Majority
Cross appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Ellis, J.), entered November 21, 2013 in Clinton County, which, among other things, partially granted petitioner’s application, in a combined proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 and action for declaratory judgment, to annul a determination of respondent Central Office Review Committee denying his grievance.
Petitioner, an inmate at Clinton County Correctional Facility, filed a grievance asserting three complaints: improper conduct by the package room staff when he attempted to mail
“Judicial review of the denial of an inmate grievance is limited to whether such determination was arbitrary and capricious, irrational or affected by an error of law” (Matter of Hutchinson v Fischer, 112 AD3d 1245 , 1245 [2013], lv denied 23 NY3d 903 [2014] [citations omitted]; see Matter of Shoga v Annucci, 122 AD3d 1180 , 1180 [2014]). The record reflects that, after an investigation, the denial of wrongdoing by package room staff was credited, and we find no basis to overturn the denial of that aspect of the grievance (see Matter of Delgado v Artus, 93 AD3d 1041 , 1042 [2012]). The record also supports the finding that the advance request form (see 7 NYCRR 721.3 [a] [3] [iv], [v]), which petitioner submitted with his 17 addressed envelopes, did not indicate that he wanted them mailed as one package and, accordingly, they were mailed out separately before the mail room staff received his letter requesting that they be mailed as one unit.[1] As no violation of the applicable correspondence directives was established, this
* The evidence also established that, had the mail room staff received petitioner’s request to have the envelopes sent in a package as one unit in advance, it would have advised him that the mailing would have to be done through the package room.
Turning to the cross appeal, we agree with respondents’ objection to that part of Supreme Court’s judgment ordering the facility to comply with the mandates of 9 NYCRR part 7031 which, as relevant here, require the provision of notary services to prisoners within one day (see 9 NYCRR 7031.5). As this Court previously recognized, “[t]his regulation applies only to those prisoners confined in a local correctional facility’ (see, 9 NYCRR 7031.1 [a], [b] [3]), which by statutory and regulatory definition is limited to city- or county-operated places of confinement (see, Correction Law § 2 [16] [a]; 9 NYCRR 7000.1 [b] [1]) . . . [and] does not encompass [s]tate correctional facilities” (Matter of Rodriguez v Barreiro, 165 AD2d 969 , 969 [1990]). Prisoners in state facilities are entitled to “reasonable access to the services of a notary public within 72 hours of [a] request excluding weekends and holidays” and, if confined to a special housing unit, “at least two times per week” (Dept of Corr & Community Supervision Directive No. 4483 [III] [J]; accord 7 NYCRR 304.8, 330.4 [e] [8]). Here, it is significant that neither petitioner’s grievance nor the “affidavit of service” for which he sought such services required notarization (see 7 NYCRR 701.5 [a]). Mindful that the inmate grievance program “is not intended to support an adversary process” and is designed to be “simple and expeditious” (7 NYCRR 701.1 [a], [b]), we find that the facility has the discretion to assign its limited notary staff to matters that require notarization, and find no abuse in the exercise of that discretion here. Petitioner’s remaining contentions have been reviewed and determined to lack merit.
Garry, Rose and Lynch, JJ., concur.
Ordered that the judgment is modified, on the law, without costs, by reversing so much thereof as partially granted petitioner’s application; petition dismissed in its entirety; and, as so modified, affirmed.
Cases cited
- Hutchinson v. Fischer 112 AD3d 1245 at 1245 p. 1249
- Shoga v. Annucci 122 AD3d 1180 at 1180 p. 1249
- Delgado v. Artus 93 AD3d 1041 at 1042 p. 1249