p. 326The court refused thus to rule, on the ground that the collector was not bound to give any notice of his liquidation to the defendants, nor to bring his decision to the defendants knowledge, and that the time within which to give notice of dissatisfaction as aforesaid, and appeal, must run from the date of such liquidation, whenever made. To which decision the defendants excepted.
The defendants then requested the court to admit the evidence offered by them as to the commercial designation of the rice, on the grounds that the collector had given no notice of liquidation as aforesaid, and that, therefore, they were not. debarred by the limitations of the statute from giving such notice of - dissatisfaction aud appeal, as required by the ruling of the court.
The court refused to admit the evidence, on the ground that, having ruled that no notice of liquidation from the collector to the defendants was required, the defendants were barred, and the evidence inadmissible. To which decision the defendants excepted,
The defendants then requested the court to instruct the jury that it was a condition of the bond that the same should be cancelled upon the payment of $12,524.95, within one year from date of importation, and as' it ivas admitted that $12,352.15 had been paid within one year, that the jury could lawfully find no greater amount of damage than the difference between these two amounts, and interest on this difference.
The court refused to so instruct the jury. To which decision the defendants excepted.
The court then directed the jury to bring in a verdict for the plaintiffs for $2111.77, gold, with interest, to which direction of the court the defendants excepted.
Verdict and judgment having gone for the United States, the defendants brought the case here.
Mr. Ethan Allen, for the plaintiffs in error:,
The liquidation of the duties, and the decision of the col
p. 327lector is a secret .proceeding, so far as the merchant is concerned. No date is fixed when the act shall be done. The appraiser notes his classification of the merchandise on the invoice when his convenience permits, and his clerk extends in figures on the entry the amount of the duty according to this classification ; and this constitutes the decision of the collector, of which, according to the ruling of the court below, no notice whatever need be given to the importer, although from the moment this decision is made, the ten days limitations begin to run withjn which the importer must protest and appeal. As this statute takes away the common-law right of.the citizen to defend himself, as in this case, against an alleged illegal exaction, it is a severe statute, and should be interpreted liberally. Indeed the treasury department, by regulations adopted in 1869, directs notice to be given to the merchant of the time when the decision of the collector is made, by ordering collectors to “keep a daily record of the entries liquidated,” &c., and to “give notice of the liquidation of such entries by posting a transcript of such record in some conspicuous place in the custom-house, &c., for ten days.” As these regulations, however, were issued in 1869, and as the bond upon which this suit is brought was made in 1864, these regulations do not cover this case. They show, however, that the treasury recognizes it' as a duty to give notice to the merchant of the decision of the collector. Before this regulation was made, it was the custom for the collector to send a special notice to the importer, informing him of any decision made. This notice, however, was not given to the importers in this case, as was admitted on the trial.2. In an action on a bond, of many separate conditions— like the one in suit — the performance of either one of which cancels the bond, the maker of the bond is entitled to choose which condition he will fulfil in satisfaction of it.In part fulfilment of the first condition, it was admitted on the trial that $12,352.15 had been paid within one year. The only breach, then, on the part of the importers, was in not paying the balance of $172.80 within the year. Had
p. 329would be superfluous. The importer is instructed by the law at what time the collector or officers of the customs must liquidate the duties. The statute, and the treasury regulations established under it, require that the duties must be ascertained whenever an entry is made, whether it be for warehousing or for withdrawal. In practice, it is true, the liquidation at the time of entry for warehousing is little more than an approximate estimate, and it is mainly for the purpose of determining the amount of the bond to be given. It is made, and the bond is given, before the goods are sent to the warehouse, or even to the appraisers’ stores, and before they are weighed, gauged, or measured. But the importer enters them and gives the bond, the amount of which is regulated by the estimated amount of duties. It is due to his inattention, therefore, if, he does not know what that estimate is at the time when it is made. Equally true is it that he has ample means of knowledge of the second or corrected liquidation — that made at the time of the withdrawal entry. One of the conditions of his bond is that he pay the amount of duties to be ascertained under the laws then existing or thereafter enacted. He is- thus informed that there is to be another liquidation, and that the law requires it to be made at the time when he s 'all make his withdrawal entry and when the duties are required to be paid. There is, then, no reason for requiring a notice to be given to him of the collector’s decision. But, if this were not so, it is certain that the statute requires none; and it is not for us to rule that what Congress has declared, to be conclusive shall not be so, unless something has been done more than the lawmakers required. It follows that the Circuit Court was not in error when it refused to receive evidence to show that the rice which the officers of the customs had decided was “ cleaned rice,” and subject to duty as such, was “ uncleaned,” and therefore subject to less duty. .No notice of dissatisfaction ivith the duty assessed, or with the liquidation made, was given to the collector within the period defined by the statute; no appeal was made to the Secretary of the Treasury, and the decision of the collector was, therefore-,
p. 331warehouse for consumption, should they be so withdrawn. It was impossible to ascertain at the time when it was given what the amount of duties would be when the goods might be withdrawn. The defeasance was, therefore, in the alternative that the penalty might be avoided by payment of a sum mentioned within'one year, or by the payment of whatever duties might be ascertained to be due and owing, that is, ascertained to be due and owing whenever the goods should become subject to duty by withdrawal for consumption. It was not, therefore, an ordinary pecuniary bond. Hence, when the defendants requested the Circuit Court to instruct the jury that it having been admitted $12,352.15 had .been paid within one year, no verdict could be returned for any greater sum thairthe difference between the amount paid and $12,524.95 (the sum mentioned in the defeasance), with interest thereon, we think it was not .error to refuse the instruction. At law the penalty was forfeited by the non-performance of any one of the conditions. The defendants’ claim to relief was in equity alone, and though in the ease of an ordinary pecuniary bond, with a simple pecuniary penalty, compliance with the condition-to pay at a specified day is allowed even in a court of law to be compensated for by the payment of the sum mentioned in the condition, with interest thereon, the rule may well be otherwise in the case of such a bond as this. If it be admitted that the obligors might have selected the condition with which they would comply beforé a legal forfeiture had been commenced, it must still be held that, considering the nature of the bond and the purpose for which it was given, such an option was not theirs after they had come into .default. They can be relieved from the forfeiture only upon their doing complete equity, and that is nothing less than the payment of all th'e duties, to secure which thej’ gave the bond.
It follows that the jury were properly directed to return a verdict for the plaintiffs for the amount of duties unpaid, as ascertained and liquidated by the collector, with interest thereon..
Judgment affirmed.