dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211. Bohl-Cooley opposed and cross-moved for summary judgment. Both motions were denied because of insufficient affidavits. Pretrial discovery proceedings were had and BohlCooley made another motion for summary judgment against the Authority. On the return date, Special Term refused to grant the Authority’s request for an adjournment and granted summary judgment against the Authority, signing an order at the bench. The attorney for Bohl-Cooley had previously agreed to an adjournment of the motion on a condition but withdrew the agreement the day prior to the return date. Consequently, the Authority submitted no papers in opposition to the summary judgment motion. Thereafter, the Authority, by order to show cause, brought on a motion pursuant to CPLR 5015 to vacate the judgment and to be allowed to defend the action. The motion to vacate was denied by Special Term on the ground the Authority failed to state any acceptable excuse for the default and had failed to state any defense to the complaint. The Authority appeals from denial of that motion. A party to be relieved of a judgment entered by default must show a justifiable reason for the neglect and demonstrate that there is a meritorious defense to the action (5 Weinstein-Kom-Miller, NY Civ Prac, par 5015.04; Wachtell, NY Practice under the CPLR, pp 424-425;
Fusco v Malcolm, 50 AD2d 685 ). We turn first to the question of whether the Authority has shown that it has a valid defense on the merits. The Authority contends that the only claim asserted against it in the complaint is one to foreclose a lien on the moneys owed to the general contractor; that the lien is fatally defective and that therefore a meritorious defense exists. The Authority asserts that the lien is invalid because the notice of lien, although served on the State Comptroller, was not served on the fiscal officer of the Authority pursuant to the requirements of section
12 of the Lien Law. The Authority does not contend that the additional filing with it was defective. Section
12 of the Lien Law provides, in pertinent part, as follows: "At any time before the construction or demolition of a public improvement is completed and accepted by the state or by the public corporation, and within thirty days after such completion and acceptance, a person performing work for or furnishing materials to a contractor, his subcontractor, assignee or legal representative,
may £le a notice of lien with the head of the department or bureau having charge of such construction or demolition and with the Comptroller of the State or with the £nancial ofRcer of the public corporation, or other ofRcer or person charged with the custody and disbursements of the state or corporate funds applicable to the contract under which the claim is made.” (Emphasis added.) Section
23 of the Lien Law requires that its provisions be liberally construed "to secure the beneficial interests and purposes” of the law and that a substantial compliance with its several provisions is sufficient for the validity of a lien and to give the courts jurisdiction to enforce the lien (Hawkins
v Mapes-Reeve Constr. Co., 178 NY 236 , 241;
Rockland Lake Trap Rock Co. v Village of Port Chester, 102 App Div 360 , 361-362, affd
185 NY 590 ). In the instant case there is adequate proof in the record to establish that the State Comptroller had such a connection with the funds involved so as to substantially meet the requirements of section
12. Correspondence in the record indicates that the State Comptroller was to audit the claims of the subcontractor; that the Comptroller must approve any settlement; and that the Comptroller, in fact, did not approve the loan and subsidy contract in an amount sufficient to provide the necessary funds for the work, requiring termination of the work. Indeed, the contract was abrogated because of the failure of the State Comptroller to approve the necessary funding. (See, also,