Savard and Lizotte v. The King

The appellants, members of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, had, on May 7, 1944, together with another constable by the name of Massicotte and a corporal Dub6 who was in charge, gone to the village of St. Lambert, situated at some thirty miles from the city of Quebec, for the purpose of apprehending one Georges Gu6nette wanted on a charge of having conspired with others to assist one Plante to escape from the custody of a peace officer, some ten or more attempts having previously been made. These constables and three others had made on the same day an earlier trip and, after having searched the premises of Guinette's father unsuccessfully, decided to return to their headquarters in the city of Quebec. After proceeding some distance, the four abovenamed constables turned about and went back to St. Lambert on the chance that Gu6nette might have returned to his father's house thinking that the coast was clear, Corporal Dub6 stationed the appellant Lizotte and Massicotte outside the house, while he himself entered it followed by the appellant Savard.

While so engaged, Dube's attention was attracted by a sound upstairs and he went up just in time to see Guinette jump from a window.

Savard immediately ran from the house in pursuit of Gu6nette, and, seeing he was losing ground, and as Gu6nette ignored his calls to stop, he fired four shots in the air from his revolver.

As Gu6nette still paid no attention, Savard lowered his revolver toward a point approximately, so he says, six feet to the left of Gu~nette so that the latter would not only hear the bullet but see the spurt of the ground where it hit. As Savard fired this fifth shot, Guinette was in the act of jumping a fence, at a distance of more than two hundred feet from the house, and, as he reached the PRESENT:-Rinfret CJ. and Kerwin, Taschereau, Rand and Kellock JJ.

other side, he appeared to bend forward with the left hand resting on the fence and the right hand on the ground. He then straight- ened himself and ran for a distance of approximately seventy-eight feet where he stumbled and fell face down.

According to medical evidence, he was then dead or died very shortly thereafter. The THE KING appellant Lizotte and Massicotte also ran in pursuit of Guinette, Lizotte firing one shot in the air and a second one toward a point, he says, some thirty feet to Gu6nette's right and Massicotte also firing one shot in Gu6nette's direction.

The indictment charged that the appellants "have together and illegally inflicted corporal wounds which caused the death of (Guinette), thus committing manslaughter."

In view of the uncertainty as to the identity of the person who had fired the fatal shot (only one bullet hit Gu6nette), counsel for the Crown at the opening of the trial declared expressly that the case fell within the provisions of subsection 2 of s. 69 Cr. C., and they submitted to the jury that the appellants had formed a common intention to bring about the arrest of Guinette by any means, that such intention involved an unlawful purpose, namely, the use of force beyond the limits permitted by section 43 Cr. C., that each of the appellants was an accomplice in the commission of a crime by one or the other and that it was immaterial which of them actually fired the fatal shot, as the death of Guinette was or ought to have been known to each of them to have been a probable consequence.

Counsel for the Crown further submitted that the common wrongful intention originated from the acts of the appellants and their companions and the incidents occurring during their trip, which showed a fixed purpose to use more violence than necessary to take Guinette into custody, or that the common intent started to be illegal at the moment of the simultaneous firing by the appellants and Massicotte.

The trial judge after having read subsection 2 of section 69 Cr. C., charged the jury in so many words that it applied; he also stated that there was no illegality attaching to the appellants' conduct prior to the moment of the firing, but that the illegality then started, if the jury was of the opinion that they had then used undue violence (s. 43 Cr. C.). The appellants were found guilty and condemned respectively to twelve and nine months' imprisonment.

conviction was affirmed by a majority of the appellate court, the two dissenting judges being of the opinion that a new trial should be granted. Held that the appeal should be allowed, the convictions quashed and the appellants be discharged.

There is no evidence upon which a finding could be made that the appellants formed at any time a common wrongful intention as required by subsection 2 of section 69 Cr. C.-Moreover the erroneous directions given by the trial judge have necessarily influenced the jury's minds and have totally rendered defective and void the conclusion they have reached.- Their verdict, being thus illegal, must be quashed.

Counsel for the Crown also contended that, if the verdict was held to be illegal, the only remedy this Court could grant would be an order for a new trial, as the Court could not go beyond what was directed by the dissenting judgments: the appellants could then be proceeded against individually under subsection (1) of section 69 Cr. C. or additional evidence might be forthcoming which would make subsection (2) applicable.

Held that, in a case like the present, such an order ought not to be made, so as to permit an entirely new case to be made against the appellants.

While the existence of a dissent on a question of law (s. 1023 Cr. C.) is a condition precedent for an appeal to this Court, the Court once seized of the appeal is not limited to the remedy considered appropriate in the dissent, but has complete jurisdiction to direct the remedy which in its opinion the Court appealed from ought to have granted (s. 1024 Cr. C.).

Under the circumstances of the case and in view of the manner the case was deliberately proceeded with by the Crown, the granting of a new trial would violate the fundamental right of an accused not to be placed for a second time in jeopardy.

Manchuk v. the King (Q19381 S.C.R. 341 and Wexler v. The King [19391 S.C.R. 350) foil. Per The Chief Justice and Kerwin and Taschereau JJ. The Supreme Court of Canada, when given jurisdiction to entertain an appeal on any question of law on which there has been dissent in the court of appeal (section 1023 Cr. C.), is justified, whether grounds of dissent are specified or not in the formal judgment of that court, to look into the reasons for judgment of the dissenting judges in order to find the grounds of dissent.-Reinblatt v. The King ( (1933) S.C.R. 694) foll.

APPEAL by the appellants from a judgment by a majority of the Court of King's Bench, appeal side, province of Quebec, affirming a verdict of guilty rendered by a jury in a trial of manslaughter, the dissenting judgments ordering a new trial.

The material facts of the case and the questions at issue are stated in the above headnote and in the judgments now reported.

Lucien H. Gendron K.C., Ggrald Fauteux K.C. and Mark Drouin K.C. for the appellants.

Antoine Rivard K.C. and Noel Dorion K.C. for the respon- * dent.

TASCHEREAU J.:-Les appelants Fernand Savard et Roger Lizotte, tous deux de 'la Gendarmerie Royale canadienne, ont 6t6 traduits devant la Cour d'Assises h Qu6bec, pour repondre 'a 1'accusation d'avoir:ensemble illigalement caus6 des lsions corporelles qui ont entrain6 is mort de Georges Gu6nette commettant par 1a un crime d'homicide involontaire (manslaughter).

Trouv6s coupables, ils furent condamnes respectivement

& douze et h neuf mois de prison, et ce verdict du jury fut confirm6 par la Cour du Banc du Roi.

MM. les juges

Francaeur et E. Stuart McDougall, qui 6taient dissidents, auraient accord6 un nouveau prochs.

Dans le jugement formel de la Cour du Banc du Roi, la dissidence de M. le juge Francceur est exprimbe dans les termes suivants:- Et celle de M. le juge McDougall se lit ainsi:- Ces deux m~mes juges de la Cour du Banc du Roi, dans leurs raisons oii cette Cour peut 6galement chercher des motifs de dissidence, en sont 6galement venus h ]a conclusion qu'il n'y a aucune preuve qui puisse justifier 1'application de l'article 69, paragraphe 2, Code Criminel.

