the left side of the road. There was a governor on the car which precluded a speed exceeding forty miles per hour. KE We know nothing of what the actual speed was but, even UMM.G8 if it were much lower than that permitted, it would not take long to cover the 66 feet.
KerwiJ. The appeal should be dismissed with costs.
Solicitors for the appellant: Bull, Houser, Tupper, Ray, Guy & Merritt.
Solicitor for the respondent: A. E. Branca.
MODERN MOTOR SALES LIMITED
AP N (Defendant)........................
*May 28,29 AND
SAM
MASOUD
AND
MONTREAL)
*Jan7 CANDY MANUFACTURING LIMIT- RESPONDENTS. - ED (Plaintiffs) .....................
ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH, APPEAL SIDE, PROVINCE OF QUEBEC.
Motor vehicles-Warranty-Collisior-Defective brakes-Negligence of driver-Liability of owner-Action in warranty against used car dealer -Action by purchaser and third party-Latent defects-Arts. 1053, 1054, 1520, 152, 1527 C.C.
By a judgment from which no appeal was taken, the respondents and the driver of a truck, owned by the respondent Masoud and lent by him to the respondent corporation of which he was the president, were jointly and severally condemned to pay damages as the result of a collision between the truck and a horse drawn vehicle. The judgment held that the accident was mainly due to the defective condition of the brakes on the truck. The driver was found liable because he had been negligent; the respondent corporation, because it was the employer of the driver; and the respondent Masoud, because he was paying the driver's salary and had allowed the use by the corporation of the defective truck. The respondent Masoud had only a few days previous to the accident purchased the truck from the appellant. Contemporaneously with the filing of their plea in the action, the respondents, but not the driver, took action in warranty with the customary conclusions against the appellant who did not intervene in the principal action but denied liability in warranty. The judgment in the warranty action dismissed the corporation's action and maintained Masoud's Rinfret CJ. and Taschereau,
Rand, Cartwright and Fauteux JJ.
CJ. APPEAL from the judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench, -appeal side, province of Quebec (1), maintaining, St. Germain J.A. dissenting, the appeals of the respondents in an action in warranty against a used car dealer. A. Laurendeau, Q.C., for the appellant.
A. J. Campbell, Q.C., for the respondents.
The (dissenting): In this case, a truck driver, Picard, employed by the Montreal -Candy Manufacturing Co. Limited, was found liable on account of his personal negligence, for -an accident, as a result of which he was sued together with his employer, the Candy Company, and one Sam Masoud, the owner of the truck. The trial judge, in his judgment, held that the degree of responsibility of Picard amounted to ten per cent of the damages incurred; that the Candy Company was responsible under Art. 1054 of the Code, 'as the employer of Picard; and that Masoud, as owner of the truck, was responsible because he had put into circulation a vehicle with defective brakes.
The learned judge attributed to this defect the main cause of the accident.
There was no 'appeal from that judgment and, therefore, it is from those findings at the trial that we must proceed to determine the decision which has to be rendered in the matter now submitted to this Court.
This matter is an action in warranty brought by both the Candy Company and Masoud against Modern Motor Sales Co. Limited, the present appellant, which sold the truck to Masoud.
Both the Courts below found the appellant guilty in having sold the defective truck, but the question on the appeal is whether, on that ground, it should be held responsible in warranty towards both Masoud, the purchaser of the truck, and the Candy Company.
No doubt can be expressed as to the responsibility in warranty of the appellant towards Masoud on account of the contractual relation which resulted from the sale to him. But, a different consideration arises with regard to the action in warranty of the Candy Company. No contractual relationship existed or exists betwen the appellant and the CJ. Candy Company.
Moreover, the Candy Company was not found responsible for the damages caused on the ground that tihey were making use of a defective truck; the ground of their responsibility was exclusively the fact that they were the employer of the driver Picard. It is, therefore, on account of the personal negligence of their employee. With that point, the appellant is in no way concerned and there exists no connection between that ground of liability and the fact that they sold a defective truck to Masoud.
It is significant that the trial judge himself, when disposing at the same time of the principal action and of the actions in warranty dismissed the action in warranty of the Candy Company against the appellant.
I agree with Rand J. that while the appeal Modern Motor Sales Co. Limited fails as against Masoud, it is well founded as against the Candy Company and to that extent the judgment appealed from should be reversed.
