Majority — HUNT J.
Syllabus
1. When a vessel is regularly registered in the port to which she belongs, that is to say, “ in the port nearest to which her owner, husband, or acting and managing owner usually resides” [registered, ex. gr., at New York], the fact that she may be temporarily in a port of a State [as ex. gr., Mobile, in Alabama], other ttym that where her home port is, and engaged in lawful commerce — one of a daily line of steamers — betweendelivered the opinion of the court.
' The fact that the vessel was physically within the limits of- the city of Mobile, at the time the tax was levied, does not decide the question. Thus, if a traveller on that day had been passing through that city in his private carriage, or an emigrant with his worldly goods on a wagon, it is not contended that the property of either of' these persons would
On the other hand this vessel, although a vehicle of commerce, was not exempt from taxation on that score. A steamboat or a post-coach engaged in a local business within a State may be subject to local taxation, although it carry the mail of the United States. The commerce between the States may not be interfered with by taxation or other interruption, but its instruments and vehicles may be.[9] †It is not, therefore, upon this principle that we are to decide the case. Nor does it fall within that range of, cases of which The Steamship Company v. The Portwardens,[2] and Gibbons v. Ogden,[3] furnish illustrations. In each of those cases the taxation ivas upon a subject directly connected with the navigation of the public waters and with the commerce of the country. In the first case a statute had been passed requiring every vessel entering the harbor of New Orleans to pay five dollars to the port wardens, in addition to other fees, whether any service were performed or not. In the second case vessels navigating the waters of' the Hudson River were required to take a license for that purpose from the State of New York. The imposition in this class of cases was a tax upon the use of the public waters of the country, and tended immediately to interfere with and to obstruct the commérce between the States. In the instance before us the tax was upon a vessel at the wharf. It was in this respect as if a tax had been laid upon lumber or cotton lying on the dock at Mobile.
This vessel was owned by and employed in the service of a resident of the State óf New York. It was primarily and presumptively taxable under the authority of that State, and of that State only. It is urged that her status, or condition, was affected by what was done, or neglected, in regard to her register and enrolment. In Blanchard v. Martha Washington,[4] the law on this subject is thus explained: “ Ships or vessels are required to be registered[5] by the collector of the
† † 6 Wallace, 31.
‡ ‡ 9Wheaton, 210.
§ § 1 Clifford, 466.
|| || 1 Stat. at Large, 288.
There was nothing, therefore, in her enrolment in the. port of Mobile that affected her. registry in New York, or her ownership in that place, or that tended to subject her to •the taxation of thp State of Alabama, under the circumstances stated.
It is the opinion of the court that- the State of Alabama had no jurisdiction over this vessel for'the purpose of taxa7 tion, for the reason that it had not become incorporated into: the personal property of that State,' but was. there témpora-' rily only, and that'it was engaged in lawful commerce between the States with its' situs at the home port of New
This vessel, the Frances, remained the property of the plaintiff, with her home port at New York, and had never become blended with the commerce and property of the State of Alabama, withi,n the principle of People v. Commissioners.[9] The vessel touches tri-weeldy or daily at Mobile, and the same at New Orleans. If her regular route were from New Orleans to Mobile, thence to St. Augustine, thence to Savannah, thence to Charleston, and returning by the same course, the casé would be no different. She would be engaged in interstatemommerce, with her home port still remaining unchanged, and the property continuing'unmixed with the permanent property of either State. Her right to trade at each of those ports, without molestation by either of these States, is secured by the Constitution of the United States. The Federal authority has been exerted by the passage’ of the navigation laws and the issuing of a coasting license to this vessel. All State interference is thereby excluded.
• Whether the steamer Frances was actually taxed in New York during the years 1866 and 1867 is not shown by the case. It is hot important. She was liable to taxation there; That State alone had dominion over her for that purpose. Alabama had no more power to tax her or her owner than had Louisiana, or than Florida, Georgia, and South Carolina would have had in the case I have supposed.
The jurisdiction of this court over the present case, as in
T Judgment reversed.
* lSupra.
Footnotes
- * Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheaton, 1; “ Passenger Cases,” 7 Howard, 283 .
- * Blanchard, v. Martha Washington, supra; White’s Bank v. Smith, 7 Wallace, 646.
- * 17 Howard, 696 .
- * 28 New York,'224.