Bernard v. Amyot-Forget

GUY BERNARD AND OTHERS (Plain- APPELLANTS; *M ay 29

*Dec. 15

AND

DAME ALBERT AMYOT-FORGET

R

N RESPONDENTS AND OTHERS (Defendants) ......

ON APPEAL FROM THE OF KING'S BENCH, APPEAL SIDE, PROVINCE OF QUEBEC.

Will - Substitution - Children - Grandchildren - Whether great-grandchildren included-Whether rule of representation of Article 980 C.C. applicable-Article 509 C.P.

The testator's will provided that on the death or remarriage of his widow the children issue of his marriage should have the usufruct of his property and that on the extinction of the usufruct the ownership should pass to "the children issue of the lawful marriage of my children, that is to say my grandchildren". It is admitted that the will created a fiduciary substitution and that the final opening of the substitution has occurred.

The appellants, whose parents died prior to the date of distribution of the estate, claimed, as great-grandchildren of the testator, the shares which their parents, as grandchildren of the testator, would have received had they survived. Their action was dismissed by the Superior Court and by a majority in the Court of Appeal for Quebec.

Held: (Rinfret C.J. and Taschereau J. dissenting), that the appeal should be allowed.

The rule of representation enunciated in Article 980 C.C. applied.

The words "children" and "grandchildren" as used in the will applied to all the descendants of the testator and, therefore, to his great-grandchildren as well as to his grandchildren.

Per Rand J.: The word "grandchildren" is used without qualification and, therefore, Article 980 C.C. disposes of the question.

The phrase "that is to say" is introductory to a form of statement equivalent in meaning to one already made and its effect is the same as if the equivalent expression had been used alone in the first instance. Even if this were to produce tautology, it would not be sufficient to change the legal meaning of the words. The instrument leaves no doubt of the general intention that the property should pass to the direct descendants by equal division between the family lines of the children. Locke J. agreed with Barclay J. that the words "that is to say my grandchildren"

following the words "the children issue of the lawful marriage of my children" should be construed as being merely explanatory and not limitative.

The testator must be assumed to have known the law and the significance of the word "grandchildren" used without qualification.

Per Cartwright J.: If it was the intention of the testator to qualify or cut down the meaning ascribed to the word "children" by Article 980 C.C., it is unlikely that the notary who prepared the will would have chosen as a word of qualification a word to which the same meaning is ascribed by the same Article of the Code. It is more reasonable to suppose that an unnecessary and repetitious phrase was used. Rinfret C.J. and Taschereau, Rand, Locke and Cartwright JJ.

: Since the words "children" and "grandchildren" are qualified, Article 980 C.C. cannot be invoked in favour Ena of the appellants. The phrase "that is to say my grandchildren" would be meaningless if it were not descriptive.

Without inquiring into the reasons of the testator but giving the fair and literal meaning to the actual language of the will, the property should go to the children issue of the lawful marriage of his children who can never be the great-grandchildren.

:

The word "grandchildren" is not used without qualification and the expressions accompanying it are sufficiently clear to justify the exclusion of the great-grandchildren from the disposition. The words cannot be a meaningless repetition and must be given a meaning. The words determine the intention of the testator and indicate who should benefit.

APPEAL from the judgment of the Court of King's Bench, appeal side, province of Quebec (1), affirming, Barclay and Pratte JJ.A. dissenting, the dismissal of the action by the Superior Court in an action taken by the great-grandchildren of the testator.

The 'CHIEF JUSTICE (dissenting): Dans la cause de Mgtivier v. Parent (2), cette Cour a d6cid6 unanimement: The general provisions of the Civil Code (Arts. 1013 et seq.) enacting certain rules of interpretation as to contracts are applicable, by analogy, to arrive at the true meaning of the clauses of a will, taking into account however the difference existing between a contract and a will. Therefore, in a will as in a contract, the real intention of the testator must first be looked for and such intention will be found by giving a fair and literal meaning to the actual language of the will; and it is only when the intention is really doubtful that it is permissible to go outside the literal meaning of the words.

Il suit de cette d6cision que l'on doit interpreter la volont6 du testateur suivant le sens litt6ral des termes qu'il a employds et que 'on ne doit chercher son intention par voie d'interpr6tation que lorsque cette intention est douteuse. (1013 C.C.)

En plus, toutes les clauses d'un testament doivent s'interpr6ter les unes par les autres, en donnant h chacune le sens qui rbsulte de l'acte entier (1018 C.C.).

(1) Q.R. [19521 KB. 89.

