Per Duff and Anglin JJ.-The provisions the Civil Code in regard the registration unopened substitutions do not contemplate Fitzpatrick (.J. Idington, Anglin and Brodeur JJ.
registration affecting immovables, as such, but refer merely to registration necessary to the operation of the instrument creating the substitution; consequently articles 2090 and of the .
Civil Code have no application.
Per Duff J., Brodeur J. contra.-Article of the Code Civil Procedure deals primarily with procedure and should construed in connection with article the Civil Code as to effectuate rights resting upon the provisions of the Civil Code relating to substantive law. Vadebonacur City of Montreal Can. S.C.R. 9), distinguished.
Per Duff and Anglin J.-The registration an instrument creating a substitution is effective from the date upon which it registered and protects the rights of the substitute against the right acquired a purchaser under a subsequent sale in execution made the sheriff.
Trudel v. Parent (Q.R. 578), referred to.
Per Anglin J.-In the case of a sale under execution against institute, subsequent to the registration of the substitution, the purchaser at sheriff's sale acquires merely the personal interest of the institute subject to the substitution; such a title cannot defeat the claim the substitute.
Per Brodeur J., dissenting.-Inasmuch as the claim the execution creditor was for a debt due and exigible prior to the date when the instrument creating the substitution was registered, the effect of the sale the sheriff was to discharge the immovable sold from the claim of the substitute and to give the purchaser at that sale an absolute title to the land having priority over that the substitute.
APPEAL from the judgment of the Court of King's Bench, appeal side (1), affirming the judgment of the Superior Court, District of Montreal, maintaining the plaintiff's action with costs.
The circumstances of the case. are stated in the judgments now reported.
The action was instituted by Madame E. Couloinbe, in her capacity of tutrix to her minor child, the present plaintiff, issue of her marriage with the late Donald J. McIntosh, deceased, for the recovery of the R.L.N.S. 444.
lands in question. By the judgments rendered in the courts below, the appellant, defendant, was ordered to deliver up possession of the said lands, reserving to hIc*osH. him, however, the right of retention, under article 419 of the Civil Code, until reimbursement of amounts expended in necessary improvements, etc., and it was ordered that experts should be appointed to ascertain the extent of such improvements and to establish the amount to be accounted for by the defendant for rents, issues and profits during the time he had been in possession.
A. Geoffrion K.C. and St. Pierre for the appellant.
ligneault K.C. and Erroll Lan guedoc for the respondent.
(oral).-This appeal is dismissed with costs subject to a modification of the judgment appealed from directing that all questions as to amounts to be allowed the appellant for improvements and whether he is chargeable with rents, issues and profits from the 19th September, 1907, or some later date, shall be disposed of in the Superior Court after the expertise.
InINGTox J.-This case has beeii argued twice and as result of due consideration of all that has been urged in the somewhat varying arguments I think this appeal should be dismissed with costs.
J.-The registration referred to in each the articles 938, 939, 940, 941 and 950 of the Civil Code is, in my judgment, the same registration; that is to say, registration at the registry office of the domicile. is not registration affecting immovables as such, but registration necessary to make operative an instrument creating a substitution which is unopened.
I think the effect of articles 950 and 953 of the Civil Code and 781 of the Code of Civil Procedure is that an unopened substitution registered in the sense mentioned, that is to say, pursuant to article 941, C.C., is not affected by a sale under execution except in those cases provided for in article 953, C.C. I think that is the effect of the explicit provisions of these two articles; and I think the reasonable conclusion is that to apply article 2090, C.C. (relating to immovables as such), in such a way as to prejudice rights otherwise arising from such registration would be opposed to the policy of the law. Article 781, C.P.Q., it may be observed, is an article dealing primarily with procedure and it ought to be construed as far as reasonably possible so as to effectuate rights resting upon the provisions of the Civil Code relating to substantive law. It must be read with article 953, C.C., when the effect of a sale under execution upon an unopened substitution is in question and with article 1447, C.C., When it is a question of customary dower.
Vadebonca'ur v. City of Montreal(1), as I read it, does not proceed upon a construction of article 781, C.P.Q., alone, but chiefly on the provisions of the Special Act upon which the respondent in that case relied.
J.-The defendant attacks the judgment against him rendered by the trial judge, and confirmed tinct grounds with which I propose to deal. I shall, however, first state the material facts.
It is admitted that by the will of Donald McIntosh, who died in 1846, a substitution of the property in question was created, of which the testator's son Archibald McIntosh, who died in 1866, was the institute and first grev6, Donald J. Mcintosh, who died in 1907, was the second grevt.
and his son, Archibald McIntosh, the younger, now of age, is the ultimate substitute. A demand of abandonment was made Donald J. McIntosh prior to the 17th of January, Curators of his estate were appointed on the 24th of January, 1891.
