Majority — BRADLEY J.
Syllabus
1. To ascertain the intent of the parties is the fundamental rule in the construction of agreements. When the substantial thing which they have in view can he gathered from the whole instrument, it will control mere formal provisions, which are intended only as a means of attaining the substance.delivered the opinion of the court.
The large investment of capital made by the appellee in sole reliance on the water-power which the lease secures, with the full knowledge which the appellants had of this reliance and intended investment, renders it necessary that we should look carefulty to the substance of the original
Now, in speaking of a certain .quantity of water,-we always have reference to its cubical contents, its bulk or weight. We mean so many gallons, or hogsheads, or cubic feet of water. We have no reference to surface or sectional measurement. A square foot, or a square inch of water, expresses no quantity at all. But- when we speak of the quantity which will pass through a square foot, or square inch of aperture, in a certain time, then our words have meaning. The size and position of the aperture so carefully prescribed in the lease were intended merely as a means of measurement of the real thing granted, namely, that certain quantity of water per second, or per hour, which the parties had in mind, and about which they were dealing. If we can ascertain this, we can easily adjust the mutual rights of the parties. Can it be ascertained from the terms of the lease, aided by the light derived from the evidence in the cause? We think it can. And in making this inquiry we have a right to examine into the state of things existing at the time
The amount of water which will be discharged through an aperture of a given size will depend upon the form of the aperture, the head under which the water is drawn, and the freedom from obstruction with which it is permitted to flow away.
In this case the lessee is not restricted as to the form of the aperture, except, perhaps, that it shall be rectangular. So that it contains only the content of two hundred square inches he is at liberty to construct it of such relative dimensions as he sees fit. Of course it is his interest to give it the greatest length and the least height consistent with a free flow. Such a form gives the greatest head of water abov.e the aperture and increases the discharge. The right of superintending and directing the construction of the works, reserved to the lessors, cannot be construed to restrict this discretion of the lessee. That right has more particular reft erence to the manner of the construction, and the solidity and safety of the work, in reference to the structure and uses of the canal. It cannot be allowed to annul the substantial rights of the lessee without becoming repugnant to the grant.
In the next place, as to the head of water under which the leased water is to be drawn, the only restriction imposed upon the lessee in this regard is that the lower edge of the aperture shall not be nearer to the caual bottom than two feet. Of course he is entitled to draw under the entire head of water above this two feet. What that head shall be will depend upon the usual depth or height of water in the canal. It is to be presumed that the parties contracted in reference to that. The lessors do not guarantee any particular head ; but any alteration of their canal which would materially and permanently reduce it would abstract from the lessee a portion of the water, which he must be presumed to have stipulated for. The contract was made in reference to the state of things existing at the time it was made.
This rate of flow would give to the appellee, through his aperture of two hundred square inches, a discharge of thirteen and one-third cubic feet per second. Something like this amount of actual water must be considered as within the intent of the parties to give and receive.
But the fact became developed that, by the faulty con
Now, certainly, it is not equitable, even if it be in accordance with the strict letter of the lease, that the appellee should be compelled to pay full rent for half the quantity of water, which, according to the real intent of the parties, lie stipulated for. True it may be said that it was his own fault, to construct the forebay in the disadvantageous manner which he has done, and that if he wants the full benefit of his lease he should tear it down and reconstruct it differently. This would require a great sacrifice on his part, and would not benefit the appellants. Surely, a court of equity cannot be compelled to consign a party to sueli a clumsy and ruinous-remedy as this. The appellants can sustain no injury by allowing the lessee to take so much water as he supposed he was getting and as they supposed they were granting. This would be in accordance with the substance of the agreement. It would carry out the intent of the parties as gathered from the whole instrument and the state of affairs existing at the time it was made, and would save the lessee from a ruinous expenditure for alterations rendered necessary by his mistake.
It may be said that the location of the appellee’s mill at a distance of 350 or 400 feet from the canal was a circumstance which the lessors had a right to take into account, and that by having to conduct the water such a long distance it could not be supposed that the lessee would be able to draw as much water through a given aperture as if his mill had been located nearer. This is true; and whatever is due to that circumstance the appellants are entitled to insist upon. But Mr. Hutton, the commissioner, says in his report that, making all allowance for the particular circumstances and location of the appellee’s mill, he still ought to receive at least •eleven cubic feet per second through the aperture named in
But if the appellee should receive eleven cubic feet of water per second, to which his lease may justly entitle him, this is not sufficient to drive his mill; and the question then arises as to the additional quantity which he requires, and which, according to the witnesses, is about twelve cubic feet per second. It appears from the case that the appellants agreed to furnish him the additional amount required for his mill on the usual terms; and that the appellee accepted the offer; but, in consequence of the controversy which arose about the measurement of the water and his refusal to comply with their demands, they declined to carry out the agreement. Had the appellants been right in the position they assumed, they would have been justified in making this refusal. But we think that they were not right, and, therefore, that they are bound to carry the agreement into effect, and that the appellee is entitled to receive the additional amount required, at the same rate, and on the same terms at which he was to have the original two hundred square inches. And as eleven cubic feet of water per second are due to the original aperture named, the additional twelve eubie feet per second would require, according to the report of the commissioner, a corresponding aperture of two hundred and seventeen square inches. For this additional amount of aperture the appellee should be charged, making the total amount four hundred and seventeen square inches. But to get the water to which it entitles him, as his forebay and apparatus are at present constructed, he is obliged to have, in reality, at the canal, an aperture of seven hundred square inches. The appellants were willing that he should have this aperture by increasing the height of the original aperture, but insisted that he should pay for seven hundred inches, according to the terms of the lease. Under the peculiar exigencies of the case, obstructed as the flow now is, we think that for the aperture named he should be charged
The result is that the decree must be
Affirmed, but without costs in either court.
Mr. Justice STRONG, with whom concurred Mr. Justice DAVIS, dissenting:
I dissent from the judgment given in this case. In my opinion, it practically makes a new contract for the parties; a contract to which they never agreed. It holds that what, at most, was an expectation of results amounts to a binding obligation that they shall follow. To this I cannot agree.