United States v. Mora

delivered the opinion of the court.

We think the judgment in this case should be reversed. The objection that the bond does not correspond with the form prescribed by the second section of the act of May 20, 1862 ( 12 Stat. 404 ), does not meet the case. It is supported by the third section, if not by the second, in connection with the treasury circular issued under it May 23, 1862.

To understand the force of the objection and the answer to it, it is necessary to look at the general scope of the act.

The first section authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to refuse a clearance to any vessel or other vehicle laden with goods destined for a foreign or domestic port, whenever he should have satisfactory reason to believe that any of the goods, whatever their ostensible destination, were intended for parts or places in the possession or under the control of the insurgents. The second section empowered the collector of customs, in granting a clearance of any vessel for a foreign or domestic port, if he should deem it necessary, under the circumstances of the case, to require a bond from the master or owner of the vessel in a penalty equal to the. value of the cargo, that the cargo should be delivered at its destination, and that no part of it should be used to aid any persons in insurrection. This authority given to the collector was independent of any instructions which he might receive from the Secretary, and in no sense conflicted with what the Secretary might do, or require to be done, under the other portions of the act. \

The third section gave the Secretary of the Treasury discretionary power to prevent the transportation, in any way, of any goods, whatever their ostensible destination, in all cases where there should be satisfactory reason to believe that they were intended for any place in possession of the insurgents, or

The first and second sections related more particularly to clearances of vessels; and the third, to goods to be transported in vessels and other vehicles. The security specified in the second section was required to be given by the master or owner of the vessel, and, as already stated, was to be taken at the discretion of the collector, without further instructions on the subject. The security specified in the third section was not limited to any particular penalty, and it was not stated by whom it should be given. It was to be Reasonable security, and would, as a matter of course, have to be furnished by the person who should desire to have the goods transported.

By virtue of the powers conferred by the third section, the Secretary of the Treasury issued instructions to the collector of New York to refuse clearances to all vessels (whatever their ostensible destination) which were believed by him, on satisfactory grounds, to be intended for ports or places in possession or under control of the insurgents; or where there was imminent danger that the goods laden therein should fall into the possession or under the control of the insurgents; and in all cases where, in his judgment, there was ground of apprehension that any goods shipped would be used in any way for the aid of the insurgents, the collector was directed to require substantial security that such goods should not be transported to any place under insurrectionary control, and should not in any way be used to give aid or comfort to the insurgents.

It cannot be pretended that the Secretary of the Treasury-exceeded his authority in giving these instructions. They are fully authorized by the third section o'f the act. We are of opinion that the powers given to the collector by these instructions were sufficient to authorize him to take the bond in

Now, although the condition of the bond is an amplification of the condition prescribed in-the instructions of the Secretary, yet the amplification is-in line with, and intended more effectually to secure the performance of, the condition prescribed. The instructions authorized the collector to stop the vessel and the goods from clearing at all, if he believed, on satisfactory ground, that the latter were intended for places in the possession of the insurgents, or that there was imminent danger of their falling into their hands. Now, though he might have grounds deemed by him satisfactory for believing that the goods were intended for the use of the insurgents, yet, on assurances given by the shipper that - they were really and truly intended for consumption in Mexico, he might be willing to let them go forward, if the shipper would give security that they should be landed and used in Mexico, and should not, with his consent or allowance, or that of his agents, be used to give aid and comfort to the insurgents. This is substantially what the condition of the bond amounts to. And it cannot be denied that it is in general conformity with the purpose and

Now, under certain circumstances, specified in tbe second section of the act, tbe collector bad authority to take a certain bond, without being instructed thereto by tbe Secretary of tbe Treasury. By virtue of instructions given by tbe Secretary under the third section, the collector bad authority, and was required, to take a certain other bond; and'be was further authorized to refuse a clearance altogether. Under tbis last power of refusing a clearance, what was there to prevent him, or to make it unlawful for him, to take such a bond as was given in tbis case, if tbe owner of tbe goods chose to enter into it for the purpose of inducing tbe collector to grant tbe clearance ? It only requires what tbe law sought to secure. If tbe shipper chose to give tbe bond in order to get bis goods cleared, it was a voluntary act on bis part; and what ground has be or bis sureties to complain ? Tbe only complaint they could make, if they could make any, was, that tbe circumstances did not exist which wpuld have justified the collector in refusing a clearance, and that tbe taking of tbe bond was, therefore, an act of duress. But tbis tbe defendant did not attempt to prove. He put himself at tbe trial on tbe sheer ground that tbe collector bad no right to take such a bond at all as the one in question. But tbe right to take tbe bond, so far as tbe shipper and bis sureties are concerned, was included in tbe greater right to refuse tbe clearance altogether. And the bond itself, duly executed by them, is prima fade evidence that it was voluntarily entered into. United States v. Bradley, 10 Pet. 343 .

Tbe government, however, did not rest upon tbe bond alone, but offered to prove that tbe goods were not landed at Matamoras, according to their destination; but that, after tbe

Our opinion is, that, considering the powers which were conferred upon the collector by virtue of the instructions issued by the Secretary of the Treasury under the third section of the act, he had authority to take such a bond as that which is the subject of this suit.

But even if the first condition of the bond, which required the goods to be consumed in the republic of Mexico, were not sustainable, the latter condition, which provided that no part of the goods should be transported to any place under insurrectionary control, and that none of them should be used in any way, with the consent or allowance of the shippers or their agents, to give aid or comfort to parties in rebellion against the United States, is in exact conformity with the instructions, and is severable from the rest. On the authority of United States v. Hodson ( 10 Wall. 395 ), and the cases there relied on, the bond would be good pro tanto; and as the evidence offered by the government tended to show a breach of this condition, which is free from objection, it should have been received.

In either aspect of the case, therefore, whether we consider the bond as in general conformity with the object of the act, and voluntarily given by the shipper to obtain a clearance of his goods, or whether we consider it as strictly conformable to the instructions issued under the third section, with only a superadded condition, which may be disregarded, the court below was in error in rejecting the evidence offered by the plaintiff, and directing a verdict for the defendant.

We think the case is covered by the decision in United

The judgment of the Circuit Court will be reversed, and the cause remanded for a new trial; and it is

So ordered.