In an action to quash a procks-verbal passed by a municipal council for the purpose of opening a road and acquiring land by way of expropriation or otherwise, the controversy relates to a title to lands and an appeal lies to the Supreme Court of Canada. Idington J. dissenting. Murray v. Town of Westmount (27 Can. S.C.R. 579) followed.
MOTION to quash an appeal from the judgment of the Court of King's Bench, appeal side, reversing the judgment of the Superior Court and maintaining the respondent's action to quash a proc~s-verbal and a resolution homologating same, passed by the appellant for the purpose of opening a road and acquiring land by expropriation or otherwise.
*PRESENT:-Sir Louis Davies C.J. and Idington, Duff, Anglin and Mignault JJ.
The material facts of the case are fully stated in the reasons for judgment of the registrar of this court on a motion to affirm jurisdiction, which motion was granted. THE REGISTRAR.-ThiS is a motion to affirm the jurisdiction of the Court. The facts of the case are in as follows
On the 15th August, 1917, Jos. N. Poirier, named surintendent spdcial of the municipal council of the county of Arthabaska by virtue of a resolution passed on 13th of June of the same year, made a procas verbal for the construction of a road as therein set out. The said procks verbal recited the regularity of the proceedings which led up to the same and ordered that a road should be opened and that certain lands should be expropriated for the highway and that the work should be executed by the appellant as provided by the municipal code, but at the cost and charges of the respondent and mise-en-cause.
On the 12th September, 1917, this procs verbal was homologated and public notice thereof as required by the municipal code was duly given on the 19th September. By by-law No. 60 of the appellants, dated 11th September, 1918, a delay was granted for the completion of the work. On February 19th, 1919, an action was instituted by the present respondents to have the said procs verbal declared illegal and ultra vires and asking to have the resolution homologating the same annulled on a number of grounds.
The case was inscribed en droit and argued before Mr. Justice Pouliot, who states in his judgment that the mayors of the respondent and mise-en-cause corporations had concurred in the resolution appointing Poirier as surintendent spdcial of the projected work and in the resolution of Sept. 12th, 1917, of the appellants which homologated the procs verbal. The learned judge also says that the respondent corporation, by resolution of 10th Sept., 1917, supported the request of certain inhabitants of the respondent corporation who would be contributories to the expense of this work asking that some amendments should be made to the procks verbal in order that the road should be declared a county road and be at the charge of the county for opening and maintenance or at the charge of the petitioners, Boulanger et al, or to declare it a local road at the charge of the Corporation of St. Norbert, the mise-en-cause, and that consequently the plaintiff corporation could not be permitted to ask that the procks verbal be declared illegal as it had implicitly admitted its legality.
The said judgment also states that the proceedings in the expropriation had been made in execution of the said procks verbal, that arbitrators had been appointed, the lands valued and that indemnities had been accorded to the various proprietors, which indemnities had been paid to the parties expropriated and accepted by them and that the monies so paid amounted to
$2,825, and the learned judge concludes his judgment by dismissing the plaintiffs action with costs.
On appeal to the Court of King's Bench, the judgment of Mr. Justice Pouliot was reversed and from this judgment the present appeal is taken to the Supreme
Court of Canada. The respondents in this court oppose the motion relying strongly upon the decision of Toussignant v. Nicolet (1), the head-note of which says
The judgment of the court was pronounced by Sir Henri, then Mr. Justice, Taschereau in which he held COEA that the jurisprudence of the court was against the right to entertain the appeal. He says:- P.
The fact that the procks verbal attacked by the appellants' action may have the result to put upon them the cost of the work in question, COPORA- alleged to be over $2,000, does not make the controversy one of $2,000. There no pecuniary amount in controversy; in other words there no controversy as to a pecuniary amount or of a pecuniary nature. The Registrar It is settled law that neither the probative force of a judgment, nor its collateral effects, nor any contingent loss that a party may suffer by reason of a judgment are to be taken into consideration when our jurisdiction depends upon the pecuniary amount or upon any of the subjects mentioned in sec. 29 of the Supreme Court Act.
At the conclusion of his judgment he says that certain decisions of the court are authorities against the appellants' claim to an appeal based upon s.s. (g) of sec. 24 of the Act, (now sec. 39 (e)) and proceeds:-- Then this is not a case of a by-law, but of a procks verbal. And it is a private action, not a petition to annul under the Municipal Act. The distinction between these two proceedings was made in Webster v. The City of Sherbrooke and McKay v. Township of Hinchinbrooke (2). I am of the opinion that the authority of this decision has been much shaken by subsequent decisions. So far as it holds that where a municipal by-law is attacked in a private action that the judgment quashing the by-law would only be binding as between the parties it is seriously controverted by some of the judges in the case of Shawinigan Hydro-Electric Co. v. Shawinigan Water & Power Co. (3).