The quotation made by my Brother Rand, in his reasons for judgment, and taken from "Les Pandectes Frangaises, Nouveau R6pertoire, Tome 34, p. 36 et seq., 49 et 54" seems to me to be absolutely in point. The appellant, to my mind, cannot be called upon to warrant either Picard or the Candy Company against their liability resulting from the negligence of Picard. The action in warranty of the Candy Company should, therefore, be dismissed. It strikes me, however, that from the practical point of view such a result is really not very material.
Masoud was condemned to pay the full amount of the damages (less ten per cent attributable to the negligence of the driver Picard).
As the warrantor of Masoud, the appellant will, therefore, be called upon to pay all the damages, less ten per cent, and in turn, of course, Masoud will hand over to the plaintiff in the main action the sum of money thus received from the appellant.
If the Candy Company had succeeded in its action in warranty against the appellant, the latter would not have S been obliged to pay any more. The sum which it will pay to Masoud is exactly the same as that it would have paid to the company. It would be one and the same amount; RinecJ. and when the plaintiff in the main action receives that amount from Masoud, he will become completely disinterested. The Candy Company will only have to pay to the main plaintiff the ten per cent for which Picard was found responsible on account of his personal negligence. The whole matter, so far as the Candy Company is concerned, resolves itself into a question of costs. Its action in warranty against the appellant being dismissed by the present judgment, it will have, of course, to pay the costs of the appellant in this Court; but, as the appellant fails so far as Masoud is concerned, I would agree with my Brother Rand that the appellant should be entitled to recover only one-third of its costs in this Court as against the Candy Company, and that there should be no costs as between the Candy Company and the appellant in the Court of King's Bench.
J.:-Le 29 octobre 1940, M. Rosenthal, conduisant une voiture A traction animale, a 6t6 frapp6 au coin des rues Cherrier et St-Hubert, dans les limites de la Cit6 de Montr6al, par un camion, propri6t6 de Sam Masoud, et conduit par Rdouard Picard.
Ledit Rdouard Picard 6tait employ6 de la Montreal Candy Manufacturing Co. Ltd., qui se servait de ce camion pour transporter sa marohandise.
Masoud avait achet6 ce camion de la Modern Motor Sales Ltd., et l'avait pr~t6 h la Montreal Candy, compagnie dont il 6tait le principal actionnaire. C'est lui qui payait Picard dans le temps oii l'accident est arrive.
Les trois d6fendeurs, poursuivis conjointement et solidairement, ont pr6tendu qu'ils n'6taient pas responsables de cet accident qui serait attribuable au fait que les freins du camion n'ont pas fonctionn6 quand le chauffeur Picard a voulu les appliquer.
Le 4 avril 1941, Masoud et la Montreal Candy Manufacturing Co. Ltd, mais non Picard, ont institu6 une action en garantie contre la Modern Motor Sales Ltd, disant en substance qu'ils ont contest6 l'action principale, qu'ils ont ni6 toute responsabilit6, que le camion avait t6 achet6 par Masoud de Modern Motor Sales Ltd, et que l'accident dont la faute ne peut 6tre impu.tie aux d6fendeurs, est entibrement au fait que les freins du camion vendu 6taient dans une condition d~fectueuse, un fait qui aurait dfi 6tre connu par la Modern Motor Sales Ltd, et que cet 6tat des freins constituait un d6faut cach6. La conclusion de cette action en garantie est que la Modern Motor Sales Ltd, soit condamn6e h indemniser les demandeurs en garantie, Masoud et la Montreal Candy Manufacturing Co. Ltd, de toute condamnation qui pourrait 6tre prononc6e contre eux.
L'honorable Juge Surveyer de la Cour Supirieure, devant qui se sont instruites en m~me temps, et 1'action principale et Vaction en garantie, a condamn6 sur 1'action principale les trois d6fendeurs Masoud, Montreal Candy Manufacturing Co. Ltd. et Picard, conjointement et solidairement, A la somme de $3,893.00 avec int6rits et d6pens. Il en est arriv6 A la conclusion que Picard avait t6 n6gligent dans la conduite de I'automobile, que la Montreal Candy Manufacturing 'Co. Ltd. 6tait l'employeur de Picard, et que Masoud devait 6galement 6tre tenu responsable parce qu'il payait Picard, et aussi parce qu'il avait remis h la Montreal Candy Manufacturing Co. Ltd. un camion dont les freins 6taient dans un 6tat d6featueux.
