Majority — Strong J.
Syllabus
An act of the general assembly of the State of Illinois in force March 7, 1867, authorized towns acting under the Township Organization Law of the State — of which the town of Concord was one — to appropriate money to aid in the construction of a certain railroad, to he paid to said company as soon as its track should have been located and constructed through such towns. At a popular election held in the town of Concord, on the 20th of November, 1869, the proposition to make sucli appropriation was submitted to the legal voters thereof, as required by the act; and the town voted the appropriation, provided the company would run its road through the town. On the 20th of June, 1870, the company gave notice of its acceptance of the donation; and on the 9th of October, 1871, town bonds representing such donation were issued by the supervisor and town-clerk. Held, 1. That under the statute the town could not make an appropriation or donation in aid of the company until its road was located and constructed through the town. 2. That the constitution of the State, which came into operation July 2, 1870, annulled the power of any city, town, or township, to make donations or loan its credit to a railroad company, and, after that date, rendered the act of 1867 ineffective. 3. As the town had no authority to make a contract to give, and the acceptance by the company was an undertaking to do nothing which it was not bound to do, before the authority of the town to make or to engage to make a donation came into existence, no valid contract arose from such offer and acceptance. 4. That the bonds so issued are void.delivered the opinion of the court.
The bonds to which the coupons in suit were attached purport to have been made under legislative authority given to the town officers by the act of March 7, 1867. Their recitals make direct reference to that act by its title, which is set forth at length, with an averment that they were issued under and by virtue of it. The primary question, therefore, is, whether that statute did in reality give to the supervisor and clerk of
“ Provided, however, that the proposition to appropriate moneys to said company shall be first submitted to a vote of the legal voters of said respective townships, towns, or cities, at a regular annual or special meeting, by giving at least ten days’ notice thereof; and a vote shall be taken thereon by ballot at the usual place of election; and if the majority of votes cast shall be in favor of the appropriation then the same shall be made, otherwise not.”
The second section empowered and required the authorities of said municipalities to levy and collect a tax, and make such provisions as might be necéssary for the prompt payment of the appropriation under the provisions of the law.
The authority given to the town of Concord by this statute was not to subscribe to the stock of the railroad company, but to make an appropriation or donation in aid of the construction of the road; and even that donation was not permitted to be made until after the completion of the location and construction of the road through the town. It has been strenuously insisted during the argument that the act conferred no power upon the town to make an appropriation or donation by the issuing of bonds or certificates of indebtedness. It is said that other provision was made for the donation, — provision by the levy and col-. lection of a tax. We do not care, however, to discuss this matter, for in the view which we have of the case it is quite immaterial.
“No city, town, township, or other municipality, shall ever become subscribers to the capital stock of any railroad or private corporation, or make donation to, or loan its credit in aid of, such corporation: Provided, however, that the adoption of this article shall not be construed as affecting the right of any such municipality to make such subscriptions, where the same have been authorized under existing laws, by a vote of the people of such municipalities prior to such adoption.”
This article, in our opinion, makes a clear distinction between subscriptions to the capital stock of a railroad company, or a private corporation, and donations or loans of credit to such corporations. The latter are prohibited under all circumstances. The former may still be made, if they have been authorized by a vote of the people prior to the adoption of the constitution. A very able and ingenious argument has been submitted to us, aiming to show that in fact the article makes no such distinction, and that donations and subscriptions are put upon the same footing; but we cannot yield to it our assent. No matter what may have been the intention of the mover of the proviso, the intent of the framers of the article, and of the people
If, then, the State constitution prohibited donations to railroad companies, made after its adoption, the act of the legislature of 1867 became ineffective after July 2,1870. After that date the power no longer existed in the municipality.
We do not say that the new constitution could annul or impair any contract that was made between the town and the railroad company, during the time in which the town had authority to make it. A constitution can no more impair the obligation of a contract than ordinary legislation can. But the record exhibits no contract made before July 2,1870. The town voted on the twentieth day of . November, 1869, that it would make a donation, provided the company would run its railroad through the town. On the 20th of June, 1870, the company gave notice of its acceptance of the donation. But the town was not empowered to make the donation until the road was located and constructed through the town. It had no authority to make a contract to give. And the acceptance was an undertaking to do nothing which the company was not bound to do before the authority of the town to make a donation, or to engage to make a donation, came into existence. What is called the acceptance of the railroad company cannot be construed as an engagement to locate and build the railroad through the town. It amounted to no more than saying, “ If we build our road through your town, we will receive your gift.” There was, therefore, no consideration for the town’s promige to give, even if the popular vote can be considered a promise. There was no contract to be impaired. A contract should be clearly proved before it invokes the protection of the Federal Constitution.
Judgment reversed and new trial ordered.