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Bélanger v. Canadian Consolidated Rubber Co.

(1922) 63 SCR 384 Tribunal SCC Date de la décision 1922-03-29 Anglais

Table des matières
the judgment of Surveyer J. and dismissing the appellant's claim for augmentation of the maximum compensation under the "Workmen's Compensation Act."
The material facts of the case are fully stated in the above head-note and in the judgments now reported. Charlemagne Rodier K.C. for the appellant.-There is an "inexcusable fault" of the respondent company: as the appellant had no experience in the work he was ordered to do;
the machine was dangerous; appellant had received no previous instructions; there were no protection devices; the floor was slippery; there had been a previous similar accident.
A. Chase-Casgrain K.C. for the respondent.
JUSTICE.-This action is one brought under the "Workmen's Compensation Act" of Quebec. The plaintiff claimed not only the ordinary maximum compensation, which indeed was admitted by the defendant company, but alleging "inexcusable fault" on the part of the company claimed $25,000 damages for the injuries sustained by him.
These injuries consisted of the loss of both his hands. They were caught and crushed in the machine which he was working, necessitating their amputation.
For three months previous to the accident he had been working at the back of the same machine receiving the cotton as it passed through, but on the occasion of the accident he had been put to work at the front of the machine feeding the cotton into it between two rollers. machine in question is called a Calendar and is electrically driven.
It consists of two rollers of about 24" (inches) in diameter which turn reversely on each other, and cotton in sheets or layers for the purpose of being pressed to an even surface is passed between them. They revolve at a maximum rate of about four revolutions per minute.
The "inexcusable fault" is alleged to have consisted mainly in the fact that the machine was defective in not having been provided with proper safety and protection devices for the workmen employed in running it. Other faults were alleged, but the absence of additional protective devices to those already provided was the main and chief one relied on and the only one in my opinion under which the plaintiff could hope possibly to succeed.
Their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in the appeal of Montreal Tramways Co. v. Savignac (1), stated as their opinion that leaving the question to be determined in each case as it arose.
If the plaintiff had suceeded in shewing that the L12 work in which he was engaged when injured was dangerous work, and that there were other known protective devices for workmen engaged on Calendar machines of which the company could and should have known, and had neglected to provide, the question before us would have assumed an entirely different aspect. But the evidence seems clear that there were no other protective devices known or in use which the company could have or should have provided. As a fact the company had an engineer who was continually working, looking up new devices for safety apparatus.
None so far had been found applicable to this machine.
The manufacturers who supplied these Calendar machines did not provide any such additional safety device, other than the apparatus of wire for stopping the machine within four seconds. No evidence was given that any safety guard was in use anywhere on machines of the sort in question here.
The government inspectors whose duty it is to see that employers were warned to guard dangerous machines when practicable had never given the defendant any notice to provide any additional safety guard on this machine, and I cannot find any evidence establishing that there was anywhere a practicable additional guard in existence or use which should have been known to the defendant company and installed by them.
The work in which the plaintiff was engaged was not specially dangerous work.
On the contrary, I have had great difficulty in determining how the plaintiff could have had his hands drawn in between the rollers unless by gross carelessness or neglect on his own part.
He was a workman who had been working on and about the machine which caused the accident for a period of about three months, although he had not previously to the day of the accident been employed in actually feeding the cotton between the slowly revolving rollers.
Under all the circumstances I cannot find "inexcusable fault" on the part of the company in not having provided an additional guard for the protection of the workmen feeding the cotton between the rollers. I would therefore dismiss this appeal.
J. (dissenting)-The appellant having served as a shipping clerk for some years was given employment in one of the respondent's manufacturing shops by way of taking away from the rear of a Calendar machine pressed cotton which had passed through between the rollers of said machine.
The said machine consists of two rollers which are placed one above the other and each twenty-five inches in diameter at the rate of four revolutions a minute. It was stated in argument and not denied and seems borne out by the evidence that a party engaged, as appellant was, when working at the rear of the machine, could neither see nor learn from where he stood when so engaged how the work was done of feeding the cotton into the front of the machine.
Hence the three months he was so engaged were of no service in way of instructing him how to feed the machine and the dangers to be avoided in doing so. He was only twenty-five years of age when he was suddenly, on returning to work at one P.M. of the 3rd April, 1919, directed by the foreman over him to proceed to the front part of the machine and feed the cotton into it, and he obeyed the order so given.
About half an hour after he had begun doing so his right hand was drawn in between the said rollers and in the effort to extricate it he slipped on the damp floor and so fell that his left hand also was drawn in between the said rollers.
