p. 467him to be delivered to Zachariah D. Feller, who replied that it was some time since the deed was delivered to him, and be had forgotten. After a little hesitation, he said he believed old Zachariah Feller told him that if David Feller, young Zachariah’s father, would give his son Zachariah a bond for $600, then the deed should be delivered to Zachariah D. Feller ; that the transaction was of considerable standing, and he could not recollect how it was. Killián Miller testified, that in a conversation he had with Rowley on a certain day when Mr. Oakley was consulted by Zachariah D. Feller respecting his claim, Rowley related what took place either at the time the deed was drawn or executed. He stated that Zachariah Feller told him to keep the deed, and if old Feller would give his son Zachariah a sum of money, then he should have the deed; and Rowley asked the witness whether a bond could not then be made out to secure the money so as to give the deed effect. Jacob Shook testified that Rowley, in answer to his inquiry about the deed in question, said that Zachariah Feller told him that if old David Feller would pay or secure to his son Zachariah $600, the deed was to be delivered to Zachariah. Thomas J. Oakley testified that at the'consultation with him alluded to, Rowley stated expressly that the deed was absolutely delivered to him for Zachariah D. Feller, and that the statement then made to him by Rowley in relation to the whole transaction was substantially the same as he had testified on the trial. He further testified that the question submitted to him by Mr. Rowley at the consultation was, whether the bond could then be given by John D. Feller and David Feller, junior, to Zachariah D. Feller, in pursuance of their agreement with Zachariah Feller, deceased, and be as valid and effectual as if it had been executed in the life time of Zachariah Feller.
A verdict was taken for the plaintiff .subject to the opinion of the supreme court.
P. Ruggles, for the plaintiff.
The principal question is, whether a resulting trust was created in this case, or whether the purchase was made for the benefit of the lessor of the plaintiff. A resulting trust, it is admitted, may be created by
p. 468paroi, and of course may be rebutted by paroi. (2 Johns. C. R. 405, 416. 1 id. 582.) The intention of the party paying the consideration is inquirable into, to determine whether or not a resulting trust is created. (2 Maddock, 115. 1 Swanton, 18. 4 Desaussure, 487. 16 Johns. R. 197, 9.) The intent here to benefit the lessor of the plaintiff is incontrovertibly established.E. Williams, for defendant.
The consideration being paid by Zachariah Feller, sen. and the. deed taken by him in the name of Zachariah D. Feller, the latter became the trustee of the former, and the trust might be enforced in equity. (2 Johns. Dig. 424, tit. Resulting Trust, and cases there cited.)It is very probable that it was intended to give the lessor of the plaintiff an interest in the premises conveyed to him ; but the estate vested in the purchaser, the elder Feller, and that estate could be divested only in conformity to the provisions of the statute of frauds; it could not be divested by any thing resting in paroi. A resulting trust may be rebutted by paroi, that is, the payment of the consideration may be denied or explained; what rests in pais may be rebutted by proof in pais; but the proof establishing the trust being uncontradicted, the estate vested in the purchaser by operation of law, and he has done no act to divest himself. (1 Cox, 15.)Was it an executed gift % The deed was not delivered to the grantee, nor was he put in possession of the land. A paroi promise to pay money as a gift will not support an action. (Pearson v. Pearson, 7 Johns. R. 267.) In that case, the court say a gift is not consummate and perfect until a delivery of the thing promised, and until then, a party may revoke his promise. If personalty will not thus pass, surely an in-interest in land cannot in this way he created. If there was a delivery of the deed, that delivery was conditional, and the condition has not been performed.Ruggles, in reply.
The intention of the purchaser to benefit the grantee, whose name he procures to be inserted in the deed, may be shewn, to rebut the evidence of a resulting trust arising from the proof of the payment of the consid
p. 469eration ; it explains the payment. Parol proof is admissible in support of the nominee of a conveyance. (2 Cox, 91.) The proof here is not only that the donor intended to give, but that he had given the land described in the deed. There was nothing executory in the thing; nor was it extraordinary that the donor should remain in possession and not communicate what he had done to his donee; it is what happens in every case of devise. Whether the donee received $600 from his father’s estate cannot -affect the deed. It is manifest the anxiety of the donor on this subject was only to increase the interests of the object of his beneficence, not to make bis own donation dependant upon the happening of that event.The premises in question were purchased by Zachariah Feller from Henry N. Hoffman in June, 1820, for the sum of $1750. The consideration was paid by Zachariah Feller, but the deed was, by his directions, taken in the name of bis nephew, Zachariah D. Feller, the lessor of the plaintiff. The question is, whether the estate vested absolutely in the lessor, or whether it is a case of an implied or resulting trust in favor of the individual who paid the purchase money.
The payment of the consideration by Zachariah Feller is clearly proved, and that is prima facie sufficient to establish a resulting trust. (1 Johns. Ch. R. 586, and 2 Johns. Ch. R. 408, 451, where the subject is fully discussed, and all the English authorities collected and considered.) But as a resulting trust may be proved, so it may be rebutted by paroi evidence; (2 Atk. 98; Amb. 126; Dougl. 24; 2 Johns. Ch. R. 416 ; 2 Madd. Ch. 113 ; Dyer v. Dyer, 2 Cox, 94 ; 1 Cox, 15 ; 1 Swanston, 18 ;) and I think the evidence in the case clearly shews that the purchase was not made by Zachariah Feller for his own benefit, but that he intended it as a gift and advancement to his nephew. Mr. Rowley, who drew the deed and witnessed its execution, testifies that Zachariah Feller directed the deed to be delivered to him, the witness, for Zachariah D. Feller, the grantee, which was accordingly done ; and he retained it in his possession until
p. 470after the death of Zachariah Feller. He declared to John D. and David Feller, that he intended to give the lessor of the plaintiff a part of his farm, in order to make him equal in point of property with his brothers, to whom their father had given the largest portion of his estate by his will; and he afterwards declared to the same witnesses, that
he had given to Zachariah D. Feller the quarter of his farm which he bought of Henry N. Hoffman. He told Mr. Rowley that the conveyance was intended
as a provision for Zachariah D. Feller, according to the understanding when he came to live with him. This evidence completely repels all idea of a resulting trust. Admitting apart of the consideration or inducement to the making of this conveyance to the lessor to have failed, it cannot he set up at law, and would have no effect upon the legal title. (2
Johns. R. 177, 179,
note.)Judgment for plaintiff