Majority — SWAYNE J.
p. 433Syllabus
1. Where on a trial for infringement of a reissue of letters-patent — the defence being a want of novelty — a defendant requests the court below to direct the jury to bring in a verdict for the defendant (no objection being then or having during the trial been taken by such defendant, that the reissue was for a different invention from that secured by the original patent), and the request for the direction just stated not having been on that ground, but on the ground of the evidence “ relative to the alleged prior use of the process, and the novelty, and usefulness, character, and effect of the alleged invention being so decisive as to entitle the defendant to a verdict” — and the request has been refused — the defendant cannot assign as error the refusal to give the direction, because the reissue was not for the same invention as was the original patent.2. A reissue is primS facie to be presumed to be for the same invention as is the original patent.
8. A direction to find for one party or the other can only be given where there is no conflict of evidence.
4. Where, on a question of novelty in a patented process, a witness has stated that, after the patent, he was using a particular process which he had been using for twenty years before (a process which the defendant affirmed to be the same as the one patented), it is allowable to ask the witness whether the patentee had not forbid him to use what he was then using; the purpose of the question being to show that the patentee had forbid him, and that the witness then disclaimed using the patented process, and said that he had “a way of his own ” which he was using.
5. It is allowable to ask a witness of the opposite side, who has referred to and said that he had seen and copied a paper in reference to the expenses of the suit, subscribed by various persons, what were the contents of the paper; the purpose of the question being to show by the answer that the defendants’ witnesses were in a combination to defeat the plaintiff' and t.o share the expense of the opposition. It was not necessary prior to the question to call on any one to produce the original paper.
6. When a patent is on trial and the question in issue involves the matter of novelty, utility, and modus operandi, it is proper enough to ask what the effect of the patented invention has been;
7. In construing a patent courts should proceed in a liberal spirit, so as to sustain the patent and the construction claimed by the patentee, if it can
p. 435ersville, New York, brought suit against Klein, glover in the same place, for an infringement of a patent. The plaintiff got a verdict; the defendant having in the course of the trial taken various exceptions, on which the case was now here.
In August, 1869, Russell obtained a patent for a new and useful improved process of treating leather so as to render it suitable for the manufacture of gloves. The specification said:
“ My invention'consists in a novel treatment of what is known as ‘bark-tanned lamb or sheep skin,’ an article used by bookbinders, and which, while sufficiently soft and supple for the purposes of their trade, is too harsh and stiff for glove-making and a variety of other purposes. This objection is removed by my treatment of the article, and the leather rendered so soft and free, yet full in respect of body, as to adapt it, among other purposes or uses, to the making of what are termed ‘dogskin gloves.’
“ The process I adopt, and which constitutes my invention, is as follows: I take of ‘fat liquor’ obtained in scouring deerskin after tanning in oil, say ten gallons, and warm the same by heating to or near the boiling-point. I then add to such heated fat liquor eight ounces of sal soda, twelve ounces of common salt, one pint of soft-soap, and four ounces of Venetian red, and stir and mix these several ingredients with the fat liquor. This forms the treating mixture or compound; and when made in the foregoing quantity will suffice for five or six dozen skins, but of course such quantity may be moi-e or less varied, as may also the proportions of the ingredients; and the Venetian red or other coloring matter is modified or omitted as desired.
“ To effect the treatment hereinbefore referred to, of the bark-tanned lamb or sheep skins, I lay said skin on a table or other suitable surface, and rub the above-described compound on to both sides of it, using for tbe purpose a horse or other suitable brush or rubber, by which it can be worked into the skin, that is afterward hung out to dry, aud subsequently ‘staked,’ when the character of the skin will be found entirely changed from harshness to softness, and in other respects, thereby adapting it to the manufacture of gloves of the description previously named,
p. 437skins; but, of course, such quantity may be more or less varied, as may also the proportions of the ingredients, and the Venetian red, or other coloring matter be modified or omitted as desired.
