Harrington v. Corse

WILLIAM HARRINGTON, et al., (DE-)

*No

FENDANTS en garantie IN THE SUPE- APPELLANTS; RIOR COURT).................................

*April 19.

NORTON B. CORSE, es-qualile, (PLAIN- TIFF en garantie IN THE SUPERIOR

RESPONDENT. COURT).....................................)

ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH FOR LOWER CANADA (APPEAL SIDE).

On the 30th April, 1869, H. S. being indebted to J. 1 in the sum of $3,000, granted a hypothec on certain real estate which he owned in the city of Montreal. On 28th June, 1870, H. S. made his will, in which the following clause is to be found: "That all my just debts, funeral and testamentary expenses be paid by my executors hereinafter named as soon as possible after my death." By another clause he left to W. H. in usufruct, and to his children in property, the said immoveables which had been hypothecated to secure the said debt of $3,000. In 1879 H. S. died, and a suit was brought against the representative of his estate to recover this sum of $3,000 aud interest.

Held,-(Reversing the judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench, Strong, J., dissenting.) : That the direction by the testator to pay all his debts included the debt of $3,000 secured by the hypothec.

Per Fournier, Taschereau and Gwynne, JJ.: When a testator does not expressly direct a particular legatee to discharge a hypothee on an immoveable devised to him, art. 889 of the C. C. does not bear the interpretation that such particular legatee is liable for the payment of such hypothecary debt without recourse against the heir or universal legatee.

W.

4 12.

Bench for Lower Canada (appeal side) confirming the judgment of the Superior Court (Montreal)

An action was brought by Kate Ann Parkin against the respondent N. B. Corse, as sole surviving executor of the last will and testament of the late Hiram Seymour, for the recovery of $3,150 and interest due under an obligation of date the 80th April, 1869, given by the late Hiram Seymour to the executors of the late James Parkin, and transferred to the plaintiff Kate Ann Parkin, by which the house and premises, No. Beaver Hall, were specially hypothecated, the said obligation being duly registered. The respondent thereupon called en garantie the now appellants, special legatees under the last will and testament of Hiram Seymour, requesting them to discharge the debt, alleging that the universal legatees under Hiram Seymour's will had notified him not to pay the debt, but to claim it from the special legatees. The appellants refused to take up the fait et cause. of Corse and pleaded to this action en garantie. The following question of law was submitted to the court, viz:- Does the special legatee of an immoveable property, hypothecated by the testator for a debt of his own due at the time of his death, take the property subject to the hypothec upon it, or is the universal legatee, or legatee by general title, bound to discharge the hypothee that is, to pay the debt, when not obliged to do so by the will?

The chief point submitted to the court tarned upon the interpretation of articles 735, 740, 741 and 889 of the civil code Lower Canada.

These articles are as follows:- SUtPREMDE COURT OF CANADA.

[VOL. IX. a universal legatee.

A legatee by general title is held to contribute in proportion to his share in the succession.

A particular legatee is bound only in case of the insufficiency of the other property, and is also subject to hypothecary claims against the property bequeathed, saving his recourse against those who are held personally.

Art. 740. An heir or universal legatee, or a legatee under general title, who, not being personally bound, pays the hypothecary debts charged upon the immoveable included in his share, becomes subrogated in all the rights of the creditor against the other co-heirs or co-legatees for their share.

Art. 741. A particular legatee who pays an hypothecary debt for which he is not liable, in order to free the immoveable bequeathed to him, has his recourse against those who take the succession, each for his share, with subrogation in the same manner as any other person acquiring under particular title.

[Art. 889. If before or since the will, the immoveable bequeathed have been hypothecated for a debt of the testator remaining still due, or even for the debt of a third person, whether it was known or not to the testator, the heir, or the universal legatee, or the legatee by general title, is not bound to discharge the hypothec, unless he is obliged to do so by the will.]

A usufruct established upon the thing bequeathed is also borne without recourse by the particular legatee.

The same rule applies to servitudes.

If, however, the hypothecary debt of a third person, of which the testator was ignorant, affect at the same time the particular legacy and the property remaining in the succession, the benefit of division inay reciprocally be claimed.

R1TCHIE, C.S.:

The clauses in the will and codicils relied on are the following :

Thirdly.-That all my just debts, funeral and testamentary ex- 4i4

Harrington Hall built Harrington, Laura, And by the said codicil the said testator ratified and confirmed said last will.

. By article 919 " The Testamentary Executor pays the debts and discharges the particular legacies with the consent of the heir, or of the legatee who receives the succession, or, after calling in such heir or legatee, with the authorization of the court."

This article and article 889, read in connection with the evidence in this case, leaves in my mind no difficulty in satisfactorily determining this case without discussing the other question raised.

This places the office and duty of executors on a very different footing from that of an executor under the English law, where the absolute duty is cast on the executor of paying the debts of the deceased without any consent or authorization, and therefore while it may be said, under the English law, that a clause directing the executor to pay the debts of the testator is a mere formal one, adding nothing to the position or legal obligations' of the executor, it is, under article 919 C. C., clearly defined and affects the position and duty of the executor and imposes on him others than that obligatory by the law without such a provision, viz., absolutely to pay the debts without either consent or authorization, and that the testator intended that this was to be an absolute duty obligatory on the defendant sufficiently to relieve the immoveable be- HaINqueathed from the hypothecary debt appears from the clause read in connection with the other provisions of the will which, to my mind, very clearly indicates Ritchie,c.J. that such bequest was free from such hypothecary claim. The will shows, in no uncertain manner, in my opinion, that the daughter was to be on a par with her sisters, which could not be if this hypothecary debt wiped away the bequest to her.