Sur 1'action en garantie, I'honorabe Juge de premibre instance a rejet6 la r6clamation de Montreal Candy sans frais, et il a condamn6 ia Modern Motor Sales Ltd. h payer A Masoud la somme de $1,946.50 6tant la moiti6 des dommages accord6s A Rosenthal, le tout avec d~pens.
Les motifs de ce jugement sont que la d6fenderesse en garantie, Modern Motor Sales Ltd., 6tant un commergant habituel d'automobiles usag6s, doit tre pr6sumbe connaitre les d6fauts de la chose qu'elle vend.
L'accident serait presque compl~tement sinon exclusivement au fait que les freins 6taient dans une condition d6fectueuse, et comme le Juge arrive A la conclusion que Masoud et la Modern Motor Sales Ltd. sont en faute, le d6fendeur en . garantie doit consiquemment rembourser A Masoud, demandeur en garantie, la moiti6 de la condamnation sur 'action principale, soit $1,946.50.
Personne n'a interjet6 appel du jugement sur 1'action principale, mais Masoud et Montreal Candy ont tous deux J.appelM du jugement sur 1'action en garantie.
Modern Motor Sales a 6galement log6 un contre-appel.
La Cour du Banc de la Reine (1), M. le Juge St-Germain 6tant dissident, a rejet4 l'appel de Modern Motor Sales Ltd., mais, les appels de Masoud et de Montreal Candy ont 6t6 maintenus parce que la condition d6fectueuse des freins constituait au moment de la livraison du camion un d6faut cache suivant les dispositions de Particle 1522 C.C. pour laquelle la Modern Motor Sales Ltd. doit 6tre tenue responsable en vertu des dispositions de l'article 1527 C.C.
Masoud avait le droit de s'attendre A ce que le camion ait 6t6 examin6 d'une fagon prudente et, suivant la preuve, la Modern Motor Sales Ltd. n'a pas rempli ce devoir qui lui 6tait impos6.
II a 6t6 6galement dcid6 que cette faute donnait ouverture A une r6clamation en garantie de la part de Montreal Candy.
La signification du jugement de la Cour du Banc de la Reine est done h 1'effet que la seule partie responsable de cet accident est la Modern Motor Sales comme cons6quence de la condition d6fectueuse des freins, et que faction principale ayant 6t6 maintenue, l'action en garantie doit I'6tre 6galement, parce que le d6fendeur en garantie, n'6tant pas intervenu A l'action principale, ne peut contester le jugement rendu sur icelle.
L'appelant soumet en premier lieu que Faction en garantie contre la Modern Motor Sales ne peut rdussir, que cette Compagnie soit responsable ou non de cet accident. Si elle n'est pas responsable, il ne peut y avoir de condamnation prononcee contre elle; si, d'autre part, elle est seule responsable, elle aurait 6tre poursuivie directement par la victime, et comme il n'existait aucun recours contre les d~fendeurs principaux, I'action institu6e contre eux aurait dfi Stre rejet6e. Ceci aurait 6galement dispose de Faction en garantie.
Ce raisonnement ne manque pas de logique, mais il piche en ce sens que Faction de Rosenthal, demandeur principal, a 6t6 maintenue contre les trois d6fendeurs principaux, Picard, Masoud et Montreal Candy, conjointement et solidairement, pour la somme de $3,893.00 et de ce jugement MOTD. il n'y a pas eu d'appel. Comme le fait remarquer la Cour du Banc de la Reine, la Modern Motor Sales n'est pas intervenue pour contester l'action principale, aprs avoir T a n J. 6t6 appele en garantie, et il en rdsulte qu'elle ne peut aujourd'hui soulever devant les tribunaux la validit6 de ce premier jugement, et pr6tendre qu'il est errond.
Entre l'appelante et les d6fendeurs principaux, le jugement sur 'action principale est inattaquable.