“ To effect the treatment hereinbefore referred to, of the bark-tanned lamb or sheep skin, the same should bo well dipped in or saturated with the fat liquor or compound of which fat liquor is the base. This may be done by laying the skin to be treated on a table or other suitable surface and rubbing the fat liquor or compound on or into both sides of the skin, using for the purpose a horse or other suitable brush or rubber, by which it can be worked into the skin, that is afterward hung out to dry, and subsequently 1 staked/ when the character of said skin will be found entirely changed from harshness to softness, and other respects, thereby adapting it to the manufacture of gloves of the description previously named, and to a variety of other purposes for which said skin was not suitable prior to the treatment of it I have herein described.”
“ What is here claimed and desired to be secured by letterspalent is:
“ 1. The employment of fat liquor in the treatment of leather substantially as specified.
“ 2. The process, substantially as herein described, of treating bark-tanned lamb or sheep skin by means of a compound composed and applied essentially as specified."
Upon this reissue Russell sued Klein as an infringer. His allegation was that bark-tanned leather before his treatment of it was harsh, “squeaky,” and unsuitable for gloves; but that by his process, which, as he alleged, included heating the fat liquor, the “squeak” was removed, and the leather rendered soft, pliable, and suitable for a fine glove; that the treatment costing little greatly enhanced the value of the leather, and furnished a cheaper material for gloves than any other of the same quality and value.
The plaintiff’s charge of infringement was wholly confined to the use of his process, including heat; and there was no allegation that the defendant had violated the plaintiff’s rights by using fat liquor without heating it.
p. 438The. defence was want of novelty. The case was heard before the district judge, sitting on the circuit. Numerous witnesses in behalf of the defendant swore that the application of fat liquor to leather, for the purpose of making it soft and pliable, had been known and .in. more or less use for many years; though they did not swear clearly that the application of fat liquor in a heated state with the effects which, in that state, it produced had beeu thus known or in use; and there was no proof by them of any use of fat liquor since the plaintiff's process had been patented otherwise than by heating the ingredients. Nor did they all swear so fully that the application and value of it was known in regard to bark-tanned skins; a good deal of their testimony relating to oil-tanned skins; and some of it to tanning raw skins or skins imperfectly tanned. Some stated that fat liquor heated nearthe boiling-point and so applied would ruin the skins.
Ou the other hand, numerous witnesses of the plaintiff, glovers, at Q-loversville, and elsewhere, more or less familiar with the glove business in the vicinity, and during the term of alleged prior knowledge spoken of by the witnesses of the defendant, testified that they bad no knowledge of such leather as that which the plaintiff produced till about the date of his'patent; that then the kind of leather produced by him with heated fat oils, &c., went into extensive use, and that there was a great demand for it in the market. Some of these witnesses stated that heating' the fat liquor to the boiling-point and allowing it to cool so as to make it cápable of being worked- in, did not destroy its properties. And the testimony of the witnesses of the defendant on cross-examination, tended perhaps to show that their knowledge of the means of softening leather at all by fat oils was very imperfect, and that what product was produced from bark-tanned skins was much inferior to that produced by the plaintiff; and was still affected with “squeak,” and could not be used for the better sorts of glove; and that while they had experimented with heated fat oil, they had
p. 439never brought any of their ideas to a practical use, aud had abandoned them.
In the course of the trial, one Uriel Case, a witness of the defendant, having testified as to the manner in which skins were treated twenty years ago, which manner the defendant asserted was substantially like the patented process; and having testified further that he had treated skins in this manner for twenty years until after the issue of the plaintiff’s patent, was asked by the plaintiff—
“ Did the plaintiff come and forbid you going on ?”
A question to which the defendant objected as immaterial, incompetent, and as calling for the declaration of the plaintiff. But the court allowed the question to be put; the defendant excepting. The witness stated that the plaintiff did not forbid him, but asked him, “Are you not interfering with my patent?” and that he, the wituess, “ might have' told him that he had a way of his own of fixing bark-tanned skins,” “ that he did not remember having said anything about its being an old thiug, or having been done so twenty years ago.”
