Hyperlawhypertext legal database R. v. Ibanescu 2013 SCC 31

← Cases

R. v. Ibanescu

2013 SCC 31 [2013] 2 SCR 400 Court SCC Decision date 2013-05-30 Docket 34653 English

PartiesMihai Ibanescu Appellant·Her Majesty The Queen Respondent

Counsel (2)
Solicitors for the appellant: Schurman, Longo, Grenier, Montréal.
Solicitor for the respondent: Poursuites criminelles et pénales du Québec, Montréal.

Judges McLachlin, Beverley; LeBel, Louis; Fish, Morris J.; Abella, Rosalie Silberman; Rothstein, Marshall; Cromwell, Thomas Albert; Moldaver, Michael J.; Karakatsanis, Andromache; Wagner, Richard

Delivered by The Court

On appeal from Quebec

Subjects Criminal law

Contents

Reasons for Judgment — The Court

The Court — In R. v. Gibson, 2008 SCC 16, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 397, a majority of this Court — for the reasons of LeBel and Deschamps JJ. — held that straddle evidence is admissible to rebut the statutory presumption that the blood alcohol level of the accused exceeded the legal limit at the time of driving, although there was disagreement on the issue of the probative value of this evidence. In our view, a statement of a legal principle that is accepted by a majority of the Court constitutes the opinion of the Court with respect to that legal principle. This is so even if some of the members of the Court who endorse that legal principle dissent from the majority’s disposition of the appeal. Therefore, the straddle evidence in this appeal was admissible.
With respect to the probative value of the evidence, we would adopt the reasons of LeBel J. in Gibson as setting out the appropriate test.
Applying these principles, we would allow the appeal. LeBel J. in Gibson found that straddle evidence showing blood alcohol content between 40 mg of alcohol per 100 mL of blood, assuming an elimination rate of 20 mg per hour, and 82 mg, assuming an elimination rate of 10 mg, “may be capable of raising a reasonable doubt” as to whether the accused’s blood alcohol content exceeded the legal limit at the time of driving (para. 72). The straddle range in this case was almost identical to LeBel J.’s example, placing the appellant’s blood alcohol content within a range of 57 mg, assuming an elimination rate of 15 mg, and 83 mg, assuming a rate of 10 mg, at the time of driving. The trial judge who, in accordance with LeBel J.’s reasons in Gibson, weighed this evidence in the light of all of the evidence at trial, committed no legal error in finding that the statutory presumption had been rebutted. Nor did the trial judge commit any palpable or overriding errors in weighing the appellant’s other indicia of impairment (2009 QCCQ 4279 (CanLII)).
Accordingly, we would allow the appeal and reinstate the appellant’s acquittal at trial.

Cases cited