Majority
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the plaintiffs appeal from (1) a judgment of the Supreme Court, Dutchess County (Rosa, J.), entered July 30, 2014, which, upon a jury verdict on the issue of liability, is in favor of the defendants and against them dismissing the complaint and awarding the defendants costs and disbursements, and (2) a supplemental judgment of the same courts entered October 15, 2014, which, upon an order of the same court dated September 4, 2014, denying the plaintiffs’ motion pursuant to CPLR 4404 (a) to set aside the jury’s verdict, awarded the defendants additional disbursements.
Ordered that the judgment and supplemental judgment are affirmed, with one bill of costs.
The plaintiffs commenced this action to recover damages for personal injuries that the injured plaintiff, Charles Aitcheson, allegedly sustained when, as he was driving in the southbound lane of Route 22 in Dutchess County, the front driver’s side of his pickup truck struck the rear corner of the passenger side of a dump truck owned by the defendant Town of Dover and operated by the defendant William Lowe. Prior to the commencement of the jury trial, the defendants moved, in limine, to preclude the introduction of a computer-generated animation
“The Supreme Court has broad discretion in determining the materiality and relevance of proffered evidence” (Caplan v Tofel, 58 AD3d 659 , 659 [2009]; see People v Scarola, 71 NY2d 769 , 777 [1988]; Gurgenidze v Vitale, 44 AD3d 900 , 901 [2007]; Klempner v Leone, 277 AD2d 287 , 288 [2000]). Here, contrary to the plaintiffs contention, the Supreme Court did not err in excluding the plaintiffs’ proposed computer-generated demonstrative evidence without first permitting an offer of proof on the record. In their application during trial, the plaintiffs did not set forth any grounds for admission of the demonstrative evidence that they had not presented in their prior motions (cf. Sargente v Mobarakai, 129 AD3d 818 , 819 [2015]). In any event, even if the court erred in this regard, reversal would not be warranted, as there is no indication that the court’s refusal to hear an offer of proof prejudiced a substantial right of the plaintiffs or that admission of the computer-generated demonstrative evidence would have had a substantial influence on the result of the trial (see CPLR 2002; Nestorowich v Ricotta, 97 NY2d 393 , 401 [2002]; Sargente v Mobarakai, 129 AD3d at 819 ; Deandino v New York City Tr. Auth., 105 AD3d 801 , 803 [2013]; Geary v Church of St. Thomas Aquinas, 98 AD3d 646 , 647 [2012]; Division Seven, Inc. v HP Bldrs. Corp., 58 AD3d 796 , 797 [2009]).
Dillon, J.P., Dickerson, Duffy and Connolly, JJ., concur.
Cases cited
- Caplan v. Tofel 58 AD3d 659 at 659 p. 849
- People v. Scarola 71 NY2d 769 at 777 p. 849
- Gurgenidze v. Vitale 44 AD3d 900 at 901 p. 849
- Sargente v. Mobarakai 129 AD3d 818 at 819 p. 849
- Nestorowich v. Ricotta 97 NY2d 393 at 401 p. 849
- Deandino v. New York City Transit Authority 105 AD3d 801 at 803 p. 849
- Geary v. Church of St. Thomas Aquinas 98 AD3d 646 at 647 p. 849
- Division Seven, Inc. v. HP Builders Corp. 58 AD3d 796 at 797 p. 849