So too, one Place, a witness of the defendant, having disclosed on cross-examination the facts, that he was a glover at G-loversville, in partnership with his brother, and that the plaintiff in the present case had sued him aud his said brother some time before for an infringement of this same patent; that he, the witness, was now present, as b.is brother also was, without any payment of witness fees, as a wituess for the defendant; that his brother had given him a paper in reference to the expenses of this suit; that he, the witness, had copied it and given it back to his brother, and had not seen it since — was asked by the plaintiff to state the substance of that paper. This was objected to by the defendant: 1st. Upon the ground that the statement of the witness was not the best evidence. 2d. Because no foundation had been laid for the production of the secondary evidence of the contents of the papers in question; and 3d. Because the testimony would be immaterial and incompetent. But the
p. 440court held the question admissible, the defendant excepting. The witness answered:
“It was merely in substance to defend the manufacturing interests against Russell’s patent. I didn’t know who signed it.”
The defendant having given evidence of the use of fat liquor upon oil-tanned skins for many years prior to plaintiff’s patent, which use, he asserted, was the same, substantially, as the patented process — and the plaintiff having given evidence that the oil-tanned skins referred to in such testimony, were skins dressed “from the raw” in oil, and that the fat liquor used upon them was a part of, or in aid of, the oil-dressing process — aud the plaintiff’ asserting that the use of the fat liquor in the process of oil tanning, was essentially different from the patented process, that in oil dressing's it is termed, the fat liquor was used in connection with oil for the purpose of tanning the pelt, or, in other words, of converting it into leather from the ran> state, while in the patented process the fat liquor was applied to a skin alreadg tanned, aud for the purpose of softening and adding new properties to it — called a witness, one Dr. Porter, who stated that he was a physician and chemist, and had examined the patent of Russell and the specifications, and had made tests and experiments in relation to the fat liquor and the process therein described. The plaintiff then asked him:
“ Will you state whether tbe effect of fat liquor applied to oil-tanned and bark-tanned skins is the same.”
The defendant objected to the question “as immaterial, the purpose for which the process is used being immaterial, if the process is the same;” but the court allowed the question to be put. The witness answered “ that the general effect was the same, but that tbe combination by the fat liquor with the different skins produced compounds essentially. different.”
The record, which set out the substance of the evidence, proceeded:
“ The evidence here closed, and the foregoing comprised the
p. 441substance of all the evidence given relative to the alleged prior use of the process mentioned in the patent, and the novelty and usefulness, character and effect, of the alleged invention of plaintiff; and thereupon the counsel for the defendant insisted before the said judge that the said several matters so produced and given in evidence as aforesaid wore sufficient, and ought to be allowed as decisive evidence to entitle the defendant to a verdict, and requested the said judge to direct the said jury to find a verdict for the defendant."
The judge refused so to direct the jury, and proceeded to charge; charging among other things—
“ That, taking the reissued patent as the basis of the plaintiff’s claim, the true construction of the first claim is the employment of fat liquor generally in the state in which it comes from the mills, in the treatment of leather substantially as described; that this claim covered the employment of fat liquor in its pure and simple state.
/‘That the second claim covered the compound substantially as described in the specification, and that the heating of the liquor was an essential portion of the patented process under this claim.
“ That specifications are not addressed to men entirely ignorant of the manufacture to which the specification relates, but to persons skilled in the art to which it appertains; that if, upon reading this specification, parties skilled in the art of dressing skins would know, that this heating was for the purpose of making this compound with the fat liquor or for some other purpose, and that it would not do to apply the fat liquor at or near the boiling-point, because it would destroy the leather, such parties would not be misled by it, and therefore it would not be a fatal defect; but that, if persons skilled in the art, in attempting to put the plaintiff’s invention in practice under this specification, would ordinarily apply the liquor to the skins used while it was at or near the boiling-point, and thus destroy them, then, of course, this specification was bad.