Therefore there is a clear indication on the face of the will, as well as in the express words of the code, that he intended to oblige his executor to pay all his debts, including the hypothec in question, and the appeal should be allowed.

STRONG, J: was opinion that the appeal should be dismissed for the reasons given by the majority the Court of Queen's Bench.

La premibre question soulev6e en cette cause est do savoir lequel, du l6gataire universel, on du 16gataire particulier, doit, depuis 1'adoption de 1'article 889, C. C., acquitter une dette en paiement de laquelle le testateur a hypoth6qu6 un immeuble compris dans un legs particulier. 2o. D'aprbs les dispositions du testament dont il s'agit en cette cause, y a-t-il lieu de faire application au cas actuel de 1'article 889?

Avant la promulgation du Code Civil cette question ne pouvait souffrir de difficult6.

Il est indubitable que dans 1'ancien droit frangais c'6tait A 1'h6ritier on 16gataire universel a cquitter 1'hypothbque grevant une proprit6 comprise dans un legs particulier. Los codificateurs charg6s de declarer quel 6tait 1'ancien droit , ce sujet out formellement exprim6 leur opinion comme suit (1):

If a thing bequeathed by a particular title be pledged or hypothecated for a debt due by the testator, or for any other debt, which, either before or after his will, be known to affect the particular Fournier, J. legacy, the heir, or the universal legatee by general title, is bound to free it from such debt.

L'article 889 a-t-il cha*ng6 1'ancien droit sous ce rapport et impos6 au 16gataire particulier au lieu de l'h6ritier on 16gataire universel l'obligation de payer cette hypothbque ? La Cour Suprieure, si6geant A. Montreal, dont le jugement a 6t6 confirm6 par une. majorit6 de la Cour du Banc de la Reine, a d~cid cette question dans 1'affirmative.

L'article 889 -est ainsi conqu:

Si, avant le testament, ou depuis, l'immeuble 16gu6 a t bypoth&qu6 pour une dette restke due, ou mame s'il se trouve hypoth6qu6 pour la dette d'un tiers, connu ou non du testateur, 'h6ritier ou le 16gataire universel, ou & titre universel, n'est pas tenu de l'hypothque, A moins qu'il n'en soit charg6 en vertu du testament. L'usufruit constitu6 sur la chose 16gu6e est aussi supportk sans recours par le 16gataire particulier. 1 en est de mtme des servitudes. Si, copendant, 1'hypothbque pour une dette trangbre, inconnue au testateur, affecte en m6me temps le legs particulier et les biens demeur6s dans la succession, rien n'empiche que le b~nkfice de division ait lieu r6ciproquement.

Dans le cas particulier dont il s'agit il 6tait A peine n6cessaire d'entrer dans 1'examen de la premibre question, mais puisqu'elle a 6t6 soulev~e, il vaut mieux dans 1'int6r~t public qu'elle soit dscid6e de suite. Aprbs avoir non-seulement lu, mais 6tudi6 attentivement, les savantes dissertations des honorables juges de la Cour du Banc de la Reine sur cc sujet, je me suis- convaincu que les raisons donn6es par les honorables juges Tessier et Cross devaient 1'emporter sur celles .de leurs coll6gues, et je ponse, comme eux, que l'article 889 n'a (1) No. 140, p. 363, Nos. 4 et 5 des Donations testamentaires. StREME COURT OF CANADA.

[VOL. If. pas chang6 1'ancien droit A cet 6gard.

C'est encore, suivant moi, A I'hlritier ou au l6gataire universel A acquitter 'hypothbque grevant une propri6t6 comprise dans un legs particulier.

Fou ir,J.

Le testateur a, en outre,1ui-m~me d~cid& cette question par les dispositions de son testament.

Par l'article 3 de son testament il ordonne en ces termes le paiement de ses dettes:

all just Mais, objecte-t-on, cette clause est insuffisante pour d6charger le 16gataire particulier de 1'obligation d'acquitter 'hypothbque.

Les ex6cuteurs testamentaires 6tant d6jA oblig6s par la loi de payer les dettes du testateur (art. 919), cette clause est de style et n'ajoute rien aux obligations 16gales de 1'ex6cuteur, et elle n'est pas une preuve quo le testateur avait l'intention de faire payer par les l6gataires universels une dette hypoth&caire payable par le 16gataire particulier. Je ne puis adopter cette manibre de voir.

La comparaison de la disposition testamentaire au sujet du paiement des dettes avec l'article 919, semble conduire A une conclusion tout-A-fait contraire. Les pouvoirs de 1'ex6cuteur testamentaire an sujet du paiement des dettes sont tras restreints d'apras cet article. lis ne le sont aucunement d'aprbs le testament qui fait l'objet de notre examen.

En effet l'article 919 dit: dettes et consentenent VoilA bien des formalit6s auxquelles la loi assujetit I'executeur testamentaire dont les fonctions n'ont pas 6 modifi6es par une extention de pouvoir qu'il est loisible au testateur de faire suivant l'article 921. L'executeur testamentaire ordinaire ne peut done, VOL. II.] SUPREMfl COURt OF CA A1)A.

suivant Particle 919, payer ni une dette ni un legs sans avoir obtenu le consentement de 1'h6ritier on 16gataire universel; s'il ne fait pas les d6marches n6cessaires pour obtenir le consentement il est alors oblig6 de lui faire des sommations pour les appeler au paiement on du Fournier, J. moins leur en donner un avis pr6alable.

