proof other than that above stated; and also that the plaintiff had failed to prove an offer of a lease executed by himself, or a demand of a lease executed by the defendant. The court denied the motion for a nonsuit. The plaintiff thereupon further proved that the defendant had applied to a third person to induce SSelson to withdraw the security for the rent; and also proved declarations of the defendant, that the tavern stand was worth from §1000 to §15^0 per annum to an occupant who would keep a good house; this last evidence was objected to, but the objection was overruled. The defendant proved by several witnesses that the value of the rent of the premises did not exceed $250 per annum. The judge charged the jury that the plaintiff was entitled to recover the damages necessarily resulting from the breach of the contract, and that the expenses of removing his family and furniture from Niagara county to Tonawanda, was a proper item of damage under the declaration in the cause. The defendant excepted to the charge, and requested the judge to instruct the jury that the measure of damages in the case was the difference between the actual value of the rent and the sum which the plaintiff had agreed to pay as rent, and that if he had agreed to pay more than what would be a fair rent for the premises, he was only entitled to nominal damages. The judge refusing so to charge, the defendant again excepted, and the jury found a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for $235, upon which judgment was entered. The defendant sued out a writ of error.
M. T. Reynolds, for the plaintiff in error,
insisted that the plaintiff below ought to have been nonsuited, for that the declaration stated the rent to be payable quarterly, and no such proof was offered (Douglas, 655, 1 Starke's Ev. 398; 2 id. 46). The contract also was declared on as conditional, and the evidence showed it was absolute. By the terms of the agreement a ■written lease was to be executed, and no offer or demand of such lease was shown. The proof of damages received by the court below was inadmissible.
S. Stevens, for the defendant in error,
The variance between the declaration and proof, as to the rent being payable quarterly, was not raised [74] on the trial. The objection of variance as to the contract being stated' to be conditional, and the proof showing it to be absolute, is not supported by the record. The refusal to deliver possession was equivalent to a refusal to execute a lease, and under the circumstances of the case the plaintiff was relieved from tendering a lease on his part, it being apparent the defendant did not intend to perform the contract. The evidence of the value of the premises to a tenant was proper; as was also the proof of the damage sustained by the plaintiff in removing his family and furniture. In support of the last proposition, he cited 11 Price, 19.
By the Court,
The objection of variance, as to the rent being payable quarterly, not having been raised on the trial, can not be urged upon a writ of error.
The plaintiff below was not bound to come with his lease executed, or to await the defendant’s time to execute a lease and renew the demand, after the latter had peremptorily refused to give possession. That any such effort would have been in vain and idle, is evident from the previous attempt of the defendant to procure the withdrawal of Nelson’s name as security. If the defendant was desirous to profit by the indulgence due to a grantor or lessor, in the allowance of time for preparing the conveyance, he should have said so, or at least not have taken ground which would have made a tender of a lease, or a demand of one, a most useless ceremony.
The measure of damages was certainly not confined to the difference of rent. The jury might look to the actual value of the bargain which the plaintiff had made.