In the latter case also the majority of the court held that although the proceeding was one nominally for an injunction, the court would look at the substance of the appeal which in that case was the validity of a contract involving $40,000 and on that ground held that the court had jurisdiction to hear the appeal.
(1) [1894] 24 Can. S.C.R. 52.
(2) [1894] 24 Can. S.C.R. 55. (3) (1910] 43 Can. S.C.R. 650.
VOL. LXII. More recently in the case of Bisaillon v. the City of
Montreal (1), it was held in an action brought to annul a resolution of the City of Montreal and for an injunction to restrain the city from proceeding to expropriate lands, that the Supreme Court had jurisdiction under sect. 46 s.s. e of the "Supreme Court Act" ont he ground that it involved title to lands and other matters or things where rights in future might be bound. The most recent case of all is that of La Ville de La Tuque v. Desbien, decided in February, 1920, and reported shortly in the Supplement to Cameron's
Supreme Court Practice, p. 35.
At the time of the publication of the supplement the reasons for judgment were not available. I have them now so far as any were delivered, viz., those of Mr. Justice Brodeur
(concurred in by Mr. Justice Idington) and of Mr.
Justice Mignault.
In that case the declaration alleges that the municipal council of La Tuque had passed a resolution ordering the opening of a new road according to the terms of the petition.
The declaration alleged that the road had been opened to the public for three or four weeks; the resolution of the council was attacked on the ground that it was illegal and ultra vires, as the municipality had no power to buy the land required for the opening of the road; and that the proceeding by way of by-law and resolution was not sufficient to make valid the procedure of the municipal council.
Mr. Justice Gibsone in the Superior Court found in favour of the plaintiff and declared the resolution illegal and ultra vires and ordered the road to be closed and his judgment was confirmed by the Court of King's Bench.
Thereupon an appeal was taken to the Supreme Court of Canada and the respondent moved to quash for want of jurisdiction.
Mr. Justice Brodeur says- S'il s'agissait que de la 16galit6 de la rdsolution ordonnant I'ouverture d'une rue, il n'y aurait pas de doute que nous n'aurions pas juridiction.
Verchbres v. Varennes (1); Bell Telephone Co. v. Quebec (2); Dubois v. Ste. Rose 3).
Mais cette resolution comporte l'acceptation de donation et I'achat des terrains pour une somme excidant $2,000.
Ces terrains, dont le titre 6tait en faveur de la corporation, cessent par m~me d'6tre la propri6td de la corporation municipale et les vendeurs ou les donateurs qui ont 6t6 mis en cause redeviennent les propriftaires des terrains qu'ils avaient c6d6s.
Je ne vois pas la diff6rence entre la pr6sente cause et celle de The Registrar Murray v. Westmount (4), nous avons d6cid6 que dans une action pour annuler un r6glement pour l'expropriation d'un terrain le litige a trait A un droit immobilier, "title to lands."
. Je pourrais aussi citer la cause do Shawinigan Hydro-Electric Co. v. Shawinigan Water & Power Co. (5), oh il s'agissait d'un raglement ordonnant 1'achat de certaines propri6tis. La majorit6 de la cour a d6cid6 que nous avions jurisdiction.
La cause de Bisaillon v. La Cite de Montreal (6) avait 6t6 institude pour annuler une r6solution par laquelle la cit6 se d6sistait de l'expropriation de certains terrains et limitait son expropriation A d'autres propri6t6s; et nous en sommes venus A la conclusion que cette cour La motion doit 6tre renvoyde avec dspens.
Mr. Justice Mignault in his judgment states:- Je suis d'opinion que l'affaire en litige s'616ve A la somme ou valeur d'au moins deux mille dollars.
Le maintien de l'action de l'intim6 a n6cessairement I'effet de rendre nulles les ventes de terrains que les mis-en-cause ont fait A i'appelante, car s'il a 6t6 jug6 que la resolution en question est ill6gale, ultra vires et nulle, et s'il est fait d6fense A l'appelante de donner suite A la dite resolution, il restera d6cid6 que l'appelante n'avait pas droit d'acheter ces terrains pour l'ouverture de la nouvelle rue, et elle ne pourra pas payer la balance qui reste due sur les achats, car ce serait donner suite A la r6solution qu'elle a adopt6e.
Le montant valeur en contestation est d'au moins $2,000.