His cries of distress arrested the attention of others and some one of them stopped the machine.
As a result of the accident both his hands had to be amputated and thus he is crippled for life.
He was given no instruction of any kind, or warning or help, as any young inexperienced beginner ought to have had, as is abundantly testified by more than one witness.
There was no guard or protective appliance of any kind in front of the machine.
Such devices are in use in many ways and of different kinds when the Calendar machine, or its principle, is applied to doing other work than the particular kind done in respondent's factory.
One witness pretends he has seen the like machine at work elsewhere when serving same purposes as in the respondent's shop and that without any guard other than the appliance used to stop the machine, which only proves how reckless some manufacturers can be.
Electric current was the motive force used to operate the machine in question.
It could be cut off by pulling a wire at the side of the machine, about three feet or more from where the appellant was standing when engaged at feeding the cotton into the machine. I am unable to understand people who refer to this as a safeguard or means of protecting the person engaged in feeding the machine.
It obviously is not, and when once such a person's hands, or single hand, is drawn in he cannot even stop the machine. There had been a similar accident about eight months previously in the use of this machine, whereby the man engaged as appellant was, on the occasion in question herein, had lost part of his hand. Yet no means were actually taken by the respondent to apply any safeguard.
Apparently it is cheaper for people like respondent to pay the occasional small toll extracted from them by the terms of the "Workmen's Compensation Act" than to invent or apply any invention known to safeguard employees.
The appellant sued respondent for damages resulting to him and the learned trial judge held that there was inexcusable fault on the part of respondent leading to this accident and thus the $2,500 limit of the "Workmen's Compensation Act" was no bar to his recovery as if suing at common law.
He assessed the damages on that basis at $17,500.
I unhesitatingly agree with his finding that there was inexcusable fault.
I am not so clear as to the finding of inexcusable fault having the necessary legal consequence of damages being recoverable to the full extent that would have been allowable had the "Workmen's Compensation Act" never been passed.
I was tempted to think in the course of the argument here that there might be implied in the following quotation from the "Workmen's Compensation Act", the graduating of the scale of damages proportionately to the gravity of inexcusableness thus brought in question.
However, though taking several objections in their factum to the measure of damages, counsel for the respondent do not present any such view or indeed any view we have given heed to here for many years past. Even when the amount exceeded that, we might, if trying the case or in sitting in appeal below have allowed;
yet mistakes of that kind should not be entertained here and thereby encourage needless litigation.
Agreeing, as I do, with Mr. Justice Tellier's view of the case, I think that possibly respondent missed a good chance when it failed to act on his suggested reduction.
The measuring of damages such as appellant has to endure by what a young man of twenty-five is earning to my mind is quite fallacious.
And before parting with this case I cannot forbear quoting a sentence taken from the respondent's own regulations, which reads as follows:
If the non-observance of this injunction had been properly and consistently acted upon I can hardly imagine respondent's foreman, who placed appellant where he met such disaster as in question herein, would have dared to venture on such a foolhardy step as ordering an ignorant and inexperienced youth to feed such a machine as in question, even if it had been protected or guarded as it was not.
I would allow this appeal with costs throughout and restore the learned trial judge's judgment.
J.-The material facts sufficiently appear in the judgments delivered in the Court of King's Bench and in the opinion of my brother Mignault, in whose conclusions as well as his appreciation of the presentation of the appellant's case by Mr. Rodier I fully concur.
Ordinary liability for the maximum compensation under the "Workmen's Compensation Act" having been admitted by the defendants, it is only necessary to consider the appellant's claim for augmentation of that amount under Art. 7325 (2) based on his allegation that the accident, in which he was very seriously injured, was due to "inexcusable fault" of his employer.
In Montreal Tramways Co. v. Savignac (1) their Lordships of the Judicial Committee said:- I shall not essay the formulation of a definition that is probably impracticable.
The only alleged fault on the part of the defendants which could with any degree of reasonableness be pressed as inexcusable was the omission to provide an efficient guard to prevent the hands of the operator being drawn into the Calendar machine at which the plaintiff was injured. The practicability of such a guard is perhaps sufficiently established by the evidence. But no guard was furnished by the manufacturer of the machine and there is no satisfactory evidence that such a guard was in use anywhere on machines intended for the purpose for which the machine in question was used.
The Government Inspectors, whose duty it is to see that employers are warned to guard dangerous machines when practicable, had not notified the defendants to guard this machine. evidence falls short of establishing that there was a practicable guard for it which was, or should have been, known to the defendants.
