The only issue before us on the appeal was whether the amendments sought to be made to the pleadings should be refused on the ground that the amended pleadings disclosed no cause of action. We decided that issue, holding that the amendments should be allowed:
[1989] 2 S.C.R. 1069. On the record before us, in the absence of evidence and given the fledgling character of actions based on aboriginal claims, we were not prepared to say that any of the defects alleged would necessarily be fatal to the claim. Since we could not conclude that the pleadings disclosed no cause of action at this stage, we dismissed the appeal and allowed the pleadings to stand. It is a settled principle that pleadings should not be rejected unless they are clearly and obviously invalid:
McNaughton v. Baker (1988), 25 B.C.L.R. (2d) 17 (C.A.);
Minnes v. Minnes (1962), 34 D.L.R. (2d) 497 (B.C.C.A.);
Hubbuck & Sons, Ltd. v. Wilkinson, Heywood & Clark, Ltd., [1899] 1 Q.B. 86 (C.A.) A refusal to allow an amendment must meet the same standard.