Georges Gu6nette, Roland Fontaine et Edouard Bernard

6taient tous trois accus6s d'avoir conspird ensemble afin de faire 6vader un nomm6 Herv6 Plante, detenu par Gordon

P. Coutu, qui avait antbrieurement proc6d6 A son arrestation. Le mandat avait 6t6 6mis par M. le juge Laetare Roy, de la Cour des Sessions de la Paix A Qu6bec, le 3 mars

1943, mais le 6 mai 1944, il n'avait pas encore 6t6 ex6cut6.

Durant au delh de 14 mois, les pr6venus avaient r6ussi h dipister les policiers, qui avaient fait plus de dix voyages h St-Lambert, dans le comt6 de Levis, mais chaque fois, leurs recherches 6taient demeur6es infructueuses.

Dans l'aprbs-midi du 6 mai 1944, le caporal Turgeon, en charge du d6tachement de la Gendarmerie Royale h Qu6bee, decida de faire une nouvelle tentative afin d'op6rer ces arrestations.

Il donna instruction au constable Dub6, accompagni de six constables, dont les appelants, de se rendre ' St-Lambert, et c'est au cours de leurs recherches que Georges Gu6nette fut tu6 d'une balle de revolver. Et LomE comme consequence de cette trag6die, Savard et Lizotte fu- KIa rent accuses d'homicide involontaire coupable.

J. Durant cette nuit du au mai, les constables firen't deux autres voyages ' St-Lambert. Quelques incidents, qui se produisirent au cours du premier, doivent n~cessairement 6tre mentionnis, car il en sera question plus loin, lorsque nous examinerons certains aspects 16gaux de la cause, que les parties ont discut6s au cours de 1'audition.

En arrivant St-Lambert, Dub6 apergut une automobile qui filait vers 1'autre extr6mit6 du village, dans la direction de St-Isidore. Croyant que cette voiture pouvait 6tre occup6e par les trois personnes recherchdes, il la suivit, mais aprbs s'6tre rendu compte que les passagers n'6taient pas ceux qu'il d6sirait appr6hender, il leur permit de continuer leur route. Mais la preuve rivble qu'avant de leur donner cette autorisation, I'un des constables non identifi6 dans 1'automobile de Dub6 aurait dit aux passagers, parmi lesquels se trouvait un nomm6 Baillargeon:-"Si vous n'aviez pas arrit6, nous aurions tir6."

Lorsque Dub6 revint avec ses deux compagnons au village de St-Lambert, il donna instruction h trois constables, Lizotte, Desjardins et Emond de se rendre chez Fontaine et Edouard Bernard, tous deux 6galement recherch6s, pendant que lui-m~me avec d'autres iraient chez Gu6nette. Chez Fontaine, l'un des constables serait entr6 dans la chambre de mademoiselle Jeannette Fontaine, et lui aurait dit:-"Je regrette de vous d6ranger". Elle aurait r6pondu, d'apris son t6moignage:-"Vous vous fatiguez encore pour rien ce matin". Et ce m~me constable aurait r6pondu h son tour:-"Vous croyez que nous nous fatiguons pour rien, peut-&tre que d'autres seront fatigu6s avant longtemps".

Durant ce temps, les autres constables qui n'6taient pas allis chez Fontaine firent des recherches dans la maison de Guinette et dans les environs. Dub6 rapporte qu'apris qu'il efit fouill6 en vain la maison, le pare Guinette lui dit qu'il n'avait pas vu son fils depuis quinze jours, qu'il venait rarement h la maison, qu'il avait perdu toute influence sur lui et qu'il 6tait bien d6cid6 h ne pas 6tre pris vivant. Dub6 d6cida alors de retourner h Qu6bec, mais h la sortie de la maison de Gu6nette, il rencontra le constable Massicotte qui, au second 6tage de la grange de Gu6nette, avait trouv6 une couverture et un oreiller.

Il s'6tait rendu compte que ce lit improvis6 avait 6te r6cemment occupe, car l'oreiller 6tait encore chaud. On fit alors d'autres recherches dans la direction de la rivibre Chaudibre, mais sans r6sultat.

Au cours du voyage de retour vers Qu6bec, Dub4 s'avisa de revenir A la maison de Guinette accompagn6 de trois constables, Massicotte, Savard et Lizotte, tandis que les autres devaient continuer leur route vers la ville. En arrivant A St-Lambert, il plaga ses hommes A des points stratigiques autour de la maison de Gu6nette, y p6n6tra luim~me et demanda au phre Gu6nette si son fils 6tait revenu.

C'est ' ce moment qu'il entendit un bruit provenant de

1'6tage sup6rieur, oi il monta, et vit Georges Gu6nette,

I'homme* qu'il recherchait, sautant par une fenatre du ctd ouest de la maison.

Massicotte, Savard et Lizotte partirent alors h sa poursuite vers la rivibre, oft les constables, lors de leur visite pric6dente, avaient remarqud des embarcations.

Gu6nette, qui avait une avance d'environ cinquante pieds et qui gagnait toujours du terrain, refusa de s'arriter, malgr6 les ordres qu'on lui intimait, continua sa course A travers le champ fraichement labour6 et sauta la cl8ture en y posant la main gauche, de sorte qu'il avait les pieds dans une position horizontale A la droite de son corps.

Savard 6tait au centre derrire lui; il avait Lizotte A sa droite, plac6 dans le chemin Brochu, et Massicotte A sa gauche.

C'est pendant cette course que les trois constables firent feu. Savard tira cinq coups de son revolver 45,

Massicotte un seul d'un revolver de mime calibre et Lizotte deux coups, d'un revolver 38. Tous d'apris leurs tmoignages tirbrent en 'air, sauf Savard et Lizotte qui tir6rent chacun un coup, vers le sol, mais h c6t6 de Guinette, afin de 1'impressionner davantage et le convaincre qu'il

6tait pr6f6rable de se rendre.

Apris avoir saut6 cette cliture, situ6e A 225 pieds de sa risidence, Gu6nette parcourut encore 78 pieds et aprda avoir fait une hisitation, il tomba la face contre terre. La preuve midicale r6vile qu'il dfit mourir h ce moment ou quelques instants plus tard. La balle, qui avait p6n6tr6 LIzoE au dessus du rein gauche, 6tait sortie dans la rigion du poumon droit. Le docteur Gilbert, de Charny, le premier qui constata la mort, exprima l'opinion que la balle devait provenir d'un revolver calibre 38, car cette dernidre pouvait 6tre introduite plus facilement dans i'orifice de la blessure.

Cependant, cette pr6tention n'est pas admise par 1'un des m6decins de la Couronne.

Ce r6sum6 de la preuve, peut-6tre trop long, est cependant nicessaire pour bien situer le litige et pour d6terminer les questions 1gates qui nous sont actuellement soumises et que 'on trouve dans le jugement formel de la Cour du Banc du Roi et les raisons 6crites des juges dissidents. La Couronne a fait reposer sa cause devant le jury sur le paragraphe 2 de i'article 69 du Code Criminel. C'est aussi la directive donn6e par le juge pr6sidant le procks. Cet article se lit ainsi:- Une seule balle a frapp6 Gu6nette, et, comme il 6tait assez probl6matique de dire qui avait tir6 cette balle, on a voulu, par le jeu de Particle 69, paragraphe 2, faire disparaitre cette difficult6 de l'esprit du jury, en leur disant que les accus6s faisaient partie d'un complot illegal, que chacun d'eux 6tait complice d'une infraction commise par i'un ou 1'autre des constables et qu'il -tait en cons6quence immat6riel de d6terminer qui avait tir6 le coup fatal. Au cours du procks qui eut lieu h Quebec, le procureur de la Couronne, expliquant 'la cause au jury, fit un r6sum6 de la preuve qu'il d6sirait lui soumettre, et lui dit:- Plus tard, lorsque la preuve de la Couronne fut termin6e, la d6fense pr6senta une motion de non-lieu de la part de 1accus6 Lizotte, et dans la r6plique de i'avocat de la Cou- LizorE ronne, on y trouve ce qui suit:- KING Les jur6s d6cideront si, A un moment donn6, cette exp&dition, qui a Taschereau J. pu paraitre commenc6e avec des buts 16gaux, est devenue une exp6dition illigale.

