Majority — STRONG J.
Syllabus
A., the president of a railroad company, wanting B., a farmer, to sell to him a piece of land containing about 1100 acres, and worth $10 an acre, agreed to give to B. five bonds, for $1000 each, of the company, with coupons for overdue interest, the whole principal and interest being nominally for $6000, assuring B. that the bonds and coupons were very good, that he could make the' money any time out of them, and could enter 1100 acres of other land, belonging to the railroad company, full out as good as his own. B., believing what A. told him, gave up his land to A.delivered the opinion of the court.
It is impossible to separate the receipt which Rayburn gave for the one hundred and nineteen bonds from the arrangement by which he gave up his title to the moiety of the St. Luke lands, and the engagement of Kitchen to secure to him $10,000, the understood value of the lands.' They are all parts of one transaction. The assent of Rayburn to a rescission of the contract by which he had become the equitable owner of that moiety, the acceptance of some of the bonds
Thus far there is little conflict in the evidence. But from this point onward there is more disagreement. The account of the transaction given by Kitchen is that he agreed to give Rayburn, in satisfaction of the debt, railroad bonds of the Cairo and Fulton Railroad Company, enough to pay for a thousand acres of land of the company, then held by trustees, and that he did give him five such bonds for $1000, each amounting with the interest coupons thereon to more than
The testimony of Rayburn is that Kitchen not onty gave him the five bonds towards the liquidation of the debt, but that he also said if they were not sufficient, he (Rayburn) might use a sufficient number of the others in his possession (meaning those for which the receipt was given) to pay himself for the undivided half of the St. Luke lands, valued at $10,000 by Kitchen himself. If this is true there is an end of the plaintiff’s case, for it clearly appears that the bonds could not be used in the entry or purchase of the railroad company’s lands, and that the whole of them, one hundred and twenty-four in number, were sold for $10,000, a sum not greater than the agreed value of the St. Luke lands. The plaintiff’s bill affirms that sale, and it seeks to follow the proceeds subsequently invested, in part, in the laud bought from Timberman.
It is not necessary, however, to determine whether the testimony of Rayburn in this particular is a true account of the transaction. There is another aspect of the Case which is controlling. The arrangement between Kitchen and Rayburn, in which the latter surrendered his claim to the St. Luke lands, accepted bonds in payment of the debt due him, and assumed a trust of other bonds, even if it was such as the plaintiffs allege, was fraudulently obtained by Kitchen. He had been president of the l'ailroad company. He knew its condition. He knew that the bonds were almost valueless. He had declared that under certain cii'cumstanees they would not be worth moi’e than five cents on the dollai'. Having himself a claim upon the company, he had refused to receive the company’s bonds in liquidation of the claim at more than $50 each, including unpaid coupons, and he had settled with the company, receiving one hundred and sixty-eight bonds at that rate. Yet, in order to effect his
The complainants, then, do not come into court with clean hands. They are seeking the benefit of a contract obtained by their fraud, or by the fraud of Kitchen. Hence they can have no standing in a court of equity. Such a court will not lend its power to assist or protect a fraud. It will not even enforce an unconscionable bargain. In Bein v. Heath[1] it was said to be a principle in chancery “ that he who asks relief must have acted in good faith. The equitable powers of this court can never be exerted in behalf of one who has acted fraudulently, or who by deceit or any unfair means has gained an advantage. To aid a party in such a case would make this court the abettor of iniquity.” For this reason, if for no other, the plaintiffs cannot succeed. They are seeking in a court of equity to derive an advantage from their own wrong.
Decree affirmed.
* 6 Howard, 247 .