On the same day the will Donald McIntosh was first registered. Subsequently, in 1896, the defendant became a judgment creditor of Donald J. McIntosh and under his judgment procured a sale of the land in question by the sheriff at which he became its purchaser.
Before paying his purchase money, however, he obtained an order that the other creditors of Donald J. McIntosh should give him security against distuTbance of his possession the property by any person taking title under the substitution.of which he then had full notice; and he received such security.
The appellant now claims that because the will Donald McIntosh was not registered before the abandonment by Donald J. McIntosh, the right of Archibald McIntosh as ultimate substitute is defeated by the provisions of articles 2090 and 2091 of the Civil Code, which read as follows:- In my opinion these articles have no application. The title with which they deal is a title in or upon the immovable property of the bankrupt.
The title of Archibald McIntosh the younger as ultimate substitute is in no wise derived from Donald J. McIntosh. Neither is it "in or upon his immovable property.", It is a title which comes directly from the testator who created the substitution, and it confers real rights in and upon his property.
It is not as the property of Donald J. McIntosh that Archibald McIntosh the younger receives the land in question (from him only possession is taken), but as the property of his greatgrandfather.
(Art. 962, C.C.)
Moreover, the title asserted by the appellant is under the sheriff's sale. He is not claiming in this proceeding under the abandonment or the bankruptcy; and I incline to think it is only persons claiming under the abandonment in bankruptcy and who have actually demonstrated by a judgment of distribution or other equivalent legal procedure that they have sustained prejudice or loss in consequence of the registration, who can attack it under article 2090, C.C. Trudel v. Parent (1).
The registration of the substitution was not a nullity. It was effectual from the date at which it was made.
(Art. 941, C.C.) That was long before the defendant acquired his interest under the sheriff's sale.
While the claims. of creditors of the institute, which antedated the registration of the substitution, un1 may, when duly preferred, prevail against the interest of the substitute (arts. 938 to 942; 2086-7, and 2109- 10, C.C.), it does not follow that upon the sale under an execution issued upon a personal judgment, such as was that obtained by the appellant against Donald J. McIntosh, in a proceeding in which the substitute or his representative was not impleaded (art. 959, C.C.), and there was no question before the court his interest, the title Which passed to the purchaser included that interest. On the contrary it is provided by article 781 of the Code of Civil Procedure that a sheriff's sale does not discharge the property from rights of substitution not yet opened, and article 950, C.C., states that- This obviously means "if it have been registered" before the sale takes place or, at events, before delivery of judgment by which the sale is authorized. The registration of the substitution was effectual from date at which it was made.
(Art. 941, C.C.) It would therefore seem that all that was acquired by the appellant under the sheriff's sale (no attack having been made up to that time on the substitution or on the interest of the substitute, which had then been registered for several years) was the personal interest of the institute subject to the substitution. The purchaser under the title thus acquired cannot defeat the claim of the substitute.
The next contention of the appellant was that the substitution is void because it was not published as required by article 57 of the "Ordonnance de Moulins" of 1566. He contends that the modifying declaration of the 17th of November, 1690, was never registered by J the Superior Council of Quebec and is therefore not in force in that province. In 1855 registration was substituted for publication, 18 Vict., ch. 101. The decision in Blidmer v. Dufresne(1), at page 92; Cass. Dig. (2 ed.) 873(2), is conclusive on this point against the appellant. Article 941, C.C., which is not new law (Aleloche v. Simpson(3) ), embodies the former provisions as to publication and registration and declares the effect of compliance with its requirements. The appellant next charges that the registration the will was defective because in the declaration the testator's death is stated to have occurred in 1866 instead of 1846. That mistake was a mere clerical error. It could have mislead nobody because the same declaration gave the date of probate of the will as the 20th of January, 1846. Such a mistake did not affect the validity of the iegistration.
Counsel for the appellant further contends that as the plaintiff's declaration in this action shews Archibald McIntosh the younger to be the heir of Donald J. McIntosh and no renunciation by him of the inheritance is alleged or proved, Archibald McIntosh must be deemed to have assumed -the burden of his father's debts. It is not in 'his quality of 'heir to his father that Archibald McIntosh takes the property in substitution. The plaintiff's declaration alleges only the facts material to establish his 'title as substitute. It is true that those same facts would establish his -heirship to his father. But they are not alleged for that purpose and he is not, merely because he claims and takes his great-grandfather's property as ultimate substitute, rOSH. to be deemed burdened with his father's debts in default of shewing that he had made a renunciation of his father's estate. Moreover, as a minor he would have taken with benefit of inventory.
The appellant finally maintains that he has been wrongfully held accountable for the revenue of the property-by the Superior Court from the date when he acquired it; and by the court of appeal from the date of the death of Donald J. McIntosh. He asserts that his liability to account is only from the date the commencement of this action, because he was then first notified of the death of Donald J. McIntosh by proceedings at law.
