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Co-Operative Fire & Casualty Co. v. Ritchie et al.

[1983] 2 SCR 36 Court SCC Decision date 1983-09-27 Docket 17000 English

PartiesCo-Operative Fire & Casualty Company (Plaintiff) Appellant·Lucien Ritchie and Debra Ritchie (Defendants) Respondents

Counsel (4)
Clarence A. Beckett, for the appellant.
Norman Hill, for the respondents.
Solicitors for the appellant: Patterson, Smith, Matthews & Grant, Truro.
Solicitors for the respondents: Landry & McGillivray, Dartmouth.

Judges Ritchie, Roland Almon; Dickson, Robert George Brian; Estey, Willard Zebedee; McIntyre, William Rogers; Wilson, Bertha

Delivered by Judgment of the Court

On appeal from Nova Scotia

Subjects Insurance

Contents

Judgment of the Court

The judgment of the Court was delivered by

The Plaintiff, Cooperative Fire and Casualty Company is a party to a contract with at least one of the Defendants, Lucien Ritchie, which contract provides for a motor vehicle liability policy.
Lucien Ritchie, one of the Defendants, is a party to the contract referred to in the first paragraph herein. Lucien Ritchie is the husband to the second Defendant, Debra Ritchie. Lucien Ritchie is the registered owner of the subject automobile.
Debra Ritchie is the wife of Lucien Ritchie and was the operator of the subject automobile at the time of the automobile collision referred to hereinbelow.
The subject automobile is a 1971 Chrysler automobile. It is registered in Mr. Ritchie’s name. It was bought and paid for by Mr. Ritchie. Mr. Ritchie drove it very little. Mrs. Ritchie drove it regularly and treated it as her own with the knowledge and consent of Mr. Ritchie. It was represented by Mr. Ritchie in his application to the Plaintiff for the policy that Mrs. Ritchie was to be the principal operator and in fact she was the principal operator of the subject automobile.
The subject automobile liability policy is policy number 4604979 and was in force at the time of the automobile collision referred to hereinbelow. Mr. Ritchie was the only person throughout with whom the Plaintiff Insurance Company dealt. It was to Mr. Ritchie that the Plaintiff Insurance Company addressed itself in any letters and in any billings. Mr. Ritchie alone bought the policy and paid for it.
The automobile collision which gives rise to these proceedings occurred on the 9th day of April, 1979 at approximately 8:00 o’clock in the evening on Main Street, in the City of Dartmouth and Province of Nova Scotia.

[Page 39]

The subject automobile, collided with other automobiles and in the result Cooperative Fire and Casualty Company paid $3,478.05 to third parties who suffered damages on account of this collision. These third parties were persons who had claims, jointly and severally, against Lucien Ritchie, as the owner of the subject automobile and Debra Ritchie, as the operator of the subject automobile. The Defendants admit that these third parties would have been successful against both of the Defendants quite aside from the operation of any contract between the parties to this suit and aside from the operation of the Insurance Act. In fact these third parties did not recover judgments for their claims against the Defendants. The Plaintiff, insurance company, settled and paid the third party claims because it realized it would have to ultimately settle and pay out these claims of the third parties because of the operation of Section 98(1) of the Insurance Act.
The City Police in Dartmouth, took samples of Debra Ritchie’s breath shortly after the collision referred to hereinabove and did a chemical analysis of these samples. She was found to have approximately 205 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood. Debra Ritchie was ultimately convicted under Section 236 of the Criminal Code of Canada. The Defendants admit that at the time of the collision referred to at number 7 hereinabove Debra Ritchie was under the influence of intoxicating liquor to such an extent as to be, for the time being, incapable of the proper control of the automobile within the meaning of statutory condition number 2.
Mr. Ritchie had no reason to expect that Mrs. Ritchie would drink intoxicating liquor to such an extent as to effect her driving and then to drive. Mrs. Ritchie had a clear driving record and had never before given Mr. Ritchie any concern about driving in an intoxicated condition.

Statutes and regulations cited