A la conclusion du procks, lors de sa plaidoirie au jury, l'un des avocats de la Couronne s'exprima ainsi:- C'est que cette loi a 6t6 faite pr&cis6ment pour pr~voir de ces cas comme celui qui nous occupe actuellement, lorsqu'une, deux, trois ou quatre personnes, ensemble, dans un. mgme but, commettent des actes illigaux; ils sont tous ensemble responsables des consiquences, et c'est pour cela qu'il importe peu de savoir si c'est la balle de Lizotte ou de Savard qui a tu.

Ce qu'il importe de savoir, c'est si ces deux-lk, ou ces trois-1A on quatre-A, ensemble, ne s'taient pas r6unis pour faire de la poursuite de Guinette une opbration qui est devenue illigale du moment oil ils ont commenc6 A tirer. Gu6nette ne serait pas mort aujourd'hui.

Ce n'est pas ensemble qu'ils ont tir6. C'est parce qu'ensemble ils ont pris des moyens illbgaux pour arriver A leur fin avec ill6galit6, que l'article 69, paragraphe 9, trouve son application.

Et plus tard, un second avocat de la Couronne dit h son tour:- L'invention de Lizotte pour essayer de chercher ailleurs le coupable est une invention qui ne tient pas debout; d'autant plus que, mame si c'6tait vrai, ces deux personnes dtaient engagdes dans la poursuite de moyens commun3 qui 6taient des moyens illigaux, et au mgme titre que celui qui aurait vraisemblablement tird, ils sont coupables de manslaughter, ils sont coupables de la mort qu'on leur impute de Gubnette. Et, dans son adresse au jury, le juge donne la direction 16gale suivante:- L'article 69, paragraphe 9, s'applique. Je I'affirme et j'y reviendrai plus tard.

Ailleurs, il dit:- Devez-vous trouver une diff6rence de responsabilit6 entre I'accus6 Savard et entre laccus6 Lizotte, si vous en venez A un -verdict de culpabilit?

Et apris avoir cit6 l'article 69, paragraphe 2, du Code Criminel, Phonorable juge continue:- Me Gendron soutient que cet article ne s'applique pas. Malheureusement, je ne puis partager son opinion.

Le paragraphe 9 s'applique. L'illigalitd commenpa an moment oii ils, Jes acuss, et le constable Massicotte, se mirent ensemble a tirer dans la poursuite de leur but commun, contrairement a la loi, si vous juges qu'ils abushrent de la violence. L'entente eat devenue illIgale au cours de l'exdcution, tousjours si les accus6s exc6dirent, d-'aprbs vous les moyens raisonnables et causbrent la mort-article 43 C. Cr.

D'apris ces textes que je viens de citer, les constables poursuivaient done des buts illigaux, leur expedition qui A l'origine a pu paraitre 16gale serait devenue une exp6dition ill6gale, au moment oi les deux appelants et Massij. cotte ont commencd 4 tirer. Comme cons6quence, en vertu des dispositions de l'article 69, paragraphe 2, tous ceux qui ont fait feu sont coupables au mame degr6, quel que soit celui qui ait tu6 Gu6nette. C'est bien li la th6orie de la Couronne, admise par le juge au cours du proces.

Pour que larticle 69, paragraphe 2, s'applique, il faut de toute nicessit6 qu'il y ait entente de poursuivre un but illigal. C'est l'616ment essentiel qui entrainera la culpabilit6 de tous, si Pun d'eux commet une infraction dans la poursuite de ce but.

Or, il importe done de se demander quel projet ill6gal avaient congu les accuses, quel acte d6fendu par la loi ils avaient projet6 de poser; oii, quand et comment ils se sont concert6s pour qu'ils tombent sous le coup de l'article que je viens de citer.

Lors de l'audition de la cause devant cette Cour, le procureur de la Couronne a tent6 d'6tablir que le projet de commettre un acte ill6gal n'6tait pas nicessairement n6 sur le terrain de Gu6nette au moment les constables ont commenc6 h faire feu, mais que les actes des appelants et de leurs compagnons, au cours du trajet de Qu6bec h St- Lambert, d~montraient l'intention bien arr~t6e d'user de plus de violence qu'il n'6tait n~cessaire pour proc6der i l'arrestation de Guinette. Il y aurait done eu complot de commettre un acte ill6gal, et l'illigalit6 de cet acte consisterait dans la violation de 1'article 43 du Code Criminel, qui se lit ainsi:- A & Cette pr6tention doit Utre rejet~e pour deux raisons. La premidre, c'est qu'elle n'a jamais t6 soumise au jury, qui n'a pas eu A se prononcer sur ce point, et qui en a 6t6 emp~ch6 par les directives m~mes du juge, qui lui a dit que l'ill6galit6 avait commenc6 au moment meme oil les coups de feu ont 6t6 tir6s. La seconde raison qui motive le rejet de cette pr6tention, c'est qu'il n'y a aucune preuve au dossier qui puisse justifier un jury, instruit de ses devoirs, d'en arriver l6galement a une semblable conclusion. Pour essayer d'6tablir 'intention commune des consta- J. bles de faire usage d'une force plus que n6cessaire, on a invoqui l'incident qui est arriv6 lorsqu'un constable aurait dit aux passagers de 1'automobile Baillargeon: "Si vous n'aviez pas arrt6, nous aurions tir6". Et on a relev6 aussi la conversation entre le constable non identifi6 qui aurait dit A mademoiselle Fontaine:

Ces faits ne sont pas pertinents h la cause, et leur r6cit devant le jury 6tait inadmissible. Ces paroles ont 6t6 prononc6es hors la pr6sence des accus6s et ne peuvent en aucune fagon servir de preuve contre eux.

Je n'ignore pas que lorsqu'il s'agit de conspiration, des declarations faites par l'un des conspirateurs, hors la pr6sence des autres, peuvent en certains cas, servir de preuve contre tous les conspirateurs; mais encore faut-il qu'iI existe quelque connexit4 entre ces d6clarations et la poursuite du but commun qui, dans le cas actuel, aurait conduit

A la mort de Gu6nette. De plus, cette rigle que je viens de citer, et qui dans notre droit constitue une exception, est baste sur la th6orie qui veut que dans le cas de conspiration, vu qu'il y a unite de volont6, la d6claration de l'un est cens6e 6tre la d~claration de tous. Pour que la 14claration de 1'un puisse ainsi servir contre les autres, il faut donc, prouver par des preuves additionnelles que celui contre qui on veut s'en servir 6tait partie au complot. Cette autre preuve dans le cas pr6sent fait totalement d6faut.

Ces deux faits sont les seuls que la Couronne a invoques pour d~montrer l'existence d'un complot antbrieur. Il me semble qu'elle a failli dans sa tentative de convaincre la

Cour de 1'existence de cette entente pr6alable de commettre un acte ill6gal.