Le seul droit du d6fendeur en garantie qui n'est pas intervenu est d'essayer d'6tablir qu'il n'y a pas lieu h garantie de sa part. Dans Meilleur v. Montreal Light Heat & Power Company et la Cite de Montr6al (1), M. le Juge Martineau si6geant en revision, s'exprimait de la fagon suivante: Lorsque le garant a 6t6 assign6, que 'action principale comme Faction en garantie ont t6 rtunies, que Faction principale a 6td maintenue ainsi que f'action en garantie, le garant ne peut, sur le seul appel du jugement qui le condamne indemniser le ddfendeur principal, le faire infirmer, parce que le jugement eur Faction principale serait errond.
Dans Archibald v. Delisle (2), le Juge Taschereau parlant pour la Cour dit:
By the judgment against which the appellants, defendants in warranty, now appeal, they have been declared to be the warrantors of the plaintiffs in warranty. And as the plaintiffs on the principal action have appealed from the judgment dismissing their action, they might have obtained here a reversal of that judgment and obtained a condemnation against the defendants Delisle, plaintiffs in warranty.
That condemnation would then have reflected on the appellants, defendants in warranty, as it is res judicata between them and the plaintiffs in warranty, so long as that. judgment stands, that they are their warrantors against the condemnations on the principal action. (In what form, and by what means, the plaintiffs in warranty could then have obtained a judgment against the defendants in warranty we are here not concerned with.)
It follows clearly that the appellants Baker et al., have an interest upon this appeal distinct and separate altogether from the condemnation to costs.
Ce sont ces principes que la Cour du Bane de la Reine a accept6s dans la pr6sente cause, et je m'accorde avec ses conclusions.
Il r6sulte donc comme consequence du jugement de premidre instance que Picard, Masoud et Montreal Candy sont conjointement et solidairement responsables de l'accident dont Rosenthal a t6 la victime. J'entretiens des doutes (1) Q.R. (1917) 52 S.C. 366.
69999-1
(2) (1895) 25 Can. S.C.R. 1 at s6rieux sur 1'existence de cette solidarit6 entre les trois d6fendeurs. En effet, elle ne pourrait exister que par I'application de l'article 1106 C.C. qui veut que lFobligation r~sultant d'un d6lit ou quasi-dblit commis par deux personnes ou plus, soit solidaire. Encore faut-il que les d6bi- J teurs aient commis un quasi-d6lit et que soit le mime quasi-d6lit.
C'est h cette seule condition qu'il y aura solidarit6.
Dans le cas qui nous occupe, I'obligation de Picard, conducteur du v6hicule, de r6parer le dommage caus6, prochde bien d'un quasi-d6lit, mais les sources qui font naitre les obligations de Masoud et de Montreal Candy sont enti~rement diff6rentes. La responsabilit6 de Montreal Candy, suivant le jugement du Juge de premibre instance, naitrait de Ia relation d'employeur et d'employ6 (1054 C.C.).
Elle aurait son fondement sur un texte de loi, et ne pr6senterait aucun caract~re quasi-d6lictuel. Masoud, qui payait Picard, serait responsable 6galement comme cons6quence de l'application de Particle 1054, et il aurait aussi commis le quasi-d61it de donner la possession d'un camion d6fectueux h la Montreal Candy, ce qui l'obligerait h r6parer le dommage en vertu de 1053. Quasid6lit bien diff6rent de celui de Picard.
Mais il semble inutile d'approfondir davantage cette question, car le premier jugement prononce la solidarit6 et vu le difaut d'appel, il ne peut 6tre attaqu6. C'est tel qu'ii a t6 rendu qu'il faut le consid6rer, et c'est de cette condamnation solidaire que l'appelante doit indemniser les intim&s, A moins qu'elle n'en soit dispens6e pour queique autre motif.
II faut donc prendre pour acquit, comme l'a trouv6 le Juge au procks, que la cause de cet accident est la d6fectuosit6 des freins du camion achet6 par Masoud de 1'appelante. Cette dernidre est commergante en automobiles et camions usag6s, et comme telle, elle est pr6sum6e connaitre les difauts de la chose qu'elle vend; dans le cas de dommages subis comme r6sultat de ces vices, elle est tenue d'indemniser Yacheteur (C.C. 1527).
La preuve d6montre surabondamment que le d6faut aux freins, cause de 1'accident, 6tait un vice cach6 et la responsabilit6 de 1'appelante vis-h-vis de Masoud se trouve cons6quemment engag6e. Elle r6sulte de sa "faute professionnelle".
"Spondet peritiam artis", et on peut ajouter avec Ulpien, "Imperitia culpae annumeratur".