Dans la cause de Auger v. Beaudry (1), le Conseil Priv6 a d6clar6:

Amxor- ... But whatever wavering from the strict rule of construction may have taken place in the past, it is now recognized that the only safe method Hmfr t CJ. of determining what was the real intention of a testator is to give the fair and literal meaning to the actual language of the will. Human motives are too uncertain to render it wise or safe to leave the firm guide of the words used for the uncertain direction of what it must be assumed that a reasonable man would mean.

,Ce sont lA les principes qui doivent nous guider pour 1'adjudication sur le point de droit que les parties nous ont soumis en se pr6valant des articles 509 et suivants du Code de Proc6dure Civile.

La question est tris simple:

Par son testament, date A Montr6al le 15 avril 1875, M. Jean-Baptiste Dufort a dispos6 de sea biens, tant en usufruit qu'en capital, en faveur de son 6pouse et de ses enfants.

11 leur a 16gu6 la jouissance et usufruit de ses biens leur vie durant, puis, A la Clause sixibme du testament, il a ajout6:

... Et quant A la propridt6 de mes biens, je la donne et 16gue aux enfants A naitre en l6gitime mariage de mes enfants, c'est-h-dire A mes petitsenfants; lesquels diviseront et partageront mes biens entre eux par parts et portions 6gales par souches, apr~s I'extinction de 1usufruit par moi 16gu6 tant A madite 6pouse qu'& mes enfants.

Les appelants, qui sont les arribre petits-enfants du testateur, ont. pr6tendu que cette clause les incluait dans la disposition.

Les intim6s, au contraire, ont conclu A ce qu'ils soient d6claris les seuls appel6s d6finitifs aux biens substitubs, vu qu'ils sont les seuls survivants des enfants du testateur.

La Cour Sup6rieure a donn6 raison A ces derniers et elle a 6t6 confirmie par la majorit6 de la Cour du Banc du Roi (en appel) (2).

La demande des appelants est bas6e sur Particle 980 C.C., qui se lit comme suit:

Art. 980. Dans la prohibition d'ali6ner, comme dans la substitution, et dans les donations et les legs en g~ndral, le terme enfants ou petits enfants, employ6 seul soit dans la disposition, soit dans la condition, s'applique A tons les descendants avec ou sans gradualit6 suivant la nature de Pacte.

V() Q.R. [19521 K.B. 89. Et la pr6tention des appelants est que par application de cet article les mots "enfants" et "petits-enfants" doivent 6tre compris comme s'appliquant A tous les descendants. De mime que le juge de premibre instance et la majorit& de la Cour d'Appel, je ne puis me rendre A cette interpr- Cj. tation.

En vertu de 'article 872 C.C., "Les rbgles qui concernent les legs et les pr6somptions de la volont6 du testateur, ainsi que le sens attribu6 h certains termes, cident devant l'expression formelle ou autrement suffisante de cette volont6 dans un autre sens et pour avoir un effet diff6rent". Or, la rbgle pos6e dans l'article 980 C.C. ne peut 6tre invoquee ici par les appelants.

En effet, cette rigle ne s'applique que lorsque le terme "enfants" ou "petits enfants" est "employ6 seul". Ce texte de l'article 980 C.C. est encore plus formel que le texte en langue anglaise "without qualification". Ainsi que le fait remarquer 1'honorable Juge Marchand, qui a fait partie de la majorit6 en Cour d'Appel, le testateur n'a jamais employ6 ces termes seuls. Cela, d6ja, serait suffisant pour que l'article 980 ne rigisse pas la Clause sixibme du testament.

Mais il y a plus. Introduire cette rigle pour interpr6ter la clause aminerait A une redondance ou & 'emploi de mots inutiles. Si, au lieu de constituer une description, cette phrase ne devait 6tre considdr6e que comme n'ajoutant rien aux mots "petits enfants" qui la pr6cident, alors cette phrase 6tait inutile.