D'ailleurs, dans sa charge au jury, le juge a dit que le timoignage de Baillargeon ne pouvait pas incriminer les deux accus6s, et il a aussi ajout6 que le t6moignage de mademoiselle Fontaine ne pouvait pas non plus avoir d'influence sur la cause.

a cependant autoris6 le jury a prendre connaissance de la d6claration faite & Baillar- LomE geon, non pas parce qu'elle peut relier les accus6s h la trag6die qui est arrivie, mais seulement afin de "se mettre j. dans une atmosphbre ou un climat sp6cial". Si je m'accorde avec le juge quand il dit que la preuve de ces deux incidents ne peut incriminer les deux accus6s, je diff6re entibrement d'opinion avec lui quant h sa seconde remarque. La preuve est pertinente ou non. Comme elle ne 1'est pas, elle n'aurait pas 6tre soumise au jury, et encore moins pour le justifier au cours d'un procks criminel de se placer dans un "climat sp6cial", ce qui h mon sens constitue une nouvelle et bien 6tonnante thiorie.

La Couronne elle-m~me ne semble pas convaincue de l'existence de ce plan pr6congu par les constables pour faire usage d'une violence d6raisonnable, car elle dit dans son factum:- Et le juge dit au jury:- Evidemment, le but de cette exp6dition 6tait l6gal. On se rendait A St-Lambert pour ex6cuter le mandat 6mis contre Gu6nette et les autres par M. le juge Letare Roy. Rien dans la preuve ne peut laisser supposer que les constables aient eu des intentions criminelles, qu'ils aient voulu faire autre chose que de mettre a ex6cution, par des moyens 16gaux, 1'ordre 16gal du magistrat.

I reste, comme le juge 1'a dit au jury, et comme d'ailleurs la Couronne elle-m~me l'a pr6tendu au cours du procks, que l'entente serait devenue ill6gale au cours de l'exp6dition. Le complot ill6gal existerait donc, et son fait constitutif serait que les accus6s et leurs compagnons auraient fait feu presque simultan6ment, pour forcer Gu6nette h arriter sa course.

Mais la simultan6it6 de ces coups de feu est-elle bien la preuve d'une r6solution concert6e et arr~t6e, agr66e par tous, de poser un acte ill6gal?

Je sais bien, et la jurisprudence et les auteurs l'enseignent, que le complot n'a pas besoin toujours de longue pr6paration, et m~me qu'en certains cas, il peut 6tre 6tabli par la preuve de certains faits, qui d6montrent chez plusieurs 1'existence d'une volont6 commune d'agir flgalement. Mais la seule r6solution concert6e, qu'elle soit pr6alable ou sur-le-champ, n'est pas suffisante; pour qu'il y ait crime, il faut le dessein, I'intention de commettre un acte ill6gal, qui est une circonstance nicessaire a la crimi- J. nalit6.

Sans doute, les trois constables qui poursuivaient

Guinette se sont entendus, tacitement on autrement, pour tirer des coups de feu dans l'air ou sur le sol, afin d'inspirer au fugitif une crainte salutaire, qui peut-6tre le pousserait h se livrer aux officiers de justice, et cette entente demeure jusqu'ici dans les cadres de la stricte 16galit6. Rien en effet ne d6fend h des constables, autoris6s A porter des armes, de s'en servir pour les fins que je viens de mentionner.

Dans le cas present, six coups ont 6t6 tir6s en l'air, et deux dans la direction du sol. Qu'au cours de la poursuite d'un but 16gal, qui 6tait I'arrestation de Guinette, une balle 6gar6e ou non, provenant de l'arme de l'un des poursuivants, frappe la victime, n'indique pas qu'il y ait unit6 de but entre tous 'les policiers pour commettre un acte ill& gal, et qu'il s'ensuive que, par 1'op6ration de Particle 69, paragraphe 2, tous soient tenus responsables de l'imprudence criminelle de 1'un, si imprudence criminelle il y a v6ritablement. Cet acte isol6 ne peut certes pas d6montrer un concert de volont6s confondues en une volont6 unique et commune, de commettre un acte ill6gal et qui marquerait les actes de tous du sceau de la criminalit6.

Tout au plus indique-t-il l'agissement d'une seule personne qui, sans doute, peut 6tre le r4sultat d'une n6gligence ou d'une imprudence criminelle, si on y rencontre les 616ments youlus, ou encore le simple r6suitat d'un accident qui n'entrainerait aucune responsabilit6.

On sait que le complot criminel est un crime par luim~me, qu'il est complet, et par consiquent punissable, sans qu'il soit n6cessaire de prouver un commencement d'ex6cution. Le l6gislateur a consid6r6 la r6solution arrat6e de plusieurs personnes de commettre un crime, sans meme que le crime ne soit commis, comme une menace envers la soci~t6, qui justifie cette dernibre reprisentde par 1'Etat de se placer en lgitime d6fense et d'exercer une action r6pressive.

Si Gu6nette n'eut pas 6t frapp6, il est certain

S.C.R.1 que personne n'efit song6 alors h voir dans les actes des constables qui tiraient en 1'air, pour-proc6der a cette arrestation, les 616ments du complot. Et cependant, d'apris la th6orie de la Couronne, ces constables eussent 6t6 des criminels qui, sans rbaliser la fin poursuivie, 6taient tout de meme tous des conspirateurs qui avaient dans l'esprit des intentions perverses.

Or, c'est parce qu'on a dit au jury qu'il y avait complot et que Particle 69 (2) s'appliquait; c'est parce qu'on lui a enseign6 que 1'acte isol6 de l'un entrainait la responsabilit6 de l'autre; et c'est parce qu'instruit qu'il n'avait pas A se demander qui avait tir6 la balle qui a caus6 la mort de Gu6nette, que le jury a rendu un verdict que la loi du pays n'autorise pas. C'est cette directive erron6e, qui a n6cessairement influenc6 le jury et qui viole totalement la conclusion A laquelle il est arriv6. Je suis clairement d'opinion, comme d'ailleurs MM. les juges Francceur et McDougall le disent dans leurs notes dissidentes, qu'il n'y a aucune preuve qui puisse justifier l'existence d'un semblable complot criminel, et par cons6quent, l'application de Particle 69 (2).

Entach6 d'illigalit6, ce verdict doit 6tre cass6. Mais la Couronne soutient que, mime si le verdict est ill6gal, cette Cour ne peut pas accorder plus que les juges dissidents de la Cour du Banc du Roi n'ont accord6, soit un nouveau procks. Je ne puis admettre cette pr6tention, que je crois erronde en droit. La juridiction de cette Cour est limit6e 6videmment aux questions de droit sur lesquelles il y a eu dissidence en Cour du Banc du Roi. L'une de ces dissidences 6tait qu'on avait donn6 h l'article 69 (2) du Code Criminel une interpr6tation erronde, et avec cette dissidence, je suis d'accord.

Mais il est du devoir de cette Cour, lorsqu'elle croit une dissidence bien fondie, de proc6der h rendre le jugement qui aurait dit 6tre prononc6, et, pour atteindre ce but, elle tient ses pouvoirs de larticle 1024 du Code Criminel, qui dit:- La question de droit qui donne juridiction h cette Cour, qui en r6alit6 la saisit du litige, est formul6e par la Cour du Banc du Roi, mais le remade qui doit 6tre apport6, quand elle est jug6e fond6e, est du ressort de cette Cour, qui peut et doit alors rendre l'ordonnance que requiert la justice. (Manchuk v. The King (1) ).

