Majority — Steong- J.
Syllabus
1. The charter of the Chesapeake and Ohio Railroad Company does not exempt from taxation that portion of the road of the company between Richmond and Covington. •delivered the opinion of the court.
Each of these cases presents the same question. That a contract for some exemption from taxation was made by a legislative offer of the State, and an acceptance of the offer by the company, is not controverted; but the extent of the exemption is the matter in question between the parties. To ascertain what that was, it is necessary to review the legislative acts which made the- offer accepted by the company. Preparatory to such an examination, it may be well, also, to notice some antecedent facts stated in the record.
■ On the fifteenth day of February, 1858, an act of the legislature of Virginia was passed, authorizing the board of public works of that State to construct a railroad from Covington to the Ohio Eiver, on State account, under which act the construction was commenced and prosecuted by means of State appropriations, made from time to time, until the work was arrested by the late civil war. The completion of the road, however, was deemed an object of great importance to the people of Virginia, and on the 26th of February, 1866, an act was passed, entitled “ An Act to incorporate the Covington and Ohio Eailroad Company,” the provisions of which we shall presently notice. The State having then been divided, the legislature of West Virginia, to which State the road was deemed equally
The act of Feb. 26, 1866, proved ineffectual. The Covington and Ohio Railroad Company was not formed. The commissioners were unable to find parties able and willing to accept the charter, and contract with them on the terms proposed by it. Accordingly, on the 26th of February, 1867, the legislature of West Virginia, and on the 1st of March, 1867, the legislature of Virginia, each passed another act, entitled
An Act to provide for the completion of a line or lines of rail*
The second was made to the Virginia Central Railroad Company alone, and it was made in the fifteenth section of the act, which is as follows : —
“ The Virginia Central Railroad Company may contract with the Covington and Ohio Railroad commissioners, for the construction of the railroad from Covington to the Ohio River; and,-imthe event such contract is made, the said Virginia Central Railroad Company shall be known as the Chesapeake and Ohio Railroad Company, and shall be entitled to all the benefits of the charter of the Covington and Ohio Railroad, and to- all the rights, interests, and privileges which by this act are conferred upon the Chesapeake and Ohio Railroad Company when organized.”
No such consolidation as that proposed by this statute ever took place. It was impossible, because the Covington and Ohio Railroad Company never came into existence. But the second alternative proposed was accepted. The Virginia Central did
■ Thus the contract between the State and the company was formed, and such were its terms. The question now is, How far did the contract exempt the property of the Virginia Central (now the Chesapeake and Ohio) Company from taxation, or rather what property did it exempt ?
This is in be answered in view of the statute alone. The contract with the railroad commissioners made no attempt to confer upon the company any greater or other rights, privileges, or immunities than those described in the statutes. By virtue of it, the company obtained two classes of rights: First, the benefits which the act of Feb. 26, 1866, amended by the act of 1867, would have conferred upon the Covington and Ohio Railroad Company had it been formed; and, second, the rights, interests, and privileges' of the corporation contemplated by the first alternative proposition — namely, the corporation formed by consolidation of the companies mentioned — would have possessed had such consolidation been made. What, then, were those rights, benefits, interests, and privileges ? The Covington and Ohio Company, had it been formed, would have been exempt from all State taxation of its property; but its charter gave exemption to no other property. Had a consolidation taken place between it and the Virginia Central, and had the two companies become one corporation, together owning the property of both, that portion of the property brought hy the Covington and Ohio into the aggregate would have continued exempt. But exemption of other property was not contemplated by the charter. So much is settled by repeated decisions of this court. Philadelphia, Wilmington, & Baltimore
There was no express provision in either of the statutes that the property of the Virginia Central shall, in any contingency, be exempt from taxation, and certainly,- in our opinion, nothing they contain raises an implication of such an exemption. What was exempted was that which the legislature provided might be the property of another company. The right or immunity of that company was a limited right or immunity, and the Virginia Central, when it acquired it, took it with its limitations.
. Nor was there any thing in the grant to the Virginia Central, made by the contract under the fifteenth section of the act of 1867,.of all the rights, interests, and privileges which by that act .were conferred upon the Chesapeake and Ohio Railroad Company when organized (that is, upon the Chesapeake and Ohio, if such a company - should be, formed -by consolidation), from which can be inferred an exemption from taxation of any thing except what would have been brought into the common stock, if the proposed Covington and Ohio Company had been organized, and had become a party to the consolidation. The consolidated corporation would have acquired, as .we have seen, no greater immunities from taxation than the constituent companies had prior to the union, and would have held them distribu-tively;. that is to say, whatever privileges and advantages either of them possessed would have been held by the new company to the extent of the road occupied by each respectively upon the consolidation. It. would have, stood-in-their place, and have possessed the powers, .rights, privileges, -and immunities the constituent companies had severally enjoyed in the portions of the road which had previously belonged to them. ,
If it be asked, why, then, were the rights of the consolidated
No doubt the extension of a railroad from Covington to the Ohio River was a favorite project of the State; and it was intended to offer terms which, it was supposed, would induce the Virginia Central Company to undertake its construction; but what the terms were must be gathered from the acts of the legislature, and from the contract with the railroad commissioners.
In the agreed statement of facts, it appears, that the exemption from taxation provided for in the statutes was held out to the Virginia Central by the railroad commissioners, as one of the inducements to enter into the contract to construct the road, it being supposed by the commissioners and by the company that the exemption covered the wbple line from Richmond to the Ohio River. This fact, however, can be of no importance to the decision we feel constrained to make. No such stipulation was inserted in the contract; and even if such a representation was made to the company, it was but- the expression of an opinion respecting the meaning of a statute, in regard to which the company had the same knowledge that the commissioners had.
It will be seen from what we have said, that, in our opinion, the Court of Appeals of Virginia construed the acts of 1866 and 1867 correctly, and that no attempt has been made to impair the obligation of a contract. • Judgment affirmed.
Cases cited
- 10 How. 877 10 How. 877 p. 726
- Minot v. Philadelphia, Wilmington & Baltimore Railroad 18 Wall. 206 p. 726
- 16 Wall. 460 16 Wall. 460 p. 726
- 92 U. S. 666 92 U. S. 666 p. 726