Majority — FIELD J.
Syllabus
On the 35th of May, 1850, Congress passed an act entitled “An act making a grant of lands to the State of Iowa, in alternate sections, to aid in the construction of certain railroads in said State” (11 Stat. at Large, 9). That act granted to the State for the purpose of aiding in the construction of a railroad between certain specified places, alternate sections of land, designated by odd numbers, for six sections in width on each side of the road, to bo selected within fifteen miles therefrom. And the act declared that tho lands thus granted should be exclusively applied to the construction of the road, and be subject to the disposal of the legislature for that purpose and no other, and only in the manner following, that is to say, a quantity of land not exceeding one hundred and twenty sections, and included within a continuous length of twenty miles of tho road, might be sold; and when the governor of the State, should certify to the Secretary of the Interior that any continuous twenty miles of the road were completed, then another like quantity of the land granted might be sold, and so from time to time until tho road was completed.after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court, as follows:
The question for determination is, whether the plaintiff took a good title to the lands in controversy under the conveyance from the first company, the Iowa Central Air-Line Railroad Company, or whether that title is vested in the last company, the Iowa Railroad Land Company.
It is contended by the defendants, first, that under the act of Congress of May 15th, 1856, no lands could be sold by the, State until twenty continuous miles of the road were constructed; second, that if one hundred and twenty sections could be sold in advance' of such construction, they could only be taken from lands adjoining the line of the road from its commencement on the east; and third, that the grant by the State to the first company was upon conditions precedent, which not having been complied with, the title did not pass. Neither of these positions can, in our judgment, be maintained. The act of Congress by its express language authorized a sale of.one hundred and twenty sections in advance of the construction of any part of the road. It was only as to the sale of the remaining sections that the provision requiring a previous completion of twenty miles applied. It is true it was the sole object of the grant to aid in the construction of the railroad, and for that purpose the sale of the land was only allowed, as the road was completed in divisions, except as to one hundred and twenty sections.
The evident intention of Congress in making this exception was to furnish aid for such preliminary work as would be required before the construction of any part of the road. No conditions, therefore, of any kind were imposed upon
Nor was there any restriction upon the State as to the place where the one hundred and twenty sections should be selected along the line of the road, except that they should be included within a continuous length of twenty miles on each side. They might be selected from lands adjoining the eastern end of the road or the western end, or along the central portion.
The act of Congress of May 15th, 1856, was a grant to the State in prcesenii; it passed a title to the odd sections designated, to be afterwards located. When the line of the road was fixed, and the location of the odd sections thus became certain, the title of the State acquired precision, and at once attached to the land. And the act of the State of July 14th, 1856, was also a grant in prcesenii to the first railroad company. That company took the title and interests of the State upon the terms, conditions, and restrictions expressed in the act of Congress. The further conditions as to the completion of the road imposed by.the State were conditions subsequent and not conditions precedent, as contended by the defendants. The terms, in which the right is reserved by the act of the State to resume the lands granted, imply what the previous language of the act declares, that a present transfer was made, and not one dependent upon conditions to be previously performed. The right is by them restricted to such lands as at the time of the resumption had not been previously disposed of. The resumption, therefore, of the grant by the failure of the first company to complete the road did not impair the title to the lands, which the act of Congress authorized to be sold in advance of such completion, and which were sold by that company.
We are of opinion, therefore, that the plaintiff took a good, title to* the premises in controversy by his conveyance from that company. The judgment of the court below is, therefore,
Affirmed.