Majority
p. 39Wall & Wall vs. Osborn.
Headnote
Where a party sold a mill standing upon the lot of his neighbor, and appointed a day for the purchaser to take it away, promising to aid him in its removal if assistance was necessary, and the mill was subsequently taken down and removed by the purchaser; it was held that the vendor was liable to an ac. tion of trespass, although there was no proof of his being present, or aiding in the removal of the building.Error from the superior court of the city of New-York. The Messrs. Wall sued Osborn in trespass for entering upon a lot owned by them, and taking down and carrying off a mill erected thereon. Osborn Was in possession of a lot adjoining that of the plaintiffs, whose mill projected a few inches upon the lot of the defendant. The defendant sold the mill to one Carman, and told him that if he would send his men to take down the mill, at a specified time, he would have a man to assist him if he wanted help. The mill was subsequently taken down by Carman, but whether Osborn was present or furnished any assistance was not clearly shown. The chief justice of the superior court instructed the jury that the sale of the mill to Carman, and the appointment of a time for him to take possession of it, was not such a participation in the act of removal as to make the defendant a trespasser. The jury found for the defendant, and the plaintiffs having excepted to the charge of the judge, sued out a writ of error.
C. O'Connor, for the plaintiff in error.
F. B. Cutting, for the defendant in error.
By the Court,
In Guille v. Swan, 19 Johns. R. 382, Ch. J. Spencer says: “ To render one man liable in trespass for the acts of others, it must appear either that they acted in concert, or that the act of the individual sought to be charged, ordinarily and naturally produced the acts of the
p. 40
others. In Scott v. Shepard, 2 Black. R. 892 , Chief Justice De Grey laid it down as a correct principle, that one who does an unlawful act is considered as the doer of all that follows. 1 anguage of Lord Ellenborough, in Leame v. Bray, 3 East, 595, he is the causa causans — the prime mover of the damage to the plaintiff. By the act of selling the plaintiffs’ property, the defendant assumed a control over it, and by appointing the time for the removal of the mill, he virtually directed the purchaser to take it away. In the case of Morgan v. Varick, 8 Wendell, 594, the defendant sold the plaintiff’s steam engine, and requested the purchaser to take it away; and he was held liable in trespass. The principle has been frequently recognized in this court, that any unlawful interference with or assertion of control over the property of another, is sufficient to subject the party to an action of trespass or trover. 8 Wendell, 613. 7 Cowen, 735. See also 10 Mass. R. 125 . If the law were otherwise, great injury might ensue, without remedy, to the aggrieved party. The defendant in this case, by undertaking to sell the plaintiffs’ property, was the moving cause of the injury sustained by the plaintiffs. On the supposition that the purchaser is perfectly responsible, the plaintiffs have been put to trouble and expense for which the defendant should be liable; if the law were otherwise, and if in such case a purchaser was irresponsible, the owner might lose his property altogether. The judgment below must be reversed, with costs ; venire de novo to issue in this court.