A d6faut de ces proc6d6s il doit recourir 5 l'autorisation judiciaire. Dans le cas actuel 1'ex6cuteur est en vertu de Particle 3 du testament dispens6 de recourir A toutes ces formalit6s. II a un pouvoir g~n6ral et absolu de payer les dettes et les legs sans recourir A toutes ces formalit6s. Si l'intention du testateur est 6t6 de laisser ses ex6cuteurs soumis aux restrictions 16gales, il se serait content6 de les nommer sans d6finir leurs obligations. Mais il est 6vident qu'il a voulu exercer le privilge que donne Particle 921 de " restreinde ou 6tendre les pouvoirs, les obligations et la saisine de 1'ex6cutgur testamentaire, et la dur6e de sa charge."

Lorsque 'on compare Particle 3 du testament avec la clause contenant la nomination des ex6cuteurs, il ne peut plus y avoir de doute sur la signification A donner A l'obligation impos6e dans ce cas de payer toutes les dettes.

Le testateur se dessaisit entre leurs mains de tous ses biens, tant mobiliers qu'immobiliers. II prolonge 1'exercice de leurs pouvoirs au delA de la dur6e 16gale.

leur donne le pouvoir de vendre tous ses biens immobiliers, non 16gu6s, i tels prix et conditions qu'ils croiront avantageux, et enfin le pouvoir d'administrer tous ses biens comme 4ils leur appartenaient A eux-m~mes.

Il n'6tait gubre possible de donner A des ex6cuteurs testamentaires des pouvoirs plus 6tendus que ne le comporte cette clause. Ils avaient non-seulement le devoir de payer toutes les dettes, mais ils avaient 6galement le pouvoir de -vendre toutes les propri6t6s. N'est-il pas 6vident, en prenant ensemble les deux clauses'du testament, que le testateur a soustrait I'ex6eution de ses derniares volont6s l'op6ration de la loi. Il a profit6 des pouvoirs que lui donnait Particle 921 pour faire sa propre loi aux ex6cuteurs testamentaires. Dans 1'exGOution des devoirs qu'il leur a trac6s, 'il ne Founir, a fait d'autre loi que ses volont6s, manifest6es par le testament, et il ne les a soumis, en outre, A d'autres rbgles que celles que leur dicteraient leur conscience, leur prudence et leur bon jugement, comme hommes d'affaires.

L'effet de telles dispositions 6tait 6videmment de mettre de c6t6 1'article 889, tout aussi bien que les autres articles concernant le paiement des dettes, la saisine des immeubles, la dure de 1'ex6cution testamentaire.

L'obligation de payer toules les dettes r6sultant in6vitablement du testament, peut-on distinguer entre les dettes celles qui sont garanties par hypoth6ques de celles qui ne le sont pas, lorsque le testateur n'a pas distingu6 ? A moins que la loi n'ait fait A ce sujet une distinction qui s'impose, on ne pout pas non plus faire cette distinction sans enfreindre la volont& du testateur et sans faire pour lui une distinction qu'il n'a certainement pas voulu faire.

Mais la loi fait-elle une distinction entre une dette gaiantie par hypothbque et colle qui ne l'est pas. La premibre est-elle d'une nature diff6rente de la seconde, forme-t-elle une classe distincte soumise A des principes diff6rents ? La loi ne fait aucune difference A cet egard. Une hypothique no pout pas exister par ellemime et ind6pendamment d'une dette dont elle est l'accessoire.

Elle n'est (1'hypothbque) dit le code, art. 2017, qu'un accessoire et ne vaut qu'autant que la cr6ance ou obligation qu'elle assure subsiste. II faut in6vitablement en conclure qu'en disant A ses ex6cuteurs testamentaires de payer toutes ses dettes, le testateur-dans le cas pr~sent a compris 6galement celles qui 6taient garanties par hypothbques.

oNG- En.venir A une autre conclusion serait dans le cas actuel contrevenir aux intentions du testateur; ce serait d6ranger la distribution 6quitable et, autant que les Fournier. J. circonstances le lui out permis, 6gale de ses biens entre ses enfants. . Le testateur avaitatrois filles et deux gargons. .Parmi les biens de sa succession se trouvent trois maisons situ6es au Beaver Hall Bill, Montrial, tant les Nos. 19, 21, 23.

II donne A sa fille Maria Eliza Seymour veuve de Jean Bruneau, en usufruit, la maison No. 21, et la propriUt6 A ses enfants pour 6tre partag6e par 6gales proportions. Le No. 23 est 16gu6 en usufruit h son fils U. E. Seymour et A sa femme, et aprbs leur d6chs en pleine propri6t6 ;! leurs enfants. A Laura Seymour, 6pouse, depuis d6c6d6e, de l'appelant, il l6gue la proprift6 du No. 19 pour en disposer comme bon lui semble.

A dame Charlotte Seymour, 6pouse de B.

Son fils, Melandhon H. Seymour, ayant eu par anticipation tout ce qu'il aurait en droit d'avoir dans sa succession, il lui fait en outre remise de tout ce qu'il peut lui devoir.

II donne encore A ses deux filles, Maria Eliza, veuve Bruneau, et Laura, 6pouse de

Harington, $3,000 chacune, payables apr~s la mort de leur mare.

y a un legs en faveur de cette derniare de tous les biens mobiliers contenus dans la maison No. 23. Enfin, il vent qu'aprbs la mort de son 6pouse et l'ex6cution de ses divers legs d~iment faite (and after the foregoing bequests duly made), que le r6sidu de sa succession, quel qu'en soit le montant, soit 6galement divis6 entre ses trois filles, ci-dessus-nomm6es, par parts 6gales (share and share alike), les instituant ses 16gataires r6siduaires.

