purchased the property, he had reasonable cause to believe Darby to be insolvent, or to be acting in contemplation of insolvency. If he believed him insolvent, why trust him to pay six thousand dollars due for interest in a few days after the sale, instead of retaining in his own hands enough money to pay it. His conduct on that occasion cannot be explained on the theory of his belief in Darby’s insolvency; but we are not concerned with his actual belief on the subject. The real inquiry is, had he good grounds for believing that insolvency existed. It appeai'3 that Darby’s banking paper had been met up to the date of the sale, and it is a fair inference that the real estate paper secured by deed of trust, which was overdue, remained in that condition by consent of parties. Britton, the president of the National Bank of the State of Missouri, located in St. Louis, considered Darby to. be wealthy, and was a good deal surprised when he heard of his failure. This reputation for wealth was not confined to Britton, but was shared by others on account of a supposed ownership of a large amount of real estate. The Third National Bank and the Traders’ Bank, a short time preceding the sale, took his exchange on New York at the usual rates, and others dealt with him as if he were entirely solvent. Polk, a leading lawyer of the city, held his certificate of deposit for forty thousand dollars, and Knox and Brotherton, prominent citizens, were in the habit of indorsing his paper. These parties, from their
All of them had equal opportunities with Lucas of knowing his real condition, aud some far better, for Knox and Brotherton were on terms of intimacy with him, while Lucas was not. If they were ignorant of the exact state of his affairs, how can Lucas, with less familiarity with them, be supposed to be in a different condition. It is claimed, however, that Lucas is chargeable with notice that Darby’s paper was in the hands of street brokers, because the Boatman’s Institution, of which he was a director, purchased it from them, and that paper put on the street in this manner is evidence that the maker is insolvent. This conclusion by nq means follows, for a man may sell his paper on the street at a great sacrifice to effect a purpose deemed beneficial by him, and still not be insolvent. This proceeding undoubtedly tended to show that Darby was embarrassed, but, if his paper bore the indorsement of good men of reputable standing and recognized wealth, it is reasonable to suppose they were satisfied with his pecuniary status. This supposition is verified in the case of Knox, one of the indorsers, who, when asked by the president of the institution “how good is Darby ?” replied, “as good as anybody.” It is fair to infer that this information quieted any misgivings which this officer had about purchasing the paper, and that Lucas, with the other directors, was told what Knox said. If so, it is idle to say that the confidence of Lucas in Darby’s solvency had nothing to rest on. If it be conceded that the mode of raising money adopted by Darby had a tendency to create distrust in the mind of Lucas, it is nevertheless apparent that the fact of two men of substance indorsing his paper, coupled with the broad declaration of one of them on the subject of his pecuniary condition, was well calculated to remove this distrust and establish his credit.
It is contended, however, by way of impeachment of the good faith of the transaction in controversy, that the property was sold for less than its value, but we are by no means
It is insisted, however, that Lucas was precluded from
These things relieve him from the charge of making a certificate with intent to procure for Darby a credit to which he knew him not to be entitled, but they do not furnish a case of justification, as, manifestly, certificates to character or value should not be given unless they are known to be true. It cannot be doubted, from the evidence, that neither Lucas nor Britton meant to do anything wrong, and, if so, we know of no principle of law which would estop Lucas from disputing the correctness of the valuation named in the certificate in order to show his good faith and fair dealing in his transaction with Darby.
It is hardly necessary to say, in concluding this ease, that the sale of real estate by Darby was not out of the usual course of business within the meaning of the Bankrupt Act.
Decree affirmed.