Mais si cette Cour a ce pouvoir d'accorder un rem~de diff6rent de celui que les juges dissidents de la Cour du Banc du Roi ont cru juste d'appliquer, doit-elle exercer ce droit, ou ordonner qu'il y ait un nouveau procks? Je pense bien qu'il y aurait lieu h un nouveau procks, si la Couronne, ayant soumis la cause qu'elle a pr6sent6e au jury, avait demand6 subsidiairement de d6terminer la culpabilit6 de l'un des accuses, au cas Particle 69 (2) ne s'appliquerait pas, et si le juge, refusant de donner cette dernibre instruction, avait avis6 le jury que seul 69 (2) trouvait son application.

Alors, 6videmment, dans le cas d'un acquittement, la Couronne, n'ayant pas obtenu la justice qu'elle demandait, aurait pu invoquer ce grief et obtenir un nouveau procks.

Mais, dans le cas qui nous occupe, c'est I'inverse qui se pr6sente. La Couronne a soumis que Particle 69 (2) s'appliquait. C'est le fondement m~me de sa pr6tention; toute sa cause repose sur cette th6orie, et c'est ainsi qu'elle a voulu que les accus6s fussent jug6s. Alors qu'elle est intimbe devant cette Cour et qu'il est 6tabli que sa premibre tentative d'obtenir une condamnation doit n6cessairement faillir, elle demande la permission de recommencer le procks, en soumettant les memes faits ou des faits additionnels. Ceci ne peut pas tre accord&.

Les appelants ont t6 en p6ril d6jh, au cours de ce premier procks. Ils ont 6t0 jug6s devant une cour compitente par douze de leurs pairs; ils ont r6pondu h une accusation

16galement port6e, h laquelle ils ont plaid6, et le procks s'est instruit suivant les soumissions 16gales de la Couronne que le tribunal a accept6es.

Il est un principe de droit criminel, qui date de temps imm6moriaux, qu'un accus6 ne peut pas 8tre "in jeopardy"

deux fois. Cette doctrine est aujourd'hui universellement reconnue et sanctionnie par les tribunaux. Meme si personnellement j'entretenais des doutes sur cette question, je serais lii par une d6cision de cette Cour, rendue il y a quelques annies. En effet, dans la cause de Wexler v. The King (1) oit la Cour du Banc du Roi de la province L'oE de Quebec avait ordonn6 un nouveau procks, cette Cour THE KING a prononc6 l'acquittement, et le principe pos6 dans cette Taschereau J.cause-lh doit nous guider dans la d6termination de celle-ci. Comme le disait alors Sir Lyman Duff, juge en chef:- To set aside a verdict of acquittal in such circumstances, merely because the case for the Crown might, on a possible view of the evidence, have been put upon another footing would, it appears to me, introduce a most dangerous practice; a practice not, I think, sanctioned by the statute.

Et M. le juge Kerwin s'exprimait ainsi:- The real point for determination is whether, after an accused person has been tried on a charge of murder and acquitted, the Crown is entitled to an order for a new trial in order to present an entirely new case against him.

An appeal is given the Crown by the 1930 amendment to section 1013 of the Code "on any ground of appeal which involves a question of law alone."

Assuming, without deciding, that the pertinent question here is one of law, the Crown's contention is not entitled to prevail. Je crois done, pour les raisons ci-dessus, que l'appel doit 6tre maintenu et que les accus6s doivent 6tre lib6r6s. Etant donn6 cette conclusion h laquelle j'arrive, il est inutile de discuter les autres moyens d'appel qui ont 6t6 soulev6s.

RAND J.-The case against the accused, advisedly and exclusively presented by the Crown to the jury, was this: the use of arms by way of shooting in the air or the ground was in the circumstances an unnecessary use of force and hence illegal; from its commencement, it constituted an unlawful common purpose affecting all those taking part in it; and each officer became, under ss. 2 of sec. 69 of the Criminal Code, responsible for the consequences of that use of arms by the others. This dispensed with the consideration by the jury of the question whose shot brought the deceased down.

The following excerpts from the address of Crown counsel summarize the position taken:

Admettons, pour le b~ndfice de la discussion et sans rien retirer de ce que j'ai dit jusqu'h present, que, jusqu'l la fuite de Guinette, tout est parfait, tout est 16gal.

Gubnette saute, ils partent h courir apris, c'est ce qu'ils doivent faire; ils sont mal organiss; parce qu'ils sont mal organisis, ils vont 6tre obliges de sauter des barribres, ca ne fait rien, c'est leur faute, ils sont mal organisbs; h un moment donn6, ils se mettent A tirer.

(1) [19391 S.C.R. 350.

De ce moment, Votre Seigneurie, tous ensemble et d'un commun accord, Lizotte et Savard out ensemble d~cid6, dans la poursuite du but Sv commun, d'employer des mayens ill6gaux. De moment-1A il y a entre LIZor eux une entente qui est devenue une entente illigale.

Rand J. C'est que cette loi a 6t.faite pricis6ment pour pr6voir de ces cas comme celui qui nous occupe actuellement, lorsqu'une, deux, trois ou quatre personnes, ensemble, commettent ensemble, dans un m~me but, des actes illigaux; ils sont tous ensemble responsables des consiquences, et c'est pour qu'il importe peu de savoir si c'est la balle de Lizotte ou de Savard qui a tu6.

The trial judge adopting the same view instructed the jury that ss. 2 applied and that the only question was accident or not, in the following language:

L'article 69, paragraphe 2, s'applique.

Je I'affirme et j'y reviendrai plus tard.

Comme if ne s'agissait que d'une question de droit qui n'intressait pas le jury, parce que je d6ciderais le contraire de la pr6tention de Me Gendron, que je voulais simplement discuter ses arguments, une traduction eut t6 inutile et n'eut servi qu'd cr6er de la confusion.

Je n'ai pas traduit plus loin pour le jury que les citations qui appuyaient mon opinion.

est clair que la Couronne doit faire sa preuve. C'est une question de faits pour le jury de dire si elle 1'a fait ou non. S'il s'agissait d'un accident ou non.

Devez-vous trouver une difference de responsabilit6 entre 1'accus6 Savard et I'accus6 Lizotte, si vous en venez au verdict de culpabilit6? Me Gendron soutient que cet article ne s'applique pas. Malheureusement, je ne puis partager son opinion.

Le paragraphe 2 s'applique. L'illigalith commence au moment oit ils, les accus~s et le constable Massicotte, se mirent ensemble i tirer dans la poursuite de leur but commun, contrairement b la loi, si vous juges qu'ils abus~rent de la violence. It is desirable for the moment to consider the circumstances in relation to see. 69, which is enacted in these words:

69. Accessories, principals, etc.-Every one is a party to and guilty of an offence who

(a) actually commits it;

(b) does or omits an act for the purpose of aiding any person to commit the offence;

(c) abets any person in commission of the offence; or

(d) counsels or procures any person to commit the offence. 50138-31

Two conditions are seen to be essential to bring the common purpose charged within ss. 2: that it was unlawful and that the shooting of the deceased ought to have been known to be a probable consequence of it. It was of course open to the Crown, under the first subsection, to seek at the same time to hold individually responsible the officer whose shot actually struck the deceased; but that course, as I have intimated, was deliberately put aside. One reason for this was virtually conceded: the conviction of both accused was sought, but as only one bullet struck the deceased, resort to ss. 2 was necessary. There was also serious doubt of which one of the eight shots fired from three guns, all of the others admittedly into the air or the ground, was fatal; but consistently with the case submitted the trial judge, over the objections of the accused, gave the instruction quoted. It was not suggested that the accused intended to hit the victim, and accident might have arisen from a ricochet or from the officer stumbling on uneven ground at the moment of firing.