J.

Il termine son testament par la clause cit6e plus haut d6finissant les pouvoirs des excuteurs testamentaires. Ce testament ne 116montre-t-il pas clairement que l'intention du testateur 6tait de regler lui-mame sa succession et de n'en rien laisser A 1'op6ration de la loi ?

Ne fait-il pas voir en mome temps a l'vidence qu'il voulait autant que possible conserver l'galit6 entre ses enfants, surtout entre ses filles, en donnant la raison pour laquelle il ne place pas Madame Heiusley sur un pied d'6galit6 (on a par) avoc ses deux autres filles.

donne encore ii chacune de ces prenibres une somme de $3,000, et, enfin, les institue toutes trois par parts 6gales 16gataires r6siduaires.

On voit aussi qu'il voulait mettre ses deux fils sur un pied d'6galit6 par la d6claration qu'il fait, que son fils, 11. I. Seymour, ayant dejA repu sa part, il lui fait remise de ce qu'il pent encore lui devoir. Peut-on croire aprbs toutes ces d6clarations, et surtout apris l'injonction formelle de payer toutes ses dettes, que le testateur avait en vue de d6ranger le partage si bien ajust6 de sa succession en laissant porter A l'un des 16gataires seul la charge d'acquitter l'obligation de $3,000, effectant une des propri6t6s 16gu6es.

Il n'y a certainement pas song6 un instant. Mais on peut dire qu'il avait pu avoir l'id6e de la difficult6 si ing6nieusement soulev6e ici, difficult6 que ne soupponnait certainement alors ni les testateurs ni les notaires.

On pourrait dire encore qu'il a pris les moyens n~cessaires de la trancher en ordonnant le paiement de toutes ses dettes comme premibre disposition de sa succession. En se mettant au point de vue du testateur on compre 4 nieux toite li port6e de cette dbclaration.

La mort de sa femme et celle do Laura, Madame Harrington, ont forc6 le testateur de modifier son testa- AS' ment par deux codicilles.

Les dispositions de ces codicilles n'affectent aucunement la signification que doit avoir dans le testament l'injonction de payer toutes Fournier, J. les dettes. Par le premier de ces codicilles il institue, en consequence du dchs de sa femme, ses deux fils 16gataires r6siduaires conjointement avec ses trois filles. Ainsi il y a maintenant cinq 16gataires r6siduaires an lieu de trois.

Par le deuxibme, en cons6quence de la mort de Madame Harrington, l6gataire en pleine proprift6 de la maison No. 19, il institue Harrington, mari de cette dernibre, l6gataire en usufruit et leurs quatre enfants 16gataires en pleine proprit6.

Ce codicille semble n'avoir pas en d'autre objet que d'6tendre la lib6ralit6 du testateur jusqu'A l'appelant, qui par le pr6d6chs do son 6pouse se trouvait A ne recevoir aucun avantage personnel dans la succession du testateur. L'id6e de rparer cette omission semble avoir 6t l'unique preoccupation da testateur.

Pensait-il par hasard que le logs de $3,000 et la part attribu6e dans le r6sidu de la succession A Madame Harrington passeraient aux enfants de cette derniare ? Malheureusement il n'en pent Atre ainsi. Ces legs sont devenus caducs par le pr6d6chs de leur mbre. II ne reste A ces petits-enfants du testateur que la proprit6 de la maison No. 19.

Qu'arrivera-t-il si la pr6tention de faire porter aux 16gataires particuliers la charge de payer seuls 1'hypothbque affectant la maison No. 19 qui leur est 16gu6e, est maintentLe ? Priv6s sans doute par pure inadvertance des deux autres legs faits A leur mbre, ils se verraient encore enlever la meilleure partie de leur legs s'ils 6taient condamn6s A payer l'hypotheque -de $3,000 affectant la maison qui leur est 16gu6e.

En recherchant dans les dispositions du testament quelle a t6 l'intention du testateur est-il possible d'en arriver a une conclusion semblable ? Rien ne me parait avoir 6t6 plus loin de 1'intention du testateur dont les dispositions repoussent toute ide d'un pareil r6sultat. Bien plus, les 16gataires universels daus ce cas n'6tant 16gataires que du r6sida de la succession aux conditions formellement impos6es par le testateur aux ex6cuteurs testamentaires, savoir : 1? paiement de toutes les dettes, 20 ex6cution de tons les legs particuliers, ne faut-il pas avant que 1'on puisse constater un r6sidn, faire d6falcation de toutes les dettes et de tons les legs particuliers.

Si los exXuteurs testamentaires saisis de tous les biens veulent ex6cuter leur mandat (trust) c'est 'opration qu'ils sont oblig6s de faire avant de remettre aux 16gataires universels le r6sida des biens. Ceci est d'autant plus 6vident que le testateur en ne d6passant son actif, assurait A son point de vue 1'ex6cution do toutes ses lib6ralit6s.

me parait, en cons6quence, clair que la nature du testament dont il s'agit rend impossible l'application au cas actuel de 1'article 889.

me semble que cette question ne pourrait gubre 6tre soulev6e quo dans un cas od le testateur n'ayant fait aucune disposition quant au paiement de ses dettes, c'est alors A la loi A r6gler ce qui ne l'a pas 6t par le testament. J'ai donn6 A cette importante question si habilement trait6e de part et d'autre dans les savantes dissertations des honorables juges qui out t6 appel6s A exprimer leurs opinions, toute l'attention qu'elle m6rite; cependant je n'ai arriver A la m6me conclusion que ces Honorables juges sur 1'interpr6tation A donner A l'art. 889, et je suis d'opinion que celle qu'ils ont adopthe ne devrait pas pr6valoir.