Pour cette raison je suis d'avis que le droit d'appel existe, mais ce droit d'appel pourrait 6galement se justifier sous l'op6ration du paragraphe (b) de Particle 46 de '"Acte de la Cour Supr6me," car l'affaire en litige "a rapport A un titre de terres ou tenements". Je suis done d'avis que Ia motion de l'intim6 doit 6tre renvoy6e avec d6pens.
(1) 19 Can. S.C.R. 365.
(4) 27 Can. S.C.R. 579.
(2) [1891] 20 Can. S.C.R. 230.
(5) 43 Can. S.C.R. 650.
(3) [1892] 21 Can. S.C.R. 65. (6) Cameron's Sup. C. Pract. Vol. 2, 176. The present case, I think, is clearly distinguishable from Toussignant v. Nicolet (1) in this regard that in the latter the proceedings were taken as soon as the resolution of the municipal council was passed homologating the procs verbal.
In the present case after homologation the road was laid out, lands were expropriated, moneys paid to the property owners in amount exceeding $2,000 and the lands became the property of the municipality.
If the present judgment appealed from should stand it would mean that the municipality will have no title to the lands expropriated.
There is therefore clearly a title to lands involved and a sum of money exceeding $2,000 and these are not matters collateral to the procks verbal but are the very substance and essence of the matter in controversy between the parties.
I am therefore of opinion that there is jurisdiction in this court to hear the appeal. At any rate the question of jurisdiction is sufficiently doubtful, putting it most favourably to the respondent, that I conceive it my duty to allow the application because no special prejudice will arise to respondent.
He still has the right to move to quash the appeal for want of jurisdiction at the opening of the court.
April 8th, 1921,
E. R. Cameron, Registrar.
Alleyn Taschereau K.C. and W. Girouard for the motion.
Antonio Perreault K.C. contra.
THE concur with Mr. Justice
Mignault.
(dissenting).-This suit being essentially nothing but a struggle between appellant, a county municipality, and the respondents, which are other municipal corporations within same, as to the validity of a procks verbal of the appellant and proceedings pursuant thereto for the purpose of constituting a county highway and of imposing the burden of creating and maintaining same, or respectparts thereof, upon the respondents, fail understand how either the title to land or the amount which might be involved in the execution of the project if carried out, are at all in question.
Probably some day we will hear the argument put forward that we have jurisdiction because two thousand dollars had been spent by the parties in litigation and that hence it is necessary to see which party we should direct to pay that sum.
I am of the opinion that we have no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal and that the affirmation by the registrar's order of such right must be reversed with costs of the application before him and of this motion. J.-I concur in the result.
J.-I concur with Mr. Justice Mignault. J.-Lintim6e demande la cassation de cet appel, pr6tendant que nous sommes sans juridiction pour en connattre.
Le savant greffier de cette cour, M. Cameron, sur une motion de l'appelante, a d~clar6 que nous avions juridiction, mais l'intim6e n'en demande pas moins que l'appel soit cass6. L'action de l'intim6e, rejet6e par la cour sup6rieure mais maintenue par la cour du Bane du Roi, est en cassation d'un prochs-verbal homologu6 par le conseil de l'appelante, et par ses conclusions l'intimbe demande m2 l'annulation du proc~s-verbal et de la r6solution d'homologation.
Le prochs-verbal ordonne l'ouverture d'un chemin et I'acquisition A l'amiable ou par expropriation du terrain n6cessaire, et la resolution du conseil de l'appelante, en homologuant ce proc6sverbal, ordonne par 1A-mime cette acquisition ou cette expropriation.
L'intimbe a attendu si longtemps avant d'intenter son action que le terrain A tre occup6 par le chemin avait 6t6, lors de la signification des proc6dures, non seulement expropri6 mais pay6, la d6pense totale se montant A $2,825.00.
Je suis d'opinion qu'il y a lieu d'appliquer ici la d~cision de cette cour dans Murray v. The Town of
Westmount (1).
Dans cette dernibre cause une r6solution du conseil municipal ordonnait l'6largissement d'une rue et I'acquisition ou 'expropriation du terrain requis.
Ici c'est une route qu'on veut ouvrir et le proc~s-verbal et la r6solution d'homologation d6cr& tent 1'acquisition A l'amiable ou par expropriation de l'emplacement du chemin.
Il y a done parit6 complate entre les deux espices, et puisque dans Murray v. Town of Westmount (1) nous avons d6cid6 que nous avions juridiction, le litige se rapportant "A un titre,
A des terres ou tenements" (art. 46, "Loi concernant la cour suprime"), il faut nicessairement en arriver A la m~me conclusion ici.
Je suis d'avis de renvoyer la motion de l'intim6e avec d6pens.
Motion dismissed with costs.