Majority
Syllabus
1. "When a collector of internal revenue in a rural district of Mississippi— where, owing to the lawless condition in which the rebellion, then but recently suppressed, had left the region, it was not safe to have gold and silver in one’s house — in vidlation of the provisions of the Independent Treasury Act. but with an apparently good motive — openly and without indirection, añfd because he thought it more safe thus to act than to take gold and silver — took in payment of taxes on cotton, accepted drafts drawn by the shippers of it on consignees of it in New Orleans (which was the place < ? deposit for taxes collected in Mississippi), after-wards (the drafts not-being paid, and he having in his accounts with the government charged himself and been charged by it with the tax as if paid in gold and silver), sued the acceptors, the fact that in taking the drafts instead of gold and silver, he had acted in violation of the statutes of the United States, does not so taint his act with illegality as that he cannot recover on them; the government not having repudiated his act nor called on the shipper to pay, hut on the contrary, leaving the account of the collector open to see if he could not himself get the amount from the acceptor of the drafts.delivered the opinion of the court.
The question presented for our determination is whether the securities upon which the judgment vvas recovered, are fatally tainted with illegality.
Cooke was the collector of internal revenue for one of the collection districts of Mississippi. Curtis was his deputy. New Orleans was the designated place of deposit for the
Such is the case upon the facts as presented in the record.
The act of August 6th, 1846,[3] requires all taxes and duties accruing to the government to be paid in gold and silver, or treasury notes. The act of July 13th, 1866,[2] imposed a tax
† † 14 Stat. at Large, 98.
The judgment of the court below must be sustained upon several grounds:
As between the parties, the tax was paid by Cooke for Caruthers. & Co. His marking the bales, giving the permit, charging himself with the amount, and reporting it to the government as paid, had that effect. The result was the same to Caruthers & Co. as if so much money had been advanced at their .request, and so applied for their benefit. They were permitted to ship the cotton to the plaintiffs in error, in all respects as if the money had been actually paid and th,e requisite vouchers had’been given upon the basis of such payment. The assumpsit of .the collector supplied the place of the money. No demand has been made by the government against Caruthers & Co. They have had the full benefit of the arrangement. As between them and Cooke, the transaction is as if Cooke had lent Caruthers & Co. the amount in gold or silver, or treasury notes, with one hand, and received it back with the other. It has beeu held that promissory notes given under such circumstances can be enforced by the payee.[3]
* St. Alban’s Bank v. Dillon & McGowan, 30 Vermont, 122; Kelley v. Noyes, 43 New Hampshire, 211; see also Smith v. Mawhood, 14 Meeson & Welsby, 463.
The .written promise of the plaintiffs in error to accept these drafts was equivalent to acceptance. No question is raised upon that subject by their counsel. After notice of the drawing of the drafts, aud the sale of the cotton, they had so much money in their hands to be applied according to .their engagement. There was no stipulation between them and Cooke. Their contract was with Caruthefs & Co. "When the money was received for the cotton they held it in trust for Cooke, and their sole duty and business in relation to it was to pay it over upon the drafts when called for, according to their agreement. If they paid it to Caruthers & Co. they did so in their own wrong. The fact in no wise affected their liability to Cooke and is not an element in the case to be considered. In no view can they be permitted to keep the money for their own use, or avail themselves of a payment made in violation of Cooke’s rights and their duty. They can no more object to the consideration of the drafts than if the money were still in their hands. For the purposes of this case, it must be regarded as there-when payment of the drafts was demanded.
It is a consideration of' weight, though not controlling, that there is nothing disclosed which looks like fraud on the part of the defendant in error. There was neither concealment, indirection, nor oppression. Nothing beyond the tax was demanded or stipulated to be paid. Caruthers & Co. received in full the consideration upon which the drafts were drawn, and the defendants in full the consideration upon which they agreed to accept and pay them. It would
Judgment aeetrmed.
Footnotes
- * Brightly’s Digest, 888.