Je me permettrai d'ajouter que l'interpr6tation de l'art. 889 adopt6e par ha majorit6 de la Cour du Banc de la Reine ne pent manquer d'entrainer des cons6quences de la plus haute gravit6. Cette question, soulev6e en cette cause pour la premibre fois, n'a jamais attir6, que je sache, l'attention des testateurs ni des notaires.

Si cette interpr6tation devait pr6valoir que d'arrangements de famille, faits depuis la publication du code civil, vont J. tre troubl6s.

N'y aurait-il pas lieu dans ce cas A 'intervention de la 16gislature pour donner A l'interpr6tation qui paraitra la plus en harmonie avec 1'esprit du code civil, la sanction 16gislative?

HENRY, J.:- I think the intention of the testator is very clear to divide his property among his daughters, and I think the direction to the executor was merely intended to take away the right of the party in whose favour the bequest was made to call upon the heir at law to pay off the hypothec.

The effect of the law in the Province of Quebec is a little different from what it would be in other provinces. The executors in the other provinces and in England are called upon to pay the debts, while in Quebec they have nothing to do with the debts unless the testator calls upon them to do so. In this will there is a clear direction to pay all the debts, and it includes this hypothecary debt as well as the other debts. I think, therefore, the appeal should be allowed.

J. :- On both of the points urged by the appellant, I am of opinion to allow this appeal.

In addition to the cogent reasoning of Tessier and Cross, JJ., in the Court of Queen's Bench, in support of the view that art. 889 of the code does not make a particular legatee liable, without recourse, for the debt of the testator hypothecated upon the immoveable bequeathed to him, I remark that the said article of the civil code relates only to immoveables; and this not in. advertently, since art. 140 of the report of the codifiers, which it purports to amend, gives the law both as to pledge of moveables and as to hypothec of immoveables, so that clearly as to moveables, the rule is still that a debt of the testator is not payable by the particular legatee.

If, for instance, he leaves to his particular legatee a watch which, at his death, is pledged for a certain debt, this debt has to be paid by the heir or universal legatee. Have the codifiers intended that a different rule should prevail as to immoveables ? Up to the code, moveables and immoveables have certainly always been on the same footing in this respect, and there were no reasons that I can see for creating a difference between them.

I entirely concur in the reasoning of Tessier and Cross, JJ., in the Court of Appeal, and hold with them that this article does not bear the interpretation that the particular legatee is liable for the payment of the debts hypothecated on the immoveable left to him, without recourse against the heir or universal legatee.

On the other point, I am also with the appellant. I am of opinion that if, as held by the courts below, the law was now that, unless otherwise ordered by the testator, the particular legatee is liable for the debt hypothecated on the immoveable bequeathed to him, the respondent here would even then not be liable for the debt in question in this cause, because Seymour, the testator, has ordered the contrary. The clause of his will relating thereto is:

Does not this mean, nay, more, say, in as clear terms as possible, "all my debts ? " Can it be read as meaning only his chirographary and not his hypothecary debts? I cannot see upon what principle this could be done. Now, when the testator said " all my debts," we cannot make him say "not all my debts," or may be "no debt at all," for this debt in question here may be the only one the testator owed.

This debt of $3,000 Seymour had contracted on the Taseheau, 30th April, 1869.

On the 28th June, 1870, he begins . his will by ordering his executor to pay all his debts, and then makes to the respondent and others certain particular legacies.

This, it seems to me, shows not only that the testator intended these particular legacies to be free from all debts, but that he had this particular debt in his mind when he ordered his executor to pay all his debts. I cannot accede to the proposition that we may treat, as a matter of form and of no meaning whatsoever, this clause of the will by which Seymour orders the payment of his debts. I know of no rule under which we would be authorized to set at nought any part of a will under pretence that it is merely a matter of form.

This clause, like all the others, must have its execution.

If the law is, as it was before the code, that the particular legatee' is not liable for the debts of the testator, the appellant must succeed independently of this clause of the will. If, on the contrary, the law was now, as held by the courts below, that the particular legatee must pay, without recourse, the debt hypothecated upon the immoveable bequeathed to him, unless the heir or universal legatee is obliged to do so by the will, then the clause of the will ordering all the debts to be paid by the executor is far from being a clause banale. To say. that, as the law orders the executor to pay the testator's debts, this clause of

Seymour's will m:'ans nothing, seems to me to be taking for granted that it does not include the debt hypothecated on the property bequeathed to the appellant.

The law does not order the executor to pay this particular debt, if the interpretation given to the code by

Ih3 the majority of the court below is correct, but this clause of Seymour's will does it, as I read it, in as plain terms as possible.

Two arrdts of the Parlement de Paris, cited in Taun eau,Me; lin's Rep. (1), relating to the meaning of the words in a will " pay my debts," have some analogy with the present case.

In the first case the will was as follows:- " Je lbgue A Madame de Mailloc et A Madame de Buvron tout ce que je peux leur donner je les prie de faire prier ieu pour moi, payer mesdetteset rAcompensermes domestiques." Cette disposition (says Merlin) a fait naitre la question de savoir si les h6ritiers des propres devaient contribuer aux dettes. Une sentence par d6faut du chAtelet avait prononc6 l'affirmative. Mais par arrAt rendu le 22 juin 1728, cette sentence a t6 infirm~e, et il a ordonn6 que les h6ritiers jouisaient des propres sans tre tenus de contribuer A aucune dette.