I am unable to agree that in the circumstances the use made of arms for such a purpose could be found or held to be unlawful. Failing illegality, it becomes unnecessary to consider whether the accused could be found liable for the death as a probable consequence.

The direction that ss. 2 applied was therefore an error that vitiates the conviction and it must be set aside.

On the argument, the actual theory laid before the jury was confused with a purpose, formed when the detachinent set out from Quebec, to bring back the deceased if necessary by the use of any force short of taking life, even though in excess of that permitted by section 43, and that this involved the accused in the shot that caused the death. The short answer to this is that there was not a tittle of evidence by which it could have been supported. Even less was there any evidence to justify the view that such a purpose arose at the moment of the firing. The question now is whether the Crown should be permitted to submit to another jury the alternative view, the individual responsibility of each of the accused, which in the first instance it deliberately refrained from presenting.

In that situation we are governed by a judgment of this Court, (Wexler v. The King (1) ) in which it was laid down that such a proceeding would violate the fundamental right of an accused not to be placed for a second time in jeopardy.

It was urged that it would be contrary to the public interest that such a serious consequence through force, excessive in fact, in making an arrest, should escape punishment.

I do not consider whether or not there was evidence on which the jury could have found whose act struck the deceased down.

The guilt or innocence either accused is not relevant to the question with which

I am now dealing.

What the Wexler case (1) declares is the principle that in such circumstances the interest of the accused becomes the paramount public interest; that, however serious the occurrence may have been, and disregarding all question of guilt or innocence, the Crown having failed on an hypothesis which was fairly and unexceptionably to itself tried out, is not on the same set of facts and on a view open to it but rejected on the first trial to be permitted a second opportunity to try to fasten guilt upon an accused.

The Wexler case (1) was an appeal from an acquittal, but there is no difference in principle between that and a conviction on a basis for which there was no support in law or in fact. And once it is clear that the conviction cannot stand, justice requires the same treatment in the one case as in the other.

I would therefore allow the appeal and quash the convictions.

J.-This is an appeal from the judgment or order of the Court of King's Bench, appeal side, of the province of Quebec, pronounced the 28th day of June,

1945, Francoeur and Stuart McDougall JJ. dissenting, which affirmed the conviction of the appellants, upon a charge of manslaughter following the verdict of a jury.

The dissents as expressed in the formal judgment are as follows:

Stuart McDougall J., dissenting, being of opinion that the verdict should be quashed and that a new trial should be ordered on the grounds:

The facts in substance are as follows:

The appellants, members of the

Royal

Canadian Mounted Police, Lizotte being a temporary constable, had, on May 7, 1944, together with another constable by the name of Massicotte and a corporal Dub6, who was in charge, gone to the village of St. Lambert for the purpose of apprehending the deceased, Georges Guinette, wanted on a charge of having conspired with others to assist one Herv6 Plante to escape from the custody of a peace officer.

A number of unsuccessful attempts, some ten or more it is said, had already been made by the police to effect Gu6nette's arrest. On the day in question, these constables and others had made an earlier trip to the village and after having searched the premises of Gu6nette's father unsuccessfully, had set out on the return to their headquarters in the city of Quebec.

After proceeding some distance toward Quebec, the four named constables on the orders of Dub6 turned about and went back to St. Lambert on the chance that Gu6nette might have returned to his father's house thinking that the coast was clear. The evidence indicates that Gu6nette had in fact, at the time of the earlier visit, been sleeping in his father's barn, but had managed to make his escape.

Corporal Dub6 stationed Lizotte and Massicotte outside the house, which was situated on the south side of a road known as the Brochu Road, while he himself entered the house followed by Savard. While so engaged, Dubd's attention was attracted by a sound upstairs and he proceeded up the stairs just in time to see Gu6nette jump from a window on the west side of the house. Savard immediately ran from the house in pursuit of Guinette who ran westerly through a ploughed field behind the house extending for a distance of 255 feet to a fence which separated the Gu6nette property from the property of Brochu, further to the west.

Brochu's land in turn extends some 300 feet to a river.

As Savard pursued Gu6nette, he says he was losing ground, and as Gu6nette ignored his calls to stop, he fired four shots in the air from the *45 calibre revolver which he carried.

As Gu6nette still paid no attention, Savard says he lowered his revolver and fired toward a point approximately 6 feet to the left of Gu6nette with the idea that the latter would not only hear the bullet but see the spurt of the ground where it hit. At this time, he was some

40 or 50 feet approximately in a direct line, parallel with the road, behind Gu6nette. As Savard fired this fifth shot,

Guinette was in the act of jumping the fence into the

Brochu field and as he reached the other side, he appeared to bend forward with the left hand resting on the fence and the right hand on the ground. He then straightened himself and ran somewhat more toward the south, but still westerly, for a distance of approximately 78 feet where he stumbled and fell face down.

According to the medical evidence, he was then dead or died very shortly thereafter.

This evidence by itself might very well indicate that

Savard's last bullet had hit Guinette. There is, however, other evidence to be mentioned.

Lizotte had been stationed on the Brochu Road on the north side of the Gu6nette house, while Massicotte had been instructed by Dub6 to post himself in a line with

Lizotte on the south side of the house between the house and the barn to the west. Massicotte, however, testified that these instructions had been changed and that Dub6 had assigned him to a post on the highway running north and south, east of the Guinette house. This change in instructions is, however, denied by Dub6. Lizotte, from his L.rE post on the Brochu Road, on observing Guinette jump from the window, tried to get over the fence separating the Guinette property from the road but was unable to do so. He then ran westerly on the road and fired one shot in the air and a second in a westerly direction down the road toward a point, he says, approximately 30 to 35 feet to the north of Guinette and to the latter's right. After he had fired these two shots, he heard someone behind him say "tire-le" (shoot at him) and then a shot from the same direction. At that moment, Guinette who had just jumped the fence appeared to throw himself backwards. words "tire-le" were also heard by a Crown witness, Larochelle by name.

Massicotte's evidence is that, from his position on the highway east of the house, he heard Lizotte call to someone and he, Massicotte, thereupon ran after Savard in the field in pursuit of Guinette. However, three other Crown witnesses, namely, Larochelle,' Brochu and Gu6nette Sr. describe having seen two constables running on the Brochu Road and both Dub6 and Savard say they did not see Massicotte in the field where Savard was. This evidence of Massicotte was evidently regarded as so unsatisfactory by the Crown that Crown counsel told the jury that Massicotte had not done as he said but had in fact run after Lizotte on the Brochu Road. Larochelle further testified that one of the two constables on the Brochu Road had lowered his arm and fired in Guinette's direction and that the constable who did so was wearing a soldier's cap.

Lizotte was in civilian attire and bareheaded while Massicotte was in uniform. There is evidence indicating that Lizotte's last shot and the shot fired by Massicotte were both fired after Savard's fifth shot. The Crown does not and did not at any time suggest that the words "tire-le" were spoken by Lizotte. Accordingly, if the evidence of Larochelle and Lizotte is trustworthy on this point, these words must have been spoken by Massicotte.