“ That the jury were to consider the claim of the plaintiff as embracing two distinct and independent things; that the plaintiff had a right, if he was the first and original inventor of the use of fat liquor, in its simple and pure state, in this process, to secure that to himself pure and simple, and to hold, as an in
p. 442fringer, any one who used it without adding the other ingredients that went to make up the compound specified; that he had a right to secure the use of the fat liquor and the other ingredients also, but that the difficulty was, so far as this case was concerned, that the party having embraced within his claim the use of fat liquor in its pure and simple state, the question of heat or of the use of the compound was not very important to the interests of the pai’ties, because, if the party claimed in his pateut what was not new, or a substantial or material part of which was not new, the patent was void.
“That, if the jury were satisfied that this process of employing fat liquor in the treatment of leather, as substantially described in the patent, was known, that the process had been perfected, and had been used prior to this time of the plaintiff’s invention, and that the persons who used the process had an intelligent comprehension of its character and the effect produced, the patent would be void; and that, upon the question of the validity of the patent, they were to look to the proof in regard to the use of fat liquor, substantially in the manner described when fat liquor alone is used, unconnected with the other ingredients constituting the compound, which is covered by the second claim in the patent; that, if the jury should find that this process had been used prior to plaintiff’s alleged invention by other persons, as stated and claimed here, that the persons who used the process were aware of the object and character of it, observed and comprehended the beneficial results produced by its use, then the patent would be void upon the ground of want of novelty, although some circumstances might have induced them to abandon temporarily the actual practice of the invention, or the use of the process.
“ That if they came to the conclusion that the process claimed in the first specification, that is the fat liquor had been so used substantially as described in the specification before this invention, that was the end of the case.
“But if they should cometo the conclusion, upon the other hand, that all those other experiments were failures and were abandoned, then they would come to the question of infringement.
“That the proof in regard to the quality and character of leather produced and the knowledge of it at Gloversville and vicinity, and the want of knowledge of it, was proper for the
p. 443consideration of the jury, in connection with the question of whether these experiments were failures; whether this process was perfected and used; or whether the experiments and trials never reached the point of invention and were consequently abandoned. But it was not a question whether the result of the use of the process was as perfect at the time as it is now. It was a question whether, substantially, the same process was used.”
The plaintiff’s counsel then requested the judge to charge-the jury,
“ That the application of heat to the liquor, and the use of liquor, as described, while in a heated state, are essential parts of the invention or discovery; but it is not, by necessary construction, required by the patent that the liquor should be applied to the skins at or near the boiling heat.”
The judge declined to thus charge, on the ground that, under the first-claim of the patent, neither the heating of the fat liquor nor the application or use of it, in a heated state, was an essential portion of the process.
. The defendant’s counsel then requested the judge to charge,
“ 1st. That the invention, as described in the patent of February, 1870, is the treatment of bark-tanned sheep and lamb skins by the employment of fat liquor, and if such treatment was known to others, and more than two years before the plaintiff applied for his patent, his patent is void.”
“ 2d. That the proper construction of the patent is that the fat liquor should be applied at or near the boiling-point, and if the application of fat liquor at such a temperature to leather is injurious and pernicious the patent is void for want of utility.”
Refused iu the form put, but modified and given thus:
“The proper construction of the second claim of the patent, so far as it relates to the application of heat, is that the compound composed of fat liquor and the other ingredients required, should be applied at or near the boiling-point, under the common
p. 445compound, as claimed by the plaintiff, is not patentable, because the proportions of such compound are not fixed, but are in all respects indefinite and uncertain, and may be waived or omitted by the terms of the patent."
“7th. That if fat liquor had been used substantially in the manner specified in the plaintiff’s patent, for the purpose of rendering any kind of leather soft and supple, more than two years [before the plaintiff applied for a patent], the plaintiff cannot recover, even though it had riot been so used in dressing bark-tanned lamb or'sheep skins.”