An accident, said to have been somewhat similar to that now under consideration, had happened in the defendant's factory some time before and the evidence warrants the inference that it must have been known to them. But the circumstances of this accident are not stated and it does not appear that it was due to a cause which the defendant could or should have provided against.
For aught that is shewn this former accident may have been wholly due to carelessness on the part of the workman. Indeed, in the present case it is difficult to conceive how the plaintiff's hand could have been drawn between the rollers unless he was, at least momentarily, inattentive to what was an obvious danger.
So obvious was it that it seems to me to be idle to attempt to found a charge of inexcusable fault on the placing of an adult of ordinary intelligence at the work to which the plaintiff was assigned, however limited his experience.
Having regard to all the circumstances the plaintiff in my opinion has failed to establish a case of inexcusable fault on the part of the defendants.
J.-I concur with, Mr. Justice Mignault. J.-Le savant avocat de l'appelantqui a plaid6 sa cause avec beaucoup de talent et aussi avec une franchise qui lui fait honneur-nous a fait remarquer que les honorables juges qui ont 6t saisis de cette cause se sont 4galement divis~s. Ce qui explique peut-4tre cette diff6rence d'opinion, c'est qu'indubitablenent il y a eu faute de la part de l'intim6e, mIais ce n'est pas la question A d6cider. Il s'agit de d6terminer si cette faute peut 6tre qualifi6e de faute inexcusable aux termes de l'article 7325 S.R.P.Q. (1909), et on peut la croire quasi-d6lictuelle au sens des articles 1053 et 1054 du code civil, sans en conclure qu'elle soit r6ellement la faute inexcusable dont parle l'article 7325.
L'expression "faute inexcusable" nous vient de la loi frangaise des accidents du travail. Dans un sens, toute faute est inexcusable par l mime qu'elle est faute.
Mais le l6gislateur entend ici une faute d'une gravit6 exceptionnelle, quelque chose de plus qu'une faute m'me lourde, on dit mime quelque chose qui se rapproche de l'intention criminelle (Dalloz, Ripertoire pratique, vo. Accidents de Travail, no. 226), et dans la discussion du projet de loi au s6nat frangais, on a propos6 cette expression comme rendant bien l'ide du l6gislateur que la faute dont il s'agit devait 6tre d'une telle gravit6 qu'elle feit sans excuse. En effet, on entend g6n6ralement par faute inexcusable une faute qui est plus pr~s du dol que de la faute 1ourde (Baudry-Lacantinerie, Louage, no. 2270). inporte de tenir compte de l'origine de cette expression quand on se demande s'il y a eu, dans une espce particulibre, une faute inexcusable du patron ou de l'ouvrier. Cela 6tant dit, on peut se dispenser de d6finir cette faute.
Le conseil priv6 d'ailleurs n'a pas voulu tenter cette d6finition dans la cause de Montreal Tramways Co. v. Savignac
(1), et les circonstances varient tellement dans les espices qui viennent devant les tribunaux qu'aucune formule ne pourrait etre inaginde qui conviendrait absolument A chacune de ces espices.
Le besoin d'une d6finition se fera moins sentir du reste si on peut indiquer certains 616ments que l'on devra trouver dans chaque cas o'i l'on pr6tend que l'ouvrier ou le patron a 6t6 coupable d'une faute inexcusable.
J'accepte les 616ments sugg6rds par M. Sachet (Accidents du travail, 6e 6d., t6me 2, no 1439), et que l'honorable juge de premibre instance consigne dans son jugement:
volont6 d'agir ou d'omettre; connaissance du danger pouvant r6sulter de l'action ou de l'omission; 30 absence d'une cause justificative ou explicative.
Et j'ajoute qu'en exag6rant la faute du patronil est pleu probable qu'on exagbre celle de l'ouvrier et peut-6tre A bon droit-on en arriverait facilement A rendre la majoration de l'indemnit6 due A l'ouvrier la r~gle au lieu de l'exception qu'elle doit tre sous l'empire de toute loi des accidents du travail.
Car cette loi est fond6e sur l'id6e du risque professionnel (Fuzier-Herman, R6pertoire, vo. Responsabiliti civile, nos. 1459 et suiv.), risque que le patron et I'ouvrier doivent assumer dans la mesure prescrite par le l6gislateur, et ce n'est que lorsque ce risque a augment6 par une faute inexcusable attribuable h l'un ou A l'autre qu'il convient de diminuer ou d'augmenter l'indemnit6 normale que comporte l'6valuation, dans les conditions ordinaires, de ce risque professionel.