En outre, si l'on veut lui appliquer l'article 980 C.C., alors il faudrait lire la clause: "Je ligue aux enfants A naitre en l6gitime mariage de mes enfants, c'est-A-dire A mes petits enfants" comme si elle se lisait: Je ligue "aux descendants A naitre en 16gitime mariage de mes descendants, c'est-A-dire A mes descendants". On ne saurait ainsi travestir 1'intention du testateur. Au contraire, en traitant les mots "c'est-A-dire mes petits enfants" comme excluant les arribre-petits-enfants, qui sont les appelants, on arrive A une interpretation coh6rente de la Clause sixibme. Ce que dit le testateur, en effet, c'est qu'il 16gue "aux enfants A naitre en l6gitime mariage de mes enfants"; et si l'on applique les r6gles d'interpr6tation reconnues comme s'appliquant aux testaments dans notre jugement de Mitivier v. Parent, si l'on adopte le sens litt6ral des mots employ6s, les biens vont aux enfants n6s du mariage des enfants du testateur. Or, il est 6vident que les enfants n6s du mariage des enfants du testateur ne peuvent 6tre que les petitsenfants. Les arribre-petits-enfants ne peuvent jamais 6tre ca. les enfants n6s du mariage des enfants du testateur. Le testateur les a done exclus, et, nous 6coutons les sages avis du 'Conseil Priv6 cit6s plus haut, nous n'avons pas a nous demander quels ont pu 6tre les motifs du testateur en excluant les arribre-petits-enfants. Nous n'avons pas h sp6culer sur la raison pour laquelle il a cru devoir disposer de ses biens ainsi qu'il le dit dans son testament. Le Conseil Priv6 nous en avertit dans Auger v. Beaudry: "....It is now recognized that the only safe method determining what was the real intention of a testator is to give the fair and literal meaning to the actual language of the will".

Je suis done d'avis que les jugements dont est appel doivent 6tre confirmis, avec depens.

J. (dissenting): Par son testament regu A Montrial, le 15 avril 1875, devant les notaires Dumouchel et H6tu, Jean-Baptiste Duford a laiss6 la jouissance de ses biens A son 6pouse, Dame V6lanire Laporte. Au d6chs de cette dernibre, les enfants issus du mariage du testateur et de son 6pouse devaient A leur tour 6tre saisis des biens A titre de grev6s, et pour employer les termes m~mes du testateur, la propri6t6 de la totalit6 du patrimoine 6tait divolue "aux enfants A naitre en l6gitime mariage de mes enfants, c'est-A-dire A mes petits-enfants; lesquels diviseront et partageront mes biens entre eux par parts et portions 6gales et par souches..."

Le testateur est d~cd6 en 1876, laissant son 6pouse, d6c6d6e A son tour en 1901, et cinq enfants tous igalement d6c6d6s respectivement en 1909, 1913, 1945, 1946 et 1949. Fortunate Duford Boisseau, l'une des filles du testateur, eut cinq enfants. Deux, Robert et Alice, maintenant d6c6d6s, en ont eu quatre qui se trouvent les arribre-petitsenfants du testateur, et qui sont les demandeurs-appelants dans la pr6sente cause.

C'est leur pritention que par 'op6ration de l'article 980 C.C., le terme "petits-enfants" dans le testament crbant la substitution s'applique A tous les descendants, et qu'en cons6quence, ils doivent h6riter comme a-ppel6s au mime titre que les autres petits-enfants. M. le Juge Smith de la Cour Sup6rieure, ainsi que la majorit6 de la Cour d'Appel ont rejet6 ces pr6tentions. L'article 980 C.C. est r6dig6 dans les termes suivants: est important de signaler que le terme "petits-enfants" s'6tend aux "arribre petits-enfants", quand il est employ6 seul, c'est-h-dire, comme le dit le texte anglais, sans qualification.

Si on trouve dans la disposition quelque expression qui d6montre une intention contraire, il faut laisser au terme "petits-enfants" son sens ordinaire, et ne -pas lui donner 1'extension que le Code permet, quand il est employ6 seul.

Je partage les vues du juge de premiere instance et celles exprim6es par la majorit6 de la Cour d'Appel. Les mots "petits-enfants" ne sont pas employds seuls, et les expressions qui les accompagnent sont, je crois, suffisamment claires pour nous justifier d'exclure les "arribre petitsenfants" de la disposition testamentaire.

"Aux enfants h naitre en l6gitime mariage de mes enfants, c'est-h-dire h mes petits-enfants", sont des mots qui pr6cisent l'intention du testateur et qui indiquent quels sont ceux, et ceux-lh seuls qui devaient 6tre les appel6s d6finitifs. Il faut n6cessairement donner un sens aux mots "c'est-h-dire A mes petits-enfants".

A moins de les consid6rer comme une rip6tition inutile, ce que je ne puis faire, ils doivent qualifier les mots "les enfants A naltre en l6gitime mariage de mes enfants". C'est h eux, h ses "petits-enfants" que le testateur me parait avoir limit6 1'6tendue de sa lib6ralit6 et qu'il a voulu l6guer la propri6t6 d~finitive de ses biens. En d'autres termes, le testateur a dit qu'il instituait comme appel~s ceux-lh qui naitront du mariage de ses enfants, et il qualifie ces mots en disant que ce seront ses "petitsenfants".