When the body was examined by a doctor at the hospital to which it was taken by the constables, Massicotte asked the doctor to insert at the penetration point of the wound a *45 and a *38 calibre bullet.' This was done and the doctor then told Massicotte that it was a *38 which had caused the death because that bullet could be TiE introduced more easily into the opening than the *45. Both Massicotte and Savard carried -45's, while Lizotte carried a *38. Before the wound was further examined, the body was placed in the hands of an undertaker, who sewed up the wound.

One of the Crown experts, who later examined the body, stated that in his opinion the bullet which caused the death was a -45.

The experiment at the hospital by the doctor who first examined

Gu6nette was not communicated to Savard, who was evidently then of the opinion that it was a bullet from his pistol which had caused the death.

Savard said, however, that he did not hear the words "tire-le" nor any shot after the fifth shot he fired.

He says that, when he heard shots from the Brochu Road, he called out to stop shooting.

The indictment charged that the appellants,

It becomes important to observe the course followed by the Crown's advisers and the way in which the case went to the jury. As stated in the factum of the respondents, Crown counsel at the opening of the trial declared expressly that the case fell within the provisions of section

69 (2) of the Criminal Code, and it is common ground that the trial judge so charged the jury on the request of counsel for the Crown so to do. The case did not go to the jury in any sense as within the first subsection of section 69. As put by counsel for the respondent in their factum:

In the factum of the Crown it is also stated that:- The Crown also submitted the evidence of the witness Larochelle that a constable wearing a soldier's hat on the Brochu Road had fired at Guinette. As already mentioned, this evidence, if accepted, points to Massicotte. Further, it appears that the bullet which killed Gu6nette entered the body at the left side of the back in the vicinity of the eleventh rib and passed out at the level of the fourth rib .

some six inches higher, the direction of the bullet through the body being to some degree from left to right. Guinette in jumping the fence had placed one hand on the top rail and had vaulted over it with his feet toward the Brochu Road. As he reached the ground, his back might well have presented a target to a person firing from the road quite consistent with the location and direction of the wound, while it is not so easy, perhaps, to visualize how such a wound could have been caused by a person in the position of Savard, who is said to have been approximately in a straight line behind him.

It is impossible, however, to be dogmatic with regard to this matter, and this is the view taken by St. Jacques J. in the Court of King's Bench. The uncertainty as to the identity of the person who had fired the fatal shot (only one bullet hit Guinette), and the fact that the Crown did not suggest that Lizotte was the person who had used the words "tire-le" and that in the opinion of counsel .for the Crown there was no evidence that Lizotte or Savard had been "provoked, advised, aided or counselled" to commit the offence were no doubt the considerations which dictated the course followed in proceeding under subsection (2).

This being the view of the Crown's advisers, that course was not other than proper.

The important point is that the decision was made after full consideration of all the facts and followed after all the evidence had been placed before the jury. Section 69 reads as follows:

In the course of his charge, the learned trial judge read subsection 2 to the jury and told them in so many words that it applied. He did not, however, explain the subsection or direct the jury as to how it was to be applied to the facts in evidence according as they might determine them to be. In so doing, he took away from the jury, in my opinion, the question as to whether or not there was in fact any intention such as the subsection requires.

This appears more clearly from a reading of the charge, to parts of which I will presently refer.

The theory of the Crown with regard to the application of subsection (2) was that the appellants had formed a common intention to bring about the arrest of Guinette by any means; that such intention involved an unlawful purpose, namely, the use of force beyond the limits permitted by section 43 of the Criminal Code; and that it was immaterial which of them actually fired the fatal shot, as the death of Gu6nette was or ought to have been known to each of them to have been a probable consequence.

I am content, without determining the point, to deal with the case on the footing that the subsection may be so applied.

The learned trial judge, as will appear, charged the jury that there was no illegality in any way attaching to the appellants' conduct that day prior to the moment when the actual firing commenced.

The way in which he told them it was open to them to convict from that time on I shall now refer to. Counsel for the Crown who, as already stated, requested the learned trial judge to charge on the basis of subsection (2), did not object to the charge and must be taken to have been satisfied with it.

Coming to the charge itself, I quote:

le r6pite: vous 6tes maitres des faits, et si je les avais rapportis erron6ment, vous n'6tes pas tenus de me suivre. C'est votre opinion, c'est votre Lizorm conviction seule qui compte.

Les accusis ont-ils, usant de leur discr6tion, suivant les ordres THE KiNa regus, abus6 de leur port d'armes, et aux termes de la loi, fait un excks Kellock j.

de violence?

Les accusbs suraient-ils pu opbrer 1'arrestation, comme dit le code, par des moyens raisonnables, sans recourir A violence?

Les accus6s auraient-ils pu arrtter Georges Gu6nette ce matin-li, en le cernant, en se jetant sur lui, sans recourir aux armes I feu? Ont-ils 6t6 n6gligents, de n6gligence grossibre et ont-ils d6pass6 les limites de leurs pouvoirs, en se servant de revolvers, qui, sous pr6texte de l'avertir, le couchirent dans un champ et lui enlevarent la vie? Georges Guinette pouvait-il se sauver bien loin, seul contre quatre gendarmes arm6s et qui avaient avec eux une automobile? Si vous en venez A cette conclusion, qui est uniquement de votre province, vous devez Jes trouver coupables, suivant 1'accusation port6e.

Les accusis ont-ils fait leur devoir, sont-ils restis dans les limites de la loi, n'ont-ils commis aucun excis, est-ce un accident?

Si vous en venez h cette conclusion, vous devez les acquitter.

Devez-vous trouver une diff6rence de responsabilit6 entre I'accuse Savard et l'accus6 Lizotte, si vous en venez au verdict de culpabilit6? C'est ici que 'article 69 du Code Pnal, paragraphe 2, a son application:

"Quand plusieurs personnes forment ensemble le projet de faire quelque chose d'illigal et de s'entraider dans ce projet, chacune d'elles est complice de toute infraction commise par I'une d'entre elles dans la poursuite de leur but commun, si elles savaient ou devaient savoir que la commission de cette infraction devait 6tre la cons6quence probable de la poursuite de leur but commun."

Me Gendron soutient que cet article ne s'applique pas. Malheureusement, je ne puis partager son opinion.

Le paragraphe 2 ,s'applique. L'illigalit& commenga au moment oh ils, les accus6s et le constable Massicotte, se mirent ensemble A tirer dans la poursuite de leur but commun, contrairement & la loi, si vous jugez qu'ils abus&rent de la violence. L'entente est devenue ill~gale au cours de 1'ex6cution, toujours si les accuss exc6darent, d'apris vous, les moyens raisonnables et caushrent la mort-article 43 C. Cr.

Il me reste h vous dire que le doute est en faveur des accus6s. Quand on parle de doute, il faut que ce soit tn doute raisonnable qui entraine la conviction, c'est-A-dire, que si vous n'6tes pas logiquement et raisonnablement stirs que les accusis soient coupables, votre devoir est de les acquitter.

In the above, the jury are told these four things: (1) If they thought that the appellants could have effected the arrest by means other than by resorting to their firearms or if they were guilty of gross negligence in resorting to their firearms, they had gone beyond the limits of section 43 Cr. C. and the jury must find them guilty as charged.

