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R. v. George-Nurse

2019 SCC 12 [2019] 1 SCR 570 Court SCC Decision date 2019-02-15 Heard 2019-02-15 Docket 38217 English

PartiesHer Majesty The Queen Respondent

Counsel (7)
[1] Moldaver J. — We agree with the majority of the Court of Appeal that the circumstantial evidence presented against the appellant established a strong case to answer. In the words of the majority, which we accept, this was the “paradigm of a case to meet, far removed from ‘no case to answer’”: para. 34.
[2] That being so, it was open to the court on appeal to consider the appellant’s silence in assessing and ultimately rejecting his unreasonable verdict argument: see R. v. Noble, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 874, at para. 103.
[3] In so concluding, we note that the trial judge made it clear to the jury, on numerous occasions, that it could not consider the appellant’s failure to testify as a makeweight for the Crown’s case. In this regard, we do not endorse paras. 32 and 36 of the majority’s reasons, to the extent they may be taken as suggesting otherwise.
[4] In the result, we would dismiss the appeal.
Solicitor for the appellant: Brian Snell, Toronto.
Solicitor for the respondent: Attorney General of Ontario, Toronto.
Solicitor for the intervener: Michael Dineen, Toronto.

Judges Abella, Rosalie Silberman; Moldaver, Michael J.; Karakatsanis, Andromache; Côté, Suzanne; Rowe, Malcolm

Delivered by Moldaver J. (Abella, Karakatsanis, Côté, and Rowe JJ. concurring)

On appeal from Ontario

Contents

Reasons for Judgment — Moldaver J. (Abella, Karakatsanis, Côté, and Rowe JJ. concurring)

Moldaver J. — We agree with the majority of the Court of Appeal that the circumstantial evidence presented against the appellant established a strong case to answer. In the words of the majority, which we accept, this was the “paradigm of a case to meet, far removed from ‘no case to answer’”: para. 34.
That being so, it was open to the court on appeal to consider the appellant’s silence in assessing and ultimately rejecting his unreasonable verdict argument: see R. v. Noble, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 874, at para. 103.
In so concluding, we note that the trial judge made it clear to the jury, on numerous occasions, that it could not consider the appellant’s failure to testify as a makeweight for the Crown’s case. In this regard, we do not endorse paras. 32 and 36 of the majority’s reasons, to the extent they may be taken as suggesting otherwise.
In the result, we would dismiss the appeal.

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