Vide: Ross v. Dunstall et at (1); Samson v. Davie Shipbuilding & Repairing Co. (2); Guillouard, Vente, No. 463; Lajoie v. Robert (3); Touchette v. Pizzagalli (4).
La responsabilit6 de 'appelante vis-h-vis de Montreal Candy se pr6sente sous un aspect diff6rent.
n'existe Taseau pas entre les deux parties, comme dans le cas de Masoud, de relation d'acheteur et de vendeur, et c'est exclusivement sur 1'article 1053 que doit reposer la r6clamation de la Compagnie.
Par la faute de Modern Motor, la Montreal Candy a 6t6 tenue responsable d'un accident qui h son tour lui a caus6 un pr6judice, pour lequel elle a droit A une indemnit6.
Le vendeur d'un objet qui cause un dommage, engage sa responsabilit6, non seulement vis-h-vis l'acheteur, mais aussi vis-h-vis les usagers de cette chose, m~me s'il n'existe aucune relation contractuelle.
La faute est ddlictuelle, et c'est ce qui a 6t6 d6cid6 par la Cour du Banc de la Reine dans Drolet v. London Lancashire (5), jugement confirm6 par cette Cour, (6)
et dans Ross v. Dunstall et at (7).
Dans cette dernibre cause, Ross, manufacturier d'armes h feu, a 6t6 tenu responsable d'accidents survenus non seulement h l'acheteur imm6diat de la carabine, mais aussi A clui qui en avait fait l'acquisition chez un marchand d6taillant aux Ptats-Unis.
L'appel doit 8tre rejet6 avec d6pens, mais le jugement h 6tre enregistr6 devra 6tre modifi6 et r6duit h $3,503.70 vu le disistement partiel produit par les intimes.
J. (dissenting): I think it clear that by the law of Quebec a person who is rendered liable in civil responsibility, as, for example, under article 1054 of the Code, by reason of damage caused by things, through an act, cause or condition which can be directly traced back to the fault of another, has a right against the latter to be indemnified against the consequences of that intermediate liability; and that that indemnity may be invoked by the procedure known as warranty.
For this proposition it is sufficient to cite three authorities: McFarlane v. Dewey (8); Gosselin v. Martel (9); and Archibald v. Delisle (10). In the present case the owner of the truck, Masoud, the driver, Picard, and his employer, the Candy Company, have jointly and severally been found to be responsible for the damages caused.
The liability of the driver arose from his personal negligence; but both courts agree that there was present also, as an operative cause, the dangerous condition of the truck resulting from a latent defect in its braking gear.
Since that judgment has not been appealed, it stands as res judicata between the principal plaintiff and defendants.
Both -courts agree also that the ultimate responsibility for the condition of the truck is that of the Motor Company, the defendant in warranty, and that a legal warranty against latent defects arose on the sale of the car. There seems to be some uncertainty in the judgments as to the precise basis of liability of the owner to the principal plaintiff, but that must be taken, I think, to arise from the presumption of article 1054 in relation to damage caused by a thing in his care. It is the owner, then, who, under the judgment as between the principal defendants, represents the fault ultimately traceable to the Motor Company. Of the total liability attributable to these two causes, that portion of it chargeable against the driver and vicariously to the Candy Company as his employer, results from the personal negligence of the driver and not from any act or default of the Motor Company.
The owner, so liable, has, under the rule stated, a right in the nature of indemnity against the Motor Company; but in view of the source of the judgment against the Candy Company, that principle cannot be invoked by the latter in the warranty action. The Candy Company as a principal defendant has a right of recourse against the owner for the percentage of responsibility attributable to the latter, but this is a matter of ultimate distribution of the loss, and it arises from the rule of contribution between persons found jointly liable for delictual conduct. It is said that since the judgment against the Candy Company is for the total amount of the damages, it necessarily includes that portion ultimately chargeable against the Motor Company; and as establishing liability on the part of the Motor Company towards the Candy Company, that quantum is assimilated to damage caused the Candy Company by the Motor Company through a fault within article 1053. It is the fact that the Candy Company has been adjudged liable to the principal plaintiff in the total sum: and if the Motor Company has been 'a defendant in the main action, on the findings made, it, likewise, would have been held to that amount. But to treat the judgment against the Candy Company as damage resulting from fault under article 1053 of the Motor Company is, I think, to confuse the liability of the Candy Company to the principal plaintiff with its consequences.
