Judgment of the Court
THE CHIEF JUSTICE.-The respondent brought an action in the Superior Court at Quebec to revendicate, as against the appellant, the western half of lot 36 in the Parish of ChAteau Richer, County of Montmorency.
In answer the appellant admitted that he had no title to the land; denied that he had ever exercised or ever pretended to exercise any act of ownership with reference to it, and affirmatively alleged that he had acquired from the respondent, through one V6zina, the right to cut the standing timber on a certain portion of the property in question, and that he had not cut beyond the limits covered by the agreement sou& 8eing priv6, under which this right had been conveyed. On these issues the parties went to trial.
All the courts below held that V6zina's interest was vested in the respondent and the only doubt suggested turned upon the solution of the question- What are the true boundaries to be assigned to the coupe de bois conveyed by the respondent to V6zina? The appellant mainly relied on the literal construction of the words used in the sous seing priv6. The respondent urged that the language used in delimiting the tract is equivocal and that the intention of the parties must be gathered from the surrounding circumstances.
There was a long and tedious enqu~te; many witnesses were examined, and each party employed a surveyor to make a plan of the locality.
In my opinion the intention of the parties is to be gathered from the plain meaning of the words used by them in the document set up by the appellant and effect must be given to these words if possible. The description of the property within the limits of which the wood is to be cut is:
A In my opinion this wording is clear and plainly describes the complete boundaries. There is no doubt on the evidence that Amidke Lefrangois is the proprietor of the land to the east-Octave Gravel of that to the west, and that the property extends to the trait quarr6 on the north has never been denied. What is the reason of the difficulty with respect to the southern boundary which is said to be a river? Does that river not exist, and is it not easily traceable on the ground? Is there not a part of the property of which it is the southern boundary; and were not both parties, at the time they made their agreement, aware of its existence and exact position?
All these questions must be answered in the affirmative.
By the plans of both surveyors it appears that the River Sault h la Puce enters the land of the plaintiff at and recrosses its eastern boundary without touching its western limit and, after crossing the eastern boundary, again enters the plaintiffIs land and traverses it in a westerly direction to the westerly boundary. The tract bounded on the south by that portion of the river intercepted between the eastern and western boundaries (and having the other boundaries described in the document in question) obviously answers the description we have to apply.
If there is any doubt with respect to the description and designation of the premises sold it will be found on reference to the authorities cited in the judgment of Mr. Justice Andrews, in the Superior Court, that doubts in the circumstances of this case should be held against the respondent.
I agree with the three judges in review and the minority in appeal that there is no ambiguity in the language of the deed; that the respondent was entitled to rely on the literal construction of the words used; that the description does not bear more than one necessarily exclusive meaning; and that the appellant did not cut any timber beyond the limits of the tract covered by the agreement with V6zina.
The action should be dismissed and the appeal allowed with costs.
Appeal allowed with costs.