L'esp~ce que nous sommes appel6s A juger me fournit l'occasion d'appliquer les principes que je viens d'exposer.
B6langer, depuis longtemps A 1'emploi de l'intim6e dans le d6partement d'exp6dition des marchandises, n'6tait que depuis trois mois employ6 aux machines. Jusqu'au jour de l'accident il. recevait, derribre une machine connue sous le nom de "calendar", le coton destin6 A 6tre enduit d'une couche de caoutchouc et qui passait entre de grands rouleaux ou cylindres tournant en sens inverse A une vitesse au maximum de quatre r6volutions par minute.
Ce jour-lk, vers une heure de l'apr~s-midi, I'employ6 qui faisait fonctionner cette machine, c'est-A-dire qui faisait passer entre les rouleaux une bande de coton large de quatre pieds, ayant manqu6 tout k coup, le contre-mattre le fit remplacer par B61anger.
Ce fut un malheur pour celui-ci, car une demi-heure plus tard, il se faisait prendre d'abord la main droite et ensuite la main gauche entre les rouleaux, avec le r6sultat qu'on dfit lui amputer les deux mains.
II poursuit maintenant sous l'empire de la loi des accidents du travail, r6clamant I'augmentation de l'indemnit6 normale A raison de la faute inexcusable de son patron.
L'intimbe a pay6 A l'appelant $2,500, le maximum de l'indennit6 normale, avec $99.45 pour les frais d'action. Toute la question maintenant est de savoir s'il y a eu faute inexcusable entrainant majoration d'indemnit6. La cour de premibre instance, pr6sid6e par l'honorable juge Surveyer, a d~cid6 en faveur de l'ouvrier, jugeant qu'il y avait lieu de fixer l'indemnit6 comme si l'accident en question 6tait r6gi par le droit commun, et elle a donn6 A B6langer une augmentation d'indemnit6 de $15,000.00.
Sur appel A la cour du Bane du Roi, les honorables' juges Martin et Greenshields ont d6cid6 qu'il n'y avait pas eu faute inexcusable du patron, le troisi~me juge, I'honorable juge Tellier, 6tant d'un avis contraire, mais le juge Tellier a exprimb l'opinion que l'indemnit6 devait tout de meme tre bas6e sur l'6chelle contenue A la loi des accidents du travail, et il n'aurait accord6 au demandeur qu'une augmentation de $12,926.84.
Il y a done cette question subsidiaire A r6soudre au cas ol je serais d'avis que nous avons bien ici un cas de faute inexcusable du patron.
J'ai dit qu'il y a eu indubitablement faute de l'intimbe, mais il ne faut pas se laisser influencer par cette faute au point de conclure A l'existence d'une faute inexcusable qui est, je le r6p6te, I'exception l'empire de la loi des accidents du travail.
Ainsi c'6tait une faute de mettre A l'ouvrage sur cette machine J. un ouvrier inexp6riment6 dans ce genre de travail, sans lui adjoindre quelqu'un pour veiller A ce qu'il s'y prit de fagon A ne point s'exposer au danger, du moins pendant ses premiers essais.
C'6tait encore une faute du patron si le plancher se tenait B61anger 6tait glissant comme il le pr6tend, mais d'autres timoins le nient, ou si le coton qu'il devait faire passer entre les rouleaux pr6sentait des plis qui pouvaient saisir sa main et l'entrainer avec le coton dans ces rouleaux. Mais il ne s'ensuit nullement que cette faute fft inexcusable, et il ne peut r6sulter que confusion si on ne fait abstraction ici de la th6orie de la faute d'apr~s le droit commun, car nous sommes en presence d'une loi qui y fait exception.
Pour savoir si dans l'esp~ce cette faute 6tait inexcusable, il faut se rappeler encore ce que j'ai appel6 les 614ments de M. Sachet.
Y a-t-il eu en tout cela volont6 d'agir ou d'omettre, connaissance du danger pouvant r6sulter de l'action ou de l'omission, et absence d'une cause justificative ou explicative?
Je ne le crois pas, du moins quant aux fautes que j'ai signal6es. Il y a eu imprudence, surtout en laissant travailler un ouvrier inexp6riment6, et cette imprudence, tout en 6tant une faute, n'est pas une faute inexcusable au sens de la loi des accidents du travail.
L'appelant a abandonn6 A l'audition devant nous la faute qu'il imputait au patron de n'avoir pas pourvu A un appareil pouvant amener l'arr6t de la machine en cas d'accident.
L'appareil, une broche A la port6e de l'ouvrier, s'y trouvait et aurait immobilis6 les rouleaux dans l'espace de quatre secondes.
