Majority
In an action to recover damages for legal malpractice, the defendant Grey & Grey, LLP, appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Gazzillo, J.), dated January 16, 2015, which denied its motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (1) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against it.
Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
On September 17, 2010, the plaintiff allegedly was injured when he fell into a trench at the Hicksville Parking Facility, which was owned by the Town of Oyster Bay, while performing
Neither G&G nor the other attorney filed a timely notice of claim against the Town. Although the plaintiff commenced a proceeding for leave to file a late notice of claim against the Town which the Supreme Court granted, this Court reversed the order granting the petition and dismissed the proceeding (see Matter of Anderson v Town of Oyster Bay, 101 AD3d 708 [2012]).
The plaintiff then commenced this action to recover damages for legal malpractice against G&G and the other attorney. Prior to answering, G&G moved pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (1) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against it on the basis that documentary evidence established that it had been engaged by the plaintiff only with respect to his Workers’ Compensation claim. The Supreme Court denied G&G’s motion. G&G appeals.
“On a pre-answer motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211, the pleading is to be afforded a liberal construction and the plaintiff’s allegations are accepted as true and accorded the benefit of every possible favorable inference” (Granada Condominium III Assn. v Palomino, 78 AD3d 996 , 996 [2010]; see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83 , 87 [1994]). “A motion to dismiss a complaint based on documentary evidence ‘may be appropriately granted only where the documentary evidence utterly refutes plaintiff’s factual allegations, conclusively establishing a defense as a matter of law’ ” (Stein v Garfield Regency Condominium, 65 AD3d 1126 , 1128 [2009], quoting Goshen v Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 98 NY2d 314 , 326 [2002]; see Held v Kaufman, 91 NY2d 425 , 430-431 [1998]; Parekh v Cain, 96 AD3d 812 , 815 [2012]; Sato Constr. Co., Inc. v 17 & 24 Corp., 92 AD3d 934 , 935-936 [2012]).
“The evidence submitted in support of a [CPLR 3211 (a) (1)] motion must be ‘documentary’ or the motion must be denied” (Cives Corp. v George A. Fuller Co., Inc., 97 AD3d 713 , 714 [2012], quoting Fontanetta v John Doe 1, 73 AD3d 78 , 84 [2010]; see Attias v Costiera, 120 AD3d 1281 , 1282 [2014]; Rodolico v Rubin & Licatesi, P.C., 114 AD3d 923 , 925 [2014]). To qualify
Here, the letters sent by G&G to the plaintiff, submitted by G&G on its motion, did not constitute documentary evidence for the purpose of a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (1) (see Lindsay v Pasternack Tilker Ziegler Walsh Stanton & Romano LLP, 129 AD3d 790 , 792 [2015]; Attias v Costiera, 120 AD3d at 1283 ; Pasquaretto v Long Is. Univ., 106 AD3d 794 , 795 [2013]; Cives Corp. v George A. Fuller Co., Inc., 97 AD3d at 714 ; Jones v Rochdale Vil., Inc., 96 AD3d 1014 , 1017 [2012]). Similarly, the affirmation of one of G&G’s members was not documentary evidence for the purpose of this motion (see Lindsay v Pasternack Tilker Ziegler Walsh Stanton & Romano LLP, 129 AD3d at 792 ; Summer v Severance, 85 AD3d 1011 , 1012 [2011]).
Moreover, the documentary evidence which was submitted by G&G, the Workers’ Compensation Board Notice of Retainer and Appearance-Additional Attorney, did not utterly refute the plaintiff’s allegations, as augmented by his affidavit submitted in opposition to G&G’s motion, that G&G’s representation of him was not limited to his Workers’ Compensation claim (see Town of Huntington v Long Is. Power Auth., 130 AD3d 1013 , 1015 [2015]; Board of Educ. of Northport-E. Northport Union Free Sch. Dist. v Long Is. Power Auth., 130 AD3d 953 , 956 [2015]; Lindsay v Pasternack Tilker Ziegler Walsh Stanton & Romano LLP, 129 AD3d at 791 ; cf. Turner v Irving Finkelstein & Meirowitz, LLP, 61 AD3d 849 , 850 [2009]). This Court’s decision in Turner v Irving Finkelstein & Meirowitz, LLP ( 61 AD3d at 850 ), upon which G&G relies, is distinguishable from the
Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied G&G’s motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (1) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against it.
Dillon, J.P., Austin, Miller and LaSalle, JJ., concur.
Cases cited
- Anderson v. Town of Oyster Bay 101 AD3d 708 p. 770
- Granada Condominium III Ass'n v. Palomino 78 AD3d 996 at 996 p. 770
- Leon v. Martinez 84 NY2d 83 at 87 p. 770
- Stein v. Garfield Regency Condominium 65 AD3d 1126 at 1128 p. 770
- Goshen v. Mutual Life Insurance 98 NY2d 314 at 326 p. 770
- Held v. Kaufman 91 NY2d 425 at 430-431 p. 770
- Parekh v. Cain 96 AD3d 812 at 815 p. 770
- Sato Construction Co. v. 17 & 24 Corp. 92 AD3d 934 at 935-936 p. 770
- Cives Corp. v. George A. Fuller Co. 97 AD3d 713 at 714 p. 770
- Fontanetta v. John Doe 1 73 AD3d 78 at 84 p. 770
- Attias v. Costiera 120 AD3d 1281 at 1282 p. 770
- Rodolico v. Rubin & Licatesi, P.C. 114 AD3d 923 at 925 p. 770
- Flushing Savings Bank v. Siunykalimi 94 AD3d 807 at 808 p. 771
- Datena v. JP Morgan Chase Bank 73 AD3d 683 at 685 p. 771
- Eisner v. Cusumano Construction, Inc. 132 AD3d 940 at 942 p. 771
- J.A. Lee Electric, Inc. v. City of New York 119 AD3d 652 at 653 p. 771
- Lindsay v. Pasternack Tilker Ziegler Walsh Stanton & Romano LLP 129 AD3d 790 at 792 p. 771
- Pasquaretto v. Long Island University 106 AD3d 794 at 795 p. 771
- Jones v. Rochdale Village, Inc. 96 AD3d 1014 at 1017 p. 771
- Summer v. Severance 85 AD3d 1011 at 1012 p. 771
- Town of Huntington v. Long Island Power Authority 130 AD3d 1013 at 1015 p. 771
- Board of Education of Northport-East Northport Union Free School District v. Long Island Power Authority 130 AD3d 953 at 956 p. 771
- Turner III v. Irving Finkelstein & Meirowitz, LLP 61 AD3d 849 at 850 p. 771