For instance, the driver is bound for the total damage because he participated in causing it; it is his act and that alone that has given rise to the judgment against him as well as to the civil responsibility of his employer for the total amount. The ultimate responsibility of the Motor Company has nothing whatever to do with creating either liability.
The distribution, not of liability, but of the ultimate loss as between the culpable joint actors themselves, is a different legal function and is effected by exacting from each according to the degree of participation in causing the damage. If the driver had been sued alone, any action thereafter brought by him 'against the Motor Company would be by way of enforcing that contribution and not the prosecution of a delict against himself within article 1053. If the Motor Company were brought into the. principal action as a co-defendant, the judgment in solidarity would preclude any question of the right to contribution. But there are conditions to the pursuit of that relief, one of which is that the party claiming has in fact paid 'another's share of the joint judgment or liability; and it would seem undoubted that where there is no judgment in solidarity, all defences available in the original action would be open to the defendant in the subsequent action. The proceeding in warranty here by the Candy Company is in reality of that nature, the assertion of a claim to contribution, and the question is whether it is properly brought in warranty. As the decisions cited show, there are different categories of contractual and delictual responsibility which can be enforced in that procedure, but they all partake in some degree of a quality which constitutes the essence of the obligation of guaranty: a duty to defend another in respect of a certain act, or as the English law states one mode of it, "to save harmless" from certain consequences. Indemnity does not go quite so far, but its MASOD effects are in large measure the same; and I should say that indemnity or such an equivalent is a minimal prere- Rand J. quisite to receivability in warranty. If I interpreted the judgment below to mean, as I do not, that the appeal Court intended to add a new class of claim to those determinable under warranty, I should be obliged to take other considerations into account. On the other hand, and with the greatest respect for that Court, I cannot find in the reasons an appreciation of the distinction between guaranty or indemnity and contribution, including the conditions of the prosecution of each.
The respondents in the appeal, sensing the difficulty presented by these circumstances, have made a partial desistement of 10% of the judgment which is intended to represent the degree of responsibility of the driver and the Candy Company, and the question is whether that can affect the result at which I have otherwise arrived. I do not think so. That act impliedly admits, in fact, the view expressed, that the -claim is one for contribution. The law of France on this matter is laid down in Pandectes Frangaises, Nouveau R6pertoire, T. 34, p. 36 et seq.:
49. C'est, toutefois, A la condition que le fait qui sert de base A la demande en garantie ou en responsabilit6, soit le mime que celui sur lequel est fond6e la demande principale. Un des motifs qui ont pouss6 le 16gislateur & 6dicter les dispositions dont s'agit, a td, en effet, ainsi qui a 6ti dit supra, n. 44, d'6viter la contrari6t6 de jugements susceptibles de se produire devant des tribunaux successivement saisis. Cette consid6ration indique que, pour b6ndficier de ces dispositions de faveur, la demande en garantie ne doit pas 8tre une simple action r6cursoire, tendant, de la part de celui qui la forme, A 6tre rendu indemne, par un tiers, des condamnations dont, finalement, les consdquences doivent lui incomber. Elle doit 6tre connexe A la demande principale, s'y rattacher par un lien de d~pendance intime et n4cessaire, en 6tre 1'accessoire.
... Que, si toute action en garantie peut, pour 6tre recevable, prendre sa source dans un fait quelconque, ou dans une faute commise par celui qui est appel6 en garantie, c'est A la condition que ce fait ou cette faute ait t6 la cause de l'action principale.
The judgment of the Court of Revisioil in Th6rien v. City of Montreal and Montreal Street Railway Company (1) is a special application of the rule. There the plaintiff was injured through the dangerous condition of a street brought about by the joint negligence of the City and the Company but the City was liable in two aspects: one for its personal fault in allowing the steep side slope of the street to exist, and the other proceeding from the delict of the Company in maintaining its pole in a dangerous position. The City was sued alone and in warranty claimed indemnity against the Company. By the judgment the latter was condemned to "pay and reimburse" the City for one-half of the damages recovered. The damages were divided according to the independent responsibility of each as between themselves; but 'the claim in warranty was in fact for quasi-indemnity in relation to the second basis of liability.