(Arts. 411 and 412, C.C.) This question may well be left open to be disposed of in the Superior Court after the report is made on the expertise directed.
The judgment should be modified accordingly.
With this modification the appeal should be dismissed with costs, the appellant having failed on all his principal grounds of attack. No adequate cause has been shewn for disturbing the order of the Court of King's Bench as to costs-a thing which is very rarely done in this court when we dismiss an appeal on the merits.
J. (dissident).-Il s'agit d'une action p6titaire institube par un appel6 contre le ddtenteur d'un immeuble substitu6.
Leroux, le d6tenteur de cet immeuble, a soulev6 un grand nombre de moyens de defense h 1'encontre de cette action p titoire, mais devant cette cour il n'en a discut6 que deux, savoir:- 1. Qu'en se rendent adjudicataire de F'immeuble vendu par le sh6rif pour une cr~ance ant6rieure a 1'enregistrement de la substitution il est devenu propri6taire absolu. En second lieu, il all~gue que Penr6gistrement de la substitution ayant t6 fait dans un moment ou le greve de substitution 6tait en faillite est sans effet.
Vu la conclusion h laquelle j'en suis arriv4 sur le premier point, il ne sera pas ndcessaire pour moi d'6xaminer la seconde objection soulev6e par le d&fendeur appelant, Leroux.
Les faits qui ont donn6 lieu h cette cause sout les suivants. En 1845, Donald McIntosh aurait cr6e par son testament une substitution fid6e commissaire pour 1immneuble en question dans cette cause-ci.
Par legs, son fils, Archibald McIntosh, 6tait grev6 de substitution et an dbc~s de ce dernier la propri6t6 passait a son fils, Donald J. McIntosh, comme deuxi~me grev6, et le de ce dernier, l'intim6 dans la pres~nte cause, 6tait appel6 h la substitution.
.
Le testament d'Archibald McIntosh ne fut pas enr6gistr6 du vivant du premier grev6.
Le deuxibme grev6, Donald J. McIntosh, faisait cession de ses biens le 17 janvier, 1891, et sept jours apr~s, savoir le 24 janvier, 1891, il faisait enrkgistrer la substitution. La preuve ne demontre pas les proc& dures qui ont kt faites sur cette cession aprds la nomination des curateurs; iiais Fintim6, Moise Leroux, qui 6tait porteur d'une cr6ance due par le second grev6 et ant~rieure h l'enr6gistrement de la substitution, fit saisir lPimmeuble en question; et sur dcr&t, en date du 17 mai, 1897, il s'est port6 acquereur de cet immeuble. Apr~s le d~chs du second grev4, lFappel6 a la substitution a revendiqu6 cet immeuble et a institu6 la prbsente poursuite.
M. Mignault, dans sa plaidoirie devant cette cour, a pr6tendu que la preuve ne demontrait pas que la . creance invoquee par Leroux existait anterieurkment L Fenr6gistrement de la substitution.
Je crois, au contraire, que la preuve est aussi satisfaisante que possible et qu'elle resulte de la delaration dans la cause, de la plaidoirie et du jugement rendu dans Faction institu6e par Leroux contre Mc- Intosh.
Dans ce jugement, en effet, il est mentionn6 que la cr6ance rclam6e par Leroux contre Donald J. Mc- Intosh existait depuis 1889 en vertu du contrat de mariage de Donald J. McIntosh avec son 6pouse, Dame E. Coulombe, que cette cr~ance avait 6t6 plus tard transport6e, en 1891, a Leroux et que ce dernier avait le droit d'eii r~clamer le montant.
L'intim6 )retend que les all~gations de ce jugement ne font pas de preuve contre li parce qu'elles sont res inter alios acta.
Cet argument, dans un cas ordinaire, aurait certainement beaucoup de force; mais saurait-il en avoir dans le cas actuel, quand Fintim6 lui-mnnie dans son notion invoque cc jugement et en fait mention ? Si toutefois il y avait quelque allegation dans jugement qui ne serait pas exacte, si toutefois la crbance qui y 4tait mentionn6e n'6tait pas due par le grev6, il aurait 6t6 temps alors pour Pappel6 d'invoquer ces moyens pour rendre nul et de nul effet jugement.
Mais il n'en dit rien.
Au contraire, il all~gue ce jugement dans sa d~claration et le d6fendeur dans son plaidoyer dit qu'il est vrai que ce jugement-lh a (t rendu et qu'il a t6 rendu pour une dette qui 6xistait depuis 1889.