Refused. The defendant then modified his request, by substituting “used before the plaintiff’s invention” for “before the plaintiff applied for a patent,” and thereupon the court charged,
“That the application of an old invention or an old machine to produce a new result, because it is applied to a different material, is not an invention, and the question of novelty is to be determined in the same way. That under the first claim of the plaintiff’s, if this particular process was used for the purpose of softening leather, it is not material that it was bark-tanned sheep or lamb skins, if it be used as a process for that purpose.”
“8th. That if the object of plaintiff’s process was to substitute a less valuable article for that commonly known as ‘dog-skin,’ and to impose upon the public by representing gloves made of softened sheep and lamb skins as dogskin gloves, the patent is void for fraud, and plaintiff cannot recover.”
Refused, and the jury thus charged:
“ If the process patented cannot be made useful for any honest purpose, and can be used only for perpetrating a fraud upon the public, and is therefore not useful, but pernicious, the plaintiff cannot recover.”
“9th. That if anything claimed by the plaintiff in his patent, as used, was in fact old, the entire patent was void, and plaintiff could not recover.”
Refused, except as had already been charged.
“ 10th. That the patent could not be sustained in the matter
p. 446of the mere degree of heat, if the principle of applying heat to anyT extent is an old process.’’
Refused, except as had already been charged.
The jury found for the plaintiff.
On a motion made for a new trial (the circuit judge, Woodruff, J., now sitting), that learned justice was of opinion that there was no sufficient reason for disturbing tbe verdict. He said:
“ The conflict of evidence upon the questions of fact was great, and made it a very proper case for submission to the jury. The impression on my own mind, after a careful examination of the testimonjq is that the verdict is right, and the plaintiff is in fact the inventor of a new and useful process secured to him by his patent, and that the defendant is a wilful and deliberate infringer of his rights.”
Adverting to the construction'of the patent, given by the learned district judge, he observed that it differed from a construction which he had himself put upon it on the trial on the circuit of another case by this same plaintiff’, against another defendant, on the same patent (Russell v. Place), and where he instructed the jury that “the use of heat in the treatment of skins was an essential part of the patented process.” The learned justice continued :
“But this instruction was not excepted to by the defendant, and he is not, as a matter of right, entitled to question the correctness of the charge to the jury on that point. In that particular, the question on a motion for a new trial is not simply whether the instruction was correct. If it appeared to me to be erroneous and yet it was clear that it worked no injustice to tlie defendant, it would be no reason for granting a new trial.”
The exceptions to the evidence he,considered were not well taken; independently of which the evidence led to nothing. And on the principal questions, the learned circuit judge considering, as already said, that the instructions of the court to the jury were, “at any rate, as favorable to the defendant as he had a right to require, and that the
p. 447special instructions sought were charged as fully as the law would allow,” denied the motion for a new trial. The case was now here in this position.
Mr. Matthew Hale, with whom was Mr. J. M. Dudley, for the plaintiff in error:
1. The court erred in not directing the jury to find a verdict for the defendant. 1. The suit was upon the reissued letters. But those letters were void, because they were not granted for the same invention as that embodied in the original letters-patent.