En vertu de Particle 980 C.C., les mots "enfants" et "petits-enfants" s'appliquent h tous les descendants, et comme le fait remarquer le juge au proces, si l'on substitue le mot "descendants" aux mots "enfants h naitre" et "petitsenfants" on arrive avec la disposition suivante, oa la derniere partie n'est plus l'explication de la premiere que le testateur a voulu 6videmment donner en employant les mots "c'est-h-dire": "Je la propridth de mes biens aux descendants a naitre de mes enfants, c'est-h-dire h leurs descendants".

Je ne crois pas que le testateur ait eu l'intention d'ins6rer dans son testament une clause qui comporterait une aussi inutile r6p6tition, et qui enliverait tout sens aux mots "c'est-h-dire", employds 6videmment pour pr6ciser sa volont6.

Je crois que l'appel doit 6tre rejet6 avec d6pens. J.: The question in this appeal is the interpretation of a clause in a will which reads:

Art. 980 of the Code provides:

The point is whether the words "petits-enfants" in the clause are used "without qualification"; and in determining that, the meaning of the language as the expressed intention of the testator is to be ascertained before any resort is made to the Code.

A qualification is said to be introduced by the expression "c'est-A-dire": this, it is argued, signifies an exclusiveness to the grandchildren and as if the word "only" had been added. I must confess to a difficulty in drawing any such meaning from the phrase. Its literal translation in English is the ordinary expression, "that is to say", and so far as I can gather it means the same thing in French: in other words, it is introductory to a form of statement equivalent in meaning to one already made, 'and its effect is the same as if the equivalent expression had been used alone in the first instance.

This sense is objected to as producing tautology. No doubt we endeavour to give all words in an instrument effective meaning; but tautology is too universal a weakness or, as sometimes, strength, to give rise to a rule of interpretation that controls what would otherwise be the proper construction of the language used. The will was made in 1875 and the testator died in the following year, and the instrument leaves no doubt of the general intention that the property should pass to the direct descendants by equal division between the family lines of the children. Why should we be astute to find a qualification that arbitrarily arrests that descent?

As we are seeking what was in the mind of the testator from the words used, and what he would have declared to be his intention had the question been put to him, it is, I think, involving oneself in a wholly unnecessary verbal tangle to discover even doubt in the language here. On that view, the article of the Code disposes of the question.

Agreeing, therefore, with Barclay and Pratte, JJ. in the court below, I would allow the appeal and direct a declaration accordingly, with costs in all -courts.

J.:-I agree with the reasons for judgment delivered in the Court of King's Bench by Mr. Justice Barclay (1) and would allow this appeal with costs throughout. J.:-The relevant facts and the terms of the will of the late Jean Baptiste Duford are set out in sufficient detail in the judgments of other members of the Court.

I am in substantial agreement with the reasons of my brother Rand and with those of Barclay and Pratte JJ. and desire to add only a few words.

It is common ground that the capital of the testator's estate is to be distributed at the date of the death of his last surviving child, which occurred in October 1949, and the question to be determined on this appeal is whether the appellants, who are great-grandchildren of the testator whose parents died prior to the date of distribution, are entitled to the shares which such parents would have received had they survived.

The question turns on the following words in the will: A I do not understand that any of the learned judges in the courts below or counsel who argued the appeal before us disagreed with the following statement of Pratte J. (1): A c.c.

The learned judge of first instance and the majority in the Court of Appeal were, however, of opinion that the two expressions "enfants a naitre en lgitime mariage de mes enfants" and "mes petits-enfants" coupled by the words "c'est-h-dire" qualify each other so as to change the meaning which either standing alone would have had to "grandchildren excluding any remoter issue."

The will was prepared by a Notary who may safely be assumed to have been familiar with the terms of Article 980 of the Civil Code. I find it difficult to accept the view that if-it was his intention to qualify or cut down the meaning ascribed by the Code to the words "enfants h, naltre l6gitime mariage de mes enfants", i.e. "descendants" he would choose as words of qualification other words to which the same meaning is ascribed by the same article of the Code. Forced to choose between the two alternatives, I find it more reasonable to suppose that he used an unnecessary and repetitious phrase.

I would dispose of the appeal as proposed by my brother Rand.

Appeal allowed with costs.