En outre de cela, un certificat du r6gistrateur, qui a kt produit dans cette cause-ci et qui a dix 4galement 6tre produit lors du jugement de distribution dans la cause de Leroux contre McIntosh, c'est A dire dans la cause oil le decret a en lieu, (6montre que la cr6ance reclam~e par Leroux 6xistait en vertu de ce contrat de mariage, qu'elle ftait ant~ribure h 1'enregistrement de la substitution.
Cette question de savoir si cette cr~ance 6tait antbriure a P'enrrgistreuent de la substitution ou non ne parait pas avoir 6t6 contest~e par les parties en cour inf6rikire. Au contraire, comme je viens de le dire, le demandeur en faisait m~me mention dans son action.
Alors il me semble qu'il est trop tard maintenaut pour venir dire que la preuve est imparfaite et incomplte, quand il est, si evident par la preuve, peut-6tre secondaire, qui a faite que la cr~ance due par le second grev6 6tait bien ant6rihure h l'eur6gistrement de la substitution.
L'appel6 h la substitution pour rclamer est oblig6 de d6montrer que le testament en vertu duquel il reclame a 6t enr6gistr&
L'article 938 dit que les actes qui portent substitution doivent 6tre enrigistrbs dans lint~rt des appel6s et dans celai des tiers et que ce d6faut d'enr6gistrement ophre en faveur des tiers au prejudice des appel6s mime mineurs.
Les articles 939 et 940 du Code Civil disent que les cr6anciers du grev6 peuvent se prevaloir du d~faut d'enr6gistrement. Ii faut cependant que leur cr6ance soit antbribure h 1'enrkgistrement de ]a substitution. II n'est pas n6cessaire cependant qu'elle soit enr6gistr6e. Les cr6anciers ordinaires et les cr~anciers chirographaires out le droit de se plaindre du d6faut d'enr6gistrement. Mignault, vol. 5, p. 46.
Leroux, en sa qualit de cessionna ire de la cr~ance de McIntosh, tait don cr(ancier au moment de 1'enr~gistrement de la substitution et cet enrgistrement iie pouvait pas pr6valoir contre son cdaut id contre lui-m&me.
-st en preuve, en outre, que Mcintosh, le grev4, -i fait cession de ses biens le 17 janvier, 1891.
Ses biens out alors kt mis sous saquestre judiciaire. moment que cette cession-la 6tait faite aucun enrigistrement ne pouvait Ctre fait sur les immenbles, mime les imineubles dont it 6tait grev6 de substitution, de maiiibre a affecter les droits des cr6anciers.
Le dossier ne nous rev41e pas si l'immeuble en question taiit encore sous la main de la justice quand il a 6tk saisi et vendu a 1Fappellant, Leroux, en 1897. La vente judiciaire en lieu le 17 mal, 1897. A cette 6poque les immeubles c~d(-s en justice ne pouvaient &tre veudus qu'a la demaide du cr6ancier du failli.
Plus tard, le ler septembre, 1897, le code de proc&dure civile a kt amend6 et maintenant les biens immeubles cAdds peuvent 2tre vendus a ]a demaude du curateur.
II a t6 dbcid6 cependaiit que le code de procedure civile en autorisant le curateur Li vendre les immeubles cCd~s n'empkehait pas le crbaucier du failli qui avait un jugemvent de procder lui-m&me it la vente des ini meil)les en ex~cutioi de son jugement.
Leroux en faisant ex~cuter son jugement a pu proceder par cons~queiit contre des bicns qui 6taient encore dans les mains de la justice et le d6cret qui est iutervenu a eu pour effet de purger la substitution. Art. 781, C.P.Q.
Comme je 1'ai plus haut, le cr~ancier qui a fait vendre ces biens avait une cr~ance antribure et pr&ferable a celle du grev6 de substitution et, par cons6quent, sous l'autorit6 de 1'article 781, C.C., la substitution se trouve purg6e.
Mais on dit: 1'article 953, C.C., mentionne sp&cifiquement le cas dans lesquels le d6cret purge les substitutions.
Je ne crois pas cependant que 1'article 953, C.C., doive 4tre interpr6t6 diff6rimment de 'article 781, C.P.C.
Tous les deux doivent 6tre interprit6s I'un par 'autre et je considbre que l'article 953, C.C., n'est pas limitatif ainsi que cette cour l'a d6cid6 dans Vadeboncour v. Cit6 de Montr6al(1).
J'en suis done la conclusion que la substitution a 6t6 purg6e par la vente dans la cause de Leroux v. McIntosh, et que ladjudicataire, Fintin6 dans la pr~sente cause, a un titre farfait et qu'il peut 1'opposer h 'action p6titoire institude par pel6 h la substitution.
Le jugement a quo devrait Atre renvers6 et laction de lappel6 la substitution devrait 6tre renvoy~e avec d6pens tant de cette cour que des cours inf6rikures.
Appeal dismissed with costs; judg-, ment appealed from varied.