2. The original patent had but one claim, substantially the same as the second claim in the reissued patent. This was for the treatment of “ bark-tanned lamb and sheep skins” (not leather) with the same compound as in the reissue. The patentee stated in his original specification that it is “a full, cleai’, and exact description” of the invention. That “ his invention consists in a novel treatment of what is known as ‘ bark-tanned lamb and sheep skins.’ ” That “ the process” which he adopted and which “constituted his invention was as follows;” — here stating the ingredients of the compound and proportions, substantially as stated in the reissue, and describing only the mode of applying the compound to the skin, of crushing it into the skin, as described in the reissue, closing with the claim stated.In the comparison it will be seen that the original claimed only the treatment of bark-tanned lamb and sheep skins with the specific compound, brushed or rubbed on, neither describing, suggesting, nor indicating the treatment of leather generally at all, nor such skins with fat liquor alone without said ingredients, nor the saturating by dipping. Upon the face of the two patents the old was for treatment with the compound alone, and the reissue is primarily for treatment with simple fat liquor alone, stating only that the patentee “preferred to use the same in connection with other ingredients;” and, after describing the compound, stating that “this forms a good treating mixture or compound,” and closing with the second claim. It is simply for such treat
p. 457the bark-tanned state is too hard and stiff for glove-making, but when subjected to this treatment is rendered suitable for gloves.” Stated generally, then, the invention consists of a novel treatment of a certain kind of skin, a process or processes ; and the mariner and character of this treatment or process is to be thereinafter described.The specification then proceeds to desci’ibe the novel treatment or process constituting the invention, and begins by saying that the “principal feature” of the invention consists of the employment of fat liquor. It does not say that the whole invention, or the whole of any or either claim consists in the mere employment of fat liquor; but that this is a principal feature. The expression “principal feature” implies that there are other features. It is pertinent to observe also, in view of certain criticisms upon the specification to be noticed hereafter, that fat liquor as the principal feature, applies to the compound or second claim as well and as fully as to the first claim. As, therefore, the fat liquor is to be heated when used in the compound, no inference against its heating when used aloue can be legitimately drawn from the statement that the employment of fat liquor constitutes the principal feature of the invention. If it intends heated fat liquor in one case, as is conceded, it must in the other also.The specification then goes on to describe further the “ novel treatment,” and the other features of the invention, and says: “In treating leather,” that is, the leather before-mentioned, “ bark-tanned lamb or sheep skins,” “ with fat liquor, it is desirable to heat the latter to or near the boiling-point, and it is preferred to use the same,” i. e., fat liquor heated, “ in connection with other ingredients.” This plainly says, “ in treating the leather with fat liquor,” not with the compound, “it is desirable to heat the latter,” i. e., the fat liquor alone, “ to or near the boiling-point.” It will be observed that the heating of the liquor is mentioned before a word is said.about other ingredients; and there can be no doubt that, the patentee intended the heating of the fat liquor as a part of his process.
p. 458In prescribing the compound, the specification says: “ There may be .added to each ten gallons of such heated fat liquor,” thus showing clearly that the patentee intended headed fat liquor, both when used alone and as the base of the compound.Afterwards, in speaking of the treatment of the skin, the specification says: “ The same should be well dipped in or saturated with the fat liquor, or compound of which the fat liquor is the base.”While this includes the treatment of the skins with the fat liquor alone, and also with the compound, of which heated fat liquor is the base, it does not repeat the word “ heated;” hence the omission of the word “heated” when applied to the immersion of skins in the fat liquor alone, does not afford a presumption that the patentee did not intend heated fat liquor under the first claim. On the contrary, it affords a strong presumption of the reverse.The construction asked by the patentee is confirmed by reference to the formal claim at the close of the specification. Read in connection with and construed in the light of the whole specification, it is twofold: 1. “The employment of fat liquor in the treatment of leather, substantially as specified,”' that is to 8ay, heated and applied to the skin substantially as specified. 2. The process, “substantially as herein described, of treating bark-tanned lamb or sheep skins, by means of a compound composed and applied essentially as specified,”- that is to say, a heated compound composed and applied essentially and substantially as specified.It is said that the words “ desirable” and “preferred” in the specification are used to express the same idea, and each used in contrast with essential or necessary. This is a mistake.The word “desirable” applies to the use of the fat liquor, whether alone or in the compound, and refers to the degree of heat and not to the fact of heating. The patentee does not mean to say that it is not essential or necessary to heat the fat liquor, but that it is not essential to heat it up to or near the boiling-point. The language is not the most apt that, might have been employed to express the intention, but reasonably
