Majority
Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Sullivan County (LaBuda, J.), rendered September 17, 2014, upon a verdict convicting defendant of the crimes of predatory sexual assault (two counts), predatory sexual assault against a child (two counts) and incest in the first degree.
When this case was previously before this Court, we dismissed count 7 of the indictment as duplicitous, reversed defendant’s convictions on counts 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the indictment and remitted the matter to County Court for a new trial ( 116 AD3d 1090 , 1093 [2014]).[1] Following a retrial, defendant was convicted of two counts of predatory sexual assault, two counts of predatory sexual assault against a child and incest in the first degree. Defendant was thereafter sentenced to an aggregate prison term of 50 years to life and 25 years of post-release supervision. Defendant now appeals.
We affirm. Defendant’s initial contention that he was denied his right to a fair trial as a result of the inadequacy of the admonitions that County Court provided to the jury throughout the trial was not adequately preserved for our review as he failed to render a timely objection before County Court (see CPL 270.40, 310.10 [2]; 470.05 [2]; People v Bonaparte, 78 NY2d 26 , 31 [1991]; People v Irby, 140 AD3d 1319 , 1323 [2016], lv denied 28 NY3d 931 [2016]; People v Dashnaw, 37 AD3d 860 , 862 [2007], lv denied 8 NY3d 945 [2007]). In any event, although County Court’s admonishments to the jury were less than complete (see CPL 270.40), considered in the aggregate, we would find, if the issue were properly before us, that County Court’s admonishments “adequately conveyed to the jury its
* Defendant’s initial trial resulted in a deadlocked jury. During that trial, count 1 of the indictment was dismissed.
Defendant next contends that County Court erred in denying his request to redact certain hearsay information from the pre-sentence investigation report (hereinafter PSI), namely, a statement by his mother alleging that he had engaged in certain additional uncharged instances of sexual abuse. Notably, defendant does not challenge the judgment of conviction on this basis, as he acknowledges that County Court did not rely on this statement in imposing sentence; rather, he argues that, to the extent that this statement has the potential to result in future prejudice should he subsequently be considered for parole and/or to the extent that it may negatively effect his risk level classification, the statement should have been redacted.
“The purpose of a presentence investigation is to provide the court with the best available information upon which to render an individualized sentence” (People v Thomas, 2 AD3d 982 , 984 [2003] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted], lv denied 1 NY3d 602 [2004]), which includes information that may otherwise be inadmissible at trial (see People v Paragallo, 82 AD3d 1508 , 1509 [2011]). Indeed, where a PSI contains “clearly erroneous information,” such information should be redacted based upon the “unjustifiable risk of future adverse effects to [the] defendant” (People v Freeman, 67 AD3d 1202 , 1202, 1203 [2009]; see People v Taylor, 118 AD3d 1044 , 1048 [2014], lv denied 23 NY3d 1043 [2014]). However, a PSI “may include any relevant information on the history of the defendant. . .[,] even offenses for which he [or she] has not been convicted” (People v Whalen, 99 AD2d 883 , 884 [1984]; accord People v Paragallo, 82 AD3d at 1510 ; see People v Jones, 77 AD3d 1178 , 1179 [2010], lv denied 16 NY3d 832 [2011]). Here, inasmuch as defendant was provided with an opportunity to challenge the hearsay statement set forth in the PSI and, given the fact that County Court elected not to give any weight to the statement in question, under the circumstances, we find no basis upon which to redact the PSI (see People v Thomas, 2 AD3d at 984 ).
We likewise find without merit defendant’s contention that the sentence imposed upon his retrial was harsh and excessive or the product of vindictiveness. The fact that the sentence imposed after trial has greater than the one offered during plea negotiations is not, standing alone, proof that defendant was penalized for exercising his right to trial (see People v Martinez, 144 AD3d 1326 , 1327 [2016], lv denied 28 NY3d 1186
Devine, Clark, Mulvey and Rumsey, JJ., concur.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
Cases cited
- People v. Russell 116 AD3d 1090 at 1093 p. 1432
- People v. Bonaparte 78 NY2d 26 at 31 p. 1432
- People v. Irby 140 AD3d 1319 at 1323 p. 1432
- People v. Dashnaw 37 AD3d 860 at 862 p. 1432
- People v. Williams 46 AD3d 585 at 585-586 p. 1433
- People v. LaDuke 140 AD3d 1467 at 1470 p. 1433
- People v. Thomas 2 AD3d 982 at 984 p. 1433
- State v. Paragallo 82 AD3d 1508 at 1509 p. 1433
- People v. Freeman 67 AD3d 1202 at 1202, 1203 p. 1433
- People v. Taylor 118 AD3d 1044 at 1048 p. 1433
- People v. Whalen 99 AD2d 883 at 884 p. 1433
- People v. Qoya Jones 77 AD3d 1178 at 1179 p. 1433
- People v. Martinez 144 AD3d 1326 at 1327 p. 1433
- People v. Martinez 26 NY3d 196 at 199 p. 1434
- People v. Casanova 152 AD3d 875 at 879 p. 1434
- People v. Hughes 93 AD3d 889 at 891 p. 1434
- People v. Alford 65 AD3d 1392 at 1394-1395 p. 1434
- People v. Alford 14 NY3d 846 p. 1434