Mais l'appelant insiste et impute A l'intimbe une faute qu'il qualifie d'inexcusable, parce qu'elle n'aurait pa8 plaC un appareil protecteur devant la machine pour empecher que les mains de 1'ouvrier n'y fussent entrainbes, et cela d'autant plus qu'un accident semblable 6tait arriv6 A un ouvrier quelques mois auparavant, signalant ainsi au patron le danger que pr6sentaient ces rouleaux sans appareil protecteur.
Je suis bien prit A reconnaitre que si I'appelant pouvait dire que dans les autres usines on munit ces machines d'appareils protecteurs, ou qu'on peut facilement les en munir sans entraver le travail, et si l'accident ant6rieur avait t6 connu du patron et faisait clairement voir le danger de laisser fonctionner ces machines sans ces appareils, on aurait r6uni les 616ments dont parle M. Sachet, et partant il y aurait faute inexcusable.
Mais la lecture attentive de toute la preuve me convainc qu'il n'est pas d'usage de poser ces appareils protecturs sur des machines semblables.
D'autres machines, comme celles qu'on trouve dans les buanderies, en ont, mais pas les rouleaux dont il s'agit ici. Et peut-on facilement les en munir sans entraver le travail?
Cela ne me parait pas d6montr6. Des timoins disent que les ing6nieurs de la compagnie ont mis la question . l'6tude sans r6ussir A trouver l'appareil dont parle l'appelant. Et il faut se garder d'affirmations comme celles que fait M. Guyon, sousministre du travail A Qu6bec.
Car si M. Guyon pouvait facilement fabriquer un tel appareil, comme il le dit, pourquoi n'en a-t-il pas ordonn6 l'installation avant l'accident, comme il avait le pouvoir de le faire? Nous trouvons dans ce cas, comme dans les esp~ces semblables, des gens qui apras 1'6v6nement ont bien des suggestions h faire.
Le malheur, c'est qu'ils n'aient pas fait ces suggestions en temps utile; et en supposant qu'ils pouvaient eux-m~mes proposer un rem~de facile et pratique, rien ne d6montre que ce J. remide feat connu de l'intim6e avant I'accident. Reste l'accident arriv6 au nomm6 Hannah quelques mois avant l'accident de B6langer. J'ai lu attentivement la d6position de Hannah. Je ne trouve pas qu'il fasse voir comment l'accident lui est arrive. II a pu trbs bien tre imprudent ou inattentif. Hannah faisait passer par les rouleaux le coton avec une couche de caoutchouc, B61anger y faisait passer le coton seul. Hannah se plaint de l'appareil pour faire arriter la machine, et pr6tend qu'il aurait dd y avoir un homme A c6t6 de lui uniquement pour faire fonctionner cet appareil en cas d'accident.
L'appelant ne se plaint plus de l'appareil qui irnmobilise les rouleaux. Hannah ne signale le besoin d'aucun autre appareil protecteur.
En somme, en supposant que l'accident de Hannah et la cause de cet accident aient t connus des officiers de l'intimbe, cela n'est pas d6montr6, il faudrait encore prouver que par cet accident l'intim6e a eu connaissance du danger possible et qu'elle avait le moyen de le pr6venir par des pr6cautions qu'elle a manqu6 de prendre.
Dire que les rouleaux 6taient dangereux pour un homme attentif, c'est une affirmation que le dossier ne permet pas de faire
Je trouve done qu'il y a eu dans l'espice une faute, qui, si nous 6tions sous l'empire du droit commun, donnerait lieu A l'application pleine et entiare des articles 1053 et 1054 du code civil. Je ne crois pas cependant que cette faute soit la faute inexcusable dont parle la loi des accidents du travail.
Et comme 399, il s'agit d'une exception qu'admet cette loi dans 1valuation de l'indemnit6 que l'ouvrier a droit d'avoir, il faudrait que je fusse convaincu que nous sonnes dans le cas de cette exception pour tre en droit d'accorder l'augmentation d'indemnit6 que r6clame I'appelant.
Je ne cite pas des d6cisions ant6rieures, car celles qu'on a invoqu6es sont des arr~ts d'espce, et chaque cause a sa physionomie propre.
Les pr6tentions de l'appelant ont t soutenues avec beaucoup de talent, mais je les crois mal fond6es.
Je renverrais l'appel avec d6pens.
Appeal dismissed with costs. Solicitor for the appellant: Charlemagne Rodier. Solicitors for the respondent:
Casgrain, McDougall, Stairs & Casgrain.