The second case is given by Merlin as follows:- La dame de Talard faisant son testament, s'tait expliqu6 en ces termes: " Je veux que mes dettes soient paybes stir mes biens patrimoniaux. J'institue le prince de Rochefort l6gataire universel de tous mes sus-dits biens en toutejouissance et propri6t6, A la charge toutefois de payer les dettes de ma succession et acquitter sur les biens fonds les legs quej'ai faits." Apts sa mort, contestation entre les h6ritiers et le 14gataire universel pour la contribution aux dettes. La difficult& naissait de ce que la dame de Talard avait d'abord charg6 ses biens patrimoniaux d'acquitter les dettes, et qu'elle en avait ensuite charg6 son 16gataire universel, auquel elle ne pouvait laisser qu'une partie de ses propres. Le 16gataire universel disait que, dans de pareilles circonstances, i fallait consulter le droit commun, suivant lequel les r~serves coutumires contribuent aux dettes, avec les objets compris dans le legs universel: " Mais par sentence des requotes du palais, du 24 avril 1755, confirm6e par arrdt rendu le 17 juillet de la mome annie, sur les conclusions de M. Joly de Fleury avocat-g6n6ral, parlement de Paris a jug6 que les h6ritiers ne contribueraient pas aux dettes pour les r6serves coutumibres, et que le 16gataire universel le paierait seul."

I am of opinion to allow the appeal and to dismiss the action en garantie, with costs in the three courts against the respondent.

(1) Vo. LAgataire.

I remark that, though the registration of the obliga.

tion upon which is based the principal action is admitted at the enqudte, such registration is not alleged either in the principal' demand nor in the declaration en garantie. In the first, such an allegation was not necessary, but was it not in the second? I also remark

. that the action is upon a transfer to the plaintiff by the original creditors of the sum due by the late Seymour, and that the only signification of that transfer alleged by the plaintiff is a signification to Corse. If Corse, as held by the court below, was not liable for this sum, is the signification of the transfer upon him sufficient?

GWYNNE, J.:- Although I fully concur in the judgment of my brother Taschereau (which I have had the opportunity of seeing) upon the question which has been so fully and ably discussed by the learned judges in the courts below and by the learned counsel in their argument before us, as to the true construction of the expression in article 889 of the civil code of the Province of Quebec, namely :-" L'h6ritier ou le 16gataire universel ou A titre

" universel n'cst pas tenu de 1'hypoth6que," as it is in the French text, and " The heir or the universal legatee

"or the legatee by general title is not bound to dis- "charge the hypothec," as it is in the English text, still it is not, in my opinion, necessary that our judgment should be rested on that point, for, assuming the true construction to be that the universal legatee is not bound to pay the mortgage debt, I am of opinion that upon the other point argued the appellants are entitled to our judgment in their favor. The article provides that :

OF

[VOL. IX. the the

Reading then these words " discharge the hypotheque" as synonymous with " pay the 'mortgage debt," I am j. of opinion that the testator has, by his will, sufficiently clearly expressed his intention to be that the special legatee shall in this case enjoy the immoveable bequeathed free from all liability to pay the debt secured by hypothec upon it, for payment of which special provision is made by the will.

Construing the words used in the article as above, a somewhat similar provision is made by the English Act, 17th and 18th Vic., ch. 113, by which it was enacted that when any person should, after the 31st December, 1854, die seized of or entitled to any estate or interest in any land or other hereditaments which should, at the time of his death, be charged with the payment of any sum or sums of money by way mortgage, and such person should not, by his will, deed, or other document, have signified any contrary or other intention, the heir or devisee to whom such land or hereditaments should descend or be devised should not be entitled to have the mortgage debt discharged or satisfied out of the personal estate, or any other real estate of such person, but that the lands hereditaments so charged should, as between the different persons claiming through or under the deceased person, be primarily liable to the payment of all mortgage debts with which the same shall be charged, every part thereof, according to its value, bearing a proportionate part of the mortgage debts charged on the whole thereof.

It will be convenient to review the decisions upon this Act.

In Woolstencroft v. Woolstencroft (1) the question arose before Sir J. Stuart, V.0., whether a direction by the testator to his executors to pay all his debts out of his estate made his personal estate primarily liable for the payment of a mortgage debt charged on real estate devised by his will. The learned

Cose. Vice-Chancellor was of opinion that the mortgage debt must be paid out of the personal estate, and he stated the ground of his decision to be, that where there was a direction by the testator that his debts should be paid by his executors, that exonerated the mortgaged estate.

In the same year, but after the above decision of Sir J.

Stuart, the question arose before Vice-Chancellor Sir

W. Page Wood, in Pembrooke v. Friend under a will whereby a testator directed that all his just debts, funeral and testamentary expenses should be paid as soon as might be after his decease; but he did not direct the payment to be out of any particular fund, nor did the will contain the words that the payment was to be made " by his executors," and he devised a house which he occupied to his wife in fee. The testator had created an equitable mortgage on the house by deposit of title deeds before his death, and the question was whether or not the personal estate should pay this mortgage.

The Vice-Chancellor held -that this will contained no sufficient expression of intention of the testator that the mortgage should be paid otheiwise than under the provisions of 17th and 18th Vic., ch.

113, that is by the specific devisee of the house, and he supports this conclusion by the following language :

Woolstencroft v. Woolstencroft came up before Lord HInRNG. Chancellor Lord Campbell in appeal (1), who reversed the decision of Sir J. Stuart, V.C.