If distribution of the loss could be effected in warranty, since one of two defendants jointly liable can implead the other in that proceeding, O'Connor v. Flynn (2), it would mean that that step could become the accompaniment of every action involving a joint delict. That result might be not only unobjectionable but highly convenient as a means of determining the whole controversy; and no one would willingly add an'other item to the intricacies of Quebec procedure; but that it would be a departure from the civil law -as enunciated by the commentators and the decisions seems to me to be unquestionable, and procedural confusion can easily involve substantive matters such as the nature of the judgment here. In English common law jurisdictions under modern legislation governing negligence, such a division is made as part of the adjudication of the action; but the law of Quebec does not authorize it. In Cormier v. Delisle (3), in which Duranleau J. has clearly indicated the distinction made here between guaranty and contribution, he speaks, at p. 482, of "sa part contributive", and of its determination "soit par une action en garantie dans 'action principale soit par une action principale". The reference to the action in guaranty is, of course, a dictum, but it points the consequences of confirming the judgment in this case.
A further consideration remains. Mr. Laurendeau argues that the claim of Masoud, likewise, is struck with a fatal flaw. It is, he says, an action r6cursoire in responsibility, .
and being so, he is entitled to challenge not only his liability in warranty but also the liability of Masoud in -the main action; from the judgment in the latter there Jwas no appeal, but because the claim in the accessory proceeding is not true guaranty, it is the same as an independent action in which all defences would be open. Quasi-indemnity arising in law from a delictual act for which another incurs civil responsibility is distinguishable in.character from a contract to guarantee or defend agaisnt a certain act or obligation.
The obliger in the latter is directly interested, through the implications of the contract, in the determination of the original issue. He becomes the obligee's defender and the Code contemplates not only his participation in the defence but in formal guaranty, that he make the defence his own.
In the present case there is no such implication from either the implied warranty of fitness or the fault in setting a dangerous agency in action.
The breach of warranty in reality sounds in damages. In such a case, however, the law either implies a quasi-indemnity or assimilates the delictual liability to that of contractual indemnity so far, at least, as to permit a claim in r6cursoire under warranty procedure.
But it is unnecessary to pursue the examination of this feature further: I will assume in Mr. Laurendeau's favour that he is entitled to challenge the judgment against Masoud, but that does not, in my opinion, serve him to any purpose.
The courts below have concurred in holding that the defect of the machine was a participating cause of the damages and either Masoud or the Candy Company was chargeable with the legal care of the truck. In either case there would be a resulting liability under article 1054, against which neither could successfully invoke the exculpatory provision of that article. The person charged with the care of a thing cannot avail himself of that provision if the vice has arisen from the fault or negligence of the manufacturer or repairer with whom he deals. Here the defect was patent to professional skill, and the owner was entitled, at the time of the accident, in respect of personal care, to rely upon the exercise of that skill by the Motor Company: but for the purposes of the exculpation, it is the same as if the Motor Company had been his agent in making the inspection or reconditioning: Juris-Classeur Civil, Art. 1382-83 fin. 1384, Responsabilit6 du Fait des Choses, paragraphe N' 450. From this it follows that the Motor Company would be liable either through Masoud or the Candy Company, and I see no reason, on the evidence, to place it on the Company rather than the owner.
I would therefore allow the appeal against the judgment in favour of the Candy Company, but dismiss it with costs in respect of Masoud.
The appellant will be entitled to recover one-third of its costs in this Court against the Candy Company. There will be no costs as between the Candy Company and the Motor Company in the Appeal Court.
J.: The facts of this case are set out in the reasons for judgment of other members of the Court. The learned trial judge has found that the injuries suffered by the plaintiff were due "mainly if not exclusively" to the defective condition of the brakes of the automobile of the appellant Masoud. In the Court of King's Bench (Appeal Side) (1) the majority were of the opinion, with which I respectfully agree, that such defective condition of the brakes was the sole cause of the accident. Pratte J., with whom Gagn6 J., agrees, says:
Hyde J., with whom McDougall J. agrees, says:
All of these learned judges and, as I understand, all of the members of this Court are of opinion that it was rightly held that the existence of this defective condition was due to the fault of the appellant. Under these circumstances it is apparent that the effect of the judgment of the Court of King's Bench is to require that the damages suffered by the plaintiff be paid by the party by whose fault they were caused.
Prima facie this result would