p. 459plain nevertheless. The draughtsman evidently assumed the fact of heating, aud sought to describe the temperature without limiting it to an exact degree. This view is strengthened by reference to the original specification, where the expression is “warm the same by healing to or near the boiling-point.” Here there is no question about the fact of heating being essential; and the formula, substantially, was transferred to the reissued specification and there applied to both claims. If, from the language employed, there is no question about the necessity of heating under the old patent, and none when applied to the compound under the new, why should the same language receive a different construction when applied to fat liquor alone?■ The word “preferred” applies to the compound, and means simply that the inventor prefers it to the use of the heated fat liquor alone, and hence he describes and patents it.This word may be said to be used in contrast with essential or necessary, in reference to producing the desired result; that is to say, 6uch result may be produced by the heated fat liquor alone, and that is claimed and patented; but the inventor • prefers the compound, and that is claimed and patented also.II. As to the requests for instructions.1. The -first request does not correctly or fully describe the invention. The employment of fat liquor, merely, is not the whole of the invention. It is the employment of fat liquor in the condition and manner described in the specification. The request erroneously assumes that a knowledge by others of the thing patented, more than two years before application for the patent, renders it void. If a prayer for instruction be not correct in its very terms, it is not error to refuse it. The charge to the jury covered the ground of this request, and embraced all the defendant below had a right to ask upon the point involved.2. The second request was properly refused, and the modification was correct. The court bad already charged on this point, and the charge aud the modification of the re
p. 462the charge had fully, covered the ground, and in accordance with the request. If it was intended by the request to elicit a ruling that a patent could not be sustained for a mere degree of heat, then it was, in that particular, abstract and speculative. The specification does not fix any exact degree of heat, and the plaintiff below did not ask to have his patent sustained, on that ground.III. Exceptions to evidence.The question to Uriel Case was proper as introductory to the witness’s statements at the interview, and as proof of the fact elicited by his further cross-examination, that when charged with an infringement of the patent, he made no pretence of prior knowledge, but claimed “a way of his own,” &c., or, in other words, that he did not then infringe.The question to Place was proper also, its object, obviously, having been to show a combination among the defendants’ witnesses, including the witness under examination, to defeat the patent and share the expense, thus affecting their credibility.The objection that it was not the best evidence is untenable. The question was upon a collateral matter arising incidentally in the progress of the trial, affecting merely the credit of the witness.The witness did not know who signed the paper, and the evidence complained of being, therefore, harmless, error cannot be predicated of its admission.On the state of the case the question to Dr. Porter was proper also, for while it is true that the mere purpose or effect of a process is not patentable, it is equally true that the effect or result produced is always proper to be considered when a patent is on trial. Indeed, it is often most important in determining the questions of novelty and utility. The result, if greatly more beneficial than that produced by old contrivances, reflects back and tends to characterize tlie importance of the change. Our question to Dr. Porter tended to solve the question raised by the defendant’s evidence, whether or not the patented process was or
p. 464tents, no notice to produce it having been given. To this there are two answers: It was an incidental and collateral matter drawn out to test the temper and credibility of the witness. It in no wdse affected the merits of the controversy between the parties. The witness stated that he did not know who signed the paper. The contents could not, therefore, have operated to the injury of the defendant.
The question to Porter involved the novelty, utility, and modus operandi of the alleged invention of the plaintiff and the answer was competent evidence.
Elaborate instructions covering the entire case were given to the jury. None of them were excepted to by the defendant.
Numerous instructions w'ere asked by his counsel. An exception was taken in relation to each one of them, and is assigned for error.
We shall refer to them as they are numbered in the record.
I. That the patent is for “the treatment of bark-tanned sheep and lamb skins, by the employment of fat liquor, and if the jury believe such treatment was known to others more than two years before the plaintiff applied for his patent, his patent is void.” This instruction was properly refused. It stated inaccurately the rule of law' which it involved. A patent relates back, where the question of novelty is in issue, to the date of the invention, and not to the time of the application for its issue. The jury had already been sufficiently instructed upon the subject. The instruction assumes that the reissue was for the use of fit liquor, without reference to the point whether it were hot or cold. This renders it necessary to construe the patent with a view to the solution of that question.
