Majority
Appeal by the defendant from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Gerald, J.), dated June 10, 2015, which, after a hearing, designated him a level three sex offender pursuant to Correction Law article 6-C.
Ordered that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
The Supreme Court did not err in denying the defendant’s request for a downward departure to risk level two. A defendant seeking a downward departure from the presumptive risk level has the initial burden of “(1) identifying, as a matter of law, an appropriate mitigating factor, namely, a factor which tends to establish a lower likelihood of reoffense or danger to the community and is of a kind, or to a degree, that is otherwise not adequately taken into account by the [Sex Offender Registration Act: Risk Assessment Guidelines and Commentary; hereinafter Guidelines]; and (2) establishing the facts in support of its existence by a preponderance of the evidence” (People v Wyatt, 89 AD3d 112 , 128 [2011]; see People v Gillotti, 23 NY3d 841 , 861 [2014]; People v Wallace, 144 AD3d 775 [2016]). If the defendant “surmounts the first two steps, the law permits a departure, but the court still has discretion to refuse to depart or to grant a departure” (People v Gillotti, 23 NY3d at 861 ; see People v Wyatt, 89 AD3d at 128 ).
Here, the defendant failed to sustain his burden of proof in support of his request for a downward departure. The mitigating circumstances identified by the defendant either were adequately taken into account by the Guidelines, or were not proven by a preponderance of the evidence (see People v Velasquez, 145 AD3d 924 [2016]; People v Rossano, 140 AD3d 1042 , 1043 [2016]; People v Sanchez, 138 AD3d 946 , 947 [2016]; People v Santiago, 137 AD3d 762 , 764 [2016]). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied the defendant’s request for a downward departure and adjudicated him a level three sex offender (see People v Rukasov, 132 AD3d 748 [2015]; People v Nethercott, 119 AD3d 918 [2014]).
In light of our determination, we need not address the defendant’s remaining contention.
Balkin, J.P., Sgroi, Cohen and Duffy, JJ., concur.
Cases cited
- People v. Morrell 139 AD3d 835 at 836 p. 804
- People v. Palacios 137 AD3d 761 at 762 p. 804
- People v. Wyatt 89 AD3d 112 at 128 p. 804
- People v. Gillotti 23 NY3d 841 at 861 p. 804
- People v. Velasquez 145 AD3d 924 p. 804
- People v. Rossano 140 AD3d 1042 at 1043 p. 804
- People v. Sanchez 138 AD3d 946 at 947 p. 804
- People v. Santiago 137 AD3d 762 at 764 p. 804
- People v. Rukasov 132 AD3d 748 p. 804