(2) If, in the opinion of the jury, the appellants did not exceed the limits of section 43, Cr. C. then the death was an accident and the appellants should be acquitted.

(3) They need not differentiate between Savard and Lizotte in arriving at their verdict under (1) above in view of the provisions of section 69 (2).

(4) The unlawful intention within the meaning of subsection 2 arose when the appellants started to fire, if, in the opinion of the jury, the appellants transgressed the limits of section 43.

Section 43 Cr. C. is as follows:

Assuming that the theory of the Crown as previously set out correctly interprets the provisions of section 69

(2) as applied to the case at bar, the question of fact as to the existence or non-existence of a common wrongful intention on the part of the appellants was completely taken away from the jury by the charge.

They were told that the guilt of the appellants was dependent merely upon a finding that the appellants had gone beyond that which is authorized by section 43. This, of course, is completely erroneous and sufficient of itself to vitiate the verdict and direct a new trial.

However, in my opinion, that course cannot be followed as it is 4mpossible to find in the record any evidence supporting the existence of a common intention on the part of the appellants to prosecute any unlawful purpose within the meaning of subsection (2) even had the jury been properly charged.

The learned trial judge charged the jury, as already mentioned, and I think correctly, that there was no illegality until the instant when the firing commenced.

Accepting that, I agree with the learned dissenting judges in the court below that there is nothing from which it can be established that either of the appellants acted other than independently and as a result of the circumstances which came into existence during the attempt to make the arrest after Gu6nette was sighted. There is no evidence upon which a finding could be made that the appellants formed at that time any common wrongful intention as required by the subsection.

Notwithstanding the position taken by the Crown at the trial, Mr. Rivard now argues that there was evidence showing that the appellants had formed a wrongful intention prior to the time when the firing commenced. For the purpose of showing that the whole expedition was illegal, Mr. Rivard endeavoured to make use of the fact that the constables did not have with them the warrant for Gu6nette's arrest. The evidence shows that this was due to a mistake on the part of corporal Dub6. Unknown to him, the file at headquarters had been split into two parts, and, when leaving Quebec for St. Lambert, he had picked up what he thought was the complete file, but in fact, the papers he took with him did not include the warrant.

However, the learned trial judge told the jury that this fact made no difference so far as the appellants were concerned and specifically instructed the jury that, in considering their verdict, they were to leave the question of the presence or absence of the warrant out of consideration.

I think the learned trial judge was right and I do not think, therefore, that any point can be made of this.

Mr. Rivard next called our attention to an incident which occurred when the constables arrived at the village in the early morning for the first time. An automobile was observed by Dub6 on the village street and he gave chase. After some trouble, he managed to place his car in its path and to bring it to a stop. Some conversation took place between the occupants of the two cars, and one Baillargeon, the driver of the other automobile, deposed at the trial that one of the constables, he would not say which, in the course of this conversation had said that if Baillargeon had not stopped the constables would have fired.

There is some question as to whether this conversation took place in the presence of Savard, but I am content to assume his presence. The learned trial judge charged the jury that legally this conversation had no bearing upon the case, but he told the jury it was a circumstance which might give them what the learned trial judge called the "atmosphere" or "special climate" of the case. This was, in my opinion, highly improper. The incident was either evidence against the appellants or it was not. There is no middle ground and the charge of the learned judge on this point amounts to a direction that the jury might draw a conclusion unfavourable to the accused from something which was not evidence at all.

In my opinion, the learned trial judge was right in holding that the incident was inadmissible as evidence. Mr. Rivard now seeks to use this incident for the purpose of his present argument, namely, as showing the existence of a common wrongful intention on the part of the appellants prior to the moment of the firing. If in fact such an intention did exist at that time, then it must have been on the part of Dub6 and Massicotte and Savard, who were in the police car at the time. Lizotte was not in that car but was in the other car with three other constables in another part of the village. If Lizotte was also a party to this wrongful intention, surely the other constables in the car with him must also have been parties. It is remarkable, therefore, if Mr. Rivard be right, why none of the other constables, and more especially why Dub6 and Massicotte, were not charged. It seems apparent that this contention is an afterthought. It was not entertained by counsel for the Crown when the case was placed before the jury.

Apart from this, this incident has no relevancy to the charge upon which the appellants were tried. The argument is that when the remark was made, the constables thought that Gu6nette might have been in the Baillargeon car, and if they were willing to fire then, it would be some evidence, the weight being for the jury, that they intended to fire later when they did in fact sight Guinette and he did not stop. The incident is not capable of being the foundation for the inference sought to be drawn from it. There is nothing in the remark which would properly permit the inference to be drawn that the firing would be with intent to do other than warn, and the Crown's case would not be advanced.

The third circumstance relied upon by Mr. Rivard in support of his argument was a conversation between one of the constables and a Miss Fontaine, which took place also at the time of the first visit to the village, while some of the constables were engaged in searching the home of her father.

Miss Fontaine said to this constable something to the effect that the constables were tiring themselves that morning.

His reply, according to Miss Fontaine, was to the effect that that might be so, but others would soon be tired. This evidence, in my opinion, was also inadmissible.

Neither of the appellants were present when the words were spoken.

The trial judge permitted this evidence to be given but directed the jury that it did not incriminate the appellants and that they were not responsible for something spoken when they were not present.

Following this, however, he told the jury that it was for them to decide whether or not the words were spoken.

This was equally objectionable to his treatment of the Baillargeon incident. Even if it were the fact that both appellants were present when the statement was made, the statement, in my opinion, is completely colourless and innocuous, and incapable of being the basis of an inference that there was on the part of the appellants any such intention as is now contended for. In my opinion, therefore, as already stated, there is no evidence anywhere to support the argument now put forward by Mr. Rivard.

When a conviction is set aside on the ground that there is no evidence to support it, the result ordinarily is that the accused must be acquitted.

The Crown contends, however, that there should be a new trial, and, of course, that is what is directed by the dissenting judgments. The argument is that the appellants should now be proceeded against at the proposed new trial under section 69 (1) or, that additional evidence might be forthcoming which would make section 69 (2) applicable.

Such an order, however, cannot be made. Section 1024 provides:

[1w4 While the existence of a dissent on a question of law, as provided by section 1023, is a condition precedent for an appeal to this Court, in a case like the present, this Court, once seized of the appeal is not limited to the remedy considered appropriate in the dissent, but has complete jurisdiction to direct the remedy which, in its opinion, the Court appealed from ought to have granted. In Manchuk v. The King (1), Duff C.J.C. said:

Having this jurisdiction then, what is the duty of the Court in the circumstances here present? In my opinion it would not be proper to direct a new trial. Even had the jury been properly instructed under section 69 (2), there is no evidence, as I have pointed out, upon which the appellants could properly have been convicted. The case was deliberately proceeded with upon a theory of guilt under a certain provision of the Criminal Code which now turns out to be one which the evidence entirely fails to justify. Merely because it is suggested that upon some other possible view of the evidence some other provision of the Code might apply (which the Crown deliberately determined at the trial did not apply), or because the Crown might be able to adduce further evidence are not circumstances which would make it proper to do otherwise than to acquit. I think the principle of the decision in Wexler v. The King (2) prevents our making such an order as the Crown now asks for. I would therefore allow the appeal and quash the convictions. It is not necessary in the circumstances that I deal with any of the other grounds of dissent.

Appeal allowed, convictions quashed and appellants discharged.