The original specification declared that the invention consisted “in a novel treatment of bark-tanned lamb or sheep skins.” The patentee said: “The process I adopt, and which constitutes my invention, is as follows: I take of‘fat liquor,’ obtained in scouring deerskins after tanning in oil, saj’ ten gallons, and warm the same to or near the boiling-point. I then add to such heated fat liquor eight ounces of
p. 465sal soda, twelve ounces of common salt, one pint of soft soap, and four ounces of Venetian red, and stir and mix these sev-. eral ingredients with the fat liquor.” The claim is as follows: “What is here claimed, and desired to be secured by letters-patent, is the process substantially as herein described of treating bark-tanned lamb or sheep skins by means of a compound, and applied essentially as specified.”
With this specification and claim, it was apprehended that the patent did not cover the use of heated fat liquor alone— which the patentee claimed as a part of his invention — but that it would be held to cover the use of such heated liquor only in combination with the ingredients specified. If so, the omission of any one, or all, of the ingredients would have given immunity to an infringer. To remedy this defect the reissue was procured. In the specification in that case the patentee says: “My invention consists in a novel treatment of what is known as bark-tanned lamb or sheep skin.”
“ The principal feature of my invention consists in the employment of what is known amóngst tanners as fat liquor, which is ordinarily obtained by scouring deerskins, after tanning in oil, but which, when it is not convenient to obtain in this manner, may be produced as a liquor having the same character — obtained by the cutting of oil with a suitable alkali. In treating leather with the ‘fat liquor,’ it is desirable to heat the liquor to or near the boiling-point, and it is preferred to use the same in connection with other ingredients. Thus, for instance, there may be added to each, ten gallons of such heated fat liquor, eight ounces sal soda, twelve ounces common salt, one pint of soft soap, or an equivalent quantity of hard soap, four ounces of Venetian red; such ingredients to be well stirred and mixed with the fat liquor.”
The claims are as follows:
“1. The employment of fat liquor iu the treatment of leather, substantially as specified.
“2. The process, substantially as herein described, of treating bark-tanned lamb or sheep skins by means of a
p. 467of the second claim, to wit: “The process substantially as herein described of treating bark-tanned lamb or sheep skins by means of a compouud composed and applied essentially as specified.” Here
healed fat liquor is clearly one of the constituents of the compound. A chemist proved on the trial that heat was an element essential, in a large degree, to the efficacy and utility of both the simple liquor and the compound, when so applied. We think the better opinion is, that the first claim was intended to cover, and does cover, only the use of heated liquor.
The first instruction might well have been refused for the reason, also, that it was too broad as to this point.
II. The next prayer and the action of the court are thus set forth in the bill of exceptions :
“ 2. The defendant’s counsel also requested the said judge to charge that the proper construction of the patent is that the fat liquor should be applied at or near the boiling-point, and if the jury believe that the application of fat liquor at such a temperature to leather is injurious and pernicious, the patent is void for want of utility, and the defendant entitled to a verdict; but the said judge refused so to charge the jury, but modified the said request and instructed the jury that the proper construction of the second claim of the patent, so far as it relates to the application of heat, is that the compound, composed of fat liquor and the other ingredients required/, should be applied at or near the boiling-point, under the common knowledge of persons skilled in the art of treating this leather, to procure softness and pliability, would make them wait until it was partially cooled before its application, and if the jury believe that the application of fat liquor at such a temperature to leather as is required by the specification under this qualification is injurious and pernicious, the patent is void for want of utility, and the defendant eutitled to a verdict; and the counsel for defendant then and there duly excepted.”
• We think this ruling of the court was correct.
Ill and IV. These exceptions are sufficiently answered by what was said by the Circuit Court as to the second prayer.
p. 468V. This instruction was properly modified. The state of the evidence hardly justified the judge in giving any instruction upon the subject to which it related.
The remaining five exceptions may be grouped and disposed of together. Neither of them requires any special remark.
We are satisfied with the rulings of the learnqd judge who tried the case as to each and all of them.
We find nothing in the record of which the plaintiff m error has a right to complain.
Judgment affirmed.
Dissenting, Justices FIELD and HUNT.