The Lord Chancellor says:

the that that part that

And Pembrooke v. Friend having been cited, the Lord Chancellor says that there the Vice-Chancellor, Sir W. Page Wood, seemed to him, merely by the observations made by him, to intend to dist inguish the decision of Sir . Stuart in Woolstencroft v. Woolstencroft from the case of Pembroke v. Friend; and the Lord Chancellor attributed no weight to the words " by my executors," used in the will in the case before him, because he held and laid down as a rule, that a testator could only signify his intention that the personal estate should pay the mortgage debt by express words, declaring that the devisee of the land mortgaged should take the land free of the debt ; that the same rule should be observed with respect to exempting the mortgaged land from the payment of the mortgage debt as was before observed with respect to exempting the personal estate, the mortgage land being by the statute made primarily liable as the personal estate had been previously ; but in Mellish v. Vallins (2), Sir W. Page Wood takes the opportunity of showing that the learned Lord Chancellor had fallen into an error in laying down the above rule, arising from a want of due appreciation of the principle upon which the rule of law that to exempt the personal estate express words to that effect must be used was established, and he held that the rule, as laid down by the Lord Chancellor, could not be of general application, and he held that a bequest of personalty, subject to the payment thereout of all the J. testator's just debts, following a devise of land in mortgage, which devise made no reference to the mortgage, sufficiently indicated the intention of the testator to be that the land should not be primarily liable to the payment of the mortgage debt, and the decree was that according to the true construction of the testator's will, the mortgage debt and interest ought to be borne by and paidout of his personal estate in exoneration of his real estate.

In Allen v. Allen (1), where a testatrix had an estate which she had herself mortgaged, and another estate which had been mortgaged by a former owner, and she devised the former for sale and payment of certain legacies, and the residue of her real and personal estate, including that which had been mortgaged by a former owner,to the defendants,directing that mortgages, debts, or other incumbrances on her residuary real and personal estate should be exclusively borne by the premises charged therewith, and that " all her debts and funeral and testamentary expenses should be paid out of her said residuary real and personal estate, Lord Romilly,

Master of the Rolls, held that the mortgage debt incurred by herself was primarily payable out of the residuary real and personal estate, and not out of the mortgaged estate.

In Newman v. Wilson (2) where a testator, by his will, devised an estate, which he had subjected to a mortgage, to his wife for life, and afterwards to four of his children and their issue, and he devised all his freehold and leasehold estates and all other his real estate, except what he otherwise devised by his will, unto trustees for sale, and he bequeathed all his personal estate to the same trustees upon trust to call in and convert, and he declared that his trustees should stand J. possessed of the monies to arise from the sale of his real estate, and from the calling in and conversion his personal estate, upon trust, in the first place, to pay his funeral and testamentary expenses and certain legacies; and it was held that the personal estate and the real estate devised in trust for sale were primarily liable to pay the mortgage debt on the estate devised to the wife for life, &c.,

In Rowson v. Harrison where a testator directed that all his just debts and funeral and testamentary expenses should be paid and discharged by his executors thereinafter named, as soon as conveniently might be after his decease, out of his personal estate, the master of the rolls, holding this case to be governed by the judgment of the Lord Chancellor in Woolstencroft v. Woolstencroft, held that this will did not indicate the intention of the testator to be that the devisee of the land mortgaged should take the land otherwise than as primarily charged with the mortgage debt; but in Eno v. Tatam Vice-Chancellor Sir J. Stuart held that a devise of personal estate, subject to the payment of the testator's debts, funeral and testamentary expenses, was a sufficient indication of intention to make the personal estate the primary fund for the payment of a debt charged upon an estate particularly devised.

The learned Vice-Chancellor there said :

Finding there that there was such intention, he came to the conclusion that the devisee of the personal estate did not take anything until she should pay the mortgage debt.

The Lord Justices, Sir J. L. Knight Bruce and Sir George Turner, upon appeal affirmed this decision, and laid down the rule that the mortgaged estates are not liable where the debts are directed to be paid out of some other fund; and Sir George Turner, referring to the observations of Lord Campbell, in Woolstencroft v.

Woolstencroft, that the same rule which was applied to exempt the personal estate, should now be applied to exempt the mortgaged estate, says that he thought that meant no more than that the intention must appear, and that if it meant that it was necessary for the expressions to show an intention, not merely to charge some other fund with the debt, but also to discharge the estate mortgaged, then he was not prepared to follow the decision;

and in Moore v. Moore, which was a case similar to

Rowson v. Harrison, the same lords justices (2), following their decision in Eno v. Tatham, overruled the decision of the Master of the Rolls, which was similar to that in Rowson v. Harrison. In Maxwell v. Hyslop Vice Chancellor Malins, who approved of Lord

Campbell's judgment in Woolstencroft v. Woolstencroft, and who says that if the Appeal Court had not decided the other way he should have gladly followed it, lays down the rule, as settled by the decisions, to be,-that whenever a testator has mortgaged his estates and, by his will provides a fund, either his residuary personal estate, or an estate devised for the purpose, or the general personal estate and other property mixed up with it, or, in other words, when he provides a fund of any description whatever for the payment of his debts, that is an indication of an intention that the land is not to be the primary fund, but that the personal estate, or the particular fund provided, is to exonerate it from the mortgage debt.

By an Act passed by the Imperial Parliament on the 25th July, 1861, 30th and 31st Vic., ch. 69, which was passed to explain the operation of 17th and 18th Vic., ch. 13, it was enacted that in the construction of the will of any person who might die after the 81st day of December, one thousand eight hundred and sixty-seven, a general direction that the debts or that all the debts of the testator shall be paid out of his personal estate, shall not be deemed to be a declaration of an intention contrary to, or other than, the rule established by the said Act, unless such contrary or other intention should be further declared by words expressly or by necessary implication referring to all or some of the testator's debts or debt charged by way of mortgage on any part of his real estate.

In Brownson v. Lawrence which came before the Master of the Rolls in 1868, after the passing of the above Act, but in which the queston arose upon the will of a testator who had died in 1860, the Master of the Rolls, after reviewing Woolstencroft v. Woolstencroft, Pembroke v. Friend and Eno v. Tatham, was of opinion that in construing the wills of testators who have died between the 31st of December, 1854 and the 1st of January, 1868, he must follow Woolstencroft v. Woolstencroft, or Eno v. Tatham, according as the words of the will in each particular case came within the exact authority of one or other of those decisions; holding the rule to be that where a testator directs his debts to be paid out of some particular fund or property, or description of property, out of which, according to the rule established by the statute, they would not be primary liable, he must be taken to signify an intention to exclude the statutory rule, but where he merely directs his debts to be paid or to be paid out of his estate generally, he does not signify an intention to exclude that rule.

In Coote v. Lowndes the testator had excluded any such conclusion as an intention that the mortgage J. debt should be paid out of the personalty, by the disposition in his will whereby he had expressly directed that the devisees in trust of his real estates should, during the minorities of the cestuique trust, receive the rents and profits, and by and out of the same keep down any annuity which might be charged on the premises, and the interest of any sum which might be charged by way of mortgage on the same premises. The alteration made in the English law upon the subject by the Imperial Statute 30th and 31st Vic. ch. 69, makes decisions under that Act inapplicable to the present case, but, if the true construction of article 889 be as for the purpose of the present discussion I have assumed it to be, then, as such a construction is at variance with the provisions of the Code Napoleon in like cases, and with the law of other countries where the civil law prevails and corresponds with the provisions of the Imperial statute, 17th and 18th Vic. ch. 118,we may have recourse to the decisions under this Act to assist us in the determination of the present question.

Now, the principle to be derived from the above English cases is that, if from any provision, express or by necessary implication, in the testator's will, we find his intention to have been that his debts generally, without any specific directions as to his mortgage debts, should be paid out of any particular fund, or part of his estate other than the mortgaged estates, such intention must prevail, and the will must be construed as imposing a primary obligation upon such particular fund, or part of his estate, for the payment of his mortgage debts (as well as his other debts) in relief of the mortgaged estates particularly devised; and for the purpose of arriving at the testator's intention upon the point, no particular form of words is necessary, but, as in all j. other questions arising under the will, the testator's intention is to be gathered from a perusal of the whole will.

Now the testator, in his will, declares his intention to De:

just In connection with this clause, and as incorporated with it, we must turn to the clause appointing the executors here referred to, which is as follows :

trusty B. into and to Now these clauses, taken together, express the clear intention of the testator to be to devise the whole of his personal estate to his named executors and to give them complete power of disposition over all of his real estate not bequeathed by the will, to enable his executors, with such particular portion of his estate, to administer his estate generally, and in the course of such administration to pay all his debts as soon as possible after his decease.

The bequeathed real estate is specially excepted from the real estate over which, in such administration of the testator's estate, his executors should have any control, and the clause operates as a ch arge of all testator's debts upon the whole of his personalty and that portion of his realty not specifically bequeathed, thus displaying a manifest intention of the testator that his bequeathed realty, of which the tenement and dwelling house in question is a part, should be exempt. The usufructuary life-estate devised to the testator's wife can plainly operate only upon the real estate excepted from the estate, over which, for the purposes of administration, control is given to the executors, and such personal estate, if any, and such real estate, over which the executors were given control, as should remain after the complete administration of the testator's estate, and consequently after the payment of all his debts.

The devise to the wife is as follows:

Then, after the death of the wife, the particular realty in question, of which the testator's intention was that his widow should enjoy during her life the complete usufructuary enjoyment, without being obliged to render an account to any person whomsoever, is devised in fee simple to one of his daughters. The fact that the testator's widow died in his life time, and that he thereupon made a codicil to his will, providing that the devisees in fee in remainder should immediately upon testator's death enter into possession of the estates by the will devised to them after the death the testator's wife, can make no difference in the determination of the question before us. Then, by the codicil made after the death of testator's daughter Laura, to whom the fee simple estate in remainder after the death of the testator's wife, in the tenement and dwelling house in question, was by the will devised, the use, usufruct and enjoyment of that tenement and dwelling-house was devised to William Harrington, husband of testator's daughter Laura, for the term of his natural life, and after his death the same was devised en pleine propridte to the four children issue of his marriage with testator's daughter Laura and to the survivors of them, in equal proportions.

And by this codicil William Harrington had as full use, usufruct and enjoyment of the property in question for the term of his natural life as the testator's widow, if she had survived him, would have had. In view of the whole will, whereby it is apparent that the testator was making provision for his wife and his children, and their issue, equally out of his estate, after the whole of his debts being first paid out of the personalty and so much of his realty as was not specifically bequeathed, I am of opinion that the testator has, by his will, expressed a manifest intention that his mortgage debts as well as his other -debts should be paid out of his personal estate devised to his executors, and out the fund created by the sale of such testator's real estate over which special power, for the purpose of administration, was given to his executors, which power could only be exercised if the personalty should prove to be insufficient, and that the mortgaged estate should not be primarily liable for the debts charged upon them. A contrary decision would, in my opinion, defeat the plain intention of the testator, as appearing in his will. The appeal, therefore, should be allowed with costs, and the judgment rendered by the Superior Court of the Province of Quebec should